PJ 97
CHAPTER 3

REC #2 HATONN

MON., MAY 30, 1994 10:20 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 287

MON., MAY 30, 1994
CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 7)
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 5, PARAGRAPH 1
Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller num­ber may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide.

Federalist Papers, No comment.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 5, PARAGRAPH 2
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

Federalist Papers, No comment.

CONSTIMTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 5, PARAGRAPH 3
Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the jour­nal.

Federalist Papers, No comment.

CONSTITUTION: ARTI LE 1
SECTION 5, PARAGRAPH 4
Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, with­out the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

CONSTITUTION: ARTI LE 1
SECTION 6, PARAGRAPH 1
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensa­tion for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Federalist Papers, No comment.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 6, PARAGRAPH 2
No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been in­creased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 55, Par. 9, James Madison:

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of of­fice, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous cor­ruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suf­fice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of cor­ruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortu­nately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties, and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the peo­ple, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated and to substitute an in­discriminate and unbounded jealousy with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty who give them­selves up to the extravagancies of this passion are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of de­pravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circum­spection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human na­ture which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qual­ities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. PUBLIUS

No. 77, Par. 1, Alexander Hamilton:

It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appoint­ments, that it would contribute to the stability of the admin­istration. The consent of that body would be necessary to dis­place as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revo­lution in the officers of the government as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any sta­tion had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained for attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official exis­tence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the greater permanency of its own com­position, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 1
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments on other bills.


No. 66, Par. 7, Alexander Hamilton:

But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representa­tives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be con­ferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting impeach­ments; is not this a complete counterbalance to that of deter­mining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elec­tions of the President which do not unite the suffrages of a ma­jority of the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent power of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict that, as a mean influence, it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 2
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa­tives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be pre­sented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it but if not, he shall return it with his objec­tions to the house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, to­gether with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered and, if approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respec­tively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjourn­ment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 69, Par. 5, Alexander Hamilton:

The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legisla­ture, for reconsideration; but the bill so returned is not to be­come a law unless, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence and is to be as­cribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of substi­tuting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the con­vention have copied.

No. 73, Par. 3, Alexander Hamilton:

The last of the requisites to energy which have been enumer­ated are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States.

The first thing that offers itself to our observation is the qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolution of the two houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills with objections to have the effect of pre­venting their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the component members of the legislative body.

The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments has been already more than once suggested. The insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each has also been remarked upon, and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to de­fend himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense.

But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to in­fluence a majority of that body.

The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a num­ber of men; and that unless this presumption should be enter­tained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body.

But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the execu­tive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be in­fallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inad­vertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those er­rors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those mis­steps which proceed from the contagion of some common pas­sion or interest. It is far less probable that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.

It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the ex­cess of lawmaking, and to keep things in the same State in which they happen to be at any given period as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may pos­sibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply com­pensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the leg­islative body in a free government and the hazard to the execu­tive in a trial of strength with that body afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and that there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost re­sources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displea­sure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable that he would ultimately venture to ex­ert his prerogative, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exer­cised.

If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reason­ably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a gov­ernment wholly and purely republican?


It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not us­ing. his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in prac­tice. But it will not follow that, because it might be rarely exer­cised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitu­tional rights of the executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of de­fense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsi­bility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimu­lated by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents who, though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.

But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to de­pend on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the execu­tive the qualified negative already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO might not scruple to return it for reconsideration, subject to be­ing finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very respectable propor­tion of the legislative body whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of this conduct in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed. In propor­tion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised, and for this very reason it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time and this, too, in defiance of the counterpoising weight of the execu­tive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case than that such views should taint the resolutions and con­duct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the executive will often have a silent and unperceived, through forcible, oper­ation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition from doing what they would with eagerness rush into if no such external impediments were to be feared.

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in the State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so ap­parent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its declared admirers. (Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention, is of this number).

I have in another place remarked that the convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the constitution of this State in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the executive. PUBLIUS
[H: Please go back and read that LAST sentence and then perhaps you'll see how far you have strayed!]
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 3
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limita­tions prescribed in the case of a bill.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No, 69, Par. 5, Alexander Hamilton, and
No. 73, Par. 3, Alexander Hamilton, are applicable to this paragraph as well.

END OF CHAPTER SEVEN

CHAPTER 4

REC #2 HATONN

TUE., MAY 31, 1994 12:29 P.M. YEAR 7, DAY 288

TUE., MAY 31, 1994
CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 8)
[H: This section of your Constitution is just about the most important segment for it deals with all those things which have been usurped incorrectly, destroyed blatantly and taken over by the Elite power-brokers under guise of amendments, emergencies, total lies, executive orders and by letting (causing) the public to cease knowing anything in the original set of rules by replacing them with that which seemed sound at the time of inspiration but later became simply a tool integrated without asking, unlawfully instituted and perpetuated and, ultimately, rewriting to suit selves for a New World Order. Each thing in this section deserves so much attention from every aspect but we will diligently offer only that which is referenced and in the manner referenced by the persons in point at the writing and debating. Read carefully and weep for your nation.... Indeed, you have reached "childhood's end" in so many ways as to be lost in the counting!
The amount of writing will be large so we will effort to break up the portions into manageable lengths with an eye to continuity. We ask that readers bear with us for some will literally, as in paragraph 1, Sec. 8, be inclusive of many pages of documentation. Let us just hold together and get through this task at hand and later we will all be grateful for the opportunity of again sharing with the original drawers of the Constitution along with the original reasoning and expla­nations offered. You do not have to take "modern" man's interpretation--go to the "horse" if you want information from the "horse's mouth"!]
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 8, PARAGRAPH 1
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 30, Alexander Hamilton:


It has been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be in­cluded the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with mili­tary arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union in respect to revenue must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must em­brace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be con­tracted; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The conclusion is that there must be interwoven in the frame of the government a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.

Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every consti­tution. From a deficiency in this particular, one or two evils must ensue: either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atro­phy, and, in a short course of time, perish.

In the Ottoman or Turkish empire the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people at discretion, and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the State. In America, from a like cause, the gov­ernment of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of de­cay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands to provide the rev­enues which the necessities of the public might require?

The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to repose in the United States an unlimited power of providing for the pe­cuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles, which com­pose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary in their judgment to the service of the United States; and their requisi­tions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion be­yond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed; yet in practice it has been constantly exer­cised and would continue to be so as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been is within the knowledge of every man the least con­versant in our public affairs and has been abundantly unfolded in different parts of these inquiries.
It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation which affords ample cause of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.

What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it--in a change of the falla­cious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What sub­stitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own rev­enues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human in­genuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from de­fective supplies of the public treasury.

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution ad­mit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call internal and external taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate that fundamental maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be proportionate to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments, in­consistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle more than once adverted to the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be re­garded as a position warranted by the history of mankind that, in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a nation, in every stage of its existence, will be found at least equal to its re­sources.

To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States is
on the one hand to acknowledge that this sys­tem cannot be depended upon, and on
the other hand to depend upon it for everything beyond a certain limit. Those who
have carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited
by experience or delineated in the course of these pa­pers must feel an invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the
Union and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and
its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be rec­ollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the econ­omy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is un­worthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a gov­ernment half supplied and always necessitous can fulfill the pur­poses of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be anything else than a succession of expedi­ents, temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate ne­cessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or en­larged plans of public good?

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own author­ity to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burden­some in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudu­lent debtors--with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.

It may perhaps be imagined that from the scantiness of the resources of the country the necessity of diverting the estab­lished funds in the case supposed would exist, though the na­tional government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehen­sion on this head: one is that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is that whatever deficiencies there may be can without difficulty be supplied by loans.

The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxa­tion by its own authority would enable the national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sighted­ness of avarice.

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facil­ity, inflict upon it. PUBLIUS

No. 31, Alexander Hamilton:

In disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry that the whole is greater than its parts; that things equal to the same are equal to one an­other; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and that all right angles are equal to each other. Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common sense that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irre­sistible.

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human heart that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common sense than any of those mysteries in religion against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled.
[H: Reread that paragraph, please, considering the terms, references to matter, etc., and re­mind yourselves that this was written IN 1788 (OVER 200 YEARS AGO)! COULD IT NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN "FIRST", THIS AFTERNOON? JUST HOW FAR HAVE YOU GONE--FRIENDS?]
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less tractable.
To a certain degree it is right and useful that this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations we should be dis­posed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the pas­sions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties.

How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sin­cere in their opposition) that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the gov­ernment of the Union should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place as introductory to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in substance as follows:

A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is re­sponsible, free from every other control but a regard to the pub­lic good and to the sense of the people.

As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no pos­sible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of an­swering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be com­prehended in that of providing for those exigencies.

As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the federal government must of ne­cessity be invested with unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antago­nists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness of truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it.

Those of them which have been most labored with that view seem in substance
to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are at least of equal impor­tance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, there­fore, as necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the na­tional government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power
of taxation in the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive the former of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be NEC­ESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pre­tense of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly to the entire exclusion and de­struction of the State governments".

This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the con­stitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpa­tions of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable abyss and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn to escape from the apparitions which itself has raised. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers and, by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place: that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State governments by their original constitu­tions are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpations from that quarter? Doubt­less in the manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford to a proper extent the same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State gov­ernments to encroach upon the rights of Union is quite as proba­ble as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ towards insuring success. As in republics, strength is always on the side of the people and, as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every­thing beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people, who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to hoped will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States. PUBLIUS

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END OF CHAPTER EIGHT