PJ 96
CHAPTER 5
REC #2 HATONN

MON., MAY 23, 1994 12:58 P.M. YEAR 7, DAY 280

MON., MAY 23, 1994
CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 2)
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 1
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 45, Par. 9, James Madison:

....The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce: with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal or­der, improvement, and prosperity of the State. [H: And next, you shall see how insidiously the words are redefined and a takeover of authority through such as "war" (and declara­tions thereof), "emergency" and thus and so are usurped to finally come to mean: a takeover by the "federal" hierarchy to take from the States and The People that which is right­fully theirs to determine. Just as with "taxes", there is spe­cific authority--needing No Amendments. The Constitution, for instance, clearly states that there shall BE NO TAX ON PERSONAL INCOME AND ALL THE (TAX) AMEND­MENTS COMING FORTH ARE, THEREFORE, UNLAW­FUL!]

The operations of the federal government will be most exten­sive and important in times of war [H: Against the "several" united States.] and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security. As the former periods will proba­bly bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the gov­ernments of the particular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POW­ERS....

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 2. PARAGRAPH 1
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem­bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State Shall have the Qualifi­cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 39, Par. 5, James Madison:

....The duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard and to the model of State constitu­tions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective for the period of six years, which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no explicit provision is made for the im­peachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Vir­ginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continu­ance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behav­ior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

Could any further proof be required of the republican com­plexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guar­anty of the republican form to each of the latter. [H: now I ask you: What is there NOT TO UNDERSTAND?]
....Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Consti­tution will, if established, be a federal and NOT a national con­stitution.

The next relation is to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Repre­sentatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on the same principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is national, not federal. The Sen­ate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal, not na­tional. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allot­ted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal mem­bers of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the na­tional representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations from so many distinct and co-equal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation of the government, is by the adver­saries of the plan of the convention supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this crite­rion, it falls under the national--not the federal character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. But the operation of the government on the people in their individual ca­pacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, in the sense of its opponents, on the whole, designate it, in this re­lation, a national government....

No 45, Par. 7, James Madison:

....The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is no­wise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing to­wards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for the appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.

The number of individuals employed under the Constitution; of the United States will be much SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER EMPLOYED UNDER THE PARTICULAR STATES. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town of­ficers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be em­ployed in the administration of the federal system....

No. 52, Par. 3, James Madison:

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very prop­erly considered and regulated by the convention. A representa­tive of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no of­fice under the United States. Under these reasonable limita­tions, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth or to any particular profession of religious faith.

The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In or­der to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; second, whether they be necessary or useful.

First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in gen­eral should have a common interest with the people, so it is par­ticularly essential that the branch of it under consideration , should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sym­pathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be fol­lowed whenever it can be found.

The scheme of representation as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied is the House of Com­mons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too ob­scure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the dis­cretion of the monarch that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal am­bition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II that the intermissions should not be pro­tracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term "frequently", which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elec­tions which has been deemed necessary in the kingdom for binding the representatives to their constituents does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the de­gree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far ex­tend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal system, can­not possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty‑five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the peri­ods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial election would have been dangerous to the public liber­ties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the com­mencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good as well with regard to the then colonies whose elec­tions were least frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater fre­quency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I con­ceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exer­cised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim that where no other circum­stances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be; more­over, watched and controlled by the several collateral legisla­tures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With the less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

No. 53, Par. 1, James Madison:

I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become prover­bial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true that when once established they are often applied to cases to which the rea­son of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists be­tween the sun of the seasons, and the period within which hu­man virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time, but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the vari­ous situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation' from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislature, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Car­olina they are biennial--as is proposed in the federal govern­ment. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that ei­ther the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The im­portant distinction so well understood in America between a constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alter­able by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil lib­erty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable as well with regard to the constitution as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental arti­cles of the government. They have in particular, on several oc­casions, changed the period of election, and, on the last occa­sion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elec­tions, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the peo­ple. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the cornerstone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no constitution, paramount to the govern­ment, either existed or could be obtained, No constitutional se­curity, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exer­tions? The most simple and familiar portion of time applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the ad­vance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what ne­cessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be [H: My, the found­ing fathers WERE, after all, dreamers--were they Not?] by the authority of a paramount constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will Not be more se­cure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a con­stitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elec­tions were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alter­ations by the ordinary power of the government?

The second question stated is whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious con­siderations.

No man can be a competent legislator who does Not add to an upright intention and a sound judgement a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public sta­tions. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowl­edge requisite to the due performance of the service. The pe­riod of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into the simple form: does this period of two years bear No greater proportion to the knowledge req­uisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the ques­tion, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the exist­ing laws which are uniform throughout the State and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are Not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conver­sation of every class of people. The great theater of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform that they vary in every State; whilst the public af­fairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learned in any other place than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the em­pire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other points? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effec­tually collected if they be Not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the dif­ferent States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of some internal cir­cumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other inferior objects will re­quire a proportional degree of information with regard to them.

It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draught will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the govern­ment will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute Not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the busi­ness of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in Novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.

A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative and which has Not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be Not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought Not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal gov­ernment. And although the House of Representatives is Not im­mediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrange­ments, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will fre­quently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, No doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.

There are other considerations, of less importance perhaps, but which are Not unworthy of Notice. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel and the ar­rangements rendered necessary by that circumstance might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if Not limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No ar­gument can be drawn on this subject from the case of the dele­gates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative as­semblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the rep­resentatives by the people would Not be governed by the same principle.

A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, be­come members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps Not unwilling to avail them­selves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members and the less the information of the bulk of the mem­bers, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is No less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections, even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elec­tions cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, No matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its mem­bers; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experi­ence for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirm­ing that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberties of the people.

No 52, Par. 1, James Madison:

From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last pa­pers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Rep­resentatives.

The first view to be taken of this part of the government re­lates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the con­vention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Con­stitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too depen­dent on the State governments that branch of the federal gov­ernment which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the conven­tion. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is comfortable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is Not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution....

No. 57, Par. 4, James Madison:

....Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the consti­tution of the House of Representatives that violates the princi­ples of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the man? Let me ask whether every circum­stance is Not, on the contrary, strictly comformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and preten­sions of every class and description of citizens?

Who are to be the electors of the federal representative? Not the rich, more than the poor; Not the learned, more than the ig­norant; Not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The elec­tors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in ev­ery State of electing the corresponding branch of the legisla­ture of the State.

Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citi­zen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and con­fidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representa­tive trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their con­stituents....

END OF CHAPTER TWO

* * *
I think that through these understandings you will find that you have moved just about as far away from the truth of the Constitution as you can get. You have men who stay in office for 30-plus years and whose property and POWER over you grows ex­ponentially with each passing session. Do you not see that if you removed this longevity of office and desire for the funds in greedy fashion and limited the qualifications as now expressed through "LAWYERS", you might be able to reclaim some righteous FREEDOM and WISDOM in that which comes forth from your unlawful, incredibly corrupt systems of intended an­nihilation of your nations. So be it.
CHAPTER 6
REC #2 HATONN

TUE., MAY 24, 1994 11:45 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 281

TUE.. MAY 24. 1994
CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 3)
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 2. PARAGRAPH 2
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have at­tained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 52, Par. 3, James Madison:

....The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representa­tive of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether na­tive or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious faith....

No. 60, Par. 11, Alexander Hamilton:

.... But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are the wealthy and the well-born, as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met within the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predeces­sors? If the latter is the case (as every intelligent man knows it to be [Particularly in the Southern States and in this State]) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of elections to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference ap­prehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifica­tions of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature....
CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 2 PARAGRAPH 3
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and ex­cluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years af­ter the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Repre­sentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 54, Par. 1, James Madison:

The next view which I shall take of the House of Representa­tives relates to the apportionment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.

It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The estab­lishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the for­mer case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America not to have found a ready preference with the con­vention.

All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it fol­low, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons.

This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid instating the reasoning which may be of­fered on the opposite side.

"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, "that representation relates more immedi­ately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact that slaves are consid­ered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as per­sons. The true state of the case is that they partake of both of these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some re­spects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for the mas­ter; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another--the slave may appear to be degraded from the hu­man rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed charac­ter of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negroes COULD NO LONGER BE REFUSED AN EQUAL SHARE OF REPRESENTATION WITH THE OTHER INHABITANTS.
[H: I am responsible for any emphasis in these writings other than occasional italics. I cannot let this pass without interjection. This looks pretty sick and pretty bad, doesn't it? Well, that's because IT IS BAD and it IS SICK. MAN has never been noted for his compassion and desire for true equality. He doesn't even consider GOD his "equal". How do I know this? Because all MAN really wants from GOD is to give him what he wants--enslave other men (and hopefully, God, as well) and he breaks every law as given forth from GOD to suit his own whims and wishes. But, readers, it is far worse than that--far worse. As regards the Negroes, one day you are going to have to accept the fact that Negroes were first brought to your planet as SLAVES--to work the mines, etc., in Africa. You don't believe me? You will! They started out as genetically altered species for that spe­cific purpose and now look what a sad state of affairs you of humanity have wrought upon selves. YOU will never rectify the miserable treatment of these beloved brothers and sis­ters--NEVER!
Next, consider ALL of your plights as you re-read the above paragraph--YOU ARE ALL ALREADY ENSLAVED--and paying for it. When a man's property can be taken by force FROM him by rules and regulations--AND TAXES, YOU ARE ENSLAVED AS SURELY AS THE SUN IS GOLDEN AND THE MOON IS SILVER IN COLOR. YOU ARE ALL ENSLAVED TO THE EVIL EMPIRE OF BANKSTERS AND CRIMINAL POLITICIANS WHO ARE GOING TO RUN THE WORLD IN THIS NEW WORLD ORDER--WHICH YOU WILL WORK FOR AND PAY FOR!
Do you see other relativities, perchance? Look at the rela­tionship (comparison) between the slaves and slave commu­nities--with or against TODAY! You have brought the slaves of color into a worse enslavement--with far more insult to his being. You CALL him FREE and yet he is, as a race, totally enslaved worse than any other one grouping in the world. You have reduced the black to the most collectively repre­sentative of the heinous abuse of the WELFARE system. The little black girl children are baby factories and you treat them like chaff--not even chattel. Is it different from "slave days"? How? You cause them to work at menial tasks and in the lower end of all wage scales, saying they are either not bright enough or ill-trained. You place them on welfare which fully represents the slave-owner's responsibility to HIS SLAVES. The only thing is that NOW you have all races and creeds sucked into the Evil Empire's trap--YOU ARE ALL BUT SLAVES IN SATAN'S EMPIRE OF ELITE RULERS!!!]

"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxa­tion, as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had re­jected the slaves from the list of inhabitants when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected that the Southern States would concur in a system which considered their slaves in some degree as men when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren should themselves con­tend that the government to which all the States are to be parties ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property than the very laws of which they complain?

[H: Ah, I hear you saying something about these "Christian" men who would do such a lousy thing to the blacks. Well, readers, number 1: NO MAN WHO HOLDS OR CON­DONES SLAVES IS A CHRISTIAN! I care not what they think to call themselves! Further, the slave TRADE coming from and through England--was mostly at the hands of or­ganized Khazarian traders and they were fully THE ANTI­CHRIST in full force and action...!]

"It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide.

"This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the in­habitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very ma­terial. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are de­prived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution appor­tions the representatives. [H: Right here you have the answer to "how could the federal Constitution uphold slavery? Be­cause the federal government is subservient (supposed to be) to the sovereign rule of the STATE CONSTITUTIONS! The States allowed for slavery--the federal government would have no alternative if it acted in its proper status as a gov­erning body FOR THE STATES AND THE WISHES OF THE SOVEREIGN CITIZENS OF THOSE STATES. Re­member, you had slaves and you had State regulations un­der State constitutions--AND YOU HAD TO RATIFY EVERYTHING, INCLUDING THE CONSTITUTION, WITH THOSE SEVERAL STATES. ALSO, AT THE TIME--ONLY MEN HAD RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE!] In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census ac­cording to their full number, in like manner with other inhabi­tants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth a peculiar one. Let the compromisingly expedient of the Constitu­tion be mutually adopted which regard them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabi­tants; which regards the slave as divested of two fifths of the man. [H: Indeed, indeed; sick, sick, sick. However, WHO owned slaves? Who had the power and the financial backing to OWN SLAVES? Not those nice pilgrims who landed and all but perished in establishment of the first days of a new world. The SLAVES CAME WITH THE ELITE DREGS of Elite Society! This was a business, a venture, and holdings of THE SATAN EMPIRE AS ESTABLISHED ON THE SHORES OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN FREELAND FOR ALL MEN--INCLUDING THE NATIVE AMERI­CANS WHO MET YOU HERE. One day you are going to go back and heed the words of your "fathers" and George Washington, etc., for they told you how it would come to pass--and it has....]

"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready de­fense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representa­tion related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property than of the persons of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this princi­ple it is that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands.

"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legisla­ture to the people of each State ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like indi­viduals, an influence over each other, arising from superior ad­vantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that the rich­est State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the represen­tatives of the larger and richest States possess any other advan­tage in the federal legislature over the representatives of other States than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confedera­tion, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary res­olutions of the States composing the union. Hence the States, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the pro­posed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will de­pend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or a smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the rep­resentatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal char­acter of the individual representative, rather than from any re­gard to the extent of the district from which he comes."

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern in­terests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established.

In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the co-operation of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of repre­sentation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to de­cide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests which will control and balance each other and produce the requisite impartiality. PUBLIUS

No. 58, Par. 1, James Madison:

The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.

It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jeal­ousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is be­held....

No. 55, Par. 1, James Madison:

The number of which the House of Representatives is to con­sist forms another and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contem­plated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depository of the public interests; second, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; third, that they will be taken from that class of citi­zens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourth, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.

In general it may be remarked on this subject that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative leg­islature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among States nearly equal in popula­tion. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the pro­portion in any of the other States.

Another general remark to be made is that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as when they are very few. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the stan­dard in Rhode island, they would, at this time, amount to be­tween four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representa­tive assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportion ably a better depository. And if we carry on the suppo­sition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the con­fusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citi­zen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same rea­son that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less frequent election than the pub­lic safety might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.

With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh the ob­jections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

The number of which this branch of the legislature is to con­sist, at the outset of the government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjec­ture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will, by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a con­trary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.

The true question to be decided, then, is whether the small­ness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depos­itory for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative an­swer to this question without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State legisla­tures, and the principles which are incorporated with the politi­cal character of every class of citizens. I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch and which possess so many means of counteracting the federal leg­islature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. [H: Everybody still awake? If he can't conceive of these things then how could YOU be expected to find yourselves in this position TODAY?] I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to be­tray the solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances time, and a fuller population of our country may produce requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.

From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and indepen­dent nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their fellow-citizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and re­callable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of of­fice, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous cor­ruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suf­fice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of cor­ruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortu­nately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the peo­ple, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an in­discriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty who give them­selves up to the extravagancies of this passion-are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of de­pravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circum­spection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human na­ture which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qual­ities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. PUBLIUS

No. 56, Par. 1, James Madison:

The second charge against the House of Representatives is that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the inter­ests of its constituents.

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diver­sity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.

It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representatives relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects which do not lie within the com­pass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular au­thority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.

What are of most importance, and which seem most to re­quire local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.

A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circum­stances of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, dif­fusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legisla­ture than to review the different laws and reduce them in one general act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of tax­ation for the whole Union, without any aid from oral informa­tion, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the State the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local, legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature, and ren­der a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another cir­cumstance. The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature, where all the local informa­tion and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legis­lature of the United States.

With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organiza­tion, movement, and discipline, which apply universally.

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the rep­resentatives ought to possess, and the time that might be neces­sary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a dif­ference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowl­edge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently repre­sented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find a great dis­similarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances con­nected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every rep­resentative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States: The changes of time, as was formerly re­marked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society of hus­bandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of pop­ulation may be accompanied with a proper increase of the repre­sentative branch of the government.

The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons. (Burgh's Political Disquisitions.) It can­not be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add anything either to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowl­edge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative coun­cils. On the contrary, it is notorious that they are more fre­quently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety, be consid­ered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a consid­erable number of others who do not reside among their con­stituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these con­cessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight mil­lions--that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of free­dom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every thirty thousand inhabi­tants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it. PUBLIUS

END OF CHAPTER THREE