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제목: PJ#051, THREADS OF SILK--BANDS OF STEEL, TANGLED WEBS VOL. VII

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    PJ 51
    CHAPTER 3

    REC #2 HATONN

    MON., JUNE 22, 1992 2:09 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 310

    MONDAY. JUNE 22. 1992
    GEORGE BUSH & CIA
    CONTINUED

    Please, readers, bear with me while I give a private notation to George Green regarding the earlier mentioned phone call from "a Mr. Resnick".

    If you can't see the same paw-prints on this "intelligence" phone call as other "set-ups" then I suggest you take cover--for real. Is the total Intelligence Community this stupid or only self-ap-pointed ones who twist into unfocused childish games for their own purposes? I want to print herein the phone call as now transcribed from the phone recorder. Now, note, readers, that G.G. is UPSET to some extent for the voice leaving the mes-sage was totally "unfriendly", if I might be so observant.

    At any rate the message went as follows:

    "Hello, my name is Paul Robert Resnick, Jr. I'm calling from my residence 'at the White House' at Ave. in , Pa. I'm calling in regards to the April 14th, 1992 issue (LIBERATOR) vol. 18 no. 13. A-h-h, I'm at area code (---: ----). You can call me collect, if you so desire. This is Paul Resnick, over the Great Seal of the President - - -[message remainder cut off by the ma-chine].

    Would "I" be upset? NO--but then, I'm not George Green. Moreover, it only gives clues and information as to who and what is "behind" the foolishness for BOTH HIM AND ME! I suspect that I am getting far more annoyed with this "source" than is G.G. but each of us does that which seems suitable at a given circumstance.

    By the way, readers, I find one William Clark (remember--from the San Luis Obispo Connection?? or---) also becoming most annoying as he seems to be able to get one (using initials of J.A.) to clandestinely sign for packages, expresses and other types of material without becoming evident for personal identifi­cation. So be it. By the way, to the caller in point--YOU HAVE THE WRONG IDENTIFICATION FOR THE PERSON WHOSE INFORMATION YOU REALLY WISH TO STOP FROM THE PRINTING! CLOSE, YES--CORRECT? NO!

    Now, chela, let us continue where we left off. I can only reas­sure you, precious, that you are in MY shield so do not become faint-of-heart on me now.

    AGAIN QUOTING:

    The Brown Brothers Harriman/Skull and Bones crowd counter­attacked in favor of Bush, mobilizing some significant re­sources. One was none other than Leon Jaworski, the former Watergate special prosecutor. Jaworski's mission for the Bush network appears to have been to get the Townhouse and related Nixon slush fund issues off the table of the public debate and confirmation hearings. Jaworski speaking at a convention of former FBI special agents meeting in Houston, defended Bush against charges that he had accepted illegal or improper pay­ments from Nixon and CREEP operatives. "This was investi­gated by me when I served as Watergate special prosecutor. I found no involvement of George Bush and gave him full clear­ance. I hope that, in the interest of fairness, the matter will not be bandied about unless something new has appeared on the horizon."

    MORE OPPOSITION

    Negative mail from both houses of Congress was also coming in to the White House. On November 12, GOP Congressman James M. Collins of Dallas, Texas wrote to Ford: "I hope you will reconsider the appointment of George Bush to the CIA. At this time it seems to me that it would be a greater service for the country for George to continue his service in China. He is not the right man for the CIA."

    There was also a letter to Ford from Democratic Congress­man Lucien Nedzi of Michigan, who had been the chairman of one of the principal House Watergate investigating committees. Nedzi wrote as follows: "The purpose of my letter is to express deep concern over the announced appointment of George Bush as the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."

    ***The writing was interrupted at this point.



    PJ 51
    CHAPTER 4

    REC #2 HATONN

    WED., JUNE 24, 1992 7:19 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 313

    WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1992
    GEORGE BUSH & CIA
    CONTINUED

    QUOTING CONTINUED:

    " His proposed appointment would bring with it inevitable
    complications for the intelligence community. Mr. Bush is a man with a recent partisan political past and a probable near-term partisan political future. This is a burden neither the Agency, nor the legislative oversight committee, nor the Execu­tive should have to bear as the CIA enters perhaps the most dif­ficult period of its history.

    "Accordingly, I respectfully urge that you reconsider your appointment of Mr. Bush to this most sensitive of positions."

    Within just a couple of days of making Bush's nomination public, the Ford White House was aware that it had a significant public relations problem. To get reelected, Ford had to appear as a reformer, breaking decisively with the bad old days of Nixon and the Plumbers. But with the Bush nomination, Ford was putting a former party chairman and future candidate for national office at the head of the entire intelligence community.

    Ford's staff began to marshal attempted rebuttals for the at­tacks on Bush. On November 5, Jim Connor of Ford's staff had some trite boiler-plate inserted into Ford's Briefing Book in case he were asked if the advent of Bush represented a move to obstruct the Church and Pike Committees. Ford was told to an­swer that he "asked Director Colby to cooperate fully with the Committee" and "expects Ambassador Bush to do likewise once he becomes Director. As you are aware, the work of both the Church and Pike Committees is slated to wind up shortly." In case he were asked about Bush politicizing the CIA, Ford was to answer; "I believe that Republicans and Democrats who know George Bush and have worked with him know that he does not let politics and partisanship interfere with the performance of public duty." That was a mouthful. "Nearly all of the men and women in this and preceding administrations have had partisan identities and have held partisan party posts....George Bush is a part of that American tradition and he will demonstrate this when he assumes his new duties."

    But when Ford in an appearance on a Sunday talk show, was asked if he were ready to exclude Bush as a possible vice-presi­dential candidate, he refused to do so, answering, "I don't think people of talent ought to be excluded from any field of public service." At a press conference, Ford said, "I don't think he's eliminated from consideration by anybody, the delegates or the convention or myself."

    BUSH CIA CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

    Bush's confirmation hearings got under way on December 15, 1975. Even judged by Bush's standards of today, they con­stitute a landmark exercise in sanctimonious hypocrisy so as­tounding as to defy comprehension.

    Bush's sponsor was GOP Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, the ranking Republican on Senator John Stennis's Sen­ate Armed Services Committee. Thurmond unloaded a mawkish panegyric in favor of Bush: "I think all of this shows an interest on your part in humanity, in civic development, love of your country, and willingness to serve your fellow man."

    Bush's opening statement was also in the main a tissue of ba­nality and cliches. He indicated his support for the Rockefeller Commission report without having mastered its contents in de­tail. He pointed out that he had attended cabinet meetings from 1971 to 1974, without mentioning who the President was in those days. Everybody was waiting for this consummate pontificator to get to the issue of whether he was going to attempt the vice-presidency in 1976. Readers of Bush's propaganda biographies know that he never decides on his own to run for office, but always responds to the urging of his friends. Within those limits, his answer was that he was available for the second spot on the ticket. More remarkably, he indicated that he had a hereditary right to it--it was, as he said, his "birthright".

    Would Bush accept a draft? "I cannot in all honesty tell you that I would not accept, and I do not think, gentlemen, that any American should be asked to say he would not accept, and to my knowledge, no one in the history of this Republic has been asked to renounce his political birthright as the price of confirmation for any office. And I can tell you that I will not seek any office while I hold the job of CIA Director. I will put politics wholly out of my sphere of activities." Even more, Bush argued, his willingness to serve at the CIA reflected his sense of noblesse oblige. Friends had asked him why he wanted to go to Langley at all, "with all the controversy swirling around the CIA, with its obvious barriers to political future?"

    Magnanimously, Bush replied to his own rhetorical questions: "My answer is simple. First, the work is desperately important to the survival of this country, and to the survival of freedom around the world. And second, old fashioned as it may seem to some, it is my duty to serve my country. And I did not seek this job but I want to do it and I will do my very best." [H: Getting any ideas yet, that Mr. Bush might just "fudge the truth" a little bit?]

    Stennis responded with a joke that sounds eery in retrospect: "If I thought that you were seeking the Vice Presidential nomination or Presidential nomination by way of the route of being Director of the CIA, I would question your judgment most severely." There was laughter in the committee room.

    Senators Barry Goldwater and Stuart Symington made clear that they would give Bush a free ride not only out of deference to Ford, but also out of regard for the late Prescott Bush, with whom they had both started out in the Senate in 1952. Senator Thomas McIntyre was more demanding, and raised the issue of enemies list operations, a notorious abuse of the Nixon (and subsequent) administrations:

    "What if you get a call from the President, next July or Au-gust, saying 'George, I would like to see you.' You go in the White House. He takes you over in the corner and says, 'Look, things are not going too well in my campaign. This Reagan is gaining on me all the time. Now, he is a movie star of some renown and has traveled with the fast set. He was a Hollywood star. I want you to get any dirt you can on this guy because I need it.'"

    What would Bush do? "I do not think that is difficult sir," intoned Bush. "I would simply say that it gets back to character and it gets back to integrity; and furthermore, I cannot conceive of the incumbent doing that sort of thing. But if I were put into that kind of position where you had a clear moral issue, I would simply say 'no' because you see I think, and maybe--I have the advantage as everyone on this committee of 20/20 hindsight, that this agency must stay in the foreign intelligence business and must not harass American citizens, like in Operation Chaos, and that these kinds of things have no business in the foreign intelligence business." This was the same Bush whose 1980 campaign was heavily staffed by CIA veterans, some retired, some on active service and in flagrant violation of the Hatch Act. This is the Vice President who ran Iran-Contra out of his own private office, and so forth.

    Gary Hart also had a few questions. How did Bush feel about assassinations? Bush "found them morally offensive and I am pleased the President has made that position very, very clear to the Intelligence Committee..." How about "coups d'etat in various countries around the world?" Hart wanted to know.

    "You mean in the covert field?" replied Bush. "Yes." "I would want to have full benefit of all the intelligence. I would want to have full benefit of how these matters were taking place but I cannot tell you, and I do not think I should, that there would never be any support for a coup d'etat; in other words, I cannot tell you I cannot conceive of a situation where I would not support such action." In retrospect, this was a moment of refreshing candor.

    ON THE EDGE OF WATERGATE

    Gary Hart knew where at least one of Bush's bodies was buried:

    Senator Hart: You raised the question of getting the CIA out of domestic areas totally. Let us hypothesize a situation where a President has stepped over the bounds. Let us say the FBI is in­vestigating some people who are involved, and they go right to the White House. There is some possible CIA interest. The President calls you and says, I want you as Director of the CIA to call the Director of the FBI to tell him to call off this opera­tion because it may jeopardize some CIA activities.

    Mr. Bush: Well, generally speaking, and I think you are hy­pothecating a case without spelling it out in enough detail to know if there is any real legitimate foreign intelligence aspect...

    There it was: the smoking gun tape again, the notorious Bush-Liedtke-Mosbacher-Pennzoil contribution to the CREEP again, the money that had been found in the pockets of Bernard Barker and the Plumbers after the Watergate break-in. But Hart did not mention it overtly, only in this oblique, Byzantine man­ner. Hart went on:

    I am hypothesizing a case that actually happened in June 1972. There might have been some tangential CIA interest in something in Mexico. Funds were laundered and so forth.

    Mr. Bush: Using a 50-50 hindsight on that case, I hope I would have said the CIA is not going to get involved in that if we are talking about the same one.

    Senator Hart: We are.

    Senator (Patrick) Leahy: Are there others?

    Bush was on the edge of having his entire Watergate past come out in the wash, but the liberal Democrats were already far too devoted to the one-party state to grill Bush seriously. In a few seconds, responding to another question from Hart, Bush was off the hook, droning on about plausible deniability, of all things.

    The next day, December 16, 1975, Church, appearing as a witness, delivered his philippie against Bush. After citing evi­dence of widespread public concern about the renewed intrusion of the CIA in domestic politics under Bush, Church reviewed the situation: "So here we stand. Need we find or look to higher places than the Presidency and the nominee himself to confirm the fact that this door of the Vice Presidency in 1976 is left open and that he remains under active consideration for the ticket in 1976? We stand in this position in the close wake of Watergate, and this committee has before it a candidate for Di­rector of the CIA, a man of strong partisan political background and a beckoning political future.

    "Under these circumstances I find the appointment astonish­ing. Now, as never before, the Director of the CIA must be completely above political suspicion. At the very least this com­mittee, I believe, should insist that the nominee disavow any place on the 1976 Presidential ticket....0therwise his position as CIA Director would be hopelessly compromised.

    "If Ambassador Bush wants to be Director of the CIA, he should seek that position. If he wants to be Vice President, then that ought to be his goal. It is wrong for him to want both posi­tions, even in a Bicentennial year."

    It was an argument that conceded far too much to Bush in the effort to be fair. Bush was incompetent for the post, and the ar­gument should have ended there. Church's unwillingness to demand the unqualified rejection of such a nominee no matter what future goodies he was willing temporarily to renounce has cast long shadows over subsequent American history. But even so, Bush was in trouble.

    Church was at his ironic best when he compared Bush to a recent chairman of the Democratic National Committee: "...If a Democrat were President, Mr. Larry O'Brien ought not to be nominated to be Director of the CIA. Of all times to do it, this is the worst, right at a time when it is obvious that public confi­dence needs to be restored in the professional, impartial, and nonpolitical character of the agency. So, we have the worst of all possible worlds." Church tellingly underlined that "Bush's birthright does not include being Director of the CIA. It in­cludes the right to run for public office, to be sure, but that is quite a different matter than confirming him now for this partic­ular position."

    Church said he would under no circumstance vote for Bush, but that if the latter renounced the '76 ticket, he would refrain from attempting to canvass other votes against Bush. It was an ambiguous position.

    Bush came back to the witness chair in an unmistakably whining mood. He was offended above all by the comparison of his august self to the upstart Larry O'Brien: "I think there is some difference in the qualifications," said Bush in a hyperthy­roid rage. "Larry O'Brien did not serve in the Congress of the United States for four years. Larry O'Brien did not serve, with no partisanship, at the United Nations for two years. Larry O'Brien did not serve as the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China." Not only Bush but his whole cursus honorum was insulted! "I will never apologize," said Bush a few seconds later, referring to his own record. Then Bush pulled out his "you must resign" letter to Nixon: "Now, I submit that for the record that that is demonstrable indepen­dence. I did not do it by calling the newspapers and saying, 'Look, I am having a press conference. Here is a sensational statement to make me, to separate me from a President in great agony."

    [H: I can only again warn you-the-people--this man will do anything to achieve HIS GOALS--including bringing down the entire world into this New World Order--One World Government and he is ready to do so RIGHT NOW!!!]

    THE FORD LETTER

    Bush had been savaged in the hearings, and his nomination was now in grave danger of being rejected by the committee, and then by the full Senate. Later in the afternoon of November 16, a damage control party met at the White House to assess the situation for Ford. According to Patrick O'Donnell of Ford's Congressional Relations Office, the most Bush could hope for was a bare majority of 9 out of 16 votes on the Stennis Com­mittee.

    Ford was inclined to give the senators what they wanted, and exclude Bush a priori from the vice-presidential contest. When Ford called George over to the Oval Office on December 18, he already had the text of a letter to Stennis announcing that Bush was summarily ruled off the ticket if Ford were the candidate (which was anything but certain). Ford showed Bush the letter. We do not know what whining may have been heard in the White House that day from a senatorial patrician deprived (for the moment) of his birthright. Ford could not yield; it would have thrown his entire election campaign into acute embarrass­ment just as he was trying to get it off the ground. When George saw that Ford was obdurate, he proposed that the letter be amended to make it look as if the initiative to rule him out as a running mate had originated with Bush. The fateful letter read:

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    As we Both know, the nation must have a strong and effective foreign intelligence capability. Just over two weeks ago, on December 7 while in Pearl Harbor, I said that we must never drop our guard nor unilaterally dis­mantle our defenses. The Central Intelligence Agency is essential to maintaining our national security.

    I nominated Ambassador George Bush to be CIA Di­rector so we can now get on with appropriate decisions concerning the intelligence community. I need--and the nation needs--his leadership at CIA as we rebuild and strengthen the foreign intelligence community in a manner which earns the confidence of the American people.

    Ambassador Bush and I agree that the Nation's imme­diate foreign intelligence needs must take precedence over other considerations and there should be continuity in his CIA leadership. Therefore, if Ambassador Bush is con­firmed by the Senate as Director of Central Intelligence, I will not consider him as my Vice Presidential running mate in 1976.

    He and I have discussed this in detail. In fact, he urged that I make this decision. This says something about the man and about his desire to do his job for the nation...

    On December 19, this letter was received by Stennis, who announced its contents to his committee. The Committee promptly approved the Bush appointment by a vote of 12 to 4, with Gary Hart, Leahy, Culver and McIntyre voting against him. Bush's name could now be sent to the floor, where a re­crudescence of anti-Bush sentiment was not likely, but could not be ruled out.

    Then, two days before Christmas, the CIA chief in Athens, Richard Welch, was gunned down in front of his home by masked assassins as he returned home with his wife from a Christmas party. A group calling itself the "November 19 Or­ganization" later claimed credit for the killing.

    Certain networks immediately began to use the Welch assas­sination as a bludgeon against the Church and Pike Committees. An example came from columnist Charles Bartlett, writing in the now-defunct Washington Star: "The assassination of the CIA Station Chief, Richard Welch, in Athens is a direct consequence of the stagy hearings of the Church Committee. Spies tradition­ally function in a gray world of immunity from such crudities. But the Committee's prolonged focus on CIA activities in Greece left agents there exposed to random vengeance." Staffers of the Church committee pointed out that the Church Committee had never said a word about Greece or mentioned the name Welch.

    CIA Director. Colby first blamed the death of Welch on Counterspy magazine, which had published the name of Welch some months before. The next day, Colby backed off, blaming a more general climate of hysteria regarding the CIA which had led to the assassination of Richard Welch. In his book, Honor­able Men, published some years later, Colby continued to at­tribute the killing to the "sensational and hysterical way the CIA investigations had been handled and trumpeted around the world."

    The Ford White House resolved to exploit this tragic incident to the limit. Liberals raised a hue and cry in response. Les As­pin later recalled that "the air transport plane carrying Welch's body circled Andrews Air Force Base for three-quarters of an hour in order to land live on the Today Show." Ford waived re­strictions in order to allow interment at Arlington Cemetery. The funeral on January 7 was described by the Washington Post as "a show of pomp usually reserved for the nation's most renowned military heroes." Anthony Lewis of the New York Times described the funeral as "a political device" with cere­monies "being manipulated in order to arouse a political back­lash against legitimate criticism", Norman Kempster in the Washington Star found that "only a few hours after the CIA's Athens station chief was gunned down in front of his home, the agency began a subtle campaign intended to persuade Americans that his death was the indirect result of congressional investiga­tions and the direct result of an article in an obscure magazine." Here, in the words of a Washington Star headline, was "one CIA effort that worked".

    BUSH AND THE ADL
    [PAY ATTENTION!]

    Between Christmas and New Year's in Kennebunkport, looking forward to the decisive floor vote on his confirmation, Bush was at work tending and mobilizing key parts of his net­work. One of them was a certain Leo Cherne.

    Leo Cherne is not a household word but he has been a powerful figure in the U.S. intelligence community over the period since World War H. Leo Cherne was to be one of Bush's most important allies when he was CIA Director and throughout Bush's subsequent career.

    Cherne has been a part of B'nai B'rith all his life. He was and still is an ardent Zionist. He is typical to the extent of the so-called "neoconservatives" who have been prominent in government and policy circles under Reagan-Bush, and Bush. Cherne was the founder of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a conduit for neo-Bukharinite operations between East and West in the Cold War, and it was also reputedly a CIA front organization.

    Cherne was a close friend of William Casey, who was working in the Nixon administration as undersecretary of state for economic affairs in mid-1973. That was when Cherne was named to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) by Nixon. On March 15, 1976, Cherne became the chairman of this body, which specializes in conduiting the demands of financiers and related interests into the intelligence community. Cherne, as we will see, would be, along with Bush, a leading beneficiary of Ford's spring 1976 intelligence reorganization.

    Bush's correspondence with Cherne leaves no doubt that theirs was a very special relationship. Cherne represented for Bush a strengthening of his links to the Zionist-neoconservative milieu, with options for backchanneling into the Soviet bloc. Bush wrote to Cherne, "I read your testimony with keen interest and appreciation. I am really looking forward to meeting you and working with you in connection with your PFIAB chores. Have a wonderful 1976."

    January 1976 was not auspicious for Bush. He had to wait until almost the end of the month for his confirmation vote, hanging there, slowly twisting in the wind. In the meantime, the Pike Committee report was approaching completion, after months of probing and haggling, and was sent to the Government Printing Office on January 23, despite continuing arguments from the White House and from the GOP that the committee could not reveal confidential and secret material provided by the executive branch. On Sunday, January 25, a copy of the report was leaked to Daniel Schorr of CBS News, and was exhibited on television that evening. The following morning, the New York Times published an extensive summary of the entire Pike Committee report.

    Despite all this exposure, the House voted on January 29 that the Pike Committee report could not be released. A few days later, it was published in full in the Village Voice, and CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr was held responsible for its appearance. The Pike Committee report attacked Henry Kissinger, "whose comments," it said, "are at variance with the facts." In the midst of this imperial regency over the United States, an un-amused Kissinger responded that "we are facing a new version of McCarthyism". A few days later, Kissinger said of the Pike Committee: "I think they have used classified information in a reckless way, and the version of covert operations they have leaked to the press has the cumulative effect of being totally un-true and damaging to the nation."

    Thus, as Bush's confirmation vote approached, the Ford White House, on the one hand, and the Pike and Church Committees on the other, were close to "open political warfare", as the Washington Post put it at the time. One explanation of the leaking of the Pike report was offered by Otis Pike himself on February 11: "A copy was sent to the CIA. It would be to their advantage to leak it for publication." By now, Ford was raving about mobilizing the FBI to find out how the report had been leaked.

    On January 19, George Bush was present in the Executive Gallery of the House of Representatives, seated close to the un-fortunate Betty Ford, for the President's State of the Union Address. This was a photo opportunity so that Ford's CIA candidate could get on television for a cameo appearance that might boost his standing on the eve of confirmation.

    CONFIRMED AT LAST

    Senate floor debate was underway on January 26, and Sena­tor McIntyre lashed out at the Bush nomination as "an insensi­tive affront to the American people".

    In further debate on the day of the vote, January 27, Senator Joseph Biden joined other Democrats in assailing Bush as "the wrong appointment for the wrong job at the wrong time." Church appealed to the Senate to reject Bush, a man "too deeply embroiled in partisan politics and too intertwined with the politi­cal destiny of the President himself" to be able to lead the CIA. Goldwater, Tower, Percy, Howard Baker and Clifford Case all spoke up for Bush. Bush's floor leader was Strom Thurmond who supported Bush by attacking the Church and Pike Commit­tees.

    Finally it came to a roll call and Bush passed by a vote of 64-27. Church's staff felt they had failed lamentably, having gotten only liberal Democrats and the single Republican vote of Jesse Helms.

    It was the day after Bush's confirmation that the House Rules Committee voted 9 to 7 to block the publication of the Pike Committee report. The issue then went to the full House on January 29, which voted, 146 to 124, that the Pike Committee must submit its report to censorship by the White House and thus by the CIA. At almost the same time, Senator Howard Baker joined Tower and Goldwater in opposing the principal fi­nal recommendation of the Church Committee, such as it was--the establishment of a permanent intelligence over sight com­mittee.

    Pike found that the attempt to censor his report had made "a complete travesty of the whole doctrine of separation of pow­ers." In the view of a staffer of the Church committee, "all within two days, the House Intelligence Committee had ground to a halt, and the Senate Intelligence Committee had split asun­der over the centerpiece of its recommendations. The White House must have rejoiced; the Welch death and leaks from the Pike Committee report had produced, at last, a backlash against the congressional investigations."

    Riding the crest of that wave of backlash was George Bush. The constellation of events around his confirmation prefigures the wretched state of Congress today: a rubber stamp parliament in a totalitarian state, incapable of overriding even one of Bush's 22 vetoes.

    On Friday, January 30, Ford and Bush were joined at the CIA auditorium for Bush's swearing-in ceremony before a large gathering of agency employees. Colby was also there: Some said he had been fired primarily because Kissinger thought that he was divulging too much to the congressional committees, but Kissinger later told Colby that the latter's stratagems had been correct.

    Colby opened the ceremony with a few brief words: "Mr. President, and Mr. Bush, I have great honor to present you to an organization of dedicated professionals. Despite the turmoil and tumult of the last year, they continue to produce the best intelligence in the world." This was met by a burst of applause. Ford's line was: "We cannot improve this agency by destroying it." Bush promised to make the "CIA an instrument of peace and on object of pride for all our people."

    * * *

    On this last note of nausea-related lies, let us take a break please.

    Hatonn to stand-by. We will continue on this subject when we again sit to pen.

  2. #4
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    PJ 51
    CHAPTER 5

    REC #3 HATONN

    WED., JUNE 24, 1992 11:01 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 313

    WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1992

    "LEGAL" ATTACK TO SUPPRESS JOURNALS

    ***URGENT RELEASE FOR READERS***

    ****I have urgent information for you regarding some of the JOURNALS which have been made available. There is a massive lawsuit against all of us with insisting of confiscation and impounding of all of the Journals named (we will name them). Although there is not a "case" in the circumstance--the court WILL REQUIRE IMPOUNDING AND THAT PRINTING BE STOPPED. AS YOU WILL SEE, THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT JOURNALS AS DEAL WITH TRUTH REGARDING DIVINE SOURCE AND HENCE THE REASON FOR THE "SHUT-DOWN". I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT THESE WILL BE THE MOST VALUABLE DOCUMENTS ON THE PLANET AND I HAVE NO OTHER SUGGESTION THAN THAT YOU GET YOUR COPIES IMMEDIATELY!!! (AS LONG AS THERE ARE ONES AVAILABLE BEFORE POSTING OF CEASE AND DESIST ORDER--WHICH BECOMES HARDER BECAUSE ALL MATERIAL HAS BEEN SENT AWAY FROM AMERICA WEST FOR SOME TIME NOW.) IF YOU EVER WISH TO BE ASSURED OF HAV­ING THEM YOU WILL ACT NOW FOR THE GOVERN­MENT CAN TIE UP THE DOCUMENTS FOREVER BUT CANNOT STOP DISTRIBUTION OF THE AVAILABLE PRINTED MATERIAL SENT PRIOR TO POSTING OF NOTICE. I AM SURE THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR SHIPPING EVEN IN ADVANCE OF PAY­MENT CLEARANCE IF YOU CALL THE 800 729-4131 number.

    THE PAPERS WERE SERVED THIS MORNING AND OUR PEOPLE HAVE NOT EVEN FULLY READ THE CASE PRESENTED. THE PAPERS HAVE BEEN DULY TURNED OVER TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CENTER BY EXPRESS SHIPMENT. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

    THE JOURNALS IN POINT: AIDS: THE LAST GREAT PLAGUE; GOD SAID: LET THERE BE LIGHT AND CREATION BECAME; I AND MY FATHER ARE ONE--SECRETS OF UNIVERSAL ORDER; ETERNAL QUEST OF MAN; MURDER BY ATOMIC SUICIDE; PHONE HOME, E.T.--REACH OUT AND TOUCH SOMEONE--LIKE GOD!; THE SACRED SPIRIT WITHIN--MI­TAICUYE OYASIN; HUMAN, THE SCIENCE OF MAN--THE SCIENTIFIC DEFINITION AND PROOF OF GOD; and SCIENCE OF THE COSMOS--TRANSFORMA­TION OF MAN.

    PLEASE TAKE NOTE THAT YOUR SPIRITUAL AD­VERSARY IS THE FIRST TO RISE AND TRY TO SLAY GOD OF TRUTH--EVEN BEFORE THE ELITE CAR­TELS. THIS SHOULD TELL YOU AN IMPORTANT BIT OF INFORMATION MORE VALUABLE THAN ALL THE GOLD IN THE UNIVERSE! SO BE IT, I CANNOT FORESEE HOW MUCH TIME THERE IS BUT ASSUME A WEEK FROM THE TIME THIS REACHES YOU IS THE OUTER LIMIT--ONCE SENT FROM LOCATION THE LAW PROTECTS YOUR TRANSACTION.****

    **********************
    GEORGE BUSH & CIA
    CONTINUED

    QUOTING CONTINUED:

    CIA DIRECTOR BUSH

    When Bush became Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the incumbent principal deputy director was Gen. Vernon Walters, a former Army lieutenant general. This is the same Gen. Vernon Walters who was mentioned by Haldeman and Nixon in the notorious "smoking gun" tape already discussed, but who of course denied that he ever did any of the things that Haldeman and Erlichman said that he had promised to do. Walters had been at the CIA since May 1972--a Nixon appointee who had been with Nixon when the then-Vice President's car was stoned in Caracas, Venezuela. Ever since then, Nixon had seen him as part of the old guard. Walters left to become a private consultant in July 1976.

    To replace Walters, Bush picked Enno Henry Knoche, who had joined the CIA in 1953 as an intelligence analyst specializing in Far Eastern political and military affairs. Knoche came from the Navy and knew Chinese. From 1962 to 1967, he had been the chief of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. In 1969, he had become deputy director of planning and budgeting and chaired the international CIA committee in charge of computerization. Next, Knoche was deputy director of the Office of Current Intelligence, which produces ongoing assessments of international events for the President and the National Security Council. After 1972, Knoche headed the Intelligence Directorate's Office of Strategic Research, charged with evaluating strategic threats to the U.S. In 1975, Knoche had been a special liaison between Colby and the Rockefeller Com-mission, as well as with the Church and Pike Committees. This was a very sensitive post, and Bush clearly looked to Knoche to help him deal with continuing challenges coming from the Congress. In the fall of 1975, Knoche was to function as Bush's "Indian guide" through the secrets of Langley; he knew "where the bodies were buried".

    Knoche was highly critical of Colby's policy of handing over limited amounts of classified material to the Pike and Church committees, while fighting to save the core of covert operations. Knoche told a group of friends during this period: "There is no counterintelligence any more." This implies a condemnation of the congressional committees with whom Knoche had served as liaison, and can also be read as a lament for the ousting of James Jesus Angleton, chief of the CIA's counterintelligence operations until 1975 and director of the mail-opening operation that had been exposed by various probers.

    NORIEGA INVOLVEMENT

    Adm. Daniel J. Murphy was Bush's deputy director for the intelligence community, and later became Bush's chief of staff during his first term as vice president. Much later, in November 1987, Murphy visited Panama in the company of South Korean businessman and intelligence operative Tongsun Park, and met with Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. Murphy was later obliged to testify to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about his meeting with Noriega. Murphy claimed that he was only in Panama to "make a buck", but there are indications that he was carrying messages to Noriega from Bush. Tongsun Park, Murphy's ostensible business associate, will soon turn out to have been the central figure of the Koreagate scandal of 1976, a very important development on Bush's CIA watch.

    Other names on the Bush flow chart included holdover Ed-ward Proctor, followed by Bush appointee Sayre Stevens in the slot of deputy director for intelligence; holdover Carl Duckett, followed by Bush appointee Leslie Dirks as deputy director for science and technology; John Blake, holdover as deputy director for administration, and holdover William Nelson, followed by Bush appointee William Wells, deputy director for operations.

    [H: I can only urge you, once more, to get the ongoing series of TANGLED WEBS: TANGLED WEBS, VOL, I; TAN-GLED WEBS, VOL. II; THE MOTHER OF ALL WEBS Cr.W. HD; LOOSEN THE KNOTS AND TANGLES (T.W. IV); BLOODSUCKERS OF THE TANGLED WEBS (V); SILENT BLOOD SUCKERS OF THE TANGLED WEBS (VI) and the others as we get them to release point. Remember, chelas, these are JOURNALS and the great value is the con­tinuity of flow and integration of that which is already known. I think there is even some kind of discount if you purchase several--you'll have to check on it.]

    William Wells as deputy director for operations was a very sig­nificant choice. He was a career covert operations specialist who had graduated from Yale a few years before Bush. Wells soon acquired his own deputy, recommended by him and ap­proved by Bush: This was the infamous Theodore Shackley, whose title thus became associate deputy director for covert operations. Shackley later emerged as one of the central figures of the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980's. He is reputedly one of the dominant personalities of a CIA old boys' network known as The Enterprise, which was at the heart of Iran-Contra and the other illegal covert operations of the Reagan-Bush years.

    During the early 1960's, after the Bay of Pigs, Theodore Shackley had been the head of the CIA Miami Station during the years in which Operation Mongoose was at its peak. This was the E. Howard Hunt and Watergate Cubans crowd, circles fa­miliar to Felix Rodriguez (Max Gomez), who in the 1980's ran Contra gun-running and drug-running out of Bush's vice-presi­dential office.

    Later, Shackley was reportedly the chief of the CIA station in Vientiane, Laos, between July 1966 and December 1968. Some time after that, he moved on to become the CIA station chief in Saigon, where he directed the implementation of the Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program, better known as OPERATION PHOENIX, a genocidal crime against humanity which killed tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians because they were suspected of working for the Viet­Cong, or sometimes simply because they were able to read and write. [H: Yes indeed, I can only urge you to get the above named JOURNALS for it's all there in one or another of them.] As for Shackley, there are also reports that he worked for a time in the late 1960's in Rome during the period when the CIA's GLADIO capabilities were being used to launch a wave of terrorism in that country that went on for well over a decade. Such was the man whom Bush chose to appoint to a position of responsibility in the CIA. Later, Shackley will turn up as a "speechwriter" for Bush during the 1979-80 campaign.

    Along with Shackley came his associate and former Miami Station second in command, Thomas Clines, a partner of Gen. Richard Secord and Albert Hakim during the Iran-Contra opera­tion, convicted in September 1990 on four felony tax counts for not reporting his ill-gotten gains, and sentenced to 16 months in prison and a fine of $40,000.

    Another career covert operations man, John Waller, became the inspector general, the officer who was supposed to keep track of illegal operations. For legal advice, Bush turned first to holdover General Counsel Mitchell Rogovin, who had in De­cember 1975 theorized that intelligence activities belonged to the "inherent powers" of the presidency, and that no special con­gressional legislation was required to permit such things as covert operations to go on. later, Bush appointed Anthony Lapham, Yale '58, as CIA general counsel. Lapham was the scion of an old San Francisco banking family, and his brother was Lewis Lapham, the editor of Harper's magazine. Lapham would take a leading role in the CIA cover-up of the Letelier as­sassination case.

    Typical of the broad section of CIA officers who were de­lighted with their new boss from Brown Brothers Harri­man/Skull and Bones was Cord Meyer, who had most recently been the station chief in London from 1973 on, a wild and woolly time in the tight little island, as we will see. Meyer, a covert action veteran and Watergate operative, writes at length in his autobiography about his enthusiasm for the Bush regime at CIA, which induced him to prolong his own career there.

    And what did other CIA officers, such as intelligence ana­lysts, think of Bush? A common impression is that he was a su­perficial lightweight with no serious interest in intelligence. Deputy Director for Science and Technology Carl Duckett, who was ousted by Bush after three months, commented that he "never saw George Bush feel he had to understand the depth of something.... He is not a man tremendously dedicated to a cause or ideas. He's not fervent. He goes with the flow, looking for how it will play politically." According to Maurice Ernst, the head of the CIA's Office of Economic Research from 1970 to 1980, "George Bush doesn't like to get into the middle of an in­tellectual debate....he liked to delegate it. I never really had a serious discussion with him on economics." Hans Heymann was Bush's national intelligence officer for economics, and he remembers having been impressed by Bush's Phi Beta Kappa Yale degree in economics. As Heymann later recalled Bush's response, "He looked at me in horror and said, 'I don't remem­ber a thing. It was so long ago, so I'm going to have to rely on you.'"

    INTELLIGENCE CZAR: BUSH

    During the first few weeks of Bush's tenure, the Ford adminis­tration was gripped by a "first strike" psychosis. This had nothing to do with the Soviet Union, but was rather Ford's de­sire to preempt any proposals for reform of the intelligence agencies coming out of the Pike or Church Committees with a pseudo-reform of his own, premised on his own in-house study, the Rockefeller report, which recommended an increase of secrecy for covert operations and classified information. Since about the time of the Bush nomination, an interagency task force armed with the Rockefeller Commission recommendations had been meeting under the chairmanship of Ford's counselor Jack 0. Marsh. This was the Intelligence Coordinating Group, which included delegates of the intelligence agencies, plus NSC, Office of Management and the Budget (OMB), and others. This group worked up a series of final recommendations that were given to Ford to study on his Christmas vacation in Vail, Col­orado. At this point Ford was inclined to "go slow and work with Congress".

    But on January 10, Marsh and the intelligence agency bosses met again with Ford, and the strategy began to shift toward pre­empting Congress. On January 30, Ford and Bush came back from their appearance at the CIA auditorium swearing-in session and met with other officials in the Cabinet Room. Attending be­sides Ford and Bush were Secretary of State Kissinger, Secre­tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General Edward Levi, Jack Marsh, Philip Buchen, Brent Scowcroft, Mike Du­val, and Peter Wallison representing Vice President Rockefeller, who was out of town that day. Here Ford presented his tenta­tive conclusions for further discussion. The general line was to preempt the Congress, not to cooperate with it, to increase se­crecy, and to increase authoritarian tendencies.

    Ford scheduled a White House press conference for the evening of February 17.

    In his press conference of February 17, Ford scooped the Congress and touted his bureaucratic reshuffle of the intelli­gence agencies as the most sweeping reform and reorganization of the United States' intelligence agencies since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. "I will not be a party to the dismantling of the CIA or other intelligence agencies," he in­toned. He repeated that the intelligence community had to function under the direction of the National Security Council, as if that were something earth-shaking and new; from the per­spective of Oliver North and Admiral Poindexter we can see in retrospect that it guaranteed nothing. A new NSC committee chaired by Bush was entrusted with the task of giving greater central coordination to the intelligence community as a whole. This committee was to consist of Bush, Kissinger clone William Hyland of the National Security Council staff, and Robert Ellsworth, the assistant secretary of defense for intelligence. This committee was jointly to formulate the budget of the intel­ligence community and allocate its resources to the various tasks.

    KISSINGER, SCOWCROFT; IOB

    The 40 Committee, which had overseen covert operations, was now to be called the Operations Advisory Group, with its membership reshuffled to include Scowcroft of NSC, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff George Brown, plus observers from the attorney general and OMB.

    An innovation was the creation of the Intelligence Oversight Board (in addition to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), which was chaired by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, the old adversary of Charles de Gaulle during World War II. The IOB was supposed to be a watchdog to prevent new abuses from coming out of the intelligence community. Also on this board there were Stephen Ailes, who had been undersecretary of defense for Kennedy and secretary of the Army for LBJ. The third figure on this IOB was Leo Cherne, who was soon to be promoted to chairman of PFIAB as well. The increasingly complicit relationship of Cherne to Bush meant that all alleged oversight by the IOB was a mockery.

    Ford also wanted a version of the Official Secrets Act, which we have seen Bush supporting: He called for "Special legislation to guard critical intelligence secrets. This legislation would make it a crime for a government employee who has access to certain highly classified information to reveal that information improperly"--which would have made the Washington leak game rather more dicey than it is at present.

    FORD EO OPENS DOOR FOR DOMESTIC
    COVERT ACTIONS

    The Official Secrets Act would have to be passed by Congress, but most of the rest of what Ford announced was embodied in Executive Order 11905. Church thought that this was over-reaching, since it amounted to changing some provisions of the National Security Act by presidential fiat. But this was now the new temper of the times.

    As for the CIA, Executive Order 11905 authorized it "to conduct foreign counterintelligence activities ... in the United States", which opened the door to many things. Apart from restrictions on physical searches and electronic bugging, it was still open season on Americans abroad. The FBI was promised the Levi guidelines, and other agencies would get charters written for them. In the interim, the power of the FBI to combat various "subversive" activities was reaffirmed. Political assassination was banned, but there were no limitations or regulations placed on covert operations, and there was nothing about measures to improve the intelligence and analytical product of agencies.

    In the view of the New York Times, the big winner was Bush: "From a management point of view, Mr. Ford tonight centralized more power in the hands of the director of Central Intelligence than any had had since the creation of the CIA. The director has always been the nominal head of the intelligence community, but in fact has had little power over the other agencies, particularly the Department of Defense." Bush was now de facto intelligence czar.

    Congressman Pike said that Ford's reorganization was bent "largely on preserving all of the secrets in the executive branch and very little on guaranteeing a lack of any further abuses." Church commented that what Ford was really after was "to give the CIA a bigger shield and a longer sword with which to stab about."

    The Bush-Kissinger-Ford counteroffensive against the congressional committees went forward. On March 5, the CIA leaked the story that the Pike Committee had lost more than 232 secret documents which had been turned over from the files of the executive branch. Pike said that this was another classic CIA provocation designed to discredit his committee, which had ceased its activity. Bush denied that he had engineered the leak.

    By September, Bush could boast in public that he had won the immediate engagement: His adversaries in the congressional investigating committees were defeated. "The CIA," Bush announced, "has weathered the storm... The mood in Congress has changed," he crowed. "No one is campaigning against strong intelligence. The adversary thing, how we can ferret out corruption, has given way to the more serious question how we can have better intelligence."

    Such was the public profile of Bush's CIA tenure up until about the time of the November 1976 elections. If this had been the whole story, then we might accept the usual talk about Bush's period of uneventful rebuilding and moral boosting while he was at Langley.

    * * *

    Let us take a rest break before we take up the subject of Bush's real agenda.

    PJ 51
    CHAPTER 6

    REC #4 HATONN

    WED., JUNE 24, 1992 11:01 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 313

    WEDNESDAY. JUNE 24. 1992
    GEORGE BUSH & CIA
    CONTINUED
    As we move along here I just want you to keep in mind that "Kissinger" will be coming up constantly as the brains behind everything happening--BUT ALSO REMEMBER: THE UN­KNOWN PERSON, WALLACE STICKNEY, WHO HEADS FEMA AND WILL CONTROL UNDER DIRECTION OF THOSE SAME HANDS--IS A MEMBER OF KISSINGER'S "KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES"!!!!

    BUSH'S REAL AGENDA

    Reality was different. The administration Bush served had Ford as its titular head, but most of the real power, especially in for­eign affairs, was in the hands of Kissinger. Bush was more than willing to play along with the Kissinger agenda.

    KOREAGATE

    The first priority was to put an end to such episodes as contempt citations for Henry Kissinger. Thanks to the presence of Don Gregg as CIA station chief in Seoul, South Korea, that was easy to arrange. This was the same Don Gregg of the CIA who would later serve as Bush's national security adviser during the second vice-presidential term, and who would manage decisive parts of the Iran-Contra operations from Bush's own office. Gregg knew of an agent of the Korean CIA, Tongsun Park, who had for a number of years been making large payments to mem­bers of Congress, above all to Democratic members of the House of Representatives, in order to secure their support for legislation that was of interest to Park Chung Hee, the South Korean leader. It was therefore a simple matter to blow the lid off this story, causing a wave of hysteria among the literally hundreds of members of Congress who had attended parties or­ganized by Tongsun Park.

    The Koreagate headlines began to appear a few days after Bush had taken over at Langley. In February, there was a story by Maxine Cheshire of the Washington Post reporting that the De­partment of Justice was investigating Congressmen Bob Leggett and Joseph Addabbo for allegedly accepting bribes from the Ko­rean government. Both men were linked to Suzi Park Thomson, who had been hosting parties of the Korean Embassy. Later, it turned out that Speaker of the House Carl Albert had kept Suzi Park Thomson on his payroll for all of the six years that he had been speaker. The New York Times estimated that as many as 115 Congressmen were involved.

    In reality the number was much lower, but former Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski was brought back from Houston to become special prosecutor for this case as well. This underlined the press line that "the Democrats' Watergate" had finally arrived. It was embarrassing to the Bush CIA when Tongsun Park's official agency file disappeared for several months, and finally turned up shorn of key information on the CIA officers who had been working most closely with Park.

    With "Koreagate", the Congress was terrorized and brought to heel. In this atmosphere Bush moved to reach a secret foreign policy consensus with key congressional leaders of both parties of the one-party state. According to two senior government of­ficials involved, limited covert operations in such places as An­gola were continued under the pretext that they were necessary for phasing out the earlier, larger, and more expensive opera­tions. Bush's secret deal was especially successful with the post-Church Senate Intelligence Committee. Because of the cli­mate of restoration that prevailed, a number of Democrats on this committee concluded that they must break off their aggres­sive inquiries and make peace with Bush, according to reports of remarks by two senior members of the committee staff. The result was an interregnum during which the Senate committee would neither set specific reporting requirements nor attempt to pass any binding legislation to restrict CIA covert and related activity. In return, Bush would pretend to make a few disclo­sures to create a veneer of cooperation.

    THE LETELIER AFFAIR

    One of the most spectacular scandals of Bush's tenure at the CIA was the assassination in Washington, D.C. of Orlando Letelier, the Chilean exile leader. Letelier had been a minister in the Allende government, which had been overthrown by Kissinger in 1973. Letelier, along with Ronnie Moffitt of the Washington Institute for Policy Studies, died on September 21, 1976 in the explosion of a car bomb on Sheridan Circle, in the heart of Washington's Embassy Row district along Mas­sachusetts Avenue.

    Relatively few cases of international terrorism have taken place on the territory of the United States, but this was certainly an exception. Bush's activities before and after this assassination amount to one of the most bizarre episodes in the annals of se­cret intelligence operations.

    One of the assassins of Letelier was unquestionably one Michael Vernon Townley, a CIA agent who had worked for David Atlee Phillips in Chile. Phillips had become the director of the CIA's Western Hemisphere operations after the overthrow of Allende and the advent of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, and its Milton Friedman/Chicago School economic policies. In 1975, Phillips founded AFIO, the Association of Former Intelli­gence Officers, which has supported George Bush in every campaign he has ever waged since that time. Townley, as a "former" CIA agent, had gone to work for the DINA, the Chilean secret police, and had been assigned by the DINA as its liaison man with a group called CORU. CORU was the acronym for Command of United Revolutionary Organizations, a united front of four anti-Castro Cuban organizations based primarily in the neighborhood of Miami called Little Havana. With CORU, we are back in the milieu of Miami anti-Castro Cubans, whose political godfather George Bush had been since very early in the 1960's.

    It was under these circumstances that the U.S. ambassador to Chile, George Landau, sent a cable to the State Department with the singular request that two agents of the DINA be allowed to enter the United States with Paraguayan passports. One of these agents is likely to have been Townley. The cable also indicated that the two DINA agents also wanted to meet with Gen. Vernon Walters, the outgoing deputy director of central intelligence, and so the cable also went to Langley. Here, the cable was read by Walters, and also passed into the hands of Director George Bush. Bush not only had this cable in his hands, Bush and Walters discussed the contents of the cable and what to do about it, including whether Walters ought to meet with the DINA agents. The cable also reached the desk of Henry Kissinger. One of Landau's questions appears to have been whether the mission of the DINA men had been approved in advance by Langley; his cable was accompanied by photocopies of the Paraguayan passports. (Later on, in 1980, Bush denied that he had ever seen this cable; he had not just been out of the loop, he claims; he had been in China.) The red Studebaker hacks, in­cluding Bush himself in his campaign autobiography, do not bother denying anything about the Letelier case; they simply omit it.

    CHILEAN DC BOMB RULING:
    ALLOWED BY DEFAULT

    On August 4, on the basis of the conversations between Bush and Vernon Walters, the CIA sent a reply from Walters to Lan­dau, stating that the former "was unaware of the visit and that his Agency did not desire to have any contact with the Chileans." Ambassador Landau responded by revoking the visas that he had already granted and telling the Immigration and Naturalization Service to put the two DINA men on their watch list to be picked up if they tried to enter the United States. The two DINA men entered the United States anyway on August 22, with no apparent difficulty. The DINA men reached Washing­ton, and it is clear that they were hardly traveling incognito:
    They appear to have asked a Chilean embassy official to call the CIA to repeat their request for a meeting.

    According to other reports, the DINA men met with New York Senator James Buckley, the brother of conservative columnist William Buckley of Skull and Bones. It is also said that the DINA men met with Frank terpil, a close associate of Ed Wil­son, and no stranger to the operations of the Shackley-Clines Enterprise. According to one such version, "Townley met with Frank Terpil one week before the Letelier murder, on the same day that he met with Senator James Buckley and aides in New York City. The explosives sent to the United States on Chilean airlines were to replace explosives supplied by Edwin Wilson, according to a source close to the office of Assistant U.S. Attor­ney Lawrence Barcella." The bomb that killed Letelier and Moffitt was of the same type that the FBI believed that Ed Wil­son was selling, with the same timer mechanism.

    BUSH CIA COVER UP

    Bush therefore had plenty of warning that a DINA operation was about to take place in Washington, and it was no secret that it would be wetwork. As authors John Dinges and Saul Landau point out, when the DINA hitmen arrived in Washington they "alerted the CIA by having a Chilean embassy employee call General Walters' office at the CIA's Langley headquarters. It is quite beyond belief that the CIA is so lax in its counterespionage functions that it would simply have ignored a clandestine opera­tion by a foreign intelligence service in Washington, D.C., or anywhere in the United States. It is equally implausible that Bush, Walters, (Ambassador George) Landau and other officials were unaware of the chain of international assassinations that had been attributed to DINA.

    Bush's complicity deepens when we turn to the post-assassina­tion cover-up. The prosecutor in the Letelier-Moffitt murders was Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper. Nine days af­ter the assassinations, Propper was trying without success to get some cooperation from the CIA, since it was obvious enough to anyone that the Chilean regime was the prime suspect in the killing of one of its most prominent political opponents. The CIA had been crudely stonewalling Propper. He had even been unable to secure the requisite security clearance to see docu­ments in the case. Then Propper received a telephone call from Stanley Pottinger, assistant attorney general in charge of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. Pottinger said that he had been in contact with members of the Institute for Policy Studies, who had argued that the Civil Rights Division ought to take over the Letelier case because of its clear political implications. Propper argued that he should keep control of the case since the Protection of Foreign Officials Act gave him ju­risdiction. Pottinger agreed that Propper was right, and that he ought to keep the case. When Pottinger offered to be of help in any possible way, Propper asked if Pottinger could expedite co­operation with the CIA.

    As Propper later recounted this conversation: "Instant, warm confidence shot through the telephone line. The assistant attor­ney general replied that he happened to be a personal friend of the CIA Director himself, George Bush. Pottinger called him 'George'. For him, the CIA Director was only a phone call away. Would Propper like an appointment? By that afternoon he (an FBI agent working on the case) and Pottinger were scheduled for lunch with Director Bush at CIA headquarters on Monday. A Justice Department limousine would pick them up at noon. Propper whistled to himself. This was known in Washington as access."

    At CIA headquarters, Pottinger introduced Propper to Director Bush, and Bush introduced the two lawyers to Tony Lapham, his general counsel. There was some polite conversation. Then, "When finally called on to state his business, Propper said that the Letelier-Moffitt murders were more than likely political assassinations, and that the investigation would probably move outside the United States into the Agency's realm of foreign in­telligence. Therefore, Propper wanted CIA cooperation in the form of reports from within Chile, reports on assassins, reports on foreign operatives entering the United States, and the like. He wanted anything he could get that might bear upon the mur­ders."

    If Bush had wanted to be candid, he could have informed Prop-per that he had been informed of the coming of the DINA team twice, once before they left South America and once when they had arrived in Washington. But Bush never volunteered this highly pertinent information. Instead, he went into a sophisti­cated stonewall routine: "Look," said Bush, "I'm appalled by the bombing. Obviously we can't allow people to come right here into the capital and kill foreign diplomats and American citizens like this. It would be hideous precedent. So, as direc­tor, I want to help you. As an American citizen, I want to help. But, as director, I also know that the Agency can't help in a lot of situations like this. We've got some problems. Tony, tell him what they are."

    Lapham launched into a consummate Aristotelian obfuscation, recounted in Lapham and Propper's Labyrinth. Lapham and Propper finally agreed that they could handle the matter best through an exchange of letters between the CIA Director and Attorney General Levi. George Bush summed up: "If you two come up with something that Tony thinks will protect us, we'll be all right." The date was October 4, 1976.

    ELITE MEDIA HELPS COVER

    Contrary to that pledge, Bush and the CIA began actively to sabotage Propper's investigation in public as well as behind the scenes. By Saturday, the Washington Post was reporting many details of Propper's arrangement with the CIA. Even more in­teresting was the following item in the "Periscope" column of Newsweek magazine of October 11: "After studying FBI and other field investigations, the CIA has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the death of Orlando Letelier.... The agency reached its decision because the bomb was too crude to be the work of experts and because the murder, coming while Chile's rulers were wooing U.S. support, could only damage the Santiago regime."

    On November 1, the Washington Post reported a leak from Bush personally: "CIA officials say...they believe that operatives of the present Chilean military junta did not take part in Letelier's killing. According to informed sources, CIA Director Bush expressed this view in a conversation last week with Secretary of State Kissinger, the sources said. What evidence the CIA has obtained to support this initial conclusion was not disclosed."

    Most remarkably, Bush is reported to have flown to Miami on November 8 with the purpose or pretext of taking "a walking tour of Little Havana". As author Donald Freed tells it, "Actually Bush met with the Miami FBI Special Agents in Charge Julius Matson and the chief of the anti-Castro terrorism squad. According to a source close to the meeting, Bush warned die FBI against allowing the investigation to go any further than the lowest level Cubans.

    In a meeting presided over by Pottinger, Propper was only able to get Lapham to agree that the Justice Department could ask the CIA to report any information on the Letelier murder that might relate to the security of the United States against foreign intervention. It was two years before any word of the July-August cables was divulged.

    Ultimately, some low-level Cubans were convicted in a trial that saw Townley plea bargain and get off with a lighter sentence than the rest. Material about Townley under his various aliases strangely disappeared from the Immigration and Naturalization Service files, and records of the July-August cable traffic with Vernon Walters (and Bush) were expunged. No doubt there had been obstruction of justice; no doubt there had been a cover-up.

    TEAM A AND TEAM B
    ZIONIST INFLUENCE INFUSED

    Now, what about the intelligence product of the CIA, in particular the National Intelligence Estimates that are the centerpiece of the CIA's work? Here Bush was to oversee a maneuver to markedly enhance the influence of the pro-Zionist wing of the intelligence community.

    In June 1976, Bush accepted a proposal from Leo Cherne to carry out an experiment in "competitive analysis": in the area of National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet air defenses, Soviet missile accuracy, and overall Soviet strategic objectives. Bush and Cherne decided to conduct the competitive analysis by commissioning two separate groups, each of which would pre-sent and argue for its own conclusions. On the one, Team A would be the CIA's own National Intelligence Officers and their staffs. But there would also be a separate Team B, a group of ostensibly independent outside experts.

    The group leader of Team B was Harvard history professor Richard Pipes, who was working in the British Museum in Lon-don when he was appointed by Bush and Cherne.

    The liaison between Pipes' Team B and Team A, the official CIA, was provided by John Paisley, who had earlier served as the liaison between Langley and the McCord-Hunt-Liddy Plumbers. In this sense, Paisley served as the staff director of the Team A-Team B experiment.

    Team B's basic conclusion was that the Soviet military preparations were not exclusively defensive, but rather represented the attempt to acquire a first-strike capability that would allow the USSR to unleash and prevail in thermonuclear war. The U.S. would face a window of vulnerability during the 1980's. But it is clear from Pipes' own discussion of the debate that Team B was less interested in the Soviet Union and its capabilities than in seizing hegemony in the intelligence and think-tank community in preparation for seizing the key posts in the Republican administration that might follow Carter in 1980. The argument in Team B quarters was that, since the Soviets were turning aggressive once again, the U.S.A. must do everything possible to strengthen the only staunch and reliable American ally in the MIDDLE East or possibly anywhere in the world, Israel. This meant not just that Israel had to be financed without stint, but that Israel had to be brought into Central America, the Far East, and Africa. There was even a design for a new NATO, constructed around Israel, while junking the old NATO because it was absorbing vital U.S. resources needed by Israel.

    By contrast, Team B supporters like Richard Perle, who served as assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, were bitterly hostile to the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was plainly the only rational response to the Soviet buildup, which was very real indeed. The "window of vulnerability" argument had merit, but the policy conclusions favored by Team B had none, since their idea of responding to the Soviet threat was, once again, to subordinate everything to Israeli demands.

    Team A and Team B were supposed to be secret, but leaks ap­peared in the Boston Globe in October. Pipes was surprised to find an even more detailed account of Team B and its grim esti­mate of Soviet intent in the New York Times shortly after Christmas, but Paisley told him that Bush and CIA official Richard Lehman had already been talking to the press, and urged Pipes to begin to offer some interviews of his own.

    BUSHLIPS AT WORK

    Typically enough, Bush appeared on Face the Nation early in the new year, before the inauguration of the new President, Jimmy Carter, to say that he was "appalled" by the leaks of Team B's conclusions. Bush confessed that "outside expertise had enormous appeal to me." He refused to discuss the Team B conclusions themselves, but did say that he wanted to "gun down" speculation that the CIA had leaked a tough estimate of the Soviet Union's military buildup in order to stop Carter from cutting the defense budget.

    After the Team B conclusions had been bruited around the world, Pipes became a leading member of the Committee on the Present Danger, where his fellow Team B veteran, Paul Nitze, was already ensconced, along with Eugene V. Rostow, Dean Rusk, Lane Kirkland, Max Kampelman, Richard Allen, David Packard and Henry Fowler. About 30 members of the Com­mittee on the Present Danger went on to become high officials of the Reagan administration.

    Ronald Reagan himself embraced the "window of vulnerability" thesis, which worked as well for him as the bomber gap and missile gap arguments had worked in previous elections. When the Reagan administration was being assembled, Bush and James Baker had a lot to say about who got what appointments. Bush was the founder of Team B, and that is the fundamental reason why such pro-Zionist neoconservatives as Max Kamperlman, Richard Perle, Steven Bryen, Noel Koch, Paul Wolfowitz and Dov Zakem showed up in the Reagan administration.

    In a grim postlude to the Team B exercise, Bush's hand-picked staff director for the operation, John Paisley, the Soviet analyst (Paisley was the former deputy director of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research) and CIA liaison to the Plumbers, disap­peared on September 24, 1978 while sailing on Chesapeake Bay in his sloop, the Brillig. Several days later, a body was found floating in the bay in an advanced state of decomposition, and with a gunshot wound behind the left ear. The corpse was weighted down by two sets of ponderous diving belts. The body was four inches shorter than Paisley's own height, and Paisley's wife later asserted that the body found was not that of her hus­band. Despite all this, the body was positively identified as Paisley's, the death summarily ruled a suicide, and the body quickly cremated at the funeral home approved by the Office of Security.

    PARTING SHOTS TO POWER

    As he managed the formidable world-wide capabilities of the CIA during 1976, Bush was laying the groundwork for his per­sonal advancement to higher office and greater power in the 1980's. As we have seen, there was some intermittent specula­tion during the year that in spite of what Ford had promised the Senate, Bush might show up as Ford's running mate after all. But at the Republican Convention, Ford chose Kansas Senator Bob Dole for Vice President. If Ford had won the election, Bush would certainly have attempted to secure a further promo­tion, perhaps to secretary of state, defense, or treasury as a springboard for a new presidential bid of his own in 1980. But if Carter won the election, Bush would attempt to raise the ban­ner of the non-political status of the CIA in order to convince Carter to let him stay at Langley during the period 1977-81 as a "non-partisan" administrator.

    In the close of the 1976 election, Carter prevailed by vote fraud in New York, Ohio, and other states, but Ford was convinced by William Nelson and Happy Rockefeller, as well as by his own distraught wife Betty, that he must concede in order to pre­serve the work of "healing" that he had accomplished since Watergate. Carter would therefore enter the White House.

    Bush prepared to make his bid for continuity at the CIA. Shortly after the election, he was scheduled to journey to Plains to brief Carter with the help of his deputy Henry Knoche. The critical meeting with Carter went very badly indeed. Bush took Carter aside and argued that in 1960 and 1968, CIA directors were retained during presidential transitions, and that it would make Carter look good if he did the same. Carter signaled that he wasn't interested. Then Bush lamely stammered that if Carter wanted his own man in Langley, Bush would be willing to resign, which is of course standard procedure for all agency heads when a new President takes office. Carter said that that was indeed exactly what he wanted, and that he would have his own new DCI ready by January 21, 1977. Bush and Knoche then briefed Carter and his people for some six hours. Carter insiders told the press that Bush's briefing had been a "disaster". "Jimmy wasn't impressed with Bush," said a key Carter staffer.

    Bush left Langley with Carter's inauguration, leaving Knoche to serve a couple of months as acting DCI. George Bush now turned to his family business of international banking--or so the story goes - -

    Let us leave this, please.

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