PJ 103
CHAPTER 7
REC #2 HATONN

WED., JUL. 20, 1994 1:16 P.M. YEAR 7, DAY 338

WED.. JUL. 20, 1994
THE USURPERS, Part 10:
by Medford Evans, Ph.D.
[Who is Medford Evans? He is a Ph.D. (Yale 1933) was Chief of Security Training for the United States Atomic En­ergy Commission in 1951-52. He is also the author of THE SECRET WAR FOR THE A-BOMB.] [H: Sorry to be so late in offering this information.]

The Usurpers, Medford Evans, Western Islands Publishers, Belmont, MA 02178 (1968).

THE OPERATORS
KATZENBACH
Continuation:
Katzenbach understood. He was quick to see that Lee Har­vey Oswald, before Jack Ruby made his contribution to history, probably could not get a trial which would stand up on appeal in any court in the country. For the nation had seen and heard so much on TV during those forty-eight hours in which Oswald survived Kennedy that no impartial jury could have been found. Manchester reports that by Friday evening, within hours of Os­wald's arrest, Katzenbach "began to entertain serious doubts that any conviction of the suspect could survive appeal." Katzen­bach saw that. It was Jack Ruby who did something about it.

After Ruby's work was done, there was no way of bringing Lee Harvey Oswald to trail, fair or unfair. Since he died with­out having been convicted, he must have been, under the Law, presumed innocent when he died. Immediately upon his death, however, there was little or no hesitation in speaking of him as the "murderer" or as the "assassin". This was not merely jour­nalistic license, taking advantage of the fact that a dead man cannot sue for libel and his family are not likely to do so. The belief that Oswald was guilty, and he, solely, guilty, became an essential article of faith for those in the orbit of the Establish­ment. [H: How are we doing so far, Jackson?]

A trial in the Anglo-American tradition is a contest of adver­saries--prosecution and defense. The accused is entitled to counsel, his counsel has status as an officer of the court, but has no other responsibility than to represent the accused to his great­est available advantage. One assumes it is not to his advantage to lie to the court, but he does not have to testify against him­self. The spouse of the accused is not admitted to testify either for or against him. He has a right to confront his accusers, and to have his counsel cross-examine them. And he is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In other words, the whole original burden of proof is on the prosecution. There are other restric­tions on procedure. The system is widely regarded as the fairest application of the Law so far developed in the history of human society.

Reviewing the available record at this time, it is doubtful in the extreme whether the prosecuting attorney in Dallas could, under this adversary system, have convicted Lee Harvey Oswald of the murder of John F. Kennedy, except by appeals to the emotions of the jury and other methods which would have em­barrassed any appellate court, including the Supreme Court. Katzenbach's fears were well grounded.

But what could hardly have been accomplished under the ad­versary system of trying a case might be, and was, readily con­cluded by a court of inquisition--the Warren Commission. In the United States, so far, an inquisitorial body can try only dead men. An inquisition has many advantages over a trail court--advantages, that is, in reaching a predetermined, and thus un­fair, conclusion. They are not advantages from the point of view of the accused. An inquisition may admit whatever evi­dence it chooses--hearsay, testimony of a spouse, expressions of opinion from any source.

The most damaging testimony against Lee Harvey Oswald was that of his wife Marina, who could not have testified at all if her husband had been alive, but who, since he was dead, was the first witness called by the Warren Commission. Marina Oswald testified to the effect that Lee Oswald shot Kennedy, something she could not have really known, but she was pro­tected by the Warren Commission from cross-examination. Be­fore she went before the Commission, she appeared on televi­sion, to say, among other things: "I don't want to believe, but I have to watch facts, and facts tell me that Lee shot Kennedy." After that, the conclusion of the Warren Commission was in­evitable as to Oswald's guilt; the reasons he could not be al­lowed accomplices we have already touched upon.

Marina Oswald was well protected. Chief Justice Warren ruled, after her TV appearance and before her performance at the inquisition, that there would be no "defense counsel"--no lawyer to represent the interests of the deceased, no adversary for the Commission's Counsel, J. Lee Rankin, who had fourteen lawyers for Assistant Counsel plus a professional staff of twelve. Later in the procedures, after Marina Oswald's dra­matic first appearance, Walter E. Craig, president of the Ameri­can Bar Association, was asked to keep an eye on proceedings to insure that they "conformed to the basic principles of Ameri­can justice". He was a very tame adversary, if adversary he was, for he did so little and his name does not even appear in the Index of the Warren Report. Even so, he was not admitted as umpire, referee, or whatever, until Marina Oswald had set the stage for the inevitable denouement.

"The most striking element in the encounter of the Russian widow and the U.S. Chief Justice was Warren's solicitude re­garding her," writes Leo Sauvage, who also reminds us that un­til Mrs. Oswald was adequately prepared for her public appear­ances she remained in the custody of Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

It should not be forgotten that the Justice Department of which Katzenbach was the operating chief in 1964, was in sub­stantial control of the Warren Commission's activities, though the State Department, Treasury Department, and Central Intelli­gence Agency also had a hand in it. These agencies did all the investigative work. The FBI, which is part of the Justice De­partment, did most; the Secret Service, which is in Treasury, did next most. Abe Fortas, at the time a lawyer in private prac­tice, was the key link to the White House; Katzenbach was the main channel to the bureaucracy. These two, as it appears from Manchester and others, were in effective working relationship with each other.

The Warren Commission, with all the vast machinery at its command, did not want to know the truth, though it must have known much of it; nor did the White House and the great exec­utive departments want the Warren Commission to know the truth.

Author Leo Sauvage has something interesting to say at this point. Sauvage, correspondent in America for the Parisian journal Le Figaro, once stood high in the esteem of the polite Left, having written for The Reporter, The New Leader, and Commentary. He is a talented writer and industrious investiga­tor. But Sauvage had trouble publishing his book on the assassi­nation because his views did not coincide with those of the War­ren Commission. His book, The Oswald Affair, was eventually published by World Publishing Company.

As Sauvage points out, had the Warren Commission really wanted to know the truth, the first thing the commission would have done would have been "to reconstruct some kind of accept­able substitute" for all the documents that were not prepared in Dallas the day of the murder. For, the most incredible thing is that there is said to be no transcript of the police interrogation of Oswald between the time of his arrest, Friday afternoon November 23, 1963, and the time of his execution by the lone vigilante, Jack Ruby, some forty-five hours later, on Sunday morning, November 25, 1963. To piece out such alarming gaps of information should have been, Sauvage contends, and it is hard to disagree, "Task Number 1 for the Commission". In­stead,

...it appears that the Commission's idea of Task Num­ber 1 ...was... to give Marina Oswald, who could not have been admitted legally as a witness before Judge Brown in Dallas, the opportunity to accuse her husband before the Chief Justice of the United States (p. 139).

Marina Oswald was not only the first witness to appear be­fore the Commission (February 3, 1964), she was also the last (September 7, 1964). She gave the original impetus and direc­tion; she gave the final clearance. Her influence is suggested in a striking passage in Edward Jay Epstein's Inquest. The Com­mission's legal staff, according to Epstein, felt that her testi­mony in February "contained obvious contradictions and incon­sistencies," and thought she ought to be recalled and cross-ex­amined. One of the lawyers, Norman Redlich, wrote in a mem­orandum:

Marina Oswald has lied to the Secret Service, the FBI, and this Commission repeatedly on matters which are of vital concern to the people of this country and the world.

But Earl Warren is, in his own way, a resolute character. Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin reported, says Epstein, "that the Chief Justice considered himself to be 'a judge of human be­ings', and he and the other Commissioners fully believed her testimony."

That Marina Oswald be called as the first witness was sug­gested in a memorandum prepared December 28, 1963 by Howard Willens, vigorous young Yale Law School alumnus as­signed by Katzenbach the job of liaison between the Commission and the Department. One psychological effect was to eliminate from the area of public speculation the possible involvement of others in the assassination, to eliminate, by dwelling on domestic details of the poor and unhappy Oswald household, the very thought that the assassination was part of anything so significant as a coup d'etat.

In the main, that thought has been eliminated. Critics of the Commission who reject the proposition that the obscure Oswald by himself killed the President tend to suggest that several other equally obscure persons were involved. It is felt to be inappro­priate, and perhaps risky, to remember that it was not any ob­scure person nor a collection of obscurities, but Brutus and twenty other eminent Romans who killed Caesar.

Jackie Kennedy was quite right, at least emotionally, in re­jecting the thought that her husband had been killed by some "silly little Communist". [H: Well, now Jackie, it beats hav­ing "committed suicide" right there in public--which it un­doubtedly some day will publicly be stated.] He wouldn't have been killed by a silly little anybody. He MUST have been killed by MAKERS OF HISTORY, whoever they were They could, to be sure, have been serious "big" Communists. For this reason it seems very strange that Jackie Kennedy should, on December 1, 1963, nine days after her husband's death, have written a personal letter to Nikita Khrushchev--a letter of gratitude and respect, a letter referring to, among other things, Khrushchev's "kindness... in Vienna". But--although Manchester's The Death of a President was a best seller, and although it includes the full text of Jackie's letter to Khrushchev­--few people seem to know that President Kennedy's widow so promptly communicated with the man who was taken to be her husband's adversary on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Even if history should eventually show that the shooting in Dallas November 22, 1963 was a special kind of urban guerilla warfare, in which the target was not a fireman or policeman but the President of the United States, and in which the purpose was not to produce temporary chaos but a permanent new order--even if the essential facts of the coup d'etat come to be known and accepted, and all the falsehoods of the Warren Commission mercilessly exposed--yet still it will remain true that planning, principally in the Justice Department under Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, delayed speculation about a conspiracy long enough to insure Johnson a landslide election in November 1964.

It would, of course, be absurd to say that the Warren Com­mission participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. Unfortunately, it is not at all absurd to say that the Commission, and President Johnson, whose Commission it was, are acces­sories after the fact in the murder of John F. Kennedy. The rea­son that shocking statement is not absurd is simply that we now know for a reasonable certainty--the book Six Seconds in Dallas, by Josiah Thompson knows it, if Edward Jay Epstein knows it, we may also be reasonably sure that the Commission knew it.

But if the Commission knew that Oswald could not have been a lone assassin, and yet published the conclusion that he was, then the Commission was aiding the others--whoever they were--to escape. [H: Now you come to a really hard one to swal­low, thinkers in truth--at the time of the Warren Commis­sion--guess who was not only head of the Warren Commis­sion but also A-1 of the Committee of 16? I think you'll be real close if you guess, Earl Warren! Are you beginning to see just how handy it is to HAVE POWER?? I believe, fur­ther, that this also indicates as head of that Commission--that he was also Chief Justice of your highest judicial system in supposedly, the world--The SUPREME COURT! If all this did not take place at the same time, which I do not have any desire to look up--but Jackson can do so FOR you--then it was damned close! Is Earl Warren really gone? Let's just say that it doesn't matter--he certainly is NOT forgotten.] And this, I believe, is what is meant by the term: accessory after the fact. The charge, implicit here and in numerous other books, that the Warren Commission was lying is so shocking that many good citizens are reluctant to think about it. Some who do think about it search for plausible defenses of the Com­mission. It has been said that the Commission must have been telling the truth because the investigative resources of the De­partment of Justice were under the command of the dead Presi­dent's brother. Bobby Kennedy was Attorney General through­out the working life of the Warren Commission. The answer to that is that Bobby Kennedy depended at this time on Katzenbach to run the Department. Katzenbach, as we have seen, was the first government official to propose the Extraordinary Commis­sion which became known as the Warren Commission. It was set up with remarkable speed. The President's Executive Order 11130 which created it was issued November 29, 1963, one week to the day after the assassination. Even more remarkable was the speed, and the parallel thinking, of the Communist tabloid paper, The Worker, which on Tuesday, November 26, 1963, published its demand that just such a commission headed by none other than Chief Justice Earl Warren be appointed by President Johnson.

That Katzenbach was so largely responsible for the creation of the Warren Commission, and the Warren Commission was essential to the political security of the Johnson Administration, explains as well as anything could the "genius" Katzenbach has for knowing "how to handle Lyndon Johnson."

Katzenbach is today, of course, the Under Secretary of State--which means that he is the alter ego of Dean Rusk, LBJ's mentor in foreign affairs. Considering Katzenbach's former al­ter egoism for Bobby Kennedy, idol of the New left, and impla­cable foe of LBJ, we have a seeming paradox--unless we recog­nize Katzenbach for the link that he is between the New Left and the old.

* * *
Since we will be changing the heading to THE SCHEMERS I think it appropriate to take this off the computer and simply in­tegrate it with writing one or stand alone--whichever is appro­priate spacewise We will go on and label the next segment "Part 11". I have to ask you to write longer today because of the court appearance tomorrow morning and since it has to do with the criminal charges it may well take all day. Thank you.
CHAPTER 8
REC #3

WED., JUL. 20, 1994 1:16 P.M. YEAR 7, DAY 338

WED., JUL. 20, 1994
THE USURPERS, Part 11:
by Medford Evans, Ph.D.
The Usurpers, Medford Evans, Western Islands Publishers, Belmont, MA 02178 (1968.

THE SCHEMERS
ROSTOW, FORTAS, CLIFFORD
A "schemer" is basically not an organization man, though he necessarily works through organizations, and sometimes in and for an organization. Essentially, however, he is a loner. He thinks of other men as resources, and the coolness of his calcu­lations breeds in the others a curious amalgam of respect, admi­ration, distrust, and alienation. The Schemer is never a great commander or charismatic leader, and he himself is aware of this; he may suggest or control all or nearly all of the leader's actions, but he cannot take such action himself, for he will not be followed.

Since the Schemer lives by his wits, he has wit enough to ap­preciate the advantages of his own position, which is much freer than that of the commander, and this appreciation prevents his wasting time being jealous of the nominal superior to whom he furnishes ideas and methods. After all, it is rather fun to be a kingmaker, and to pay for the pleasure by yielding all the more splendid perquisites to the king is not a bad bargain. Besides, the comparative obscurity of the moment may be recompensed in the light of history. Hamilton is nearer to Washington in public esteem now than when both lived; Colonel E. M. House is gaining on Woodrow Wilson in fame since their time.

Three men--Walt Rostow, Abe Fortas, and Clark Clifford--have this in common: they are Schemers. Each has what Mur­ray Marder of the Washington Post has described in Doctor Rostow as "a mind which formulates ideas in series of problems and answers." Until Clifford became Secretary of Defense, no Schemer had ever assumed major executive responsibility. Schemers are fixers, they are troubleshooters. Heaven knows there is plenty to fix.

Rostow is an academic, a Ph.D. from Yale. Fortas and Clif­ford are lawyers. Fortas has an LL.B. from Yale Law School. These men are all gifted with keen analytical intelligence. Ros­tow, being apparently more a theorist than the other two, may have developed more bias for his own theories, but on the whole all three seem to have the ability to examine with cool detach­ment a situation into which, with proper inducement, they are ready to throw themselves with great force and determination. They are professionals.

WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW
Walt Rostow has an academic cover--he is an old hand at un­dercover intelligence work--OSS during World War II, a big CIA assignment while ostensibly teaching at MIT in the 1950s. Together with an MIT colleague, engineer Jerome B. Wiesner, Rostow went to the "Pug-wash" conference in Moscow in November 1960, where he talked with V.V. Kuznetsov of the Soviet Foreign Office.

The Pug-wash conferences are get-togethers for Russian and American nuclear scientists, paid for by the self-professed ad­mirer of Communists, financier Cyrus Eaton. Originally the conferences were held at Eaton's posh summer estate at Pug-wash, on Northumberland Strait, in Nova Scotia, Canada. By the sixth conference in November 1960 the spirit of international fraternity among the scientists was strong enough to result in a Moscow meeting. It had been immediately preceded by another conclave which Doctor Rostow attended also--"a series of closed meetings". Current Biography says it was comprised "of American and Soviet intellectuals held at Dartmouth College...under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation." Apparently, the scientists and intellectuals so fear an open society, so need se­crecy, that they find it necessary to hold "closed meetings" at which a highly elite group of Russians and Americans share sublime thoughts while 200 million dumb American "laymen" and a greater number of mulish Russian muzhiks and cynical Russian proletarians are excluded because they would not under­stand the technicalities and might understand all too well the politics involved in the discussions.

Rostow and Wiesner returned from Moscow prepared to guide White House policy on nuclear disarmament, and have pretty well done so ever since. Rostow told the late Marguerite Higgins of the now defunct Herald Tribune, when she asked him in July 1960 some question about the then Senator and Presiden­tial candidate John F. Kennedy, "Jack and I hit it off from the start." This brashness may account for the reservation which Arthur Schlesinger says Dean Rusk showed toward Rostow when Kennedy was filling key jobs just before the President's inauguration.

Rusk did not want Rostow in the State Department, says Schlesinger (A Thousand Days, pp. 124-125.), and Kennedy settled for making the OSS-CIA veteran a Deputy Special As­sistant (deputy to McGeorge Bundy) for national security af­fairs. Later, Rostow got the job of policy planning chairman in the State Department after all. One wonders why Rusk gave in. But, today, under Johnson, Rostow is back in the White House itself, not now as deputy, but in Bundy's place as the Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs. Bundy went to the Ford Foundation. [H: Keep it all in the Commit­tee!]
Dean Rusk's reservations about Rostow might very well stem from considerations of style. Rusk himself, while strategically audacious, is suave--deceptively deferential, even--in his man­ner; he wouldn't have called Kennedy Jack, he certainly doesn't call Johnson Lyndon, he probably doesn't even call Rostow Walt. But the two of them would not be basically at odds. They are in it all the way together--with Johnson, with Fortas, with Clifford--in the project in Socialist reconstruction in Vietnam.

Rostow would not compare with Clifford or Fortas as a Schemer in the area of domestic politics--he does not begin to understand ordinary Americans as they do. On the other hand, he has more knowledge of Europe (probably also of Asia) than Fortas and Clifford do, and he is part of the "intellectual com­munity" in a way that they can never be.

Fortas and Clifford may well be more intelligent, in every meaningful sense of that term, than Rostow, but belonging to the "intellectual community" sometimes has surprisingly little to do with intelligence. In one of Rostow's books, The United States in the World Arena, he has written:

It is a legitimate American national objective to see re­moved from all nations--including the United States--the right to use substantial force to pursue their own inter­ests... it is, therefore, an American interest to see an end of nationhood as it has been historically defined (p. 549).

This clearly threatens the continued existence of the United States. Yet it is doubtful whether Doctor Rostow could be con­victed of treason, even if he had been observed in overt acts to further the national suicide which he says is "an American inter­est"; or had been observed "adhering to their [the United States'] enemies," (as the Constitution provides must be done to sustain a treason charge). The 1960 Moscow meeting of Ros­tow, Wiesner and Kuznetsov was quite evidently not a parley at arm's length as is proper between hostile powers, and indeed Rostow and Wiesner had no diplomatic credentials to represent the Government of the United States. They were giving free advice to a high-ranking Soviet diplomat on how best to deal with diplomatic representatives of the United States--on how best to achieve Soviet purposes. Only the argument that the So­viet Union was not an enemy--an argument which makes non­sense of Cold War history and of such organizations as NATO--could seriously trouble a prosecutor who wished to build a case of treason against Rostow and Wiesner. Famed defectors Burgess, McLean, and Philby could not have told the Russians as much, for they did not know as much.

The defense of Doctor Rostow and Dean Wiesner--in practice an adequate defense against charging them with treason--is that they are simply typical of the Liberals whose principles have dominated policy these past thirty years not only in the United States but throughout the Western world. Edmund Burke said, "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people," and the Liberals are a whole international class of people--far along in bringing about the "suicide of the west", as James Burnham has so lucidly set forth in his book by that ti­tle. The pity is that, numerous as they are, Liberals are a small minority of the entire population of the United States and of the West. Yet by their power, which is largely due to the prestige of their supposed intellectual attainments, the Liberals are taking the majority down with them.

Doctor Rostow is, of course, an economic determinist which is to say he is some kind of Marxist. A Communist is some kind of Marxist, too. What is said to be his most influential book, The Stages of Economic Growth, extrapolates from Marx the curve of social development. Rostow postulates five "stages" in the life of any continuing society: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for takeoff (this term may be his chief addition to Marx, who died before the airplane was in­vented), (3) the takeoff, (4) the drive to maturity, (5) the age of high mass consumption. In the fifth stage, where there is enough of the world's goods to satisfy all, the state, if it does not wither away, can at least be transformed into a management staff, concerned with production "from each according to his ability" and with distribution to each according to his need. Such a state will be nonaggressive. In the United States, we are approximately in the fifth stage. The Soviet Union can be ex­pected confidently to enter the same stage at any historical mo­ment now. It would then, this Schemer seems to say, be desir­able for the United States and the Soviet Union to merge. In the meantime, according to Rostow, our proper stance is indeed one of readiness to prevent the Soviet Union from hurting us, or at least to minimize such hurt, but above all one of vigilance to prevent reactionary elements in our own society from--say through reckless use of nuclear weapons--destroying the rapidly maturing Soviet society. Indeed, we must do everything possi­ble to help the Soviet Union--and, of course, all other societies as well, particularly those of "underdeveloped countries." As part of their development, part as it were of their "national ado­lescence," the underdeveloped countries have not reached the stage where they should do away with nationhood. These soci­eties may break out into a kind of collective juvenile delin­quency, which we are to contain and tolerate as well as possible, while continuing to give them every fundamental kind of assis­tance. We are to be Big Brother to the world--until one day the world is one, with policies planned by the Rostows of the future--who, if geriatrics is successful, may even be the Rostows of the present! Let's consider another way of looking at the Schemer's apparent line of reasoning.

A Big Brother (USA) who is attacked by his Little Brother (USSR) takes measures to defend himself, and may even give the kid a thorough workout, a pretty fair working over. But Big Brother fighting Little Brother always to some extent pulls his punches. Big Brother does not seek victory. Big Brother wants to see Little Brother grow up to be as much of a man as he is himself. When that time comes, the two will surely be friends as well as brothers. Meanwhile, though boys lose their tempers with men, men do not lose their tempers with boys. Teach the kid's lesson, but take it easy, don't really hurt him.

What consummate conceit! No wonder Russian and espe­cially Asiatic Communists do not return the love which Ameri­can and West European "Liberals" proffer! There is in the Western attitude an arrogant presumption of superiority (imagine a Chinese trying to digest the thought that the United States is a more mature country than China!) which must be far more infuriating than any flat declaration of hostility could be.

Unfortunately, some such presumption underlies our whole operation in Vietnam of which Doctor Rostow is one of the chief Schemers.

Doctor Rostow is a strategic pacifist, since he envisions a disarmed world where fully mature societies live, without "nationhood", in his euphoric fifth stage of high mass consump­tion. But Doctor Rostow is no tactical pacifist. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes that Rostow's "combination of the spa­cious historical review with a passion for counter-guerilla war­fare caused much joking about his being 'Chester Bowles with machine guns', all of which he took with gentle tolerance." (A Thousand Days, p. 353.) By 1967 many Liberals were no longer joking about the matter, and a somewhat shook-up Mary McCarthy was referring to "the sinister Walt Rostow, and now to be closest to the cupped Presidential ear." (Vietnam, p. 62.)

I gather that Mary McCarthy thinks Walt Rostow has sold out to the military-industrial complex--or somebody who wants to make money and get increased power out of the Vietnamese War. I suspect that Mary McCarthy, subtle writer though she is, has not penetrated to the reaches of thought where Walt Rostow has concluded that a large-scale military operation in Vietnam--provided it is equipped with a governing device to pre­vent the military from seeking a "military solution"--i.e. , vic­tory--can contribute enormously to the economic growth of Southeast Asia and eventually of China, advancing the day when high mass consumption will replace the incidental and almost random killing which we must expect for a while from both the Viet Cong and our own troops.

Walt Rostow is an action-type intellectual. In this he bears comparison with the New Left. Unlike them, however, he is not interested in theatricals, and more completely than Katzen­bach he chooses to work within, and through, the bureaucracy rather than against it. He influences official policy all he can, but is evidently determined to identify himself with it, whatever it is. And how else could he stay in the White House? He has been identified with official policy, both under Kennedy and un­der Johnson--conspicuously so--since he was sent with General Maxwell Taylor in October 1961 to survey the Vietnamese situ­ation and make a report to Washington. It was in pursuance of that report that the American buildup in Vietnam began.

Rostow's--and Taylor's--influence has never ceased to be felt in the type of fighting we do in Vietnam. It may be remembered that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II was a paramilitary outfit, and Walt Whitman Rostow attained the rank of major in the OSS. As a logical consequence of that ex­perience, "guerrillas were", as Arthur Schlesinger puts it, "an old preoccupation of Walt Rostow's". As a special case of Maxwell Taylor's "Doctrine of Flexible Response", which among other things means don't use nuclear weapons unless the other side uses them first, Rostow urged upon Kennedy a new emphasis on "counterinsurgency", Special Forces, and "unconventional warfare"--phrases which mean a willingness to cut throats at night and build bridges in the daytime, just like the Viet Cong. Schlesinger says that in the wake of recommenda­tions by Rostow, Taylor, and others, and after reading Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara for himself, President Kennedy "insisted that the Special Forces be schooled in sanitation, teaching, bridge-building, medical care and the need for economic progress. "

The whole policy amounts to: introduction into Asia of the most advanced methods of socialistic reconstruction and devel­opment, coupled with an absolute veto of the most advanced methods of waging a victorious war.

In the tug-of-war between United States officers who would like to win in the field in Vietnam and Schemers in Washington, such as Rostow, who want to stay in the field but avoid victory, there has developed the fantastic use of the helicopter. Ask yourself, for you don't have to be a military expert to know the answer, how long a helicopter would last in a war against a well-equipped enemy. The fact that, prior to the North Viet­namese February attack with Soviet tanks, helicopters had been the outstanding success of our operations in Vietnam, shows as clearly as anything could that the enemy was not well-equipped. In any case, it must take managerial skill of the highest order in the White House and the Pentagon to keep our military from winning in Vietnam!

The helicopter is a police weapon. It is perfect in situations where massive firepower cannot be directed against you; it is a hovering duck against such firepower. A helicopter military at­tack on an armed city would be suicide for the attackers. In contrast, helicopters over a city in peace are an admirable means of intimidating and controlling motorists or other civilians who have no anti-aircraft weapons. This is perhaps a minor illustra­tion of the fact that the whole counterinsurgency program and method of fighting in Vietnam condition our troops to control civilian populations. Moreover: It should be remembered that if we have not subdued the Viet Cong. we have certainly sub­dued all the South Vietnamese except the Viet Cong!

The American presence in Vietnam is one part stimulus to economic growth of all East Asia, one part counter-guerilla war­fare, and one part internal police for the area. All three of these are special interests of the brilliant theoretician, Walt Whitman Rostow.

[H: I really don't think the major reason for the war is lost on this author--but I surely don't want it lost on YOU. The war was a MAJOR TESTING OF THE MIND-CONTROL TRAINING AND PROGRAMMING--AND THE PROTEC­TION AND STRUCTURING OF FURTHER BUSINESS IN ARMS AND ESPECIALLY IN DRUGS! Another major item in this little experience was to see how far ordinary sol­diers would go to follow orders and/or simply kill innocent civilians--women and children. I think the results proved that they would do anything for anybody without much hesi­tation if triggered by authority to do so. This insures total willingness to control the populations at home. However, the intent would be to have "aliens" provide police action against any given population--i.e., foreign troops patrolling, say, Los Angeles where there is no personal involvement emotionally. It is not a pretty world, readers, and this is what the "schemers" come up with and had carried out by the mind-control programmers.]

Rostow's role in the so-called disarmament program has been crucial. The great result of his and Doctor Wiesner's trip to Moscow in November 1960 was the forwarding of negotiations eventually leading to the Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, and to the later "Nonproliferation Treaty". Much more promptly, the unauthorized Rostow-Wiesner negotiations of 1960 led to the formation in September 1961 of the Arms Control and Disar­mament Agency and the adoption by the United States of a pro­gram of General and Complete Disarmament (State Department Publication 7277), according to which the world would not be disarmed at all, but all weapons suitable for war between nations would be transferred to a United Nations Peace Force, while the nations would retain only such weapons as are suitable for inter­nal-police purposes, including, no doubt, helicopters; and, of course, rifles, tear-gas grenades, pistols, and some anti-person­nel tanks. Individual citizens, for their part, would not have any weapons at all. That would be the real disarmament. Thus, the so-called disarmament is really a concentration of arms in the hands of the managers of the World Government.

Like so many of his fellow intellectuals, Rostow's great fears seem to center not on what other nations or peoples may do, but on what the United States may do, what the American people may do. We are the main threat to the world order which Doc­tor Rostow seeks. Again, I accuse of him of no special personal astigmatism here; it is an occupational hazard of the ruling in­telligentsia, it is almost a requirement of entrance to the profes­sion, to assume that for Americans to adhere firmly to American interests--at least to American interests as popularly defined--is a danger to world peace. In a way, the exaggerated opposition of American intellectuals to what they might call American chau­vinism is itself unconscious chauvinism. For it credits the United States of America with a special importance attributed to no other country.

The Soviet Union is assumed to be also a superpower, in un­easy equilibrium with which, we are expected to maintain a pre­carious balance of terror through nuclear stalemate. Yet the at­titude is implicit in all the literature of the politically sophisti­cated that the maintenance of this balance is a peculiarly Ameri­can responsibility!

[H: I hope you understand that the really terrorizing fact in­volved here is that the sophistication has grown and the con­trol overlapping--this book of observations was written a quarter of a century (26 years) ago!]

The Russians, we are informed, may be expected (1) to insist upon rigid respect of the sovereignty of the USSR, and (2) to be capable on provocation of using nuclear weapons first if they go to war. These attitudes are precisely the ones which the United States must NOT assume, we are told, for they are unreason­able. At the same time we must not dwell upon their unreason­ableness when they are assumed by the Soviet Union! Even in the midst of the theatrical "Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962", which is the nearest that Establishment intellectuals have come to accusations against Moscow. (Adlai Stevenson himself spoke harshly on television to Ambassador Zorin.) Paul Nitze (today's Deputy Secretary of Defense) told reporter Elie Abel.

The greatest danger of war as we saw it then was that we would sink a Russian ship trying to run the blockade. If that happened, it seemed highly doubtful that Khrushchev would hold still without further action. (The Missile Crisis, p. 153, Italics added.)

The then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had a knock-down-and-drag-out encounter about this with the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson. Un­fortunately, Admiral Anderson was the first of the two to be dragged out--and sent to Lisbon as Ambassador to Portugal, five years before McNamara moved to the World Bank. The Admi­ral did not like the sea-hobbles that were put on him when Mc­Namara explained, as related by Abel, that the purpose of the celebrated eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation "was not to shoot Russians but to communicate a political message to Chairman Khrushchev. The President wanted to avoid pushing Khrushchev to extremes. The blockade must be so conducted as to avoid humiliating the Russians; otherwise Khrushchev might react in a nuclear spasm" (p. 155, Italics added).

Increasingly for twenty years now, the attitude of the intel­lectuals has been: avoid humiliating the Russians. The United States must avoid even a reasonable act which might provoke the Russians to an unreasonable one. At the same time we must continually approach these unreasonable people. We must tame the bear with kindness. But that is not really very flattering to the Russians, is it? And if it were a fair description of the situa­tion, do bear-tamers really associate with bears on terms of full liberty, equality, and fraternity?

Dr. Rostow assures us that the bear is evolving, and through stages of economic growth will soon be ready for complete fra­ternity with the human, if somewhat backwoods-ish, Uncle Sam. Meanwhile, the important thing is Uncle Sam's own self-con­trol. He must under no circumstances shoot the bear! Well, if the beast starts a direct charge we might shoot him in the shoul­der, if we can't sidestep, but do not shoot to kill. Above all, do not use the nuclear rifle--unless the bear uses his first. Does the bear have a nuclear rifle? Oh, yes, of course. He is a very clever and well-trained bear. We trained him!

It seems credible that one of the incidental purposes of the expedition in Vietnam is that it keeps the American military oc­cupied in an operation which cannot actually humiliate the Rus­sians. "As fire drives out fire," so a war in Vietnam--limited in scope, limitless in duration, and of course non-nuclear--may prevent a war with the Soviet Union. Critics of the war in Viet­nam say that no American interest is at stake there. That is not the important thing. The important thing to such special intel­lectuals as Walt Rostow who promote the war in Vietnam may well be that no RUSSIAN interest is at stake there. We Ameri­cans have nothing to fear so much as our own military power--goes the theory--and Vietnam is like a roped-off arena where we can go work some of it out of our system without endangering the neighbors. Of course, again, Vietnam also brings about a reduction of tension through blood-letting.

In the mind of the special intellectual who is the Special As­sistant to the President for National Security Affairs, expedients such as the Vietnamese expedition may serve the cause of the eventual, enforced peace pending such time as we can actually see an "end to nationhood". That phrase of Doctor Rostow's is so famous, or infamous, by now that it seems only fair to give the full context in which he introduced it. It appears in the per­oration of his book The United States in the World Arena, pub­lished in 1960 by Harper, in an "Appendix A," which is a self-contained essay entitled "The National Interest," and is written by Doctor Rostow for the purpose of "permitting the readers to isolate the author's presuppositions for critical examination." Doctor Rostow says that the American people have both military and ideological interests which are subject to various threats, notably the concentration of military power in, or the acceptance of totalitarian ideology by, the nations of "Eurasia", which he defines to include Africa. It is of some interest to note that he seems to classify the Soviet Union as more of a military than an ideological threat; vice versa, one gathers, for Communist China. Noting this "dual character of the national interest", Rostow optimistically, from his point of view, opines that we in the United States can meet "current and foreseeable challenges". But, he says, you don't get something for nothing. We have to give a little. What we have to give is indicated in the following climactic passage, which I have italicized in part to clarify a bit the meaning I think is there:

THE UNITED STATES AND THE
DECLINE OF NATIONHOOD
[Rostow's heading]
Among those challenges is the problem of using Ameri­can power and influence to tame military force by effec­tive international accord; for the nature of modern weapons in a context other than American monopoly is a danger to the national interest sufficiently grave to justify acceptance of important constraints on the nation's sovereignty. Put another way, it is a legitimate American national objective to see removed from all nations--in­cluding the United States--the right to use substantial mili­tary force to pursue their own interests. Since this resid­ual right is the root of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of an international arena of power, it is, therefore, AN AMERICAN INTEREST TO SEE AN END TO NATIONHOOD as it has been historically de­fined. [H: YOURS!]

The pace at which means of communication are now under development argues, further, that the present na­tions of the globe will move into relations of increasing intimacy and interaction.

Between them, the urgent imperative to tame military force and the need to deal with peoples everywhere on the basis of an accelerating proximity argue strongly for movement in the direction of federalized world organiza­tion under effective international law. And, should effec­tive control of military power be achieved, it might prove convenient and rational to pass other functions upward from unilateral determination to an organized arena of international politics.

It is not easy or particularly useful to peer far beyond the time when this great human watershed is attained (p. 549, Italics added).

These are the words of one of the most influential Schemers in the government--in the Establishment. Doctor Rostow does not write to the laity, does not write to make the best-seller list, does not write, actually, to be read. He writes to influence the men of power within the Establishment. What he writes could be said far more briefly and appropriately in an interoffice memorandum. It could be said orally over coffee. And I am sure it has been said in memoranda and over coffee. The mem­oranda and the talk have undoubtedly had far more immediate influence than the books, which few people read. But decision-makers in our country do read the memoranda and listen to the talk because Rostow has written a book explaining how the stages of growth work, or a book explaining what is the true interest of the United States in the world arena.

Notice that Rostow says we must use "American power" which would include American military power "to tame military force" which would include American military force! To point out that this means logically using American military force, or power, against itself is not logic-chopping. That is exactly what Rostow and innumerable fellow "Liberals" want to do. It is ex­actly what McNamara did with great effect as Secretary of De­fense. The excuse for this gradual national suicide is that "modern weapons" are "a danger to the national interest", that is, the American national interest. Other Liberals than Doctor Rostow have said more explicitly the same thing, which is that America is in danger from America's nuclear weapons. And that is incontrovertible, for America's nuclear weapons have not all stayed in America, and it is even doubtful whether all of those in America are under what most Americans would recog­nize as American control. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how Doctor Rostow's conclusions follow--that national sovereignty should be sacrificed, that we should "see an end of nationhood", and that "control of military power" should be put into the hands of "federalized world organization".

If the United States today is in danger from some quantity of nuclear weapons in possession of foreign powers, chiefly the USSR, powers which are, however, to some extent quite obvi­ously "deterred" by nuclear weapons under American control, why would the United States, deprived of its nationhood, not stand in much greater danger from a federalized world gov­ernment? For that world government would possess ALL the nuclear weapons in the world, and would be guided (as Doctor Rostow indicates elsewhere that democratic governments should be) by the formula: one man, one vote. Consider that under such a government the United States would have only 6-2/3 per cent of the vote, and you will understand precisely what Doctor Rostow intends.

* * *
Still think you don't have any problems? Now, 26 years later--CAN you undo it? I honestly don't know if you WILL! So be it. I like to think that THE COMMITTEE simply had no REAL IDEA WHAT IT WAS DOING. We shall see...!