PJ#096 HEAVE-HO (Phase Two)

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PJ 96

CHAPTER 7

REC #1 HATONN

WED., MAY 25, 1994 1:31 P.M. YEAR 7, DAY 282

WED., MAY 25, 1994

CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 4)

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 2, PARAGRAPH 4

When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 2, PARAGRAPH 5

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of im­peachment.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 79, Par. 4, Alexander Hamilton:

The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be im­peached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary in­dependence of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.

The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would he more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good. The result, except in the case of in­sanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.

[H: I can't see where this has anything to do with anything other than that there is an expectation that you will always have honorable judges within the judicial system and honor­able men in public office. It would seem that ALL of that assumption has most certainly gone by the wayside. You now live in a nation wherein the JUDGES protect and har­bor the criminals and investigate "themselves". Perhaps it is not so much the lack of intent in the beginning as the deteri­oration of the judicial system as a whole in all facets of that system AND the governing bodies politic. Not particularly applicable in point to the Constitution is the next paragraph in the Federalist Papers wherein Hamilton makes reference to New York and term limitation for judges and it is inter­esting enough to present it here.]

The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I believe there are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision. There is no station in relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating and com­paring faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance, we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor and how improbable it is that any considerable portion of the bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of this sort have little to rec­ommend them. In a republic where fortunes are not affluent and pensions not expedient, the dismission of men from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a super-annuated bench. [H: Only the first paragraph above is actually applicable to the House of Representatives and to impeachment but the other refer­ences to the judicial benches (judges) is most interesting--for in this one category you have digressed into the literal trash-can, good readers.]

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1,
SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 1

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No, 39, Par. 5, James Madison:

....The Senate, like the present Congress and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the peo­ple, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the sev­eral States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves...

No. 39, Par. 12, James Madison:

....The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal, not national. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate....

No, 45, Par.9, James Madison:

....The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures.... [H: Does ANYBODY see anything gone wrong here???]

....As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner", which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collec­tive sense of the State legislature can never be influenced by ex­traneous circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would em­brace the appointments to the Senate unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question in placed--whether in their hands or in those of the Union....

No. 62, Par. 4, Probably done by Madison:

III: The equality of representation in the Senate is another point which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation every district ought to have a proportional share in the government and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the stan­dard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former lies between the proposed government and government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of pru­dence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and instead of in­dulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous con­sequences which may qualify the sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States and an instru­ment for preserving the residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States, since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the con­stitution of the Senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the States. It must be ac­knowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States would be more rational if any interests common to them and distinct from those of the other States would otherwise be ex­posed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the fa­cility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of senators and the duration of their ap­pointment come next to be considered. In order to form an ac­curate judgment on both these points it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a Senate; and in order to ascertain these it will be necessary to review the incon­veniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their con­stituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view a Senate, as a second branch of the legislative as­sembly distinct from and dividing the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be polite to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.

Secondly. The necessity of a Senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked is that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought more­over to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a Senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of leg­islation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in ap­pointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of impor­tant errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be af­firmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What in­deed are all the repealing, explaining and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admoni­tions to the people of the value of those aids which may be ex­pected from a well constituted Senate?

A good government implies two things; first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; sec­ondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: Most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert that in the American governments, too little atten­tion has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the states, is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is veri­fied in private life, and becomes more just as well as more im­portant, in national transactions.

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.

In the first place it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once by all prudent people as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him; but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another, with the melancholy distinction, perhaps, that the for­mer with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage of the indiscretions of each other. Every nation consequently whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. [H: This should disturb you so greatly that you are compelled to read it again and again: "but the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. Is this not SHOCKING to you to see that even as your Constitution was being written you wondrous Americans had already been stripped of honor and respect? Freedom? Dear ones--no freedom and no liberty--even then and yet you had, as a nation, an opportunity to become that which would endure through the eons of time as a beacon of truth and "how-to" and you blew it again. How long will it be until, if we get it all cleaned up and you again into freedom and sovereignty, you have allowed the rats aboard the ship? How long can you blame another for that which YOU have allowed to come to be?]

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known and less fixed?

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable ad­vantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the mon­eyed few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the peo­ple. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest reared not by them­selves but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the few, not for the many.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking; the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.

But the most despicable effect of all is that diminution of at­tachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the peo­ple, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government any more than an individual will long be respected, without being truly respectable, nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability. PUBLIUS

No. 63, Par. 1, James Madison:

(March 1, 1788)

A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a Senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable pol­icy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the na­tional councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: The one is, that indepen­dently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is de­sirable on various accounts, that it should appear to other na­tions as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had in every instance been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numer­ous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assem­bly so durably invested with public trust that the pride and con­sequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode-Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a se­lect and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now labouring.

I add as a sixth defect, the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of election, which in other cases produces this re­sponsibility. This remark will perhaps appear not only new but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when ex­plained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes; the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a suc­cession of well chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The impor­tance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that and assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of mea­sures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accom­plished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence which their annual as­semblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult at any rate to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immedi­ate, detached and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient perma­nency to provide for such objects as require a continued atten­tion, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually an­swerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well constructed Senate, only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be some­times necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought in all governments, and actually will in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of inter­ested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice and truth can re­gain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their gov­ernment had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.

It may be suggested that a people spread over an extensive region cannot like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have on the contrary endeavored, in a former paper, to shew that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated repub­lic. At the same time this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked that the same extended situation which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all those considerations, to recol­lect that history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a Senate. Sparta, Rome and Carthage are in fact the only States to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a Senate for life. The constitution of the Senate in the last, is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council drawn out of the Senate was appointed not only for life; but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius of America, are notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the cir­cumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render ex­treme circumspection necessary in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained that there are many points of simil­itude which render these examples not unworthy of our atten­tion. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which re­quire the control of such an institution. The people can never willfully betray their own interests: But they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concur­rence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every pub­lic act.

The difference most relied on between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation, which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasoning's contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its im­portance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient government on the subject of representation is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a dis­quisition which would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the execu­tive functions were performed not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing the people in their executive capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually elected by the people at large. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly first of four and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the people; and partially representing them in their legislative ca­pacity; since they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws; but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The Senate of Carthage also, whatever might be its power or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most if not all the popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly in Sparta, we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary ca­pacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the people; and have been considered by some authors as an institu­tion analogous to those of Sparta and Rome; with this difference only that in the election of that representative body, the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political con­stitutions. The true distinction between these and the American Governments lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of representatives of the people, from the admin­istration of the former. The distinction however thus qualified must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in fa­vor of the United States. But to ensure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other ad­vantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illus­trated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content him­self with repeating that a Senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous preeminence in the government, and finally trans­form it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer the general reply ought to be suffi­cient; that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous in­stances of the former as well as of this latter; and that the for­mer rather than the latter is apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next cor­rupt the State legislatures, must then corrupt the House of Rep­resentatives, and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted, before it can at­tempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the peri­odical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal suc­cess on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that co­equal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the at­tempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succes­sion of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously per­suade himself that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pro­nounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people; and for a term less by one year only, than the federal Senate. It is distin­guished also by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment: and at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation, as is pro­vided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser dis­tinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections that do not lie against the latter. If the federal Senate therefore really contained the danger which has been so loudly pro­claimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitu­tion, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving from the salutary operations of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the union.

But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of op­ulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected for two years and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years; and in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here unquestionably ought to be seen, in full display, the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument the British history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual en­croachments of the House of Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its exam­ples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta the Ephori, that annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life, continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. The tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the peo­ple, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. This fact is the more remarkable as unanimity was re­quired in every act of the tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government which has the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose Senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had at the commencement of the second Punic war lost almost the whole of its original por­tion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assem­blage of facts, that the federal Senate will never be able to trans­form itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives with the people on their side will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. [H: Boy, you better be praying that this is so...!] Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affec­tions and support of the entire body of the people themselves. PUBLIUS

END OF CHAPTER FOUR

* * *

My recommendation to you readers is that you go right back to the beginning of this and reread it and reread it until it is locked into your brains. Had you followed and continued to follow the original plan--you would never have allowed such atrocities to have occurred within the halls of government and justice.

I may well concur with the patriots who have recently noted the guillotines brought forth into your nation and scattered into the various "concentration" points set forth for you-the-people--­perhaps the dirty bounders who have continued to corrupt and usurp power and honor, integrity and all the wealth of all of you, HAD BETTER GET NERVOUS ABOUT THEIR NECKS! Salu.

CHAPTER 8

REC #1 HATONN

THU., MAY 26, 1994 9:58 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 283

THU., MAY 26, 1994

CONSTITUTION-FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Chapter 5)

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 2

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legis­lature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 59, Par. 8, Alexander Hamilton:

It may easily be discerned also that the national government would run a much greater risk from a power in the State legis­latures over the elections of its House of Representatives than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be that a temporary combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of senators could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity of the body; and it is not from a general or permanent combination of the States that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures; the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people which will either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to the advancement of their happiness--in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance.

No. 68, Par. Last 1/3rd of 10, Alexander Hamilton:

....But lastly, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but de­stroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two sena­tors from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years"; and the latter directs that "if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of ANY STATE, the executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the leg­islature, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an ex­press power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State executives to fill casual vacancies in the Senate by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibil­ity, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 3

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 62. Par. 2, James Madison:

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinc­tions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.

No. 64. Par. 4, John Jay:

As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the peo­ple perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and with re­spect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded that wise kings will always be served by able ministers it is fair to argue that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and char­acters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally re­sults from these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for in­tegrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged. [H: Please note that you have come full tilt--back to treaties (which rank highest in command for honoring) now being made by "advisors", "cabinet members", members of the U.N.--al­most EVERYTHING except who SHOULD make them. Af­ter treaties and new laws are made they are NOW "ratified" by some two or three persons in the middle of some dark night in closets. People--you had better get your lessons in good repair according to TRUTH or you haven't a chance! How many classes such as this are ALLOWED in your schools and colleges? I thought not.]

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 4

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally dividd.

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1

SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 5

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.
[H: How many of you even know VVII0 that might be TODAY?]

CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE 1
SECTION 3. PARAGRAPH 6

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmative. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no persons shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.
Federalist Papers, Excerpts:

No. 39, Par. 5, (near end), James Madison:

....The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

No. 65, Par. 1, Alexander Hamilton:

The remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their par­ticipation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial charac­ter of the Senate.

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar pro­priety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the great­est danger that the decision will be regulated more by the com­parative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply con­cerns the political reputation and existence of every man en­gaged in the administration of public affairs speak for them­selves. The difficulty of placing it rightly in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections will as read­ily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depository of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing will be the least hasty in con­demning that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have pro­duced it.

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution it­self? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the represen­tatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of prefer­ring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative body. Will not the reasons which indi­cate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an ad­mission of the other branch of that body to a share of the in­quiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed pointed out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to pre­fer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter as the former seem to have regarded the prac­tice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?

Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tri­bunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused and the representa­tives of the people, his accusers? [H: How FAR HAVE YOU DETERIORATED here?]

Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusa­tion brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquility. The hazard, in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more nu­merous than would consist with a reasonable attention to econ­omy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of im­peachments is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the construc­tion of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must nec­essarily have to doom to honor or to infamy the most confiden­tial and most distinguished characters of the community forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an im­proper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: the punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. [H: PAY ATTEN­TION!] After having been sentenced to a perpetual os­tracism from the esteem and confidence and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecu­tion and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to appre­hend that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of er­ror in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive that by making the same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present and disqualification for a future office. It may be said that the intervention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special ver­dicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt? [H: Well, you have it EVERY DAY! This IS THE WAY IT WORKS IN THIS DAY!]

Would it have been an improvement of the plan to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of im­peachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the con­vention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to remark upon the addi­tional pretext for clamor against the judiciary, which so consid­erable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.

Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty argu­ments, as well against as in favor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection that it would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention is this: a court formed upon such a plan would either be attended with heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State governments, to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different which could rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. The second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously con­sider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated de­termination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have ex­posed them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of fac­tion will, at certain seasons, extend his scepter over all numer­ous bodies of men.

But, though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined or some other that might be devised should be thought preferable to the plan, in this respect reported by the convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been ad­justed to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will un­dertake to unite the discordant opinion of a whole community in the same judgement of it; and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his infallible criterion for the fallible crite­rion of his more conceited neighbor? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious. PUBLIUS

***

Please, readers, do not just browse through this material and toss it aside as a bother. IT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREEDOM, SUPERB GOVERNMENT, CITIZEN SOV­EREIGNTY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY--AND HOW TO GET THE CRIMINALS OUT--AND OF ANY OPPORTUNITY TO EVER HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN! WHETHER OR NOT YOU LIKE TO REALIZE IT--GOD IS GIVING YOU THIS LAST OPPORTUNITY TO SEE, TO HEAR AND TO ACT TO RECLAIM THAT WHICH YOU HAVE THROWN AWAY, IGNORED AND ALLOWED TO BE DESTROYED BY THE CRIMINALS YOU ALSO "ALLOWED" TO TAKE CONTROL. So be it.

***

No. 66, Par. 1, Alexander Hamilton:

(March 8, 1788)

A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impres­sions, which may still exist, in regard to this matter.

The first of these objections is that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body; in violation of that important and well established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and un­connected. This partial intermixture is even in some cases not only proper, but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government, against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive, upon the acts of the legisla­tive body is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indefensible barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may perhaps with not less reason be contended that the powers relating to impeachments are as be­fore intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them be­tween the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of these branches. As the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.

It is curious to observe with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who profess to admire without exception the constitution of the State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together with the chancellor and judges of the supreme court, not only a court of impeachments, but the highest judiciary in the State in all causes, civil and criminal. [H: So, it really DOES pay the President to appoint whomever he KNOWS WILL PRO­TECT HIS ASSETS IN ALL INSTANCES! You-the-people are talking right now about the possibility of impeachment of your President, Clinton--be very sure of HOW you go about such a thing should it come to be for upon history and true constitutional fundamentals should that act be accom­plished. If you continue with the false and deceitful prac­tices as now perpetuated by the ones in power--you will only have taken backward steps and the Elite will eat you alive!] The proportion, in point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New York in the last resort may, with truth, be said to reside in its senate. If the plan of the convention be in this respect chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little un­derstood, how much more culpable must be the constitution of New York? [H: Keep in mind that these papers were being run in the New York Times and were, in this instance, ad­dressed to the People of the State of New York. We are talking about year 1788. But where better to get your information about intent of, and actual writing of, the CONSTITUTION than from the ones who WROTE IT?]

A second objection to the Senate, as a court of impeach­ments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the executive in the formation of treaties, and in the appointment to offices: If, say the objectors, to these pre­rogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to decide on general principles where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?

If we take this course it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the convention, will then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the consid­erations stated in a former number, and by others which will oc­cur under the next head of our enquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the executive will, I trust, be placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last pa­per must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical danger of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of histori­cal examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most pop­ular branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the government.

But independent of this most active and operative principle; to secure the equilibrium of the national house of representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor, sev­eral important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originat­ing money bills will belong to the house of representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting impeach­ments: Is not this a complete counterbalance to that of deter­mining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elec­tions of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a ma­jority of the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate, though contingent, power of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the union for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict that as the mean influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

A third objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men in whose official creation they had partici­pated. The principle of this objection would condemn a prac­tice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if not in all the governments, with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those, who hold office during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those, who appoint them. With equal plausi­bility might it be alleged in this case that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, pro­ceeds upon the presumption that the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it, all such, who, by their conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not al­ways correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the executive, should feel a bias toward the objects of that choice strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary as to have induced the representatives of the nation to become its accusers.

If any further argument were necessary to evince the improb­ability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate, in the business of appointments. It will be the office of the president to nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint. There will of course be no ex­ertion of choice--they can only ratify, or reject, the choice of the president. They might even entertain a preference to some other person at the very moment they were assenting to the one pro­posed; because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own fa­vorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meri­torious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment, than such as the appear­ances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it, destroy.

A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from their union with the executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would con­stitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment, they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they had been guilty? [H: I would guess that if you followed through with GUILTY parties to this kind of treachery--you would convict and hang all the surviving PRESIDENTS and leaders--along with a written denouncement of the last many presidents as well, having become deceased. Your nation has been totally destroyed through the use of these heinous TREATIES, even unto that with the United Nations!]

This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY of the chief magistrate of the union, and of two-thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national coun­cils in this particular. The convention might with propriety have mediated the punishment of the executive for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the con­duct of the negotiations committed to him: They might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body, as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: But they could not with more or with equal propriety have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two-thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national legislature, consenting to a per­nicious or unconstitutional law; a principle which I believe has never been admitted into any government. How in fact could a majority of the house of representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, than two-thirds of the Senate, sacrific­ing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt from pun­ishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good.

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the executive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to vindi­cate their own authority. We may thus far count, upon their pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might con­cern the corruption of leading members by whose arts and influ­ence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption should be sat­isfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of incli­nation in the body to divert the public resentment from them­selves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanage­ment and disgrace. PUBLIUS

END OF CHAPTER FIVE

[wave]

PJ 96

CHAPTER 9

REC #1 HATONN

FRI., MAY 27, 1994 9:16 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 284

FRI., MAY 27, 1994

THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING...?

How many times have I reminded you that the Russians are coming? No, I do not say this Russian or that Russian is due to land on such and such a day at such and such a time. However, good readers, I HAVE TOLD YOU. Now why do I go through that tacky old trick of "I told you so"? Because I am ASKED again and again--by readers who have been with us for years. No, it is not what you think from any presentation of the media, so far. However, in many instances IT IS WORSE! President Reagan SURRENDERED to the SOVIET UNION some NINE YEARS AGO, and confirmed, according to information for­warded to this location years ago and updated in the Spring. A document has now resurfaced and comes now "today" through the APFN HQ FAX. (By the way, how many of you are help­ing Ken Vardon/APFN, 3230 E. Flamingo Rd. #22, Las Vegas, Nevada 89121, STAY ALIVE?) Readers, this is a time, a final time, to help keep your people and your nation alive. To stay in operation APFN MUST be operated AS A HOBBY--it cannot even charge for service!! You must show appreciation through DONATION or it will be shut down! We are all being forced into the SAME POSITION. You cannot assume that OTHER PEOPLE are paying for the fight to save AMERICA--it isn't happening! A few give everything they ever had or ever shall, to this task, even to the loss of property and even life.

CONTACT, now the most read paper in the world, is still the least subscribed to paper--everyone is terrified of being on the subscription list. Why? Portions of it are, today, being utilized right in Congressional Banking Committee--on live TV! And, even the Congressmen use YOUR money to reprint the paper and scatter it to everywhere and everyone in Washington--with­out subscribing!

Now I want to give you a few numbers to ponder and consider how many copies of CONTACT could be furnished for a tiny portion of what is totally wasted and "blown" (pun intended). Here are just a couple of interesting grants issued right out of Washington D.C.:

$19 MILLION to examine gas emissions from cow flatu­lence.
$144,000 to see if pigeons follow human economic laws.
$219,000 to teach college students how to watch television.
$160,000 to study if you can hex an opponent by drawing an "X" on his chest...!

Oh, and let us not miss the $57,000 spent by the Executive Branch for gold-embossed playing cards on Air Force Two.

I might well concur with the intelligence of spending some mea­sure of funding on relieving your "energy" supply crisis by studying the gas emissions emanating from the belching and flatulence of CONGRESS AND WASHINGTON PARTIES IN GENERAL; however, YOU AS A NATION, are to the end of your golden rope pipe-dream. Even surrender to a foreign power is done with such subtle ploy as to cause you to think you are helping a needy brother--whilst you KILL your own families.

We will just offer the rewrite from THE DOVE, P.O. Box 41001, Sacramento, Calif. 95841:

THE SURRENDER OF THE UNITED STATES,
TO THE SOVIETS

Some nine years ago we broke the news in The Dove that President Reagan had been forced' to surrender to the Soviet Union. Most people did not believe us.

[H: Reagan also, about six or seven years ago (and some of YOU report seeing it as well as it being shown AGAIN within the last month), was on TELEVISION and suggested the Soviets and the U.S. JOIN FORCES (MILITARY) TO FIGHT THE COMMON ENEMY COMING, NOW, FROM OUTER-SPACE. I.E.: SPACE ALIENS!]

The surrender terms stated that Reagan had five years dismantle the military forces of the United States and submit to the Soviet Union or face total .destruction. At the time the Soviets had developed a laser defense which was able to knock out 95% of all U.S. missiles and bombers if we had tried to attack them. At this same time the United States had worked on a similar program called "Star Wars", but it was not yet in operation. The Soviets demonstrated their ability by shooting down the U.S. Space Shuttle with a laser, and also shooting down several U.S. rockets carrying military satellites, launched from Vanden­berg Air Force Base.

[H: If you have kept up with our writings from onset--you will further KNOW, as did those who followed Dr. Peter Beter's work long before ours--that ALL your first Shuttles were destroyed. This was known "up-front" so the teams of personnel never were put into space but rather shipped to Australia and flown back aboard duplicate Shuttles. YOU ARE PEOPLE OF THE LIE!]

It is important for you to understand that the Soviet Union has been governed, since the communist takeover, by the World Government and used as a "dummy front" to force the rest of the world into submission to a coming world dictator. The World Government then used a new technique when the five years were up. The Soviet Union collapsed and the American taxpayers were forced to pick up the tab and care for not only the Soviets, but for all the collapsing communist satellite na­tions. Then the American people were told that the cold war was over and the West had won. But here are the facts: Our money was and is being sent to the former Soviet Union, in­cluding all our technology, which could not have happened previously. The Soviet Union is now being rebuilt by the West. We are rebuilding their entire industrial base, their mines, oil fields, refineries, electric grid, nuclear reactors, and they are becoming joint partners with NASA.

They never had to fire one shot, never had to send a soldier to attack us, because we are policing ourselves, paying tribute to them and stripping our land of all our assets. The American people have been led into the smartest trap ever sprung on a people. WE LOST THAT WAR, BUT BELIEVE THAT WE WON IT.

Mikhail Gorbachev no longer rules from Moscow, he is now ruling from San Francisco. He was rewarded by the World'" Government and received a better job with greater benefits. We are reproducing the information package from the Gorbachev Foundation on the following pages. When you read the article you can come to your own conclusion. Is it a coincidence that Gorbachev is in charge of deciding what should be done with closed American military bases in America?

Gorbachev is ruling from the old Army base, The Presidio, in San Francisco, California. Read the document and weep. It is all over folks! We have lost our land. The question now is--shall our nation also lose its soul, or will we as a nation resist before it is too late???

***

Well, there you have the observations of this insightful and ob­servant American. I would note, however, for you who think all RUSSIANS are your enemy, there is one who still wields power in conjunction with a "group" who still can push a few buttons--Shevardnadze.

* * *

Let us move from this subject and again discuss constitutions and world domination. We have offered the Newstates Constitution and we have stressed the PLAN and functioning in districts of both country and WORLD--however, here is a grand outlay of A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD. The document sent to us from Florida can be obtained in reprint form from the Committee to Restore the Constitution. However, portions of the full document are not offered and therefore we have no address. Only half of the article is presented here and the remainder is expected to be printed in June. We will effort to get that for you at that time. We will not, however, wait to present this material. I believe we can count on our "2x6" friend to send us the other half. He refers to himself as "2x6" because he said that somehow it took "more than a 2x4 to get his attention!" (We now have the full document and it is presented below.)

QUOTING:

A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD

Published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (1965) financed by the Fund for the Republic, a Ford Foundation Agency.

Formerly located in Santa Barbara, California, the Center appointed socialist-oriented University of Denver Chancellor Maurice B. Mitchell as new head and merged with the 'Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado [H: Check the Committee of 300 information.], a world government policy promotion agency. Aspen Institute Chairman is Robert O. Anderson, chief executive officer, Atlantic Richfield Company; member, Committee for Economic Development (laid the ground-work for regional government), and advisory board member, Institute for Interna­tional Education.

This is an initiative for a World Constitution launched in California 20 December, 1993 as "Philadelphia II", to qualify for 8 November 1994 general elections. [H: PAY ATTENTION AND GO BACK AND RE-READ THAT SENTENCE!] (See, "U.N. One World Government by Convention", page 6, March 1994 bulletin, Committee to Restore the Constitution.)

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A
WORLD CONSTITUTION

PREAMBLE

The people of the earth having agreed that the advancement of man in spiritual excellence [H: Oh BARF!] and physical welfare [H: Oh BARF-BARF!] is the common goal of mankind; that universal peace is the prerequisite for the pursuit of that goal; that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace, and peace and justice stand or fall together; that iniquity and war inseparable spring from the competitive anarchy of the national states; that therefore the age of nations must end; and the era of humanity begin; the governments of the nations have decided to order their separate sovereignties in one government of justice, to which they surrender their arms and to establish, as they do establish, the Constitution as the covenant and fundamental law of the Federal Republic of the World. [H: No, this is not a joke! This is the real potato(e)! Here is an excellent example of the way to discern TRUTH from a presentation from these anti-Christ One Worlders: Turn every statement they make into its total opposite--and you will find the truth within the opposite result. There is a conjured humorous "law" set forth by a Dr. Galumbos, an astrophysicist who has labeled a theory into The Law of the Bureaucracy which states: "If the bureaucracy states an intent and moves upon that intent toward a stated 'goal' the law is that they will produce the EXACT OPPOSITE of that which they describe." It is worthy of note and attention and all productions from that resource should be measured by this LAW!]

DECLARATION OF DUTIES AND RIGHTS

A. The universal government of justice as covenanted and pledged in this Constitution is founded on the Rights of Man.

The principles underlying the Rights of Man are and shall be permanently stated in the Duty of everyone everywhere, whether a citizen sharing in the responsibilities and privileges of World Government or a ward and pupil of the World Commonwealth:

To serve with word and deed, and with productive labor according to his ability, the spiritual and physical advancement of the living and of those to come, as the common cause of all generations of men; to do unto others as he would like others to do unto him; to abstain from violence, except for the repulse of violence as commanded or granted under law.

B. In the context therefore of social duty and service, and in conformity with the unwritten law which philosophies and religions alike called the Law of Nature and which the Republic of the World shall strive to see universally written and enforced by positive law: It shall be the right of everyone everywhere to claim and maintain for himself and his fellowmen: Release from the bondage of poverty and from the servitude and exploitation of labor, which rewards and security according to merit and needs; freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in any creed or party or craft, within the pluralistic unity and purpose of the World Republic; protection of individuals and groups against subjugation and tyrannical rule, racial or national, doctrinal or cultural, with safeguards for the self-determination of minorities and dissenters; and any such other freedoms and franchises as are inherent in man's inalienable claims to life, liberty, and the dignity of the human person, and as the legislators and judges of the World Republic shall express and specify.

C. The four elements of life--earth, water, air, energy--are the common property of the human race. The management and use of such portions thereof as are vested in or assigned to particular ownership, private or corporate or national or regional, of definite or indefinite tenure, of individualist or collectivist economy, shall be subordinated in each and all cases to the interest of the common good.

GRANT OF POWERS

1. The jurisdiction of the World Government as embodied in its organs of power shall extend to:

a. the control of the observance of the Constitution in all the component communities and territories of the Federal World Republic, which shall be indivisible and one;
b. the furtherance and progressive fulfillment of the Duties and Rights of Man in the spirit of the foregoing Declaration, with their specific enactment in such fields of federal and local relations as are described hereinafter (Art. 27 through 33.);
c. the maintenance of peace; and to that end the enactment and promulgation of laws which shall be binding upon communities and upon individuals as well,
d. the judgment and settlement of any conflicts among component units, with prohibition of recourse to interstate violence,
e. the supervision of and final decision on any alterations of boundaries between new states or unions thereof.
f. the supervision of and final decision on the forming of new states or unions thereof,
g. the administration of such territories as may still be immature for self-government, and the declaration in due time of their eligibility therefor,
h. The intervention in intrastate violence and violations of law which affect world peace and justice,
i. the organization and disposal of federal armed forces,
j. the limitation and control of weapons and of the domestic militias in the several component units of the World Republic;
k. The establishment, in addition to the Special Bodies listed hereinafter (Art. 8 and 9) of such other agencies as may be conducive to the development of the earth's resources and to the advancement of physical and intellectual standards, with such advisory or initiating or arbitrating powers as shall be determined by law;
1. The laying and collecting of federal taxes, and the establishment of a plan and a budget for federal expenditures,
m. the administration of the World Bank and the establishment of suitable world fiscal agencies for the issue of money and creation and control of credit.
n. the regulation of commerce affected with federal interest,
o. the establishment, regulation, and, where necessary or desirable, the operation of means of transportation and communication which are the federal interest;
p. The supervision and approval of laws concerning emigration and immigration and the movements of peoples,
q. the granting of federal passports;
r. The appropriation, under the right of eminent domain, of such private or public property as may be necessary for federal use, reasonable compensation being made therefor;
s. The legislation over and administration of the territory which shall be chosen as Federal District and of such other territories as may be entrusted directly to the Federal Government.

2. The powers not delegated to the World Government by this Constitution, and not prohibited by it to the several members of the Federal World Republic, shall be reserved to the several states or nations or unions thereof.

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
THE PRESIDENT. THE LEGISLATURE

3. The sovereignty of the Federal Republic of the World resides in the people of the world. The primary powers of the World Government shall be vested in:
a. the Federal Convention,
b. the President
c. the Council and the Special Bodies,
d. the Grand Tribunal, the Supreme Court, and the Tribune of the People,
e. the Chamber of Guardians.

4. The Federal Convention shall consist of delegates elected directly by the people of all states and nations, one delegate for each million of population or fraction thereof above one-half million, with the proviso that the people of any extant state,...ranging between 100,000 and 1,000,000, shall be entitled to elect one delegate, but any such state with a population below 100,000 shall be aggregated for federal electoral purposes to the electoral unit closest to its borders.

The delegates to the Federal Convention shall vote as individuals, not as members of national or otherwise collective representations [except as specified hereinafter, Art. 46, paragraph 2, and Art. 47].

The Convention shall meet in May of every third year, for a session of thirty days.

5. The Federal Convention shall subdivide into nine Electoral Colleges according to the nine Societies of kindred nations and cultures, or Regions, wherefrom its members derive their powers, such Regions being:

1. The continent of Europe and its islands outside the Russian area, together with the United Kingdom if the latter so decides, and with such overseas English--or French--or Cape Dutch-speaking communities of the British Commonwealth of Nations or the French Union as decide to associate (this whole area tentatively denominated Europa);
2. the United States of America, with the United Kingdom if the latter so decides, and such kindred communities of British, or Franco-British, or Dutch-British, or Irish civilization and lineage as decide to associate (Atlantis);
3. Russia, European and Asiatic with such East-Baltic or Slavic or South-Danubian nations as associate with Russia (Eurasia);
4. the Near and Middle East, with the states of North Africa, and Pakistan if the latter so decides (Afrasia);
5. Africa, south of the Sahara, with or without the South African Union as the latter may decide;
6. India, with Pakistan if the latter so decides;
7. China, Korea, Japan, with the associate archipelagoes of the North- and Mid-Pacific (Asia Major);
8. Indochina and Indonesia, with Pakistan if the latter so decides, and with such other Mid- and South-Pacific lands and islands as decide to associate (Austrasia);
9. the Western Hemisphere south of the United States (Columbia)

Each Electoral College shall nominate by secret ballot not more than three candidates, regardless of origin, for the office of President of the World Republic. The Federal Convention in plenary meeting, having selected by secret ballot a panel of three candidates from the list submitted shall elect by secret ballot one of the three as president, on a majority of two-thirds.

If three consecutive ballots have been indecisive, the candidate with the smallest vote shall be eliminated and between the two remaining candidates a simple majority vote shall be

6. Each Electoral College shall then nominate by secret and proportional ballot twenty-seven candidates, originating from the respective Electoral Area or Region for the World council; with the proviso that one-third and not more than one-third of the nominees shall not be members of the Federal Convention; anal the nine lists having been presented to the Federal Convention, the Federal Convention in plenary meeting shall select by secret and proportional ballot nine Councilmen from each list, with the same proviso as above.

The Federal Convention shall also elect by secret and proportional ballot, on nominations, prior to the opening of the Convention, by such organizations of world-wide importance and lawfully active in more than three Regions as shall be designated [for the first election by the United Nations Assembly and subsequently] by the council, eighteen additional members, regardless of origin; and the total membership of the World Council shall be thus ninety-nine.

7. The primary power to initiate and enact legislation for the Federal Republic of the World shall be vested in the Council.

The tenure of the Council shall be three years.

The Council shall elect its Chairman, for its whole tenure of three years,

Councilors shall be re-eligible.

8. Within the first three years of World Government the Council and the President shall establish three Special Bodies, namely:

a. a House of Nationalities and States, with representatives from each, for the safeguarding of local institutions and autonomies and the protection of minorities;

b. a Syndical or functional Senate, for the representation of syndicates and unions or occupational associations and any other corporate interests of transnational significance, as well as for mediation or arbitration in non justifiable issues among such syndicates or unions or other corporate interests;

c. an Institute of Science, Education and Culture;

Each of the three bodies with such membership and tenures and consultative or preparatory powers as shall be established by law and with no prejudice to the establishment of other advisory or technical agencies in accordance with the purposes stated hereinbefore (Art. 1, k).

9. Within its first year the World Government shall establish a Special Body, to be named Planning Agency, of twenty-one members appointed by the President, subject to vetoes by two-thirds of the Council, for tenures of twelve years [except that the terms for the initial membership shall staggered by lot, with one-third of it, seven members, ceasing from office and being replaced every fourth year].

It shall be the function of the Planning Agency to envisage the income of the Federal Government and to prepare programs and budgets for expenditures, both for current needs and for long-range improvements. These programs and budgets shall be submitted by the President, with his recommendations, to the Council, as provided hereinafter (Art. 13).

Plans for improvement of the world's physical facilities, either public or private, and for the productive exploitation of resources and inventions shall be submitted to the Agency or to such Development Authorities or regional sub-agencies as it may establish. The Agency shall pass judgment on the social usefulness of such plans.

Members of the Planning Agency shall not be re-eligible nor shall they, during their tenure in the Agency, have membership in any other federal body.

10. The executive power, together with initiating power in federal legislation, shall be vested in the President. His tenure shall be six years.

The President shall not have membership in the Council.

The President shall not be re-eligible. He shall not be eligible to the Tribunate of the People until nine years have elapsed since the expiration of his term.

No two successive Presidents shall originate from the same Region.

11. The President shall appoint a Chancellor. The Chancellor, with the approval of the President, shall appoint the Cabinet.

The Chancellor shall act as the President's representative before the Council in the exercise of legislative initiative. The Chancellor and the Cabinet members shall have at any time the privilege of the floor before the Council.

But no Chancellor or Cabinet member shall have a vote or shall hold membership in the Council, nor, if he was a member of the Council at the moment of his executive appointment, shall he be entitled to resume his seat therein when leaving the executive post unless he be re-elected at a subsequent Convention.

No one shall serve as Chancellor for more than six years, nor as Cabinet member for more than twelve, consecutive or not.

No three Cabinet members at any one time and no two successive Chancellors shall originate from the same Region.

The Council shall have power to interrogate the Chancellor and the Cabinet and to adopt resolutions on their policies.

The Chancellor and the Cabinet shall resign when the President so decides or when a vote of no confidence by the absolute majority of fifty or more of the Council is confirmed by a second such vote; but no second vote shall be taken and held valid if less than three months have elapsed from the first.

12. The sessions of the Council, as well as those of the Grand Tribunal and the Supreme Court, shall be continuous, except for one yearly recess of not more than ten weeks or two such recesses of not more than five weeks each, as the body concerned may decide.

* * * * * * * *

Yes, we have previously run THE FIRST 12 POINTS OF the following "Constitution for the World", also. Somehow you readers don't hold to the information very long. I feel it impor­tant enough to interrupt the current lessons on your own Con­stitution of the United States of America and the EXPLANA­TION OF SAME through the Federalist Papers, to ask Dharma to finish off the document in this writing. It would have been about a month ago that the first portion was offered. We will take up directly with NUMBER 13 and will ask that you refer back to the first portion as priorily offered.

CONTINUED FROM MAY 5. 1994
COMMITTEE BULLETIN #388:

13. The budget of the World Government, upon recommendation by the Planning Agency, shall be presented every three years by the President of the Council, which shall pass it, or reject it in whole titles, by majority vote; the same procedure to apply when at other intervals the President requests additional appropriations or approval of changes.

14. Any legislation of the Council can be vetoed by the President within thirty days of its passage. But the Council can overrule the veto if its new vote, by a majority of two-thirds, finds support, within sixty days of the President's action, in the majority of the Grand Tribunal [and no such support shall be required during the tenure of the first president].

15. The President can be impeached on grounds of treason to the Constitution, or usurpation of power, or felony, or insanity, or other disease impairing permanently his mind.

The vote of impeachment shall be final when three-quarters of the Council and three-quarters of the Grand Tribunal concur and the majority of the Supreme Court validates the legality of the proceedings.

If a President is impeached or resigns or dies in the interval between two sessions of the Federal Convention, the Chairman of the Council shall become Acting President until the new Con­vention elects a new President; and the Council shall elect a new Chairman.

THE GRAND TRIBUNAL
AND THE SUPREME COURT

16. The supreme judiciary power of the World Republic shall be vested in a Grand Tribunal of sixty Justices, with the President of the World Republic as Chief Justice and Chairman, and the Chairman of the Council as Vice-Chairman ex officio.

The President as Chief Justice shall appoint the Justices of the Grand Tribunal and fill the vacancies, subject to vetoes by the Council on majorities of two-thirds. He shall have power to overrule any such veto if he finds support in a two-thirds major­ity of the Justices in office [except that no such power shall be vested in the first President].

No one, except the Chairman of the Council, shall hold membership at the same time in the Council and the Tribunal: nor shall a Chancellor or Cabinet member hold membership in the Tribunal or be eligible to it until six years have elapsed from the termination of his executive office.

17. The tenure of the Chief Justice and Chairman and of the Vice-Chairman of the Grand Tribunal shall be the time of their tenure of office respectively as President of the. World Republic and as Chairman of the Council.

The President shall have power to appoint an Alternate, sub­ject to approval by the Grand Tribunal, for the exercise of such of his functions in the judiciary branch and for such a time within his tenure as he may decide.

The tenures of the sixty Justices shall be fifteen years [except that the terms for the initial membership shall be staggered by lot, with one-fifth of it, twelve Justices, ceasing from office and being replaced every third year].

Justices of the Grand Tribunal shall not be re-eligible, except that a Justice appointed as Chancellor or Cabinet member, hav­ing resigned his membership in the Tribunal, shall be re-eligible to it for the unfulfilled portion of his tenure when six years have elapsed from the termination of his executive office.

18. The sixty Justices shall be assigned twelve to each of five Benches:

The First Bench to deal with constitutional issues between the primary organs and powers of the World government as well as with all issues and cases in which the Tribune of the People shall decide to appear in his capacity of World Attorney and defender of the Rights of Man;
the Second Branch to deal with issues and conflicts between the World Government and any of its component units, whether single states or unions thereof or Regions, as well as with issues and conflicts of component units of the World Republic among themselves;
the Third Bench to deal with issues and conflicts between the World Government and individual citizens or corporations or unions or any other associations of citizens;
the Fourth Bench to deal with issues and conflicts among component units, whether single states or unions of states or Re­gions, and individual citizens or corporations or unions or any other associations of citizens when such issues and conflicts af­fect the interpretation or enactment of federal law;
the Fifth Branch to deal with issues and conflicts, when they affect the interpretation and enactment of federal law, either among individual citizens or among corporations, unions, syndicates, or any other collective organizations of citizens and inter­ests.
Each Region shall be represented in each Bench by at least one member and not more than two.

[H: Is EVERYONE picking up the use of the term "REGION" instead of "State"?]

19. The Supreme Court shall be of seven members; five representing one each Bench, with the Chief Justice as their Chairman and the Chairman of the Council as their Vice-Chairman ex officio; and the active membership of the Benches shall thus remain of eleven each.

No two members of the Supreme Court shall originate from the same Region.

The representatives of the Benches in the Supreme Court shall be elected by secret vote of the Grand Tribunal in plenary session, with each Justice casting a ballot for five candidates, one from each Bench, and with those candidates elected who have obtained the largest vote, except that any presumptive electee shall be held ineligible whose assignment to the Court would duplicate the representative therein of any one Region or Bench.

If the first vote fails to fill all seats, the vote shall be repeated according to the same regulations.

The tenures of the members of the Supreme Court shall be; for the Chairman and Vice-chairman the same as their tenures of office respectively as President of the World Republic and as Chairman of the Council, and for the other members six years, at the end of which each of the five elected by the Grand Tri­bunal may be re-elected or shall be restored to the Bench whereof he was the delegate; but no justice shall sit in the Court beyond his regular term of membership in the Tribunal; and when the latter term expires before the regular six-year term in the court is completed, or when an elective member of the Court resigns or dies, the Grand Tribunal shall fill the vacancy for the unfilled portion of the term by secret partial election in plenary session, with the same proviso as above in regard to the representation of Regions.

Regions which have not been represented in the Supreme Court for two successive six-year terms shall have mandatory precedence in the elections for the third term.

20. The Supreme Court shall distribute the cases among the five Benches of the Grand Tribunal according to competences as specified hereinbefore [Art. 18].

Cases where compentences overlap or are otherwise doubtful shall be referred to such Bench or Benches jointly as the Supreme Court shall decide.

The Supreme Court shall have power to modify the rules of assignment for the five Benches as specified in Art. 18, subject to approval by the majority of the Council and by a two-thirds majority of the Grand Tribunal concurrently.

21. It shall be the office and function of the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Benches, within three months of their issuance, said decisions to become effective upon regis­tration by the Court, or, when annulled, to be returned for revision each to the Bench which judged the case, or to another, or to others jointly as the Court may decide; annulment, to be returned for revision each to the Bench which judged the case, or to another, or to others jointly as the Court may decide; annulment to be pronounced in cases of unfair trial or faulty procedure, and also for reasons of substance when final appeal was filed by the losing party, if the Court at its own discretion choose to take cognizance thereof, or by the Tribune of the People, whose demand shall be mandatory.

22. The Grand Tribunal, with the approval of the Supreme Court, shall establish Lower Federal Courts in such number and places as conditions in the component units of the World Re­public shall require, and a Federal Appellate Court in each Re­gion. It shall also determine the rules and competences of such courts, and appoint their officials on the basis of competitive ex­aminations.

23. The President or his Alternate and the Chairman of the Council shall not sit as judges in cases affecting the solution of conflicts between the President and the Council.

The President or Acting President or Alternate, or a Justice or the Chairman of the Council in his capacity of Justice, shall not sit as a judge in cases involving his appointment or im­peachment or demotion or tenure or in any other way affecting his particular interest.

24. No member of the Council or the Grand Tribunal shall be liable to removal from office until a criminal sentence on charges of felony or grave misdemeanor is final. But he shall be suspended from office, pending last recourse to the Grand Tri­bunal, when a sentence of guilty, issued by a lower court, has been confirmed by a Federal Appellate Court.

The Supreme Court shall pronounce final judgment on the le­gality of the proceedings. It shall also pronounce final judgment on the legal validity of elections and appointments to the Council and the Tribunal, and to the offices of President and of Tribune of the People.

25. The President in his capacity of World Chief Justice shall have power of pardon over sentences passed under federal law.

THE TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE
AND THE WORLD LAW

26. The Federal Convention, after electing the Council, shall elect by secret ballot the Tribune of the People as a spokesman for the minorities, this office to be vested in the candidate ob­taining the second largest vote among the eligible candidates; in­eligible to the office of Tribune being any candidate having also been nominated by any Electoral College for the office of Presi­dent in the current Convention, or having been a President or Acting President or Alternate or a member of the Grand Tri­bunal at any time in the nine years preceding said Convention, or originating from the same Region as the President simultane­ously in office.

The Tribune of the People shall not have membership in the Council.

The tenure of the Tribune of the People shall be three years. He shall have power to appoint a Deputy, subject to the same ineligibilities as above, with tenure to expire not later than his own.

He shall not be re-eligible, nor shall he be eligible to the of­fice of President or Alternate or Justice of the Grand Tribunal, until nine years have elapsed from the expiration of his present term.

The Tribune, or his appointed Deputy, shall have the privi­lege of the floor before the Grand Tribunal and, under such reg­ulations as shall be established by law, before the Supreme Court; but no vote in either; and he shall not be present when a vote is taken.

27. It shall be the office and function of the Tribune of the People to defend the natural and civil rights of individuals and groups against violation or neglect by the World Government or any of its component units; to further and demand, as a World Attorney before the World Republic, the observance of the letter and spirit of this constitution; and to promote thereby, in the spirit of its Preamble and Declaration of Duties and Rights, the attainment of the goals set to the progress of mankind by the ef­forts of the ages.

28. No law shall be made or held valid in the World Republic or any of its component units:
1) inflicting or condoning discrimination against race or na­tion or sex or caste or creed or doctrine; or
2) barring through preferential agreements or coalitions of vested interests the access on equal terms of any state or nation to the raw materials and the sources of energy of the earth; or
3) establishing or tolerating slavery, whether overt or covert, or forced labor, except as equitable expiation endured in state or federal controlled institutions and intended for social service and rehabilitation of convicted criminals; or
4) permitting, whether by direction or indirection, arbitrary seizure or search, or unfair trial, or excessive penalty, or appli­cation of ex post fact laws; or
5) abridging in any manner whatsoever, except as a punish­ment inflicted by law for criminal transgression, the citizens ex­ercise of such responsibilities and privileges of citizenship as are conferred on him by law; or
6) curtailing the freedom of communication and information, of speech, of the press and of expression by whatever means, of peaceful assembly, of travel;
paragraphs 5 and 6 to be subject to suspension according to circumstances, universally or locally, in time of emergency im­periling the maintenance and unity of the World Republic; such state of emergency, world-wide or local, to be proposed by the Chamber of Guardians and proclaimed concurrently by a two-thirds majority of the Council and a two-thirds majority of the Grand Tribunal for a period not in excess of six months, to be renewable on expiration with the same procedure for successive periods of six months or less but in no case beyond the date when the time of emergency is proclaimed closed, on the pro­posal of the Chamber of Guardians by simple majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently, or if the Guardians' proposal is deemed unduly delayed, by three-quar­ters majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently.

29. Capital punishment shall not be inflicted under federal law.

30. Old age pensions, unemployment relief, insurance against sickness or accident, just terms of leisure, and protection to maternity and infancy shall be provided according to the varying circumstances of times and places as the local law may direct.

Communities and states unable to provide adequate social se­curity and relief shall be assisted by the Federal Treasury, whose grants or privileged loans shall be administered under federal supervision.

31. Every child from the age of six to the age of twelve shall be entitled to instruction and education at public expense, such primary six-year period to be obligatory and further education to be accessible to all without discrimination of age or sex or race or class or creed.

Communities and states unable to fulfill this obligation shall be assisted by the Federal Treasury with the same proviso as in Art. 30.

32. All property or business whose management and use have acquired the extension and character of a federal public service, or whereon restrictive trade practices have conferred the character and power of a transnational monopoly, shall become the property of the Federal Government upon payment of a just price as determined by law.

33. Every individual or group or community shall have the right of appeal against unjust application of a law, or against the law itself, gaining access through the inferior courts, local or federal, to the superior and the Grand Tribunal, and securing the counsel and support of the Tribune of the People when the Tri­bune so decides; and, if a law or statute is found evidently in conflict with the guarantees pledged in the foregoing articles or irreparably in contradiction with the basic principles and intents of the World Republic as stated in the Preamble to this Consti­tution and in its Declaration of Duties and Rights, the Grand Tribunal shall have power to recommend to the Supreme Court that such law or statute be declared, and the Supreme Court shall have power to declare it, null and void.

34. The Tribune of the People cannot be impeached except on the same grounds and with the same procedure as specified for the President in Art. 15.

If the Tribune of the People is impeached or resigns or dies, his substitute for the unfulfilled portion of his tenure shall be the candidate to the Tribunate who was next in line in the last Fed­eral Convention, with the same provisions in regard to eligibility as in Art. 26, first paragraph.

THE CHAMBER OF GUARDIANS

35. The control and use of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of the World shall be assigned exclusively to a Chamber of Guardians under the chairmanship of the President, in his capacity of Protector of the Peace. The other Guardians shall be six Councilmen elected by the Council and the Grand Tribunal in Congress assembled, for terms of three years. [But the Grand Tribunal shall not participate in the first election.]

One former President shall also sit in the Chamber of Guardians, the sequence to be determined term for term, or, if he resigns or dies, for the fractional term, according to seniority in the presidential office; he shall have the privilege of the floor in the deliberations of the Chamber, but no vote in its decisions.

Officers holding professional or active rank in the armed forces of the Federal Republic, or in the domestic militia of any component unity thereof, shall not be eligible as Guardians.

36. The election of the six elective Guardians shall be by secret and proportional vote, with each Elector casting a ballot of six names or less; but no three Guardians of the seven, in­cluding the President and excluding the ex-President, shall originate from the same Region; and any presumptive electee whose election would contravene this norm shall be declared in­eligible and replaced by the candidate fulfilling the norm and having obtained the next largest vote.

Regions which have not been represented among the seven Guardians referred to above for two successive three-year terms shall have mandatory precedences in the subsequent elections; but the Guardian or Guardians originating from a nation or Re­gion where sedition against the World Republic is actual or, ac­cording to the majority of the Chamber, imminently expected shall cease from office and be replaced; unless the other Guardians decide unanimously otherwise.

No Guardian can be impeached or in any way suspended or removed from office for any other reason, except on such grounds and with such procedure as specified for the President and the Tribune of the People hereinbefore (Art. 15 and 34), and for the Guardians hereinafter (Art. 38).

If a Guardian resigns or dies or is in any way suspended or removed, his substitute for the unfulfilled portion of the term shall be chosen by partial election, with the same rules and pro­visos as in the first two paragraphs of this article, each elector casting a ballot of one or more names as the number of vacan­cies may be.

37. The Chancellor shall have access to the Chamber of Guardians as Deputy of the President whose vote he shall cast by proxy if the President so decides.

38. Appropriations for the budget of Peace and Defense, under control of the Chamber of Guardians, as proposed by the Chamber at the beginning of each term for the whole duration thereof, shall be submitted by the President to the Council, in conformity with Art. 13. But if a state of emergency is declared, in the manner and limits as specified hereinbefore (Art. 28, last paragraph), the Chamber shall have power to demand and appropriate such additional funds as the emergency demands, subject to auditing and sanction by the Council when the emergency is closed: whereafter, if sanction is denied, the Guardians responsible shall be liable to impeachment and prosecution for usurpation of power with the same procedure as specified for the President and the Tribune of the People hereinbefore (Art. 15 and 34).

39. The Chamber shall have power to propose by absolute majority, subject to approval by two-thirds majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently, extraordinary powers, worldwide or local, to be conferred on the President beyond those assigned to him by this Constitution, when a state of emergency, as provided in Art. 28, is proclaimed; such pow­ers not to be granted for periods exceeding six months each and to be relinquished before the expiration of any such period as soon as the state of emergency, in conformity with Art. 28, is proclaimed closed.

40. The Chamber of Guardians shall answer interrogations from the Council on its general and administrative directives, but no vote shall be taken after discussion thereof, except as otherwise provided in Art. 28 and 39; and the decisions of the Chamber in matters technical and strategic shall be final, and withheld from publicity when the Chamber so decides.

41. The Chamber of Guardians, assisted by a General Staff and an Institute of Technology whose members it shall appoint, shall determine the technological and the numerical levels that shall be set as limits to the domestic militias of the single communities and states or unions thereof.

Armed forces and the manufacture of armaments beyond the levels thus determined shall be reserved to the World Govern­ment.

THE FEDERAL CAPITOL AND
FEDERAL LANGUAGE AND STANDARDS

42. Within one year of its foundation the World Republic shall choose a Federal Capitol, or a site therefor, with eminent domain over it and an adequate Federal District.

43. Within three years of its foundation the Federal Government shall designate one language, which shall be standard for the formulation and interpretation of the federal laws; and for analogous purposes, relative to communication, taxation, and finances, it shall establish in its first year a federal unit of currency with a federal system of measures and a federal calendar.

THE AMENDING POWER

44. Amendments to this Constitution, recommended concurrently by a two-thirds majority of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal, shall be in force when approved by a two-thirds majority of the Federal Convention in the Constitutional Session following the recommendation.

Constitutional Sessions, of thirty days or less, as the discus­sion may require and the majority may decide, shall be held immediately after the ordinary electoral session in the third Fed­eral Convention and thereafter every ninth year.

[But no amendment altering the electoral units as listed in Art. 5, or the assignment to them of seats in the Council and the other Federal bodies, shall be recommended to the first of such Sessions.]

RATIFICATION AND PRELIMINARY PERIOD

45. The first Federal Convention shall be the Founding Convention...

The ways and means for the convocation of the Founding Convention, and the regulations for its inaugural and voting pro­cedures, shall be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

46. The thirty-day electoral session of the Founding Convention shall be preceded by a preliminary session of thirty days or less for the discussion and approval of this Constitution, such preliminary session to be extended for thirty additional days or less as the discussion may require and the majority may decide.

The delegates of the Founding Convention shall vote individ­ually, and not by delegations; except on the assignment to the nine Electoral Colleges or Regions of such optional states or zones as listed hereinbefore (Art. 5); in which matter the vote of the majority, within the delegation from the state or zone con­cerned, shall be binding upon the minority; and Art. 5 shall be adjusted accordingly.

The Founding Convention having discussed and approved by individual majority vote this Constitution, ratification by collec­tive majorities within as many delegations of states and nations as represent two-thirds of the population of the earth shall be sufficient for the establishment of the Federal Republic of the World.

**********

NOTE:
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, State of California, on 20 December 1993 approved initiative elections to establish global governance at US taxpayers' expense.

"Philadelphia" seeks to overthrow the Constitution of the United States and erect a 'New World Order' on the ruins of the Republic in consonance with A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD.

Photocopy "Philadelphia II" (19 pages), Initiative, Constitution Amendment and Statute, available from COMMITTEE TO RESTORE THE CONSTITUTION, INC., P.O. Box 986, Ft. Collins. CO 80522: $5.00.

CHAPTER 10

REC #1 HATONN

SAT., MAY 28, 1994 9:04 A.M. YEAR 7, DAY 285

SAT., MAY 28, 1994

HAVE YOU FORGOTTEN?

I speak to you, and you and you.... I speak to you, Dharma, as a receiver of my mind in sharing. I harken you to look and see and to hear the very breath of life abounding about you. Then I ask you to REMEMBER for it will be in the REMEMBERING that you will find balance, harmony and KNOWING. Don't turn to another--turn to me, interrogate me and do not simply trust me on some foolish blinded faith--TRY me for I shall en­dure and then you shall KNOW!

How many things you children know not! There are wonders upon wonders within every dimension of expression and you only touch the infinite and when you cannot see for a moment you panic and abruptly change, charge hither and yon and, bluntly expressed, blow your own trip. Am "I" different from a moment ago? An hour ago? An eon ago? No, but YOU ARE!

So, why the heavy heart and the somnolent hesitation in your "knowing", at least of mission? I confront YOU for it is within the very expression of YOU which will provide fuel for the lamps. Who are "YOU"? "YOU" are the expressions of your­self of higher MIND--an Overmind, if you will. In each sce­nario there are many players who must each and all come to comfort of recognition, one of the other--always AS the forces of the adversary come into play. You are fragile while awak­ening and remembering, for you are earthly TRAINED to doubt self, doubt God, doubt purpose and doubt the very JOURNEY.

Dear hearts, you are the children of the Phoenix, be it a bird, a plane or superman! You have traveled into the reaches beyond the reality of some physical bindings. Most of you will find only "tidbits" of that which you perceive as "past" and it will mean little to you emotionally for purpose will expand and en­compass all which was, is and is yet to be--for you know there is "future" expression in sequence, for if there be soul, there MUST BE A "NEXT". What you fear is that you have been and are misguided and are somehow remiss if things to do attend the play as YOU perceive the lines to read and the action under direction. Remember that the adversarial critics of the perfor­mance are always efforting to cause you to FAIL in order to recapture the physical expression.

Will some magnificent flying machine come to whisk you away in the moment of despair? No--but it shall, in the moment of glory! Despair is 'that which is the "lack of faith in knowing". Nothing more. You do not doubt or have lack of faith if ye are in knowing! You continue to look into the faces of the masses as they appear in the crowded plazas of the various places wherein men gather to witness or to object or to "demonstrate" for or against a thing. Most of the faces, my chelas, are empty--devoid of life. You are seeking LIFE wherein it has departed except for the functioning of bodies which are also only me­chanical perceptions.

You, Dharma, refuse to look within those empty eyes--for be­yond you see the reality of PROBABILITIES. Will man awaken in time? In time for WHAT? Is THIS not THE play? Were not the lines and actions, as well as the players, long ago written, acted and chosen? What are the "free-will" decisions and choices left to mankind? Only those which lead him to or from God, his DIRECTOR, his connection with Creation.

The physical perception is but like a "touchdown" of a plane at an airport--wherein you disembark, have lunch, look about a bit, and leave again to touch down in another moment, on another field in another "reality". Therefore you must make of EACH "reality" that which is expected from and by--self. I have told you before that there is neither good nor bad as you express it in the human judgments of another--or even of "self". There IS evil, both in intent and in action--for it is that "direction" of intent which pulls you into forgetfulness--away from the Truth of GOD. THERE IS ONLY MIND! THERE IS ONE THOUGHT PROJECTED FROM MIND--AND THERE IS HIGHER, OR "OVER"MIND, AND THERE IS THE SUB­CONSCIOUS ORCHESTRATING MIND AND THERE IS CONSCIOUS MIND--THE LATTER BEING THE MOST TO TALLY BLIND OF ALL EXPRESSION. THE CONSCIO MIND ONLY SEES AND ACTS UPON THAT WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE RECEIVE ING SENSES.

You ones in my company effort to find balance with that which "trains" others--be it in a church-house, another man's perceptions and/or preconceived notions as presented by others to al­low you to see and be what THEY are. YOU ARE NOT WHAT THEY ARE! You bear my own soul--and I shall allow your loss within the morass of the jungle that Man created from his imaginings. It is not a matter of giving-up or even of surrendering unto MY WILL--for I am but your will for WE have a mission, not simply "I". I care not what you were for what you represented in the past--is but the training which ALLOWS for the NOW to be perfected. What each player WAS is but the actualization of the puzzle which allows the perfection, again, of the now--and into that which is To come, to be danced awake into the merging of your DREAM with REALITY of BEINGNESS and KNOWINGNESS with the presence of that which Created you.

The expression nears wherein GOD reclaims His property from your experience. Did you think that to be just another TRIP "man"? Let us think upon this for a moment: if you had property in the form of technology or unfolding knowledge in the midst of a most primitive people--what would you do when you returned to pick up the property at a later moment? Would you not see what has been utilized, what has simply been de­stroyed and upon what basis would you leave it longer or simply remove it--or the students?

If YOU were the Creator of these beings, what would YOU do? Would you just promise them a cloud-ride? Suppose, through those conscious "senses", they had simply bred themselves de­void of living soul, that transitional energy of infinity? Let us say that you perceive hate, greed and total evil sweeping the lands and the inhabitants which once were purely perfection? Ah, but YOU do not destroy--you are God and can only CREATE. What then will you do? You will have given "man", your creation, freedom to choose his directions, and sorting is at hand--how will you choose? Will you snatch him away, like wine before its time, or will you allow him to play out his scene and see what are his choices in direction and learning?

Will or would you not cause creation of that resource to con­tinue the line of creation which must survive through the time of transition according to manifestation?? Do you not give that which IS unto your children that they might find their way and make honorable and feasible PASSAGE? You, as stewards and guides, must reach out and OFFER, as do we of the Guardians and Overwinds of higher expression. In other words, are you moving toward a world inhabited by brethren of other places and dimensions for the next experience--or, will man simply de­stroy himself?? Man can be destroyed; the essence of man can­not be touched! You must deal with that which, however, is recognized in the consciousness of man--even if not by even the majority of mankind.

I do not need to move to a theory of LIGHT, for instance--for LIGHT is all there is--but perceptions need expression. There are some four recognized forces which are fundamental: (1) Strong--the force that holds particles together in the nucleus and that, at a deeper level, holds quarks together in a particle. But never mind the facts at this writing, which are that ALL THINGS ARE HELD TOGETHER NOT BY "DRAWING WITHIN" BUT BY COMPRESSION [from without]. Each is "force" but one is in total opposition to the other. (2) Electro­magnetic--the force that acts between charges and magnets. This holds true whether the force is between the most tiny frag­ment of perception or the largest recognized parts of, say, a whole universe. (3) Weak--this has to be considered if you have "strong". This is the force responsible for some radioactive de­cay processes. One example is the beta decay of the neutron.

The only real particulate force which does not decay--is the light particulate which we casually call photons--but that is a long and tedious lesson not pertinent to this discussion. And, of course, (4) that which you call gravity--the attractive force that one piece of "matter" exerts on another. This is present whether that attraction is magnetic or like-density in expression of mo­tion and matter.

Now, again, we must always refer to "expression" and "perception" for that is ALL YOU HAVE UPON WHICH TO FOCUS. So, although the four forces appear to be very differ­ent, they are regarded, even by your physicists, as simply dif­ferent aspects of a single fundamental force. When forces (such as Electricity and Magnetism) are seen to be a single force, we say that the forces become unified, and theories that exhibit this fundamental unity are called "Unified Field theories". You can, on your place, already demonstrate that the weak and elec­tromagnetic forces will become unified at energies now capable of projecting in your own laboratories. In other words, scribe, the differences between electromagnetic and weak forces disap­pear at a given point of unification; and ultimately ALL FOUR RECOGNIZED "FORCES" WILL AND DO BECOME TO­TALLY UNIFIED!

In your so-called scientific world of language and expressions there are theories and standard models which utilize such elabo­rate things and make calculations around such as quarks and leptons, etc. I don't want to go into this here because it will only complicate the thought patterns of the ones who are work­ing from my instructions. The accepted Grand Unified Theory is about to fall apart, for instance, for it is built on the expecta­tion of (and a prediction of decay of) the "proton". How can they test it? The speculation is that it will decay with a half-life many orders of magnitude longer than the lifetime of the uni­verse--so what have you? And, how can you ever test such a theory? Why not work on the factual evidence of non-decay, which is the photon? I am continually amused as the tongue-in-cheek physicists attempt to produce a theory called the Theory of Everything (TOE). Well, it is closer than anything else you have offered as it rests on the fundamental "force" acting between particles. The world becomes, in other words and very simply, one kind of force and one kind of particle. Too sim­plistic? So be it!

CHAOS

We can refer to these above ramblings as efforting to have "order". So, let's look at disorder--or "chaos". If you per­ceive, rightfully so, a chaotic society--can we not bring order into our THOUGHTS regarding this chaos?

A chaotic system is one in which the final outcome depends very sensitively on the initial conditions. Example? White water in a stream is an excellent example of a chaotic system. If you start a chip of wood at one position, it will come out at a particular point on the other side of a rapids. If you start a second chip of wood at a position almost (but not quite) identical to that of the first, the second chip will--in general--come out of the rapids far from where the first one did. The final outcome (the end posi­tion of the chips) thus depends sensitively on the initial condi­tions (the place where they started their journey).

Now we move into "free-will" actions of, say, a society. The "general" outcome can be calculated and somewhat predicted but the interesting rule of thumb regarding "chaos" is its lack of predictability. For all practical purposes, the behavior of chaotic systems cannot be predicted.

It is impossible to measure accurately the initial conditions of a [chaotic] system. The position of even the exampled wood chip at the beginning of its journey can only be determined as accu­rately as that best-ruler-available can measure. Since the final position of the wood chip will be very different if the chip is moved by an amount smaller than even this small margin of er­ror, it follows that there is no way to predict where a wood chip will wind up in the river.

Physicists and writers get around this by simply expressing this chaotic system as "unpredictable". By this it is not implied or even stated that the state of a system cannot be known quite precisely, or that you cannot predict where it will be at some time in the future. These kinds of predictions are constantly made, now rather accurately through computer modelers. What is meant is that because it is never possible to make a PERFECT set of measurements to determine the initial state of a chaotic system, the further states can never be totally predictable. There are some systems which are so sensitive to change through the most minute change in factors as to be incapable of accuracy to a finite calculation.

Why? Because you have to consider "linear" vs. "nonlinear". Chaos is nonlinear. You are accustomed to calculating linear equations--the kind that describe familiar physics--one thing changes in direct proportion to another. For example, when you turn up the volume on your sound system, say stereo, twice as much turn gives you twice as much volume. In a nonlinear system this simple kind of relation does not hold. It's similar to what you get in your stereo system when you turn it up too loud and suddenly you get whines, whistles, distortion, and all kinds of strange things--even to the physical cracking of the box itself. For technical reasons, the solution of nonlinear equations is a very difficult business, largely impossible to achieve without computers, if at all. So the scientists come up with another in­put--called "Fractals". You see, for any "unknown" it has to be accepted and recognized and then studied to make it a "known".

FRACTALS

Fractals comprise another phenomenon that arises in nonlinear systems. The "fractal" is a contraction of "fractional dimen­sion", How can it be described so that you can have an idea re­garding that of which we speak? Let us example, this time, a garden hose which is coiled into a pile. From a far distance it has no dimensions--it just appears as a point. Closer it is seen as a solid object and therefore has the typical three dimensions. Finally, from "inside" the coil, the hose becomes simply a one dimensional expression since you can now specify from your vantage point any location on it by saying how far it is from the end. Thus, depending on the point of view, the dimensionality of the hose goes from zero to three to one dimensions. Fractals are a way of dealing with what happens in between.

Fractals can arise in nonlinear systems. Let us give an example of such a fractal: Start with a triangle and then in the middle of each side of the triangle draw another triangle. Then keep doing this on every straight line--forever. It is obvious that if you look at any piece of this system at any level of magnification, you will see the same things--that is, a straight line with triangles on it. It is also obvious that there is a connection between the ap­pearance of things at different scales of magnification. In fact, if you think about it, you'll realize that you could not tell, just looking at a line, what was the actual magnification.

Now that you are confused and in a state of individual "chaos" over the subject--what is my point? Simple--it is a PERCEP­TION which MUST be attended--but it is not NEW and it is not the focus around which life physical or dimensional will re­volve--it simply IS. And it, like all things in physical expres­sion--is PERCEIVED. How a child will perceive a blossom is very different indeed from the way in which a gardener of prize blossoms will perceive the same flower! Is one more valid than the other? No, only perceived through more varied input and knowledge. The child's perception is undoubtedly the less com­plicated for it will be expressed without judgment! However, if the point is to have prize blossoms--there is more required than "no judgment" of the blossom in point. If it is lesser or more than another--why? If total chaos controls a society--the "why" must be considered before ORDER can become.

Now, however, comes the difficult perception--how can you 'REALLY discern what are orchestrated happenings and what are chaotic happenings? RESULTS! If man, for instance, de­velops a strain of virus altered to avoid all treatment--then casts it onto society--you can know the intention is very "ordered" toward intended destruction of masses of humanity. This is not "chaos"--this is simply a shrouding by deceptive use of your perception of "chaos" so that you don't catch him meddling in the population control of your society.

UNDERGROUND BASES USED FOR
MORE THAN MILITARY TOYS

Dear ones, please do not think that, in these massive under­ground research facilities, there is simply war material taking shape. You think of "war material" and "weapons" as war­heads, bullets, phasers, etc. No, in most of these massive facil­ities there is incredible tampering with genes, DNA structures and thus and so. This is where the only-imagined death ma­chines are birthed and tested.

Are there aliens there? What are "aliens"? If in England, a man from France is an "alien". If on Earth, a being from Orion is an alien. So, in every instance--there are "aliens" in both categories. Further, IF the Godhead or Overmind is back to take His property--would it not be reasonable that HE will have His own with Him, integrated--prepared? Creator needs no new planets, no new citizens, for if there is need of further advanced "perfection" HE HAS BUT TO CREATE IT--AND NOT FROM LESSER SPECIES. There may well be an effort on HIS part to improve or teach your own species--but human man seems to have desires which will always move to the debasement through ego transition into the darker expression BEFORE HE REALIZES HIS WHOLE JOURNEY IS TO MOVE WITHIN THE LIGHT AND BEYOND THAT PHYSICAL RESTRAINT WHICH BINDS AND LIMITS EVERY FACET OF EX­PRESSION.

So, Dharma might ask me how I come to know so much about this play? My sarcastic reply could well be: "Because I wrote it!" Either way, I know the players, the script and THE OUT­COME! Your choices are yours. But I can see further! Does Dharma KNOW? Yes, but like you; she doesn't realize she knows. And therein lies the problem--lack of accurate real­ization. I didn't say "reality"--I very carefully and selectively said "realization".

TRUTH IN REALIZATION

Unfortunately, the facts are that if you refuse to come into real­ization of what IS, there is no hope of CREATING that which MIGHT BE. You will forever, in this plane, be limited by that which you allow others to impress upon your perception.

If you cannot realize, at some point along this finite journey stopoff, what is the energy resource of self and universe--how can you possibly conceive the [many] dimensional expressions of energy called YOU?

WILHELM REICH

I am not a respecter of given individual discoverers, for they are but the 're-discoverers' of existence, bearing pieces of the puz­zle of what is God and what is GOD's creative force. In every instance when all else fails--go to the source and the answers are there, simple and beautifully wondrous. If you have infinite beings in an infinite universe--you must have infinite source and resource. If you are made up of "energy", be it expressed as simply invisible energy flow or as "matter" expressed in that which is coalesced into that which physical perceptions can re­ceive and define--it has to be a massively infinite resource, does it not?

Well, it does and IS. It is expressed by several labels from Orgone Energy to Scalar Waves, Cosmic Energy to Prana (life) Creative Force. I can call it whichever you like best but since it was, in your time frame, expressed nicely by Dr. Reich, as Orgone Energy, I can utilize that which is already familiar to some of you and speak about the Biophysics of the Orgone Energy. I can better outlay it in simple English from one who speaks sim­ple English and save myself the time and bother and "your doubts" by offering you what is already available if you know where to search. This I will take from a nice little presentation of one, James DeMeo from The Orgone Accumulator Hand­book.

WHAT IS THE ORGONE ENERGY?

Orgone energy, is cosmic life energy, the fundamental cre­ative force long known to people in touch with nature, and speculated about by natural scientists, but now physically objectified and demonstrated. The orgone was discovered by Dr. Wilhelm Reich, who identified many of its basic properties. For in­stance, the orgone energy charges up and radiates from all living and non-living substance it also can readily penetrate all forms of matter, though with varying rates of speed. All materials af­fect the orgone energy, by attracting and absorbing it, or by re­pelling or reflecting it. The orgone can be seen, felt, measured and photographed. It is a real, physical energy, and not just some metaphorical, hypothetical force.

The orgone also exists in a free form in the atmosphere, and in the vacuum of space. It is excitable, compressible, and spontaneously pulsatile, capable of expanding and contracting. The orgone charge within a given environment, or within a given substance, will vary over time, usually in a cyclical man­ner. The orgone is most strongly attracted to living things, to water, and to itself. Orgone energy can lawfully stream or flow from one location to another in the atmosphere, but it generally maintains a west to east flow, moving with, but slightly faster than the rotation of the Earth. It is a ubiquitous medium, a cosmic ocean of dynamic, moving energy, which interconnects the whole physical universe; all living creatures, weather systems, and planets respond to its pulsations and movements.

The orgone is related to, but quite different from other forms of energy. It can, for instance, impart a magnetic charge to fer­romagnetic conductors, but it is not magnetic itself. It can like­wise impart an electrostatic charge to insulators, but neither is it fully electrostatic in nature. It reacts with great disturbance to the presence of radioactive materials, or to harsh electromag­netism, much in the manner of irritated protoplasm. It can be registered on specially adapted Geiger counters. The orgone also is the medium through which electromagnetic disturbances are transmitted, much in the manner of the older concept of aether, though it is not itself electromagnetic in nature.

Streamings of orgone energy within the Earth's atmosphere affect changes in air circulation patterns; atmospheric orgone functions underlie the buildup of storm potentials, and influence air temperature, pressure, and humidity. Cosmic orgone energy functions also appear to be at work in space, affecting gravita­tional and solar phenomena: Still the mass-free orgone energy is not any one of these physical-mechanical factors, or even the sum of them. The properties of the orgone energy derive more from life itself, much in the manner of the older concept of a vital force, or élan vital; unlike those older concepts, however, the orgone also has been found to exist in a mass-free form, in the atmosphere and in space. It is primary, primordial cosmic life energy, while all other forms of energy are secondary in nature. [H: So, you are going to have to quit assuming you can go to a petrol station and fill up, good friends.]

In the living world, orgone energy functions underlie major life processes; pulsation, streaming, and charge of the biological orgone determines the movements, actions. and behavior of protoplasm and tissues, as well as the strength of "bioelectrical" phenomena. Emotion is the ebb and flow, the charge and discharge of the orgone within the membrane of an organism, just as weather is the ebb and flow, the charge and discharge of the orgone in the atmosphere. Both organism and weather respond to the prevailing character and state of the life energy. Orgone energy functions appear across the whole of creation, in mi­crobes, animals, stormclouds, hurricanes, and galaxies. Orgone energy not only charges and animates the natural world; we are immersed in a sea of it. much as a fish is immersed in water. More, it is the medium which communicates emotion and per­ception, through which we are connected to the cosmos, and made kin to all that is living.

GAIANDRIAN
LIFE OR DEATH OPTION

Taking this above into consideration--how are you going to transfer or transition this energy into your own being? Through that which is created directly from and energized by the same life force. We can offer you the same creative structure which converts these frequencies and energies in flow--but you must first integrate them within your own structure to "program" your own cellular individuality or "DNA" blueprint. This can be done in several ways but the first and most easily accessed is simply to intake such a substance, in our case a solution, already "grown" in the presence and enhancement of direct orgone pres­ence along with that which is impacting in frequency from in­visible light rays of universal origin. The cells are simply structures totally integratable with any individual cell--becoming one with it--but able to exist in perfection with high-frequency motion. In physical experimentation (by the crooks in high places) there is a crossing deliberately of "sluff-over" particulate of DNA--which can move through the atmosphere and cannot be stopped by containers of many sorts and if there were perfect containers--you would not be able to function while utilizing them. So, what faces you as species? A protection system built-in which disallows take-over by influxing alien DNA structuring. This in turn, must come from individual cell capa­bility of disallowing function of introduced DNA. Cancer is nothing but a normal mutation of cells through these mutated cells of alien DNA. The immune system of the host SHOULD be able to disallow take-over by these aliens. But not so in a structured "scientific" society wherein the body is MADE TO BE IMPERFECT AND AT JEOPARDY FOR TAKE-OVER.

If bombarded by too many "alien" structures, the body cannot defend itself and will perish--or, if the structures are compatible with life--will produce a hybrid or compromised "new" product.

Well, if you are a good little person and take all your "stuff" will you be immune to any attack? No--and an overwhelming input will compromise and perhaps take-out a weak system. However, if the proper vitamin-mineral-electrolyte balance can be attained--the immune system will ADJUST and con­front the attackers and CAN prevail. This does not mean that you won't ever be "sick" or needing "recovery". It does mean that while a population dies, you may be able to prevail. I speak of these things in this message because you seem to ex­pect GOD to do everything for you and if it is not accomplishedfree of charge and free of effort on your part--it is false and you pronounce judgment of failure upon other--while defending self. It is solely up to you whichever you choose and neither will all "make it" in physical form. However, I can promise you that anyone who attends this type of security care--will not have con­cern over life-form in higher energy flow as transitions occur between dimensions. This is not some kind of MEDICAL thing. We are not talking here about antibiotics of some kind--and we would not be allowed to share those with you if we were. The intent of the Elite controllers is to kill off a bunch Of you through one route or another so get over the dream of "cure" coming from them or anyone else. THEY WILL NOT ALLOW THAT, MY FRIENDS. Oh, you don't like it "that way"? I'm sorry, chelas, that is the way it IS! And, fur­thermore, until you choose it to be different and MAKE IT DIFFERENT--it will continue as is until they "getcha"!

PERCEPTION OF GOD, ALIENS AND MAN

I remind you who would take exception to my input. That is fine and you are welcome to your choices. However, you are children of the lie. You live in a perceived Reality which is NOT. The reality lies in the dimension of energy life. You cannot place a definition of MAN on GOD, for man cannot see beyond the end of his proverbial nose. You know not what IS GOD, nor will He, She, It--ever BE what you have been led to believe! That is one promise which will stand into infinity! Further, what God creates HE can uncreate as if it never was. The one beautiful portion of the "game", however, is that HE WILL ALWAYS ALLOW MAN TO PREVAIL IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BECAUSE THAT BECOMES THE PERFECTION OF HIS GRACE AND THE REASON FOR HIS CREATION.

REALITY OF NEEDS IN A PHYSICAL WORLD

Indeed there are "needs" in a physical world which go beyond "perception" because what is manifest must be attended by that same dimensional compression. Just as an automobile is built to run its engine on carbon-based fuel, so too will the machinery of the physical mechanical body require fuel to continue to function. Note that when the brain is actually dead and the astral mind severed from the housing--the body begins immediately to break down and decay. Life support through artificial means is good for a while--but the body is actually DEAD to its own en­vironment while the mind is still quite capable of observing the phenomenon.

SENATORS ARE SPACE ALIENS?

I wouldn't place much credence on [ the Front Page story of this past week's ] Weekly World News to break such a story, espe­cially between the finite differences of Space Aliens vs. Space Cadets! However, you are in store for far more strange things coming to your attention and this is only a prelude to get you into a mode of denial, ridicule and hilarity. Indeed, far stranger things are about to come into your attention than Sam Nunn be­ing a space alien. Many are better qualified as "spaced-out" something or others, but the "aliens" of your intent would not wish to claim them. Jay Rockefeller is a different matter--and all of you had better start looking into the whole of the Rocke­feller lineage. And you had better start relating the connections to this New World Order. ''You will have a very tiny window of opportunity to bring your own order and Constitutional function to your nation--or it will be THE PLANNED ONE WORLD ORDER AND CONTROL whether or not you like it.

Indeed there are aliens among you--everywhere among you. There are ones in very high places beyond such as Senators. These cute stories are to distract you, good people, from the facts which are ready to be exposed. However, please hold it in your hearts: No self-respecting "space alien" would be so silly--especially in such a time of chaos and crisis. Space aliens can afford the luxury, if advanced to thought transition, of fun and games--YOU CAN'T! Several individuals are specifically named and I am amused indeed--didn't we send Glenn back to you? I thought he made a loop into space and we rejected him! We left him to your Savings and Loan business of the Elite money-grabbers. I also see that one, Gramm, says he comes from a place called Remulak--well, that one sounds like a regur­gitated fish fungus of some kind. I really would, however, keep a sharp eye on ones such as Carl Sagan, Warren Christopher, and a few "old" buddies you thought gone forever! Not to infer that Sagan and Christopher ever have gone anywhere. Since there is no such thing as DEATH OF MIND--there is no way to be assured of "getting rid of anyone or anything!" So be it. May the force be with you, Nanu Nanu.

Have a bit of fun and joy along the way, participants--it is the only thing you have, your perceptions, and may they always be Lighted. Humor' is a good place to begin to awaken, so that you aren't scared out of your ever-loving minds! Salu.