PJ 101
CHAPTER 5

REC #1 HATONN

MON., JUL. 4, 1994 8:45 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 322

MON., JUL. 4, 1994

COMMUNICATION
As you study, if you do, the circumstances around your world it must be rather saddening to realize that on this, your U.S.A. In­dependence Day--that there is not much "independence" any­where. Neither is there FREEDOM for which there have been fought war after war in the "name of". These are the "changes" brought about;
the illusions birthed from these encounters which allow YOU to somehow think you have gained freedom and that good has prevailed above evil. War itself is EVIL--so what can be birthed from evil save more evil? Man gains or regains free­dom in birthing from the seeds planted in GOODNESS. But is there goodness anywhere?
Of course there is goodness for there is GOD and where there is God there MUST BE goodness. The struggle is, of course, in the perceptions of thought and the in­tent within soul. This is NOT some "tangible" acquisition that you may hold as you can hold a piece of metal or a statue or a book--it is the "thought" within the folders which gives a book life and so too is the "thought" within living and experiencing which gives manifestation in "life". "Freedom" like "Christness" or "goodness" is a STATE OF EMOTIONAL (THOUGHT) BEING. Once the mind is enslaved--there is no freedom. This is why weapons of physical force may well win a battle--but it has nothing to do with "soul freedom".

The foundation of intent is guided by communication. Commu­nication, however, can be clearly explicit or it can be totally im­plicit--or, it can be that the entire thrust of information exchange is intentionally guided to attain a given conclusion. This is WHY a person must have information in TRUTH to come up with conclusions OF truth. There is a rather amusing cartoon which explains the confusion far better than I can in words. (See below) This is the story of "gossip", "leaks", rumors and thus and so. But to have valid information upon which to work you must have truth in knowing players, circumstances and ability to generalize. You must be able to mentally and literally link everything to everything--for the PLAN is GLOBAL--not isolated little non-connected "cells".

The Fourth of July is certainly easily celebrated with firecrackers, hot dogs and a great pretending of "freedom" and "independence". But what of June 26th? And so YOU ask, "What about June 26"? Does anyone know what is important about June 26th? Dear ones, it is the day of the signing of the charter of the United Nations--that which took away all freedom in independence. You have come from "winning" independence and freedom into global slavery as citizens in less than a couple of centuries.

JUNE 26, 1945

On June 26, 1945 the charter of the United Nations was signed by 50 countries in San Francisco. The TEXT of the charter was in five languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. AND JUST WHO RUNS THE UN? WHO ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL? HUMMMNNN HUMMNN.

And the debate goes on--and on--and on. However, the take-over and New World Order simply also go on--and on! It is interesting to note that bunches of years ago a person by the name of Voltaire observed that a long dispute means that both parties are wrong. I suggest that it means you have a corrupted system whereby the one who is right is not given hearing and conclusion, much the less, recognition.

We will leave the celebration to the wisdom of the celebrant for, again, that which is the focus is the mind-set of the participant. You have a flag which represents the "heavens" and stands for a nation birthed under God, with liberty and justice for all. DO YOU HAVE IT? SO BE IT! The United States is only one of many countries about your globe--I suggest that it will not be long if things continue, that June 26 will become an international holiday--and celebration will be MANDATORY.

But is it wrong that nations live in harmony? No--it would be wondrous! Do you see freedom and harmony? I see NO PEACE and NO HARMONY! Perhaps my vision is blurred by TRUTH?

GOD HAS BLESSED AMERICA, MY FRIENDS--HAVE YOU?
* * * *
Back now to The Usurpers:

THE USURPERS, Part 4:
by Medford Evans
Western Islands (publishers), Belmont, Massachusetts 02178, 1968.

ADMIRAL LEWIS L. STRAUSS
The victims of Lyndon Johnson fall into two classes: those who stood in his way, and those who stood for aggressive anti-Communism. The first class is, the world being what it is, the more numerous; but the second is especially interesting. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, a member of the original Atomic Energy Commission, later chairman of the Commission, and after that Eisenhower's appointee as Secretary of Commerce, is quite a different manner of man from Joseph Raymond McCarthy. The adjective that comes to mind first in thinking of Admiral Strauss is urbane. He meets admirably the revised version of Cardinal Newman's definition of a gentleman, as one who never unintentionally inflicts pain.

During the Hickenlooper investigation into the management of AEC under David Lilienthal, Admiral Strauss was asked point-blank what he thought of Lilienthal's judgment, and then the interrogator remarked to the Admiral that he seemed to hesitate in his reply. "I hope", said Strauss, "that you will permit my hesitation to remain a matter of record". Now you may or may not like that sort of thing, but there is nothing crude about it. Lewis Strauss is every bit as smooth as Joe McCarthy was rough.

Nevertheless, he got himself tagged as an anti-Communist, and the "Liberals" hated him just as they did McCarthy. The Senate under Johnson's leadership ganged up on him just as they did on McCarthy, and in this case you couldn't blame any of it on Eisenhower. Strauss was Eisenhower's appointee, in the Fall of 1958, to the Cabinet post of Secretary of Commerce. He had every qualification for it--possibly the best qualifications of all who ever held the job. At any rate, a President is usually privileged to have whom he likes in his Cabinet. John Kennedy had Bobby as Attorney General--nobody liked it, but almost everybody thought it was the President's business. There was nothing, nothing at all derogatory in Admiral Strauss' record, except from a militantly partisan point of view. He had, as a member of the AEC, opposed Lilienthal several times, and he had as AEC chairman fought Julius Robert Oppenheimer, with the decisive result that Oppenheimer was declared a security risk and his clearance was revoked. In hysterical reaction to this, the Alsop brothers; fancying themselves as Zola and fancying Oppenheimer as Captain Dreyfus, put out a tract entitled We Accuse! They predicted, direly, that the forces so reprehensibly represented by Admiral Strauss would "break their teeth" on the Oppenheimer case. If being harassed for years by New Mexico's Senator Clinton Anderson, and finally robbed and insulted by Lyndon Johnson's Senate Majority, constitutes "breaking your teeth"--or having them broken--then Strauss did eventually get what the Alsops said was coming to him. They got something that was coming to them, too. Their idol Oppenheimer gave the lowdown to Mrs. Dorothy Schiff--of all people--in mid-March 1955. Said the New York Postmistress:

I was amazed when twice Dr. Oppenheimer denied his excited champions, saying that the only trouble with the book was that it just wasn't true! (Quoted from Nora de Toledano in The American Mercury, July 1955.)

The Strauss-confirmation case was a severer test of Lyndon Johnson's ability to deliver something the Communist Party wanted than even the McCarthy-censure case. Eisenhower had helped him with McCarthy, but in this case, Johnson had to get Strauss over Eisenhower's protest. Further, the press had never really gone after Strauss as it had McCarthy. The AEC chairman, Secretary of Commerce, financier, and philanthropist had never been the kind of popular celebrity the Irish, former Marine, Communist-flushing Senator from Wisconsin had so justly become, and therefore was not vulnerable (or so one would have thought) to the same kind of whipped-up emotionalism of mass psychology. Finally, Strauss, unlike McCarthy, was endangering nobody's political base--not influencing nor threatening to influence any constituency against any Senator. Strauss had been appointed to office previously by both a Democratic and a Republican President, had been confirmed by both Democratic and Republican majorities in the Senate. Though generally identified as a conservative Republican (he was a personal friend of Robert Taft's), he was far from being considered "Old Guard" or "Neanderthal". He had been before his first AEC appointment a partner in Kuhn, Loeb; after leaving AEC, he had been a consultant to the brothers Rockefeller. Lewis Strauss stood for national security in the atomic energy pro­gram, and he had made the decision which was at first, to humble Oppenheimer. This was enough. It did not matter that Strauss was at other times and on other accounts quite agreeable to them. Like McCarthy, he had a good press before he ever did anything anti-Communist.

In the Fall of 1946 The New Republic looked favorably on Lewis Strauss' appointment to the then new Atomic Energy Commission. Even after he had shown his hand as one of the "security-minded", he gave the Liberals, in the Eisenhower-sponsored "Atoms for Peace" program, which he promoted, a tremendous windfall.

None of that mattered. Because of the Oppenheimer case, Strauss had to be removed, and Lyndon Johnson was the one to do it. The "second most powerful" politician in the United States in 1959 had to find himself a Senate majority to buck "the most powerful"--i.e., a popular President--in an appointment which was the latter's natural prerogative. Even Johnson couldn't have done it, and probably wouldn't have tried, if Strauss had not been previously branded as an anti-Communist.

The cold-bloodedness of Operation Strauss is well illustrated by Evans and Novak:

Lyndon Johnson had no particular interest in Strauss as a public official, as a conservative ideologist, or as a per­son. Moreover, all his instincts favored giving a Presi­dent, any President, unlimited choice in picking his Cabi­net, particularly when, as in the case of Strauss, there was no hint of corruption or malfeasance.

...Johnson dispatched Bobby Baker to do a hard head count, making sure that each Senator realized the Majority Leader himself had no position. The result of the head count gave Strauss an edge. But the margin was so close that whichever way Johnson would go might well decide the matter. By now... that Strauss confirmation hearing had become a liberal witch-hunt....

Johnson... dispatched Bobby Baker on a head count a second time. Baker informed fence-sitting and pro-Strauss Democratic Senators that 'we' are going to go against the nomination. When word of this startling development seeped into the cloakroom, the tide turned against Strauss. Two liberal Democrats who had been for Strauss, John F. Kennedy and Richard Neuberger, now were against him. (Lyndon B. Johnson: the Exercise of Power, p. 214.)

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in A Thousand Days, doesn't attribute Kennedy's switch to Johnson's influence. Reminiscing about a dinner on Harvard Commencement evening in June 1959, Schlesinger writes:

What stands out from the evening was a discussion of the confirmation of Lewis Strauss, whose name President Eisenhower had recently submitted to the Senate as Sec­retary of Commerce. It was politically essential for Kennedy, as a liberal Democratic aspirant, to vote against Strauss. But, though he had no use for him, he had a be­lief, with which I sympathized, that any President was entitled to considerable discretion in naming his cabinet. In addition, though this mattered less, his father, an old friend of Strauss's, strongly advocated confirmation. My impression was that Kennedy was looking for a re­spectable reason to oppose Strauss. At this point, Mac [McGeorge] Bundy, whose ancestral Republicanism had survived Dewey and Eisenhower, suddenly spoke up for rejecting the nomination. The backing of Harvard's Dean of the Faculty may have somewhat reassured Kennedy, who voted against Strauss a few days later (pp. 13-14).

It was well known that Lyndon Johnson was in charge of the get-Strauss operation in the Senate. The instigation seemed to come from Clinton Anderson, but the organizing and directing came from Johnson.

Admiral Strauss had pointed out in his own restrained review of the case, in his book Men and Decisions, that Johnson, "whose opposition to the nomination, though not publicly ex­pressed, was known to his colleagues", on Wednesday, June 17, 1959 left an impression in the minds of certain Senators who were for confirmation that the matter wouldn't come to a vote before Monday, June 22. Three pro-Strauss Senators had speaking engagements in the West that weekend, and accord­ingly left Washington. Thursday, June 18, the Senate agreed to vote before the close of business. Two of the three got back in time to vote (Eisenhower sent fast planes from the Air Force to bring them), the third was "paired" with an anti-Strauss Senator. The outcome was not determined, though the character of the operations was indicated, by these maneuvers. When nearly all the chips were down, Johnson still needed two Republican votes to beat Strauss. He got them from his old friend Margaret Chase Smith, and Wild Bill Langer of North Dakota. The vote (taken shortly after midnight, it was now June 19) was 49 to 46 against the anti-Communist Strauss. Evans and Novak summarize: "...it was for Johnson a victory in the old style: dramatic, close, secretive--but somehow joyless".

Well, not entirely joyless. Pravda was jubilant. Moscow Radio broadcast the victory cry of the bull ape:

Long before the discussion of his candidature in the Capitol, Lewis Strauss aroused the hatred of all honorable Americans. The United States Senate has torn the down and feathers from Strauss and he has appeared before the public stark naked as a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary and an inveterate enemy of peace.

The hatred of all honorable Americans! Clinton Anderson was an "honorable" man. Lyndon Johnson was an "honorable" man. So were they all--all 49 of them--honorable men. All ex­cept Maggie. She was a woman. But I'm sure she wouldn't want anybody to discriminate. She was as honorable as the oth­ers.

The condemnation of McCarthy and the rejection of Strauss were, from the point of view of polite liberals and timid conser­vatives, two very different events. Evans and Novak, for ex­ample, think of the McCarthy "censure" (as they insist on call­ing it, thought they know very well, and the thing was made a point of at the time, that technically it was not a censure) as one of the high points in the "public service" of Lyndon Johnson. The rejection of Strauss, on the other hand, they think of as a "cause... in question".

But to the hard core on either side, Left or Right, there was no question. To the hard core the Strauss case and the Mc­Carthy case were just alike. Wayne Morse laid it on the line. He told the Senate on June 18, 1959 that Lewis Strauss was "an enemy of the people". That is the standard form of a Soviet in­dictment. Here, for all their differences in style, were two anti-communist figures--McCarthy and Strauss--who had to be pros­ecuted. In both cases the Vyshinsky of the Senate was Lyndon Johnson.

* * * *
Let us begin a new chapter.

CHAPTER 6

REC #2 HATONN

MON., JUL. 4, 1994 10:33 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 322

MON., JUL. 4, 1994
THE USURPERS. Part 5
by Medford Evans
Western Islands (publishers), Belmont, Mass. 02178, 1968.

BARRY GOLDWATER
The last victim of Lyndon Johnson to be considered here--the only one after Dallas
--was not purely a victim. He helped to de-feat himself. Lyndon Johnson did not simply defeat Barry Goldwater in an election where the latter had--in a sense--campaigned against himself. Lyndon poured it on with an effort described by Evans and Novak as the "Anti-Campaign" (AC). The purpose of this was to "get under Barry Goldwater's skin, thereby achieving Johnson's overall goal of winning by the biggest possible margin".

Why was it such an obsession with Johnson "to win by so large a margin that the consensus he sought as the means to power would be ratified by an unprecedented electoral landslide"? (Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power, p. 465.) Well, if you had first come to Presidential power following the assassination of a popular President wouldn't you worry about a consensus? Goldwater's motivations are obscure. Most obscure are the motives of those behind both Johnson and Goldwater. Not that the same individuals backed both rival candidates.

The Establishment has its own consensus, and that consensus in 1964 was that Goldwater should run against Johnson, and that Johnson should win. This can hardly have been a matter of preferring Johnson as a person over Barry. The Establishment is, in any case, remarkably indifferent to personalities for their own sake. What seems to have been the point was that certain issues should be disposed of as permanently as possible, issues which an incumbent President would not logically bring up, issues which Goldwater could be counted on to pitch to Johnson, and which Johnson could be counted on to knock over the left-field bleachers. That's exactly the way it worked out.

The two issues that counted were (1) use of nuclear weapons, and (2) the Negro Revolution, or, as it was then more widely known, Civil Rights Movement. Both those issues were of tremendous intrinsic and political importance; both were raised by the Goldwater candidacy; and both were politically resolved to the decisive advantage of Lyndon Johnson. The Goldwater position--that nuclear weapons could conceivably be used to American advantage, and the Negroes were not a privileged caste--was violently attacked, poorly defended, and at last practically abandoned. All of this resulted in a mandate after November 3, 1964, by which the Johnson Administration could consider the United States unilaterally disarmed of the nuclear weapon, and could recognize the Negro as released from legal restriction, financial responsibility, social obligation, or moral inhibition. These results--disarmament and revolution-by-plebiscite--were evidently contemplated in advance by the Establishment, for reasons ultimately inscrutable but about which we might speculate.

Issues not planned in advance were not allowed to develop. I have in mind the issue involved in the Walter Jenkins case, which in an uncontrolled contest might have--in effect--cleared the decks of many other considerations. Granted that the American public has become relatively blase about almost everything relating to sex, and granted that the virtue of tolerance and the vice of cynicism resulted in the shrugging off what might have been one of the most odious of scandals; nevertheless the Walter Jenkins case would not have remained a matter of indifference to the American public if it had been publicly discussed, and Lyndon Johnson would not have emerged unscathed from the discussion.

Nowhere is homosexuality approved--except in the sick set. In general, it is condemned as anything from a capital crime to a pathetic aberration. It excites horror, disgust, ridicule, or pity. For the most part, people are reluctant to discuss it. That Barry Goldwater refused to discuss the Walter Jenkins case can be credited to his own normality and decency, but also his refusal constituted to some extent an evasion of responsibility. Walter Jenkins was one of Lyndon Johnson's very closest associates throughout most of his career. Jenkins' arrest in a public men's room on October 7, 1964 on a "morals charge" was not his first for a similar offense. It requires sickening sentimentality or repulsive hypocrisy to treat seriously Lady Bird Johnson's attempt to infuse the police blotter with saccharine and religiosity: "My heart is aching today for someone [Walter Jenkins] who has reached the end point of exhaustion in dedicated service to his country. I know the love of his wife and six fine children and his profound religious faith will sustain him through this period of anguish". Now nothing is more obvious than that the anguish to which she refers was anguish not just of getting caught--Jenkins had been caught before--but anguish at getting caught and not being able, in the midst of a Presidential campaign, to hush it up. Lady Bird said, in her rationalization and extenuation of Jenkins' misconduct, that he had "been carrying incredible hours and burdens since President Kennedy's assassination". She did not say what his hours and burdens had been before his similar arrest in 1959. She said, "He is now receiving the medical attention which he needs". She did not say whether he had received medical attention after committing the same offense in 1959, but it is self-evident that if he did the treatment was unsuccessful. It is interesting to note that the principal burden of defending Jenkins was left to Lady Bird, who was of course above suspicion. Johnson kept severely silent on the Jenkins affair, though by so doing he did risk censure from the Liberals for hardheartedness. Tough as a boot, Johnson followed the motto: Never complain, never explain. Not that he always follows that motto to be sure. He will complain by the hour, explain ad infinitum if it seems to serve an important purpose. But when the Jenkins case broke, the wheel went momentarily out of Johnson's hands; fate, or someone, had to save him.

Partly it was fate, partly it was Barry Goldwater. What fate did was to give the news media, within twenty-four hours, the story of Khrushchev's ouster from the Kremlin, and the next day the report of Red China's alleged explosion of its first atomic bomb.
It is interesting to remember that Jenkins was actually arrested October 7 and that through the efforts of various persons, notably Abe Fortas and Clark Clifford, the publicity was delayed for a week, and when the thing finally did break it was within reaction distance of the Chinese and Russian news-busters. Theodore White has summarized:

...the nation, in mid-campaign, had to face the fact that the President's closest personal assistant, an attendant at National Security Council meetings, master of the inner chambers of the White House, was a sexual deviate.

For twenty-four full hours Republicans and Democrats alike held their breath to see how the nation would react. And perhaps the most amazing of all events of the campaign of 1964 is that the nation faced the fact fully--and shrugged its shoulders. (The Making of the President, 1964, p. 368.) [H: You have come "a long way Baby"! YOU would now make the "deviate" President and incarcerate the citizens who might refer to him as "deviate"!)

Well, it wasn't exactly like that. The nation did not have Theodore White, for one, putting it to them quite so clearly, before the election. Brief exposure in the press
--even the widest-- makes slight impression on the public mind. Most of us assume that if a news item is important we'll hear it again, many times, and if we don't hear it again, we're likely to feel that it must not have been important--maybe not even true. All propagandists know this. In the Spring of 1953 a little group of publishing people whom I met in Washington asked me what "fallout" was, and I was rather vain about being able to tell them. In a way, too, I was gratified that they didn't know, for I regarded it as evidence that the propaganda of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, to which I was strongly opposed, had failed, since the Bulletin had been trying for some time to impress the public with the dangers of fallout. But determined propagandists with sufficient resources never give up. It was actually four years later, in the Spring of 1957, when Norman Cousins got a state­ment signed by the late Dr. Albert Schweitzer, that the world--suddenly, it seemed--began to seethe with conversations among the politely well-informed about the dangers of fallout. There was really nothing sudden about it. They had scratched that match a thousand times before it ever ignited.

Nobody followed through on the Walter Jenkins thing. No­body explained to "the nation" that Jenkins really had been picked up by the police for misconduct in the men's room--not just writing on the walls. Nobody impolitely emphasized that this was not a first offense. There was no reportage in depth on the long and intimate association of Walter Jenkins and Lyndon Johnson. No one wrote a column pointing out that there is no demonstrated cause-and-effect relationship between "exhaustion in dedicated service to [one's] country" and homosexual acts.

I think the essential thing about the Jenkins case is that it was just not in the original script, so that when it happened--like a stray dog running on stage in the midst of Hamlet's soliloquy--you just get him off as quickly as possible and try to forget it. Except this one wasn't funny.

Two issues were in the script: (1) nuclear weapons, (2) "Civil Rights". Two objectives of the Establishment were these: that the United States might be prevented from ever using the atomic weapons on which were spent so many billions of dollars and on which nearly the whole strategy of our defense depended; and that Negroes might be free to riot in the streets of major cities of the United States. To attain these objectives two things were required: (1) the election of Lyndon Johnson, (2) the annihilation of Barry Goldwater. Of course, both Johnson and Goldwater were subordinate to the attainment of the objectives. Johnson's replacement of John Kennedy on the fateful date of November 22, 1963 had promoted the objectives.

For the script, John Kennedy was not typical of the American people as a whole.
He was meeting resistance. In popular opinion, he was suspected of being an Eastern intellectual, known for being soft on Communism, and for being overcom­mitted to Negroes as a group. It seemed one could hear "popular opinion" saying:

'Good ole Lyndon, he's a tough redneck, and might be a little bit rough and even a little bit crooked, but he shore wouldn't be pro-Russian, and he shore wouldn't be pro-Negro.

'Yeh, good ole Lyndon.

'Jack Kennedy had all those wonderful qualities of charm and idealism and gallantry and humor. And good ole Lyndon, he's loyal to Jack's memory and he would do all the wonderful things Jack had dreamed of, but you come right down to it and Lyndon is more practical and he knows better how to get along with Congress--you know how close he was to Mr. Sam Rayburn--and taking everything into consideration it is just remarkable how with Lyndon we can have all that international sophisticated peace-loving atmosphere, and still keep our feet planted right in that good ole Texas dirt, with no danger of being flimflammed by a bunch of slick foreigners or uppity Negroes.

'Now this Goldwater sounds kind of dangerous. I know he's against Communists, and he doesn't think the Negroes ought to riot in the streets--but, shucks, everybody feels that way. Ole Lyndon will sure take care of that, but this Goldwater he wants to go too far'.

Well so it seemed. Goldwater put himself in the position of always trying to prove that he had not gone, was not going, would not go too far. The great flaw in this defensive strategy was that it seemed to concede that Johnson, who was presum­ably not going far enough, was at least going in the same direc­tion. Goldwater never made the point that whether he was or was not going too far, Lyndon Johnson was going
the other way! Whether Goldwater did or did not have an itchy finger for the atomic trigger--and, of course, that was an important question, about which in due course he would have to take a stand--Gold­water, as matters stood, and still stand, did not have any kind of finger on the atomic trigger. Lyndon Johnson had the atomic gun in his own holster, and the fact was that he was not ever going to use it. It was of no more use than a water pistol.

The Strategic Air Command, and the missiles, and the Po­laris submarines, and the Army's tactical nuclear weapons such as Honest John and Davy Crockett are fearsome and wonderful weapons. They cost a fearsome and wonderful amount of money, and the ground, sea, and air forces of this country are so geared to their use--or, more accurately, their hypothetical use--that, if they are never to be used, the ground, sea, and air forces will be impotent. Without the option (to adopt McNar­mara's word) of actually using nuclear weapons, the United States of America, which is spending fifty billion dollars a year on national defense, hasn't really got any national defense--a sad fact which we have demonstrated negatively in Cuba and positively in Vietnam.

While Johnson was talking about his own wonderful restraint in not pushing that nuclear button--and, of course, the way things are now he couldn't push it if he wanted to--bragging about how he loved peace and was saving the world from nu­clear holocaust, he was already escalating a non-nuclear war in Vietnam, a conflict which has resulted in nothing from the American point of view except a sort of ritualistic sacrifice of our sons. [H: The author obviously did not know or believe about the testing and training of those "sons" in mind-con­trol manipulated marionetteism OR the value of that war as pertained to the DRUG TRADE FOR THE USA. Johnson DID KNOW ENOUGH to manage to filch a bunch of U.S. gold stash and let his cute little "bride" trade it in Mexico.] Something of that sort--all of which is true--is what Goldwater should have said. Instead, he tried to prove that particular sug­gestions he made, such as using atomic weapons in Vietnam, or giving NATO commanders authority to use tactical nuclear weapons, were sound suggestions. It happens that they probably are sound, but technical considerations are involved on which the public cannot possibly have an informed opinion, and these are not matters that should be injected into a political campaign.

What should be injected into a campaign at this time is the broad charge that the Johnson Administration has been and still is engaged in a program of depriving this country of any kind of effective military defense. We have talked and negotiated ourselves into a position in which, partly for diplomatic but largely for psychological reasons, we cannot use nuclear weapons. At the same time, we do not have any other kind of weapons with which to defend the country in a nuclear age.

The doctrine that we must develop "conventional" or "guerilla" warfare because nuclear war is unthinkable has had no practical result but to eliminate our capacity to make nuclear war. If there are answers to these charges, then we should hear the answers. Goldwater did not make the charges. He was too busy trying to show that he was really a reasonable man, and had not gone too far. The public concluded that there was no use taking a chance on a man who might be going too far so long as you had a solid man like Johnson who would just stubbornly hold the line--who would, as a matter of fact, be conser­vative about the thing. The public was never told that Johnson and the Johnson Administration were unilaterally disarming America, while still charging the taxpayers fifty billion dollars a year for arms.

There is general agreement among post-election analysts that the nuclear issue killed Goldwater in 1964. The nuclear issue was a trap, set by two decades of propaganda from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, propaganda which by 1964 had achieved dizzying success among the scientific and cultural am­ateurs who are the professionals of the upper business and politi­cal world. But the propaganda still needed ratification by some kind of plebiscite.

There was an uneasy feeling among the intelligentsia that the man in the street was proud of the American military success at Hiroshima, that he agreed with Winston Churchill that only the atom bomb in American hands had prevented the Soviet conquest of western Europe in the decade following World War II, and that he was on the whole fully prepared to back a President who would not only threaten but actually impose massive retaliation on imprudent foreign aggressors.

While the nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was an important step toward United States nuclear disarmament, it was too much concerned with technical matters to have much direct psychological impact on the dangerously chauvinistic attitude of the average United States citizen.

Now if a Presidential candidate who was associated in the public mind with a readiness to use nuclear weapons could be decisively defeated by a candidate breathing apocalyptic prophecies of nuclear holocaust at the first touch of "the button" , then the intellectuals and the Establishment would have their popular mandate to dismantle America's atomic defenses!

Since the Fall of 1948, when publishers and high government officials met to discuss the Berlin situation at the home of Washington Post publisher Philip Graham (as reported in The Forrestal Diaries) there has been uneasy "agreement that in the event of war the American people would not only have no question as to the propriety of using the atomic bomb, but would in fact expect it to be used".

The announcement in 1949 of an alleged Russian bomb, and three years of Korean War in which the United States lost face tremendously rather than use the bomb, had given the intelligentsia hope that popular insistence on use of the bomb might be weaker than previously supposed, and in any case not governing. But, for the Establishment it would still be an enormous relief to have in the record some apparent repudiation of nuclear "brinkmanship" by the American masses. The atomic scientists, the media, and the Johnson Administration were set to overwhelm Barry Goldwater in 1964 with genuine scorn, phony erudition, simulated humanitarianism, and artful advertising. Barry Goldwater was not wily enough to match wits with the Establishment on the nuclear issue.

Establishment Republicans at the Republican Convention in San Francisco in 1964 devoted far less intelligence to stopping Goldwater from receiving the nomination than they did to making sure that when he did receive it he would have to run as a hawk on nuclear weapons (the word is of a later vintage, but it fits) and as a copperhead (older vintage) on Civil Rights. They further made very sure that on both these issues at least half of the Republican Party would not be with him. In consequence of that, the candidate would inevitably take a half-hearted stand, which would discourage and alienate voters who agreed with him on the issues, voters who had long ago taken their position voluntarily and firmly. During the campaign of the Autumn of 1964 these voters would see Goldwater taking their position hesitantly and under pressure. There was no victory in this prospect.

Theodore White tells how at San Francisco, on the eve of the convention, a resolution sponsored by candidate William Scranton, denouncing Goldwater's position on use of nuclear weapons, was so managed in the lobbies and corridors (without ever reaching the convention floor), was so obtrusively bungled in its processing (with former President Eisenhower in and out of the picture) that in the end it could not possibly help Scranton or hurt Goldwater as far as getting the nomination was concerned, but would inevitably linger in men's minds after the convention to hurt Goldwater badly in the campaign. White says:

As the Eastern Republicans debated their strategy... [one of them] with a foretaste of what they were doing to Goldwater, summed up their efforts thus: "What we were looking for was something that would put the nation and the rank and file of the Party on the alert to the fact that our leading candidate was impetuous, irresponsible and slightly stupid" (The Making of the President, p. 197).

Sarcastic irony, no doubt. Yet it is a fact that what beat Goldwater so badly in November 1964 was the financial and publicity power of the Establishment. And two things about the Establishment should be remembered: (1) it includes the top "Eastern Republicans", and (2) it has long been on the friendliest of terms with Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson's victory and Goldwater's defeat, important as they seemed to the candidates and 70 million voters, were incidental compared with the effective outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons which was accomplished by the campaign and election results of 1964.

Barry Goldwater was a victim of the 1964 campaign not because he lost--somebody has to lose in every Presidential campaign--but because he was selected to lose, selected to be tied to the nuclear weapons issue and to take it down to oblivion with him. In more normal campaigns domestic issues are raised against a candidate to hurt him and his party. In the campaign of 1964, Barry Goldwater was nominated and deserted by his party (every state he carried, except Arizona, is normally Democratic) on an international issue. And the Anti-Campaign was waged in such a way as to create a popular consensus, or an illusion of popular consensus, matching the long-standing consensus of the intelligentsia, against American use of nuclear weapons. Goldwater, a man of disciplined military intelligence wanted, says White, to "put the issue to rest". He put it to rest all right. By getting less than 39 per cent of the popular vote, he--and those who contrived such an outcome, of whom Johnson was certainly more important than Barry--insured that no prospect of military debacle will ever provoke any U.S. military commander to demand of the Johnson Administration or its successor permission to use nuclear weapons in defense of the United States. Moreover, by this reverse effect, he paved the way for that disarmament of the United States which seeks to assure the enemy that we will not use nuclear weapons in retaliation even if they are used against us.

During the campaign Goldwater insisted on speaking of the nuclear weapons issue, tentatively, honestly, probing as a citizen should for answers, not being sure that he had them--when politically he would have fared better either to attack ruthlessly the Johnson-McNamara unilateral disarmament program (a job that badly needed doing) or else--implying high discretion in all matters involving national security--to maintain on the nuclear question a knowing silence. On the other great issue of the campaign
--Civil Rights--it would have paid Goldwater in political coin of the realm to speak long, loud, and often. Instead, he insisted on silence.

On the nuclear issue Barry Goldwater spoke, but defensively; forgoing an occasion for merciless attack on the Administration he threw that issue away. He tried even harder to throw the race issue away, but won five states on it in spite of himself. The only other state he won at all was his native Arizona.

Goldwater was a victim in the course of Johnson's career. He was selected, not to be personally punished like McCarthy and Strauss, but to be a symbolic lesson--putting the thing in Liberal lingo, to show what happens to even an agreeable sort of fellow when he gets in the way of "history". With Barry Goldwater, it was thought that we should have heard the last in the United States of both nuclear warmongering and reactionary race prejudice. Under the benign and far-seeing leadership of the beatific Johnson we should enter a promised era of peace and brotherly love in which we could labor joyfully to perfect the Great Society. Sharp escalation in Vietnam and Black Power were just around the corner.

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I suppose most people would agree privately that the out-standing personal characteristics of Lyndon Johnson as seen publicly are meanness and hypocrisy. I am not saying that he is mean or hypocritical, for I do not know him that well; I am just pointing out that this is the way many people, probably most, feel about it these days if you come right down to it. Picking up beagles by the ears, bawling out people that work for him in front of strangers--these are not the actions of a kindly man. Theodore White quotes an observer of Johnson in the White House: "It isn't that he's mean to important people--he's mean to servants". You understand that the observer did not mean that Johnson was not mean to important people--anecdotes abound to show that he is. The observer may well have meant, it appears, that it is more detestable to be mean to the humble than to the high and mighty. It seems particularly detestable in a President who never misses an opportunity to preach the virtues of humility and compassion, who like a hippy exhorts us to be led by love.

But perhaps--perhaps--some of the anguish of the American people concerning Lyndon Johnson as President has been re­lieved.

On March 31, 1968, Lyndon Johnson announced that he would neither seek nor accept his Party's renomination for a second full term as President of the United States. Whether this announcement was just another shrewd political maneuver, or something forced upon the President by those who wield great influence over him, makes little difference. The power clique which now controls Washington and the United States is so firmly entrenched that only an aroused American people, fully aware of the continuing nature of the power this clique exercises can possibly make a real difference.

The purpose here is to help the reader reach decisions--not on any one political leader, or Presidential candidate, for any one election--but on the deeper and transcendent issues of our times. To do this we must first examine, at some length, important aspects of the Johnson Administration and certain key Administra­tion, and career men.

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Let us end this chapter here.