PJ 107
CHAPTER 1

REC #2 HATONN

TUE., AUG. 9, 1994 11:09 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 358
TUE., AUG. 9, 1994
We are going to continue straight away with more on The Usurpers, specifically Clark Clifford.

I need to tell you that Rick has done a lot of investigating and is now told that Medford Evans is deceased. We will find a way to take his work and update it FOR him when Jackson is free to do so. That was a major project requested be done, by Jackson, and we honor that intent. Men give their lives to their nation and citizens only to pass on before realizing the value of their service. May we begin to allow these past pioneers in truth never to be lost to the memory and honor of mankind.

THE USURPERS, Part 14
by Medford Evans
Western Islands (publishers), Belmont, Massachusetts 02178,
1968.
CLARK CLIFFORD
Patriots everywhere were heartened last fall to learn that Sec­retary of Defense McNamara was going to leave the post of Secretary of Defense. Even if the World Bank job means a promotion into the stratosphere, it was welcome news that we would be rid of his disarming guile down here in the tropo­sphere where we have to breathe. We breathed more easily in the Holiday Season of 1967. The interval between McNamara's promised resignation and the appointment of his successor was like a political bombing pause.

Then on January 19, 1968, just four days before the Pueblo incident, the President named to succeed McNamara the fabu­lous Washington lawyer and adviser of Presidents, Clark Clif­ford. Some who know something about Clifford felt a little chill when they heard the news. Johnson's dilemma was that if he chose somebody as disarming as McNamara, then the defense situation would continue to deteriorate; but if he chose someone who looked like an improvement then Johnson himself would stand to benefit politically.

Clifford is what they call personable. It is startling, and somehow not reassuring to think of the sinister Walt Rostow, Abe Fortas with his lidded toughness and glabrous Dean Rusk being joined by someone who looks like a gentleman.

Clark Clifford not only looks like a gentleman, he quite obvi­ously is one. Then how explain his intimate association with Johnson? How explain that he got his start to power as an aide to Harry Truman?

Clifford is evidently more than just a gentleman. Cardinal Newman has explained that a hero need not be a gentleman, and certainly the converse holds, that a gentleman need not be a hero. Clark Clifford must be something of both. He endured Harry Truman, he endures Lyndon Johnson, for a reason. David Lilienthal [H: Not to be confused with Alfred M. Lilienthal of whom we will speak later on a different subject, the paradox of anthropological fact--regarding Christians, Hebrew-Israelites, Jews and bloodline.] has revealed in his Journals some of Clifford's feelings and thoughts about Truman that Clifford himself, being a gentlemen, would never have published. That he told Lilienthal what he felt and thought about his White House boss does not mean he was no gentle­man; it simply means that he was not a completely loyal friend to Truman, though it seems altogether possible that Truman thought he was loyal. You are not to suppose that Clifford said anything crude about the President; he simply told Lilienthal things which tended to confirm reservations that the AEC, for­mer TVA chairman already had about the man from Indepen­dence. "Some of these things", Lilienthal writes, "go, or may go, beyond what I had in mind, and may confirm the feeling of quite a few liberals that Truman does not understand the world at all, and is no liberal by any definition". (Journals, Vol. II, p. 434.) This conversation took place December 9, 1948, a little over a month after the legendary victory of Truman over Dewey, which we now understand Clifford engineered. Apparently he wasn't very proud of himself. "Clark seemed tired and very thoughtful", writes Lilienthal:

He spoke in a worried tone--quite unusual for him--about the conflict within the President's own political family about future policy... spoke of the awful exhibition one sees around the White House of self-seeking, etc.... spoke of the dangers of being in the midst of such great power and influence, and its effect on people, adding, "Every once in a while I notice it in myself, and I try to drag it out in the open".

I don't think Clifford meant to drag it out in the open as completely as Lilienthal has done. Perhaps Clark Clifford will remember in 1968 the ethical worries he had after engineering a Democratic victory in 1948, and vowing not to do that again! But the signs are not hopeful.

After Truman's victory Clifford moved to a penthouse suite across Lafayette Square where he made $500,000 a year selling his knowledge of the executive branch in general and the White House in particular--all based on the most intimate association with Harry Truman. Even a gentleman has to eat.

For all his suavity and finesse, Clark Clifford is as American as the Cardinals. His father was an official of the Missouri Pa­cific Railroad, an uncle on his mother's side was editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. One has the feeling that Clifford, who took
his law degree at Washington University in St. Louis, is a rare type--a financially and intellectually qualified American who didn't go to an Ivy League university simply because he had too much youthful aplomb to care whether he went to one or not. As always with a gentleman, the ability to forgo such an advantage with composure is worth more than the advantage itself. He married a Miss Kimball, of Boston, whom he met on a European tour. Along with such elegant Yankee connections Clifford perfected what a writer for The New York Times Maga­zine calls an "old-school Southern manner", which indeed is as typical of one side of St. Louis as Anheuser-Bush is of another. One of his most important friends was James K. Vardaman Jr., son of the "racist" Mississippi governor and United States Sen­ator. Throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s Clifford prac­ticed law in one of the best firms in St. Louis. The Clifford name was added as a partner in 1938. Depression was some­thing that happened to other people. Clifford worked hard; he was able to work hard. He was a success; he was a family man, with three children.

Clifford's big break, like that of many another American, most of them not so lucky, came during World War II. His wife and children gave him draft deferment, but in 1944 he ap­plied for and got a commission in the Naval Reserve, Lieu­tenant, Junior Grade. Staff work in supply on the West Coast got him to Lieutenant Commander by the end of the war. Then, after the war he made it to Captain. Perhaps his acquaintance with Vardaman had helped. Vardaman had gone to Annapolis, but was a graduate of Millsaps College in Jackson, and had served in the Army in World War I (he was twelve years older than Clifford) had received a commission in the U.S. Naval Re­serve in 1939 and quickly advanced to Commodore--the equiv­alent of Brigadier General--was in charge of the St. Louis Office of Naval Intelligence at the time the United States entered World War II. With courage and competence reminiscent of his father, who had made a fighting name for himself in the Spanish-American War, Vardaman racked up an impressive combat record from North Africa to Okinawa, and in May 1945 was recognized by his friend Harry Truman and made Naval Aide to the President. Vardaman in turn had Clark Clifford assigned as aide to the Aide, and on Vardaman's elevation in January 1946 to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Clif­ford became Truman's Naval Aide. This position was con­verted, when the youngish lawyer donned "civvies" again to the post of Special Counsel to the President. In this role he made a little history.

The first thing of importance which, at Truman's request, Clifford undertook when settled in the White House in 1946 was to write the first bill unifying the armed services of the United States. On the face of it, this seems like an estimable thing, suffering no whit from the fact that more than twenty years later he would succeed to the enormously powerful office of Secretary of Defense created in his own legal imagination in 1946-1947. The Clark Clifford of 1946 was helped in his job of drafting a mili­tary unification bill by the fact that he had so recently been a Navy Captain. This was a help because it was the Navy which opposed unification of the services. The Navy could see the Army taking over, absorbing the Marine Corps and Naval Air, keeping the Air Force, taking every advantage of the largely landlubber civilian population's tendency to use the very word "army" as a synonym for the armed services as a whole.

The Army could see the same thing. The Army liked what it saw. At least General Marshall did. George Marshall, World War II Chief of Staff for the Army, had made his position clear at a luncheon May 9, 1945, at the home of the then Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, where Admiral Ernest J. King and Presidential adviser Harry Hopkins were also present. Accord­ing to Forrestal's published Diaries, Marshall said that he was "unshakably committed to the thesis of a single civilian Secre­tary with a single military Chief of Staff". Truman was putty in Marshall's hands, and in December 1945 sent a message to Congress asking for the kind of unification the Army wanted, or the kind Marshall said it wanted. Congressional and public de­bate over unification lasted a year and a half. In the Summer of 1946 Forrestal threatened to resign. His objection was to "the Army's view of a single Department, a one-man boss or nabob who is to be the supreme military civilian in the government". (The Forrestal Diaries, p. 202.)

Interestingly enough, the first Secretary of Defense to be­come in fact such a "nabob" was McNamara. But that kind of idea was evidently in Marshall's mind all along. What Forrestal calls the "Army view" was the view of Marshall and company. And Marshall's "company" was not limited to Army men. Plenty of Army men would have been glad to leave the Navy be.

Nevertheless, at the top echelons the Army represented the push for a consolidated command of all services, the Navy stood for autonomy of the services with new machinery for co­ordination. All this was parallel with the age-old political strug­gle between central government and states' rights. Some kind of compromise was inevitable if any unification legislation was to get through Congress; the passing of the first unification law in 1947, setting up the "National Military Establishment" depended on concessions to the Navy. Not the least concession was marking Navy Secretary Forrestal down for the proposed job of Secretary of Defense. This was in no sense a bribe in Forre­stal's mind, for he had no personal reason to want a job, the burden of which he could anticipate better than perhaps anyone else. It was some kind of advance reassurance to the Navy and everyone else who feared overcentralization. For all who knew Forrestal knew that he would not use the office to build an em­pire, would not be totalitarian in his methods, would not act from any motive but patriotism. And perhaps it was for this that he finally had to die--or be killed.

A far less conspicuous bit of inducement for the Navy was the fact that Clifford, so recently, if briefly, a Navy Captain, was selected as the lawyer to draw up the bill. Few people, in­cluding Congressmen, actually read proposed legislation. But people who consider themselves somewhat on the "inside" like to know who is really back of a bill, and who is writing it, and then they feel ready to make a decision on it. Truman said in September 1946 that he was going to have the bill "drawn in his office by Clark Clifford and Admiral Leahy". (The Forrestal Diaries, p. 204.) With that, and the eventual word that Forre­stal would be the top civilian over all the military, how could the Navy and its friends hold back?

It would be an absurd oversimplification to suppose that Clark Clifford or anyone else in 1946-1947 foresaw how the unification plan of 1947 and the second reorganization of 1949, which changed the name "National Military Establishment" to "Department of Defense", could lead to the school-teacherish, anti-military civilian establishment which is the Pentagon of the 1960s. We have had nine Secretaries of Defense these past twenty-one years. The first one, Forrestal, was frustrated and destroyed--partly perhaps, because of his critical position on Palestine, in which he clashed with, among others, Clifford; but mainly, no doubt, because of his militant anti-Communism. in which he clashed with all the crypto-Communists; but also partly because he was simply alien to the trend toward a purely "businesslike" control of the armed services.

A businessman himself, Forrestal knew that a sovereign na­tion is not just a merchant. A businessman, as such, has to deal with somebody. A businessman figures it is bad business to fight. He must deal. Now this philosophy is all right in the business world. It is a valuable adjunct in the supply functions of the military. But it is fatal in a commander of fighting men. There was historically tragic irony in Truman's message to Congress on unification in December 1945. He said so truly that "the future peace of the world will depend in large part upon whether or not the United States... is willing to maintain the physical strength necessary to act as a safeguard against any future aggressor". And at the time he said this, Truman was actually launching a reorganization of our armed services based on ideas of the financial, legal, and intellectual Establishment which could only destroy all fighting spirit, and based on ideas which did actually lead, eventually, to the reductio ad absurdum of a modern manager, Robert McNamara. McNamara would not fight anybody except American generals and admirals, and he fought them to keep them from fighting anybody else. He may have regarded Vietnam as a safety valve--the generals and admirals could fight a containment war against the Viet Cong and Ho Chi Minh without actually getting anywhere. The es­sential thing was not to fight Russia, but to deal. And to help the deal, disarm.

We cannot say that Clark Clifford anticipated in 1946-1947 that there would be a McNamara in 1961-1968. But the unifi­cation bill which he drafted was in historical fact the legal foundation for a defense establishment which, while appealing to economy and the need for preventing aggression, has actually for twenty years cost ever-increasing billions of dollars. At the same time it has either retreated before aggression, as in Central Europe and Cuba, or fought just enough to make the Communists look good, as in Korea and Vietnam.

And whatever Clark Clifford could foresee in 1946-1947, he could see everything that was happening during the McNamara years of 1961-1968, and by his position as intimate adviser to both Kennedy and Johnson he shared responsibility for the whole McNamara fiasco. The extent of that fiasco is yet to be fully revealed, but it includes more than enough American hu­miliations--from the Bay of Pigs to the capture of the Pueblo.

"The New Defense Secretary Thinks Like the President", is the title of an article in The New York Times Magazine (Jan. 28, 1968) about Clark Clifford. If that is so, and if Clifford has been the intimate adviser that all say he has been, then he must share responsibility with Johnson for McNamara's record. McNamara has contained, confused, frustrated, and in global terms neutralized the most expensive armed services in history (it would be absurd to go on calling them "the most powerful armed services"). Power is as power does, and the U.S. Navy does not protect itself even against North Korea.

The operational disarmament of the United States is a long and intricate process. It will not be complete until our nuclear stockpiles have been transferred to the custody and for the use of the United Nations Peace Force. To that end a community of politically-oriented scientists and scientifically suggestible politi­cians have labored for years. and still labor. M. Stanton Evans, who calls them "The Disarmament Lobby" and has skillfully an­alyzed them in his book The Politics of Surrender, made the following summary statement on the Manion Forum in January 1968:

Our disarmament theoreticians hold to the idea that there is a balance of terror in the Cold War in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are open to strate­gic attack. The theoreticians think, surprisingly, that this is a good thing. They like for both sides to be exposed to attack because this creates the right psychological climate for disarmament negotiations--as long as everybody is scared to death of being blown up by nuclear weapons, there will be much more public receptivity to the idea of getting disarmed.

We must realize that all of this constitutes a campaign in the field of psychological warfare--war by the "Disarmament Lobby" against the American public. It is in the minds of the public that the theoreticians want "both sides to be exposed to attack". Actually, it is not conceivable that either side is really exposed to nuclear attack--unless the American military should get out of control! The "theoreticians" whom Evans mentions (Jerome Wiesner and Walt Rostow are probably the two most important) depend, successfully to date, on firm control of the generals and admirals from the E ring of the Pentagon, or from the White House. While that control lasts, there will be no nu­clear holocaust. (At this point I seem to be arguing for the con­trol, since I am certainly as much against a nuclear holocaust as either Norman Cousins or Bertrand Russell but read on).

No other country will attack the United States with nuclear weapons, for that would risk possible retaliation from our incal­culably superior stockpile. At the same time it has long been psychologically and politically impossible for the United States to attack any other country with nuclear weapons.

For twenty years our armed services have been in an impos­sible situation. The Pueblo incident is a glaring illustration, and easy to see because it is so small a part of the whole picture. When our "trawler" was threatened it would have been natural for fighting craft--ships and planes--to come to its rescue. Two things prevented such a logical solution: (1) The Pueblo was under the personal command of Robert McNamara, the antimil­itary Secretary of Defense 7,000 miles away in Washington, so that regular Navy and Air Force commanders were not autho­rized to interfere with whatever was going on, and (2) fighting planes within striking distance when the word was finally re­ceived were armed exclusively with nuclear weapons, but nuclear weapons cannot be used for any purpose without explicit orders from the President.

Jack Anderson, of all people, wrote from Seoul, February 7, 1968, "The nuclear armaments, of course, give these few fight­ers tremendous firepower. In theory, this is supposed to provide our 50,000 ground troops in Korea with adequate air protection and still free a maximum number of planes to fight in Vietnam".

In theory. In practice, however, a plane which is armed only with nuclear weapons when nuclear weapons are effectively prohibited is an unarmed, or disarmed plane!

Throughout the world, our Army, Navy, and Air Force are as helpless in a major crisis as is a policeman or National Guardsman in a riot who has been given strict orders not to fire, or to fire only blanks.

The basic authority for maintaining our armed services in this impossible situation goes back twenty years to the Truman Ad­ministration, to a historic decision made in the White House in July 1948 by Harry Truman himself--at a time when Clark Clif­ford was Truman's other self, his alter ego. From June to November 1948 Clifford's influence with Truman was at a peak. This was no accident. Patrick Anderson, in The New York Times Magazine for January 28, 1968, tells how "Clifford emerged as the leader of a group of liberals within the Adminis­tration who met weekly to plan how they could influence Tru­man's course of action". Oscar Chapman and Leon Keyserling were in the group, certainly qualified Liberals. Anderson quotes Clifford directly:

The idea was that six or eight of us would try to come to an understanding among ourselves on what direction we would like the President to take on any given issue. Then, quietly and unobtrusively [it's such a help to be a gentleman!], each in his own way, we would try to steer the President in that direction. Most of the Cabinet and the Congressional leaders were urging Mr. Truman to go slow, to veer a little closer to the conservative line. ...
Well, it was two forces fighting for the mind of the Presi­dent, that's really what it was. It was completely unpubli­cized, and I don't think Mr. Truman ever realized it was going on (Italics added).

An appalling confession, but very instructive. The President of the United States, sitting there in the limelight, and all these psychological warfare guerillas "quietly and unobtrusively" try­ing to ambush his mind! Sort of makes you think of wolves cir­cling the campfire.

Well, Clifford and his group won, as Clifford's key role in the election campaign was to prove. What you and I are con­cerned with right now is that it was just at the peak of Clark Clifford's ascendancy over Truman that Truman effectively dis­armed the armed services of the United States of the nuclear weapons which, ever since, they have needed more and had less chance to use. As Doctor Julius Robert Oppenheimer so aptly said, "An atomic bomb which you do not use is of no use to you".

Truman's unreasonable decision was made in response to a very reasonable request from Secretary of Defense Forrestal. The Summer of 1948 was the summer of the first Berlin crisis, when the Soviets closed off ground access to West Berlin, and in due course the United States and Great Britain responded with the famous airlift of necessary daily supplies. For a time there was intense fear of general war--not "nuclear holocaust", for the legend of Soviet nuclear capability had not yet been born, but massive land warfare with countless Red Army divisions over­running Western Europe unless the United States could deter them with a "credible" threat of using the atomic bomb. It was well known that, having demobilized so frantically after World War II, we had in the Summer of 1948 little military strength except the atomic bomb, then deliverable by B-29 bombers. What was not well known, but was a fact, was that we had little or no atomic strength either, for the nuclear production lines which would by the mid 1950s give us U-235 and plutonium in great abundance, and a variety of bomb mechanisms to utilize these materials, were in 1948 the disorderly playthings of Left-oriented or pacifist-minded scientists.

Still, even a marginal atomic stockpile was, in the world of 1948, an immensely formidable resource--if its use could be credibly threatened. And it could be. The interminable propa­ganda about fallout and holocaust, through it had been pouring out of the laboratories and off the presses for three years, had had almost no effect as yet on the public consciousness. In September 1948 some twenty leading newspaper publishers of the nation met at the home of the late Philip Graham with Sec­retary Forrestal, General George Marshall (who was then Sec­retary of State), General Omar Bradley, Robert A. Lovett, and Chip Bohien to talk about the Berlin crisis. Forrestal recorded in his diary that there was "unanimous agreement that in the event of war the American people would not only have no ques­tion as to the propriety of the use of the atomic bomb, but would in fact expect it to be used." (The Forrestal Diaries, p. 488.)


CHAPTER 2

REC #1 HATONN

WED., AUG. 10, 1994 9:40 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 359

WED., AUG. 10, 1994

JUST HOLD A LITTLE LONGER, FRIENDS
Well, the interesting barrage of material has surfaced from Mr. Green et al. regarding many things--but interestingly enough the 2.5 million dollars pledged to FIGHT THESE CASES AGAINST "THEM" IS IN POINT!

At this time I think you can all understand that we have now ac­quired three sources who offer that kind of loan for funding le­gal fees. I DID NOT SAY TO PAY OFF OPPONENTS--I SAID FOR "LEGAL DEFENSE". As a matter of fact, the funds were to be stored in the Institute and backed by gold as are all funds and notes--but at present it is not yet put anywhere until the hounds are pulled off.

Mr. Horton (of Green) is pulling every dirty legal trick in the book to get a default judgment regarding the gold--WHILE THE INSTITUTE IS WITHOUT ATTORNEY SUPPORT. I THINK THERE ARE ABOUT TO BE SOME BIG SURPRISES!

Mr. Green tells "everyone" that he placed the gold he took with the court. NO, he was ORDERED to deliver the gold to the court and, as a matter of fact, the Institute is paying the costs of the gold for holding, in the court. That should tell all of you WHO the gold actually belongs to--and it is not Mr. Green.

CONTACT
What is planned for little "Contact"? LOTS! Our little handful of people cannot handle such a massive chore as publishing this paper--solely. The plans are, readers, to (not us) set up an en­tire network which will allow publication on a regular basis (timing to be established) in EVERY major city, Canada, Mex­ico and points of the four directions. Cmdr. Russbacher is al­ready making arrangements for connection in Europe and Mr. Jackson and colleagues (some of them from the Committee it­self) HERE. Remember that Capt. Russbacher was set free yesterday. It does not mean that he was sitting doing nothing while waiting. He is exactly WHO he claims to be, AS IS RONN JACKSON. They simply have not (wisely so) adver­tised!!

Will the miserable assaults sustained by Dharma, etc., be worth the results? No--because no results can ever heal completely the scars of these battles and insults against the being. The soul is not injured so all else is of little consequence in your journey--but the lessons had to be confronted and learned--and experience is often the ONLY REAL teacher. But no--in the physical ex­pression the physical rewards never offset the rememberings--only the persistence and perception become the worthy measure of TRUTH.

The point becomes focused on the allowance of evil intent, cor­ruption, thievery and such to win just because the legal system is also corrupted and is not "just". NO--it is not! This is WHY the battle continues beyond the value of the objects in point--because it is NOT ALRIGHT for your systems to be so dastardly that this can be allowed to happen.

George may well claim to have taken the gold to get it from Ekkers or whatever else he claims (ten different stories)--but the MAN WHO GAVE THE GOLD TO THE INSTITUTE (WHICH BELONGS TO ALL OF YOU PARTICIPANTS) SAYS HE GAVE IT TO THE INSTITUTE--ONLY HAD TO SEND IT TO GREEN BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY AD­DRESS HE WAS GIVEN! EKKERS WON'T EVEN SEE THE GOLD, READERS--IT WAS AND IS INTENDED FOR THE INSTITUTE. NO, IT IS NOT ALRIGHT THAT GREEN TOOK IT AND THEN REMOVED IT TO NEVADA AND BURIED IT IN HIS YARD--IT IS NOT RIGHT!

VALUE
You will find as this unfolds that the Institute OFFERED to, early on, give Mr. Green sufficient to pay his legal fees, etc., FROM THE GOLD. He got furious and hung up on Mr. Dixon. Now, he says the Ekkers (Institute) did not honor their agreement. Ekkers have NOTHING to do with it--this money BELONGS TO THE INSTITUTE AS A FUNDAMENTAL ASSET! THE INSTITUTE IS A VALID, WELL-RUN AND OPERATING CORPORATION ABIDING BY CORPORATE LAWS.

If the Institute was originally intended by Mr. Green to be some kind of a "PONZI" scheme, as Mr. Green now tells the Associ­ated Press--HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT INTENTION AS IT WAS HIS PLAN--HE WAS A DIRECTOR AND FOUNDER OF SAME. It has not been run except as an honorable and well-managed institution--investigated by every Federal agency right through the FBI--thanks to the tales and demands of Mr. Green. Always the hope of Green was to destroy the Ekkers AND THE INSTITUTE before YOU PEOPLE could stand the battle. We shall see.

Mr. Green has told everyone that "I" went with him to Nevada and left ones here. Well, if I am so "bad" or "unreal"--why would he offer such lies?? Is there not confusion offered here?

PHONE CALLS ON STOLEN NUMBERS
We have been informed that a person FROM VIRGINIA WAS SENT TO TEHACHAPI WITH THAT PHONE NUMBER TO SET UP THE PEOPLE HERE! How interesting? One of those calls was the ONE that gave away the perpetrator--by the resi­dence phone number!!! Just thought you inquiring minds would like to know! No, I won't give the information yet--I will let the investigators release it. I will remind you that surveillance teams tagged our people here quite a while back and denied doing so. The Police said it was someone ALSO from Virginia. Still interesting...? You ask "if there are connections"? The point is not IF--it is simply HOW BIG!

At this point, however, I simply ask Mike and Rick to get letters of intent from the parties with the legal backup. We do not need the loan agreements--or, produce them,
I care not which. A statement "letter" of intent is sufficient and might well give great comfort to the new attorney's coming into the cases as well. As a matter of fact, I would like the same agreement put to paper from Mike--who will also be arranging for massive funding quite soon now. I don't believe the players in these cases have any idea of the depth of their opponent--but twittering over E.T.s is also about to cease!

NO RECORDS
The interesting debate and argument from "everyone" about Gunther and Ronn is that "nobody can find out anything so they are liars and con-men!" Oh? I don't think so, good buddies and the last laugh is yet to come!!!! I would further tell you that just from "Fat Lady Singing" is plenty to fight every legal battle from now to Armageddon when the Certificates are forced into the honoring--and I am not speaking of Dare Schaut OR Trea­surygate!

ST. GERMAIN
This party just seems to continue to annoy ones. I am accused, along with Dharma, of plagiarizing books and publishing it. Good grief, readers, the books in point dealt with Germain (those in REAL question). Dharma doesn't have much of any­thing to do with any of them, except to type them. George Green even shows copyrights as "publisher" of the material. Could the wrong parties be hooded and on the scaffolding? So be it.

Germain is about to enter the picture though, ISN'T HE, MR. JACKSON? Funny thing, though, Mr. Jackson doesn't like much of Germain's routines for accomplishments. He will get used to them I would guess! Ronn also suggests that I (Hatonn) just come right on out and tell a few things which I skirt constantly. No, I don't think so, for I still have a bit of "breaking gently" to do. We will just move right on with the USURPERS so that readers continue to get background of power-players. The "players", including the ones of whom I reference--KNOW ME WELL. I would not like to spoil such a nice relationship. Thank you.

Along those lines of focus, may we move on with Clark Clif­ford, please. I have to take time, readers, to give insight to Dharma as we move along for she is the brunt of the battle--the Elite have REALLY wanted to silence her and, according to Jackson--they have come REALLY CLOSE! THAT is not a wise thing to continue much longer because I am getting pretty "testy".

There is NOTHING which says you (any of you) have to so much as look at a single word we write--so it's rather a funny thing that this CONTACT "rag sheet" has become THE paper of the centuries. Twitter, deny--anything you wish--that is NOT my business. When I speak personally to someone(s)--remem­ber something--this paper was for communications between my crew members and it is our business what is placed therein. It has had a purpose which perhaps can begin to be changed in di­rections--but just as I stay out of YOUR BUSINESS MANAGE­MENT--please understand OUR POINTS--FOR WE HAVE NO GROUPS, CHURCHES, CULTS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

Let us now turn our attention back to our subject in progress.


by Medford Evans
Western Islands (publishers), Belmont,
Massachusetts 02178, 1968.

Clark Clifford (Continued)
General Marshall once told Forrestal that John Foster Dulles had told him: "The American people would execute you if you did not use the bomb in the event of war". That today's surface attitude is hysterically opposite to that is due to: (1) continuation of "ban the bomb" propaganda by intellectuals in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and other "Liberal" organizations, (2) acceptance by the public (though not without some inner reservations) of the myth of Soviet nuclear might, (3) endorsement by the government and the Establishment of the the­ory of "nuclear stalemate". Only the first of these factors was in operation in 1948, and even that not successfully. In Eng­land, too, Clement Attlee told Forrestal that "there is no division in the British public mind about the use of the atomic bomb--they were for its use. Even the Church in recent days had pub­licly taken this position." (The Forrestal Diaries,
p. 491.)

Considering, then, that the United States might have to take serious military action in Europe in 1948, that it could not pos­sibly take such action except by use or credible threat of the atomic bomb; and considering the fact that on the home front the American people expected the bomb to be used militarily if need arose, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was completely justified in requesting of President Truman that custody of the atomic bomb be transferred from the civilian Atomic Energy Commission to the armed services. If the military could not be trusted with our most important military weapon, then they re­ally should be discharged and replaced by men who could be trusted. Talk of "taking the bomb away from the military" is largely empty oratory. It is like "taking the money away from the bankers". Whoever has the money IS the banker. Whoever has the atomic bomb IS the military--at the highest command level. America's military calamities since World War II--dead­lock (not to say defeat) in Korea, ineffectiveness in Cuba, hu­miliation in the Sea of Japan (Pueblo incident), and worst of all, the self-defeating insanity of Vietnam--have all been due basi­cally to the fact that our highest military command, in the sense indicated above
--the President, the Secretary of Defense, and their civilian aides--have regarded possession of the atomic bomb as a sacred trust. That sacred trust is to guarantee that the American military in the ordinary sense of that term, the gener­als and the admirals, the men who do the fighting--do not get their hands on any nuclear weapons that are ready for use. Truman himself said that he did not want "to have some dashing lieutenant colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop one", that he would keep the [Truman] decision in his own hands.

Forrestal's historic request was considered at the White House July 21, 1948 in a confrontation between the National Military Establishment (as the Department of Defense was then called) and the Atomic Energy Commission, of which David E. Lilienthal was chairman. AEC had custody of the bomb. Forrestal was asking that such custody be transferred to NME. Lilienthal spoke against the request. Two days later he decided in favor of Lilienthal. Forrestal wrote in his diary:

He told me that he would make a negative decision on the question of the transfer of custody of atomic bombs and said that political considerations, at the immediate moment, had influenced this decision. He indicated that after election it would be possible to take another look at the picture. (The Forrestal Diaries, p. 461.)

In view of the fact, noted above, that many in authority agreed that the American people were at the time overwhelm­ingly in favor of military use of the bomb, Truman's invoking of "political considerations" was simply absurd. The American public in 1948 did not know about the fight between Forrestal and Lilienthal, but if they had known one cannot help but feel they would have been on Forrestal's side.
The political consid­erations would have worked the other way.

As for the promise that "after election it would be possible to take another look at the picture", of course no such look--at least none involving, as it should have, any public debate--was ever taken. After election, steps were taken instead to remove Forrestal from office, to drive him crazy and to destroy him. He died, libeled in death as a suicide, in the early morning of May 22, 1949, ten months after his valiant, but futile attempt at the White House to obtain for the United States armed services the crucial weapon of modern times. We cannot dwell further upon the matter here, but study of the facts in the case leaves little room for doubt that Forrestal did not die at his own hand because of despondency over failure to achieve a sound military posture for his country; little room for doubt that he was killed to prevent his trying again, as he surely would have done, and possibly with success. (See The Death of James Forrestal, by Cornell Simpson).

What was the role of Clark Clifford in this parley on the Continental Divide of modern military history? The Chief at whose ear he hovered (when circumstances were propitious, for he had a gentleman's tact) gave the signal for the descent, which has been toward the cities of the plain, which are by a very dead sea. (Genesis 13:12).

Under "civilian control", in the interests of "economy", we have actually spent undreamed-of and ever-increasing billions on a Defense Department which approaches impotence, which is incapable of defending one of our prized floating technological marvels, the elite Pueblo, against the contemptible top minnows of Russia's miserable puppet, the so-called government of North Korea. To what degree and what extent was Clark Clifford, in 1968 Secretary of Defense, responsible in 1948 for Truman's disastrous decision to disarm America?

If we take Clifford's own word for it, his responsibility must have been very great for, as we noted above, he led one of two groups (the victorious one) that as Clifford himself ac­knowledged were "fighting for the mind of the President". And he added,
"I don't think Mr. Truman ever realized it was going on".

Clifford's influence on Truman was at all times very great, but as of July 1948 it was at a peak, for it was the summer of the Democratic Convention at which Harry Truman's nomina­tion was opposed by the Dixiecrats and by the ultra-Liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)--while Clark Clifford, Louis Johnson, and one or two others stuck with Truman. Clif­ford did considerably more than "stick". He planned the cam­paign which was to end victoriously. Too bad he wasn't as ruthless against Russia as he was against Tom Dewey. At any rate, Harry Truman must have trusted Clark Clifford a great deal at that time of the world's day.

ENTER OPPENHEIMER
Nevertheless, strategically placed as he was, and Schemer that he is, Clifford was not a prime mover in the decision to deny the armed services custody of their main weapon. The prime movers in this, as in everything relating to atomic energy, were the politically organized atomic scientists, of whom the most important was Julius Robert Oppenheimer, the Commu­nists-serving atomic scientist. The great concern of such scien­tists after Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to take from the United States military the weapon which they had in the first instance thrust upon the United States military. From August 1945 on, these scientists had seen their own political influence rise in an exponential curve, until as of midsummer 1948 Julius Robert Oppenheimer was probably the most persuasive individual in the power structure of the United States. Oppenheimer was a Schemer to make Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas look like amateurs. To ordinary methods of persuasion he added a hypnotic power. The effect is suggested in Lilienthal's Journals:

Robert Oppenheimer summarized the [General Advi­sory] Committee's views on the questions we [of the Atomic Energy Commission] submitted to them for their opinion, in an hour's statement that was as brilliant, lively, and accurate a statement as I believe I have ever heard. He is pure genius. Even these great brains [scientists on the GAC] joined in the amazement and delight we all felt with this wonderful piece (p. 186).

Of course, Lilienthal had no way of knowing whether Op­penheimer was "accurate" in all he said or not. That is why I attribute hypnotic powers to Oppenheimer. He made almost ev­erybody believe him, even after he confessed he was a great liar. That seemed to be the only time they didn't believe him, which is possibly what he intended.

Lilienthal was, as of 1948, Oppenheimer's stooge in the po­litical bureaucracy (being less intense and less delicate, he didn't burn out as fast and thus survived the more brilliant Schemer). Lilienthal, in turn, was on excellent terms with Clark Clifford. Not that Oppenheimer would have needed an intermediary to get to Clifford, but Clifford might have needed one to get to Op­penheimer, and might well have valued Lilienthal's acquaintance the more because the latter was in such close organizational re­lationship with the Mesmer of nuclear physics.

As a cultivated gentleman, with a good education and a supe­rior but not radically inquiring mind, Clark Clifford in 1948 had no more chance of thinking at variance with the line of the atomic scientists than a normal high school girl has in 1968 of wearing a farthingale. Fashion is more imperious in thought than in dress. The kind of Schemer Clifford is, in the world of international nuclear politics, is simply an adjunct to the kind of Schemer Oppenheimer was. The same goes for Lilienthal. No­body knew this better than these two lawyers. They were happy, of course, that Oppenheimer seemed to be a Liberal of some sort. So were they--Liberals of some sort.

Clifford's role in the "custody" crisis of 1948 was that of ex­pediter. It was in fact a very important, possibly an essential role. For the decision would be made and was made by the un­predictable man from Independence, who was not well enough educated to be reliably influenced directly by an Oppenheimer. Harry Truman was one mystery which Clark Clifford certainly understood better than any nuclear physicist could. Lilienthal again testifies to Clifford's importance:

I thought Clark's influence on the course of the Presi­dent had been so very, very great because he... had found a language, a terminology, and an atmosphere in which the President could express [his] deep-rooted Populist, in­surgent ideas. (Journals, p.434).

Clifford and Truman did indeed speak the same language. At least Clifford understood Truman's language, and Truman thought he understood Clifford's. Clifford was at this time not just an expediter, he was the key expediter of Truman's deci­sions.

There were others: General George Marshall, James Webb, now head of NASA, then Director of the Bureau of the Budget and like Clifford a favorite with David Lilienthal. There was Lilienthal himself, who understood Truman so much better than Forrestal did. All these men influenced the President. The one with apparently most at stake, the one who directly confronted Forrestal to block the arming of the armed services was Lilienthal. And Lilienthal had word in advance that, assuming his usual adroitness in conference did not fail, he could count on the Presidential backing needed for victory over the Secretary of Defense. He had the word three weeks in advance of the formal meeting at the White House. He had the word from the White House, from Clark Clifford. This is the entry in Lilienthal's Journals:

This morning [June 30, 1948] I had phoned Clifford to say that we were having our [preliminary] meeting with Forrestal today and would he have any further comment on the issue? He hadn't been able to talk to the President about it but would try to before noon.

He phoned at 12:20, but by that time we were at our meeting. I got him back about 2:55 p.m.

He had presented the matter to the President. The President said, "As long as I am in the White House I will be opposed to taking atomic weapons away from the hands they are now in [i.e., Lilienthal's, which is to say Oppen­heimer's], and they will only be delivered to the military by particular order of the President issued at a time when they are needed". Clifford said he wasn't surprised but seemed pleased. (Vol. II, pp. 376-377).

And why wouldn't a Master Schemer in such a situation be pleased? For this meant that so long as Harry Truman and Clark Clifford were both in the White House (and when Clifford eventually did leave, early in 1950, he left on his own initiative) atomic bombs would hardly be delivered to the military without the advice of Special Counsel Clark Clifford. Even today, as Secretary of Defense (and into the bargain, again a trusted per­sonal adviser to the President), Clifford's real power in the world could hardly be greater. He had in 1948 won the battle for the mind of the President--perhaps a simpler, perhaps a more basically American mind than those of Clifford's other Presi­dents, Kennedy and Johnson.

But American as it was, it was not in the interests of the na­tion when Harry Truman said to Forrestal, Lilienthal, and their respective associates assembled in the presidential office July 21, 1948: "You have got to understand that this isn't a military weapon". (Lilienthal's Journals, Vol. II, p. 391.) Lilienthal was certainly reacting normally when he confided to his diary, "I shall never forget this particular expression". No, I should think not. The atomic bomb is not a military weapon! Of course, as far as any real military purpose is concerned, we have acted upon that astonishing statement these past twenty years. On the other hand, we have persisted in manufacturing these things which may or may not be military weapons, but are certainly nothing else, and we have persisted in training our military personnel to rely upon them, so that in crisis they will turn to them. But then, by policy, those things which were mil­itary weapons when the plane or ship was armed are not military weapons when the time comes to fight--and the fighter is un­armed for the battle! No wonder, as Judge Morris said, we are losing.

As a final note on Clifford's role as expediter of the anti-mil­itary decision in the custody debate, observe that if he was not the author of Truman's absurd statement to Forrestal that "political considerations" were ruling, he was in the best posi­tion of anyone to know just how absurd the statement was, for he was the architect of Truman's political victory. You may be sure the custody issue never got into the campaign.

Truman had ascended to the Presidency on the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
He had not yet been elected President in his own right.

We will speak of the election when we again write. Thank you.