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제목: PJ#049, SILENT BLOOD SUCKERS OF THE TANGLED WEBS, VOL. VI

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    PJ 49
    CHAPTER 3

    REC #1 HATONN

    SAT., APRIL 18, 1992 11:04 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 246

    EASTER??

    May the Grace of God be your shield through this time of trial and sorting. May you be given into understanding of Truth as the seasons unfold one into another that you may see God in EVERY day and every experience. What meaning does "Easter" hold for you? It has as many "meanings" as there are individual souls to experience, so, would it not be wondrous if it could simply mean love for one another that your days may be long and your journey "home" be in glory? Let us each be thankful for each gifted moment in experience that our knowing grow and our understanding become full and worthy of the gift. When you crucify one man you crucify all and when you realize this Truth you shall have come a far distance. Are you worthy to "claim" forgiveness? Is there question? What "right" have you to claim forgiveness? Who told you as much? Do you dump on more burden in false perception or do you begin to see Truth and Light in your actions? It becomes a good time for thinking on these things of spirit and physical that you might blend the two in correct perception.

    "Easter" was a holiday celebrated long before the one named Emmanuel came into the world. It was a special celebration time in Jerusalem and that is WHY the time of "trial" was cho­sen to coincide. There was not even a word "Christian" at the time. I dictated a tape yesterday on the subject which I hope all who can will avail themselves for we are not ready to use the writing in this current sequence--but you need the information. I feel great camraderie as we share the WORD in this more per­sonal manner. You as a people have returned to celebrating the "original" meaning of the holiday and God is all but forgotten. Ah, may you be given into seeing the wondrous beauty and promise of the rainbow but also the hidden dangers for the enemy is the master of deceit and the Prince of Lies. If the focus is not on the promise of eternal LIFE at this time of season--then you have missed the point entirely. As the wondrous beauty of creator is reflected back unto the Earth as the flowers of renewal blossom--may you, too, reflect the glory and radiance of our beloved Source. Amen.

    I remind you again at this season of beauty as the flowers come forth in promise of another cycle--or rather, that another cycle has ended--take your glass and look into the heart of even the most tiny speck of a flower and see its life. Take that "Easter" lily and look deep within its blossom and you will see a world of perfection which surpasses all spoken messages. These are gifts from your INVISIBLE CREATOR who gives unto you, His re­flection, the wonders of the universe and offers the wisdom of all the ages if you will but accept. May you walk in beauty that glory may be found in your company.

    * * *

    CONTROLLING THE CIA

    I submit that there is no federal agency of our gov­ernment whose activities receive closer scrutiny and "control" than the CIA.
    Lyman Kirkpatrick
    former Executive Director, CIA
    October 11, 1971

    The reverse of that statement is true in my opinion, and it is shameful for the American people to be so misled. There is no federal agency of our govern­ment whose activities receive less scrutiny and con­trol than the CIA.
    Senator Stuart Symingon
    Member, Joint Senate
    Committee for CIA Oversight
    November 23, 1971

    Although Harry Truman wrote in 1963 that "I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations," he--and each President after him--willingly employed the agency to carry out clandes­tine espionage and covert intervention in the internal affairs of other countries--those activities, in short, subsumed under the "such other functions and duties" language in the enabling leg­islation. In that phrase lies the authority, according to Richard Helms, for overthrowing foreign governments, subverting elec­tions, bribing officials and waging "secret wars". As Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971, this "language was designed to enable us to conduct such foreign ac­tivities as the national government may find it convenient to as­sign to what can best be described as a 'secret service' ."

    From its beginning, the CIA's actual functions were couched in deception and secrecy. Richard Bissell's notorious Council on Foreign Relations speech in 1968 stressed that the original legislation was "necessarily vague". He continued:

    CIA's full "charter" has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain, secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the Agency's authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a se­cret "charter" remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution.

    "SECRET CHARTER" NSCID's

    There was never any doubt in the minds of men like Bissell that the CIA's functions should not be a matter of public record. In fact, the National Security Act of 1947 and the supporting Central Intelligence Act of 1949 are little more than legal covers which provide for the existence of the CIA and authorize it to operate outside the rules affecting other government agencies. The CIA's actual role is spelled out in Bissell's "secret charter"--that series of classified executive orders called National Secu­rity Intelligence Directives (NSCID's or "en-skids"). These di­rectives were "codified" in 1959, but remain unavailable to all but a few key government officials. Not until July 1973 did the CIA offer the congressional subcommittees which supposedly oversee its activities a glimpse at the "secret charter". And the public still has no way of knowing if the agency is exceeding its mandate because it has no way of knowing what that mandate is.

    During the 1947 congressional debate concerning the agency's formation, Representative Fred Busby asked, "I won­der if there is any foundation for the rumors that have come to me to the effect that through this CIA they are contemplating operational activities." These rumors were indeed accurate, and the following year President Truman approved NSC directive 10/2 which authorized first the semi-independent Office of Pol­icy Coordination and then, in 1951, the CIA itself, to carry out "dirty tricks" overseas, with the two stipulations that the opera­tions be secret and "plausibly deniable". A whole series of NSCID's expanding the CIA's activities were issued in the years that followed. One, NSCID 7, gave the CIA powers inside the United States to question Americans about their foreign travels, and to enter into contractual arrangements with American universities, even though the National Security Act of 1947 forbade the agency to exercise any "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions". An­other NSCID was apparently shown to the judge in the 1966 court case in which one Estonian-American slandered a fellow refugee and then claimed "absolute privilege" to have done so because he was acting under the CIA's orders. Having seen the secret directive, the judge ruled that the agency had the power to operate among emigre groups in the United States, and he dis­missed the suit. Yet another, NSCID 6, apparently spells out the functions of the National Security Agency (which itself was created by executive order), since in the Nixon Administra­tion's 1970 secret plan for domestic espionage there is a recom­mendation that this directive be revised to allow NSA "coverage of the communications of U.S. citizens using interna­tional facilities".

    CIA FUNCTIONS ENLARGED

    The essential point is that successive Presidents have regu­larly enlarged the functions of the CIA by executive fiat. No new laws have been passed, and only a handful of Congressmen have been informed of what was happening. And sometimes Presidents have acted without informing even these normally in­dulgent congressional "watchdogs", as was the case when Presi­dent Nixon approved the domestic spying program and received the CIA's cooperation. The CIA, if nothing else, has always considered that anything a President told it to do was permissi­ble--indeed, necessary--for the defense of the country.

    "Out of the crisis of World War II and the ensuing cold war," Senator Jacob Javits said on July 18, 1973, "lawyers for the President had spun a spurious doctrine of 'inherent' commander-in-chief powers broad enough to cover virtually ev­ery 'national security' contingency." Top CIA officials heartily endorse the broad interpretation of presidential powers, even though they understand that the agency's activities often are of doubtful legality. Senator Symington asked Director-designate William Colby on July 2, 1973, "Do not large-scale operations, such as the war in Laos, go considerably beyond what Congress intended when it provided (in the 1947 act) for other functions and duties related to intelligence?" Colby replied, "I think it un­doubtedly did." But Colby justified the Laotian operation on the grounds it was carried out with "proper review, instructions, and direction of the National Security Council" and--most im­portant--the President. The legality of the matter, in Colby's apparent view, stemmed from the chief executive's authoriza­tion, not the law. Senator Harold Hughes later asked Colby, "Do you believe it is proper under our Constitution for such military operations to be conducted without the knowledge or approval of the Congress?" Colby's written response is an in­teresting commentary on the modern meaning of congressional approval:

    The appropriate committees of the Congress and a number of individual senators and congressmen were briefed on CIA's activities in Laos during the period
    covered. In addition, CIA's programs were de­scribed to the Appropriations Committees in our an­nual budget hearings.

    Colby's claim that these committees were informed conflicts directly with the 1971 statements of the late Senate Appropria­tions Committee Chairman, Allen Ellender (quoted later), that he knew nothing about the CIA's 36,000-man "secret" army in Laos.

    Colby's explanation reflects the general belief in the CIA that legislative and judicial restraints simply do not apply to the agency--as long as it is acting under presidential order. The CIA sees itself, in Senator Symington's words, as "the King's men or the President's army". Nevertheless, Congress must take some responsibility for contributing to the agency view of being "above the law", since it specifically exempted the CIA from all budgetary limitations which apply to other government departments. The 1949 statute reads: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation otherwise may be expended for purposes neces­sary to carry out its functions..." This law, which also gives the DCI the right to spend unvouchered funds, does not say, how­ever, that the CIA should not be accountable to Congress; but that, essentially, has been the experience of the past twenty-five years (written, 1974).

    These provisions, along with Congress' practice of hiding the CIA's budget in appropriations to other government depart­ments, may well violate the constitutional requirement that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequences of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all Public Money shall be published from time to time." A legal challenge (Higgs, et al. v. Helms et al.) to the CIA's secrecy in budgetary matters, based on these constitutional grounds, is currently pending in the federal court system.

    THE 40 COMMITTEE

    The executive branch has its own mechanisms to control the CIA. While these procedures are slanted greatly to favor the agency's position, they do require high-level--usually presiden­tial--approval of all major covert operations except the CIA's classical espionage activities.

    By the 1947 law, the CIA falls under the National Security Council, reports to the President through it, and takes its orders from it. But the NSC has, in fact, become a moribund body during the Nixon Administration, and the agency reports some­times to the President but more often to the NSC staff headed by Henry Kissinger. By levying intelligence-collection priority re­quirements and requesting analytical contributions to policy studies, the Kissinger staff plays a large part in directing the CIA's information-gathering effort. As far as the agency is concerned, however, the NSC itself is little more than a conduit from the President and Kissinger to the CIA, a legal fiction which is preserved because the 1947 law gives it authority over the agency.

    Every major CIA proposal for covert action--including subsi­dies for foreign political leaders, political parties, or publica­tions, interference in elections, major propaganda activities, and paramilitary operations--still must be approved by the President or the 40 Committee. Over the last twenty-five years (written 1974) this body has also been called the Special Group, the 54­12 Group, and the 303 Committee. Its name has changed with new administrations or whenever its existence has become pub­licly known.

    Allen Dulles described the 40 Committee's role in THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: "The facts are that the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature, given any sup­port of any nature to any persons, potentates or movements, po­litical or otherwise, without appropriate approval at a high po­litical level in our government outside the CIA." Dulles' state­ment was and is correct, but he carefully omitted any mention of the CIA's espionage activities. He also did not mention that the 40 Committee functions in such a way that it rarely turns down CIA requests for covert action.

    THE SHORT-FUSE TACTIC

    The committee is supposed to meet once a week, but the busy schedule of the members causes relatively frequent cancella­tions. In addition to Kissinger, they are currently the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When it does meet--roughly once or twice a month in the Nixon Administration--intentionally incom­plete minutes are kept by its one permanent staff member, who is always a CIA officer. All the proposals for American inter­vention overseas that come before the committee are drafted by the CIA's Clandestine Services and thus are likely to maximize the benefits to be gained by agency action and to minimize the disadvantages and risks. More often than not, these proposals are put into final form only a few days before the 40 Committee meets. Thus, the non-CIA members often have little time to in­vestigate the issues adequately. And even when sufficient prior notice is given, the staff work that can be done is extremely limited by the supersecrecy surrounding the 40 Committee's de­liberations and the fact that only a handful of people outside the agency are cleared to know about its activities. Even within the CIA the short deadlines and the excessive secrecy allow for little independent review of the projects by the Director's own staff.

    The 40 Committee's members have so many responsibilities in their own departments that they usually have only a general knowledge about most countries of the world. On specific problems, they generally rely on advice from their agency's re­gional experts, but these officials are often denied access to 40 Committee proposals and never are allowed to accompany their bosses to committee sessions. Only the DCI is permitted to bring with him an area specialist, and the other high officials, deprived of their own spear carriers, are at a marked dis­advantage. Moreover, the 40 Committee members are men who have been admitted into the very private and exclusive world of covert operations, and they have an overwhelming tendency to agree with whatever is proposed, once they are let in on the se­cret. The non-CIA members of the committee have had little or no experience in covert operations, and they tend to defer to the views of the "experts". Columnist Stewart Alsop, himself an OSS veteran, described in the May 25, 1973, Washington Post how the brightest men in the Kennedy Administration could have approved an adventure with so small a chance of success as the Bay of Pigs invasion, and his explanation applies just as well to other CIA activities. Alsop stated, "The answer lies some­where in the mystique of the secret-service professional vis-a-vie the amateur. Somehow, in such a confrontation, the amateur tends to put a childish faith in the confident assertions of the professional." Similarly, Marilyn Berger in the May 26, 1973, Washington Post quoted a veteran intelligence official about his experiences in dealing with the 40 Committee: They were like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get $5 million out of the 40 Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy."

    The 40 Committee process is further loaded in favor of the CIA because the agency prepares the proposals, and discussion is thereby within the CIA's terms of reference. The non-CIA members have no way of verifying that many of the agency's assertions and assumptions are correct, for example

    6 LINES DELETED

    The non-CIA members had to accept the agency's word that this program would have a chance of success. For security reasons, the specific people and methods that the CIA intends to use in a secret operation of this type are never included in the proposal. 40 Committee members can ask about the details at the actual meetings, but they have no way of knowing, without their own regional experts present, whether or not the CIA is providing them with self-serving answers.

    In fact, much of the intelligence upon which the recom­mended intervention is based comes from the Clandestine Ser­vices' own sources, and this mixing of the CIA's informational and operational functions can cause disastrous results, as oc­curred when the agency led the Kennedy administration to be­lieve in 1961 that a landing of an exile military force would lead to a general uprising of the Cuban people. A more recent if less cataclysmic case occurred in 1970 when intervention in the Chilean elections was under government consideration. At

    9 LINES DELETED

    the content of the report provided a strong argument for U.S. intervention to forestall Soviet gains. This report may or may not have been genuine. In either case, it was disseminated by the people in the Clandestine Services who favored intervention and they were well aware of the effect it would have on the 40 Committee members. If, in this instance, the covert operators were not actually misleading the committee, they certainly could have been, and there was no way that any independent check could be made on them.

    PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: NEVER ON PAPER

    Until the 1967 disclosure of secret CIA funding of the National Student Association and scores of other ostensibly private orga­nizations, the 40 Committee was called on only to give initial approval to covert-action programs. Final approval for a covert-action program is normally given by the 40 Committee chairman--still Henry Kissinger, even since he has become Secretary of State. He, in turn, notifies the President of what has been decided, and if there is a matter on which the commit­tee was in disagreement, the chief executive makes the final decision. Although the President either reviews or personally authorizes all these secret interventions in other countries' inter­nal affairs, he never signs any documents to that effect. Instead, the onus is placed on the 40 Committee, and if he chooses, the President can "plausibly deny" he has been involved in any ille­gal activities overseas. Thus, most CIA-penetrated and subsi­dized organizations went on receiving agency funds and other support year after year without any outside review whatever of the continuing worthiness of the project. But the 1967 scandal caused the 40 Committee to revise its procedures so that all ongoing non-espionage operations were regularly reviewed. In these reviews, however, the committee is perhaps even more de­pendent on the CIA for information and guidance than with new programs. For, unless there has been a public controversy, only the Clandestine Services usually know whether their efforts to subsidize a particular organization or undermine a certain gov­ernment have been successful. And the Clandestine Services would be unlikely to admit that their own operation was going badly, even if that were the case.

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    American officials hoped that through this "democratic front" Thieu could widen his political base by rallying various non­communist opposition elements to his camp. The effort was a resounding failure from the American point of view, since Thieu showed no interest in broadening his support--as long as the Vietnamese army and the U.S. government still supported him. Even though this was one of the few instances where the State Department, through its diplomatic reporting from Saigon

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    Even Richard Bissell in his 1968 Council on Foreign Rela­tions talk admitted that the 40 Committee "is of limited effec­tiveness". Bissell stated that if the committee were the only control instrument, he would "view it as inadequate", but he be­lieved that prior discussions on covert projects at working levels in the bureaucracy compensated for the failings of the "interdepartmental committee composed of busy officials who meet only once a week". To some extent what Bissell says is true, but he omits the fact that the most important projects, such as Bay of Pigs, are considered so sensitive that the working lev­els outside the CIA are forbidden all knowledge of them. And he does not state that even when a few outside officials at the Assistant Secretary level or just below are briefed on covert op­erations, they are told the programs are so secret that they can­not talk to any of their colleagues about them, which prevents them from calling into play the bureaucratic forces usually needed to block another agency's projects. Furthermore, these officials having been let in on the U.S. governments's dirtiest and darkest activities, are often reluctant to do anything in oppo­sition that will jeopardize their right to be told more secrets at a later time. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy in State and, to a much lesser extent, in Defense does have some effect in limiting the CIA's covert operations, although not nearly so much as Bissell claimed.

    SPIES STILL SACROSANCT

    As previously mentioned, there is one CIA activity, classical espionage, over which there is no outside control--not from the 40 Committee, from the bureaucratic working level, nor from Congress. The Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and every DCI since Allen Dulles has taken this to mean that the CIA cannot inform any other gov­ernment agencies of the identity of its foreign agents--the agency's most closely guarded secrets. While this secrecy, in order not to jeopardize the lives of foreigners (or Americans) who spy for the CIA is understandable, the use of a particular agent can sometimes have a political effect as large as, or larger than, a covert-action program. For example, if the CIA recruits a foreign official who is or becomes his country's Minister of Interior (e.g., Antonio Arguedas in Bolivia), then discovery of his connection to the agency can cause an international incident (as occurred in 1968 when Arguedas publicly admitted that he had worked for the CIA). In other instances, there have been Foreign Ministers and even Prime Ministers who were CIA agents, but the 40 Committee never was permitted to rule on whether or not the agency should continue its contact with them. Sometimes the CIA station chief in a particular country will ad­vise the American ambassador that one of his agents is in a very high place in the local government or that he intends to recruit such a man, but the station chief does so at his own discretion.

    The recruitment of lower-level foreigners can also have an important effect, especially if something goes wrong. This was the case in Singapore in 1960 when a CIA lie-detector expert blew a fuse, wound up in jail, caused the U.S. government to be subjected to blackmail, and damaged America's reputation over­seas. The point to be noted is that since the CIA lie-detector man was putting a potential spy through the "black box", his mission was part of an espionage operation and hence not sub­ject to control outside the agency. Similarly, during the mid-1960's

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    Prepared by the Pentagon's National Reconnaissance Of­fice, the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule is always several inches thick and filled with hundreds of pages of highly tech­nical data and maps. To a non-scientist, it is a truly incom­prehensible collection of papers, and the staffs of the various 40 Committee members usually have only a day or two to look it over before the meetings. Under these conditions, the 40 Committee usually passes the schedule with little or no discussion. From time to time, the State Department will object to a particularly dangerous flight, such as sending an Air Force drone over South China subsequent to the American invasion of Cambodia, but nearly always missions--including the cruise of the Liberty (attacked by the Israelis during the 1967 Six Day War), the voyage of the spy ship Pueblo (captured by the North Koreans in 1968), and the flight of the EC-121 (shot down by the North Koreans in 1969)--are routinely approved.

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    Even as the 40 Committee fails to keep a close watch on secret reconnaissance activities, is relatively ineffective in mon­itoring the CIA's covert operations, and is totally in the dark on espionage operations, President Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger are unquestionably aware of its shortcomings and have done little to change things. Institutionally, the Committee could easily provide better control over American intelligence if its internal procedures were altered, if it were provided with an adequate staff, and if it could develop its own sources for infor­mation and evaluation independent of the agency's Clandestine Services. But it is the President and Kissinger who ultimately determine how the CIA operates, and if they do not want to impose closer control, then the form of the control mechanism is meaningless. The fact remains that both men believe in the need for the United States to use clandestine methods and "dirty tricks" in dealing with other countries, and the current level and types of such operations obviously coincide with their views of how America's secret foreign policy should be carried out.

    Therefore, as long as the CIA remains the President's loyal and personal tool to be used around the world at his and his top advisor's discretion, no President is likely, barring strong, unforeseen pressure, to insist that the agency's opera­tions be brought under closer outside scrutiny.

    * * *

    This appears to be a good stopping point so allow us to please do so. I believe it a wondrous day to go forth and take a break and see some of the beauty about you in this Springtime which has arrived in full-color glory. It is also a time to spend a bit of time with family and friends so that balance can be gained in this day to day assault upon your senses.

    You who ask about the uncovering of the AURORA spy-craft as to the cause of the sonic "booms"--forget it. Those are far more serious than a little spy-plane which is actually a part of the "Blackbird" project. It now becomes a lesser of two evils as to what to tell you about these incidents. I find it most interesting indeed and hope you ones will stay alert for they are handing you a plate of poison tea-cakes.

    By the way--I believe you have already forgotten about the ex­plosions over at Northrop last Friday. I don't believe you ever got any information via airwaves?? How interesting!

    Hatonn to stand-by.


    PJ 49
    CHAPTER 4

    REC #1 HATONN

    SUN., APRIL 19, 1992 9:53 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 247

    SUNDAY, APRIL 19, 1992

    EASTER MESSAGE

    Christ is quite alive and doing well OFF planet Earth. Ye of the planet cannot say the same. We are at your door awaiting the invitation to enter in. God stands at your threshold--will ye ask Him in? Or, will you take up arms against your brother, the Hosts, come in peace--because your speakers and controllers tell you that we are of evil intent and hostile? HOW did YOU be­lieve God would come to join with you? He is not out-there­-somewhere; He dwells within each and we of the Hosts are come to reclaim that which is Creator's. Who shall come and walk with me? We shall see.

    I have no further message more important than that which we are unfolding as to the culprits in the game of life on planet Earth. If you cannot know your enemy you cannot stand against him. There is nothing more important to your journey than to understand the workings of the force which binds you and con­trols the interactions of your governments and politics which in turn enslave YOU. I know my mission and Dharma knows hers--therefore, we will get right into it.

    I do have another tid-bit of information about which it would bode you well to listen-up.

    DISASTER TRAINING

    In this little California community the major work resource, other than military, is a large State Correctional Institute. You may find it interesting to note that there are organized and spe­cial training programs underway at that prison for establishment of emergency measures. The word is that a MAJOR earthquake is scheduled to be precipitated by September of this year, fol­lowing which there will be no services, a devastated aqueduct system with no irrigation facilities to the garden basket of your nation, and precautions are now under way for self-tending when it happens. This is not even told about the community so where does that leave YOU--in any community? When the en­forcement people know and you do not--does this not speak louder than do words?

    You will also be wise to note that now, in the Utility Depart­ment of Los Angeles, there are issued instructions to close off all facilities to the public and all members thereof, the minute disaster strikes. All hands will turn to restore what "life-lines" can be repaired but all people will be shut out from all facilities.

    Is it more meaningful if you hear these things from source in­stead of from me? Will you take action either way? Will you simply continue to bury your head and blame God? So be it.

    Now back to the CIA, please.

    THE "PFIAB" AND THE "OMB".

    In addition to the 40 Committee, the President has two other bodies in the executive branch which could conceivably assist him in controlling the CIA. One of these is the President's For­eign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a group of eleven presidentially appointed private citizens who meet several times a year to evaluate the activities of the intelligence community and to make recommendations for needed change. President Eisenhower originally set up the PFIAB in 1956 under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killain of MIT, and its other heads have been General John Hull, Clark Clifford [surprise!?! surely he wouldn't have been tangled up in BCCI!??], Gen­eral Maxwell Taylor, and currently (1974), retired Admiral George Anderson. The majority of its members have always been people with close ties to the Pentagon and defense con­tractors, and it has consistently pushed for bigger (and more ex­pensive) intelligence-collection systems.

    IN FEBRUARY 1974, THE PFIAB'S MEMBERS, IN AD­DITION TO ADMIRAL ANDERSON, WERE DR. WILLIAM BAKER, BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES' VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH: JOHN CONNALLY, FOR­MER GOVERNOR OF TEXAS AND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AND THE TREASURY; LEO CHERNE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMER­ICA; DR. JOHN FOSTER, FORMER DIRECTOR OF DE­FENSE DEPARTMENT RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; ROBERT GALVIN, PRESIDENT OF MOTOROLA; GORDON GRAY, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; DR. EDWIN LAND, PRESIDENT OF POLAROID; CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, FORMER CONGRESSWOMAN AND AMBASSADOR; NEL­SON ROCKEFELLER, FORMER GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK; AND DR. EDWARD TELLER, NUCLEAR PHYSI­CIST AND "FATHER" OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB.

    The PFIAB meets approximately once a month in Washing­ton, and is thus of limited value as a permanent watchdog com­mittee. It is further handicapped by its status as an advisory group, with the resulting lack of bureaucratic authority. In gen­eral, the various members of the intelligence community look on the board as more of a nuisance than a true control mechanism. Periodically, when PFIAB is in session, CIA officials brief the members on current intelligence collection and the latest national estimates. The Clandestine Services' activities--particularly covert-action operations--are almost never considered unless an operation has already been publicly disclosed.

    BILDERGERG INTENT EVIL

    [H: In speaking of meetings of high-level importance in overall decision making, I am asked constantly about the Bilderberg meeting which always takes place in April and the outcome of that meeting? This year it is postponed until the latter part of May (currently at least) to await more in­formation and direction-trends in the political campaigns. Remember, Clinton is hand-picked as the Bilderberg candi­date and future actions hinge on what is happening in the American (U.S.) Presidential campaign. The intent, of course, is that Clinton ultimately fill the lesser spot of U.S. President while Bush takes higher control within the United Nations. This requires a lot of manipulation of the people and ultimately will require Executive Order Regulations and Military force.]

    Over the years, Presidents have tended to use the PFIAB as a prestigious but relatively safe "in-house" investigative unit, usu­ally at times when the chief executive was displeased with the quality of intelligence he was receiving. Whenever an intelli­gence failure is suspected in connection with a foreign-policy setback, the board is usually convened to look into the matter. President Kennedy called on it to recommend ways to reorga­nize the intelligence community after the 1961 Bay of Pigs de­bacle, but virtually no changes resulted from the PFIAB's ef­forts. The following year Kennedy asked the PFIAB to find out why the CIA had not discovered sooner that there were Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, and the PFIAB found the two accu­rate agent accounts of the Soviet build-up buried among the thousands of misleading or irrelevant reports which had piled up at the agency in the month before the crisis. With perfect hind­sight the PFIAB declared that the CIA should have recognized the truth of these reports and rejected all the others. Similarly, in 1968 President Johnson had the board investigate why the CIA had not determined the precise timing of the Soviet inva­sion of Czechoslovakia in advance.

    These PFIAB post-mortems can be of great value to the in­telligence community in pinpointing specific weaknesses and recommending solutions; they could be even more useful in making clear that certain events simply cannot be predicted in advance, even by the most efficient intelligence system. How­ever, the PFIAB has tended to operate with the assumption that all information is "knowable" and that the intelligence commu­nity's problems would be solved if only more data were col­lected by more-advanced systems. This emphasis on quantity over quality has served to accentuate the management problems that plague American intelligence and, in recent years at least, has often been counterproductive.

    Probably the PFIAB 's most notable contribution to the na­tion's intelligence effort occurred in the 1950's and early 1960's when one of its subcommittees, headed by Polaroid's Dr. Edwin Land, conceived several new technical collection programs. Land's subcommittee was instrumental in advancing the devel­opment of the U-2 spy plane, which, with the exception of the ill-fated Powers flight over the Soviet Union, may be considered one of the CIA's greatest successes.

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    The new systems are technologically feasible, but they are fantastically expensive, costing billions of dollars, and the in­telligence benefits to be gained are marginal.

    The President's last potential regulatory body of intelligence affairs is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Known as the Bureau of Budget until 1969, the OMB is the White House agency which closely scrutinizes the spending of all gov­ernment departments and determines fiscal priorities for the ad­ministration. It has the power to cut the spending of federal agencies and even eliminate entire programs. Cabinet secre­taries can sometimes appeal the OMB's decisions to the Presi­dent but he is understandably reluctant to overrule his own bud­getary watchdog. For the CIA, however, the OMB (and the BOB before it) has never been more than a minor irritant. Its International Affairs Division's intelligence branch, which in theory monitors the finances of the intelligence community, has a staff of only five men: a branch chief and one examiner each for the CIA, the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the DIA (including the rest of military intelligence). These five men could not possibly do a complete job in keeping track of the $6 BILLION spent annually for government spying, even if they received full cooperation from the agencies involved--which they do not.

    MANAGING THE BUDGETEERS

    The theology of national security, with its emphasis on se­crecy and deception, greatly limits the effectiveness of the President's budget examiners, who are generally treated as en­emies by the intelligence agencies. In this regard, the CIA has been particularly guilty. When the OMB started monitoring the agency in the 1950's, the budget man was refused a permanent pass to visit headquarters. He was regularly forced to wait at the building entrance while a CIA official upstairs was tele­phoned and asked to verify the auditor's credentials. The situa­tion improved somewhat in 1962 after Robert Armory, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, became head of the OMB's International Division, and the examiner received his own badge. (The former examiner was meanwhile recruited by the CIA and assigned to deal with the OMB, and the new ex­aminer turned out to be himself a former agency employee, who eventually returned also to handle relations with the OMB.)

    In the mid-1960's President Johnson gave the OMB expanded power to scrutinize agency spending, but even this presidential mandate did not appreciably improve the bureau's access. For example, after the

    4 LINES DELETED

    the OMB examiner wanted to look into how the money was be­ing spent. At one point, he came to the agency with the inten­tion of speaking to the knowledgeable personnel in the Clan­destine Services, after first stopping off to see one of the CIA's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) officers. The PPB man was told not to let the OMB representative leave his office while Director Helms was being informed of what the OMB was trying to investigate. Helms promptly called a high White House official to complain that the OMB was interfering with a program already approved by the 40 Committee. The White House, in turn, ordered the OMB to drop its inquiry.

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    The significance of this incident is not so much that the CIA makes life difficult for the OMB and gets away with it. Rather, what happened reflects the agency's attitude that its operations are above normal bureaucratic restraints and that when the President has given his approval, not even the technicalities can be questioned.

    The CIA has also resorted to the use of outright lies and de­ceit to prevent the OMB from being informed about its activi­ties. In 1968 an examiner made a fact-finding tour of CIA in­stallations in Europe and the Middle East. He was accompanied by an agency officer from headquarters and his escort was specifically told by the Clandestine Services' European Division chief that the budget man should not be allowed to see anything "which might later cause us difficulty or embarrassment." The examiner was to be entertained, given cursory briefings, but not educated.

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    CIA headquarters knew that the OMB man was extremely interested in guns and police work, and the field stations were so informed.

    2 LINES DELETED

    he was asked if he would first like to visit Scotland Yard. With his interest in police work, he was unable to resist such an offer and, by prearrangement, the British police snowed him under with extensive briefings and tours of the facilities. This diver­sion, which had nothing to do with the purpose of his trip, cost him a whole day out of his tight schedule. The next day he was slated to drive to another CIA installation about a hundred miles from London. But the agency did not want him to have much time to ask questions or to look around. Thus, his route was planned to pass through Banbury, the picturesque old English town whose cross is of nursery-rhyme fame. As the agency's operators had suspected, he could not forgo the pleasure of stopping in a typical English pub for lunch and then doing some sightseeing. The better part of another day was killed in this fashion, and he never had time to dig deeply into matters the agency did not want him to know about. Soon after, he left England without ever closely inspecting the agency's extensive activities there (aimed principally at Third World countries). To be sure, he had hardly been assiduous in his effort to penetrate the CIA smoke screen.

    In the Near East, things worked out better for the man from OMB. The head of that division, unlike the European Division clandestine chief, saw the tour as an opportunity to impress the OMB examiner with the agency's activities. Thus, the escort officer was instructed to give the visitor "the full treatment", and the clandestine operators in the field were told to confide in him in order to win him over to the CIA side.

    This examiner's experience was not exceptional. Many sim­ilar instances point up the OMB's--and, earlier, the BOB's--fail­ure to exercise any degree of meaningful control over the CIA. As Director, Richard Helms was fully aware and indeed encour­aging of the agency's efforts to escape OMB scrutiny. Still, he could apparently in good conscience tell the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971, "Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget."

    [H: Is it becoming more understandable how it worked with visiting dignitaries in the Gulf War? Only that which was desired that you be shown was shown and all things staged to the point of putting Hollywood to shame--in fact, Holly­wood directors were utilized to set and stage the encounters and examinations. In addition, all material and pictures were thoroughly edited and censored--and now, the govern­ment tells you it was necessary that you be lied to and the media controlled and used as a "set-up". Is anybody out there a bit angry yet??]

    THE AMBASSADOR'S ROLE

    The American ambassador in each country where the United States maintains diplomatic relations is, in theory, the head of the "country team", which is made up of the chiefs of all the U.S. government agencies operating in that country, including the CIA. The Eisenhower Administration originated this ex­panded role for the ambassador, but also issued a secret direc­tive exempting the CIA from his supervision. President Kennedy, shortly after taking office, reiterated that the ambas­sador should supervise all the agencies and then sent out a secret letter which said the CIA was not be to be excluded. The Kennedy letter remains in effect today, but its application varies from country to country.

    In nearly every case, the personalities of the ambassador and the CIA station chief determine the degree to which the ambas­sador exercises control over the CIA. Strongwilled diplomats like G. McMurtrie Godley, first in the Congo and then in Laos (where he became known as the "field marshal"), and Ellsworth Bunker in Vietnam have kept the agency under close supervi­sion, but they are also staunch advocates of extensive clandes­tine operations. Some ambassadors insist, as did Chester Bowles in India, that they be informed of the CIA activities but usually do not try to exert any control over the operations. Still others, because of a lack of forcefulness or a lack of interest, give the CIA a free hand and do not even want to be informed of what the agency is up to.

    Again quoting the Bissell doctrine:

    Generally the Ambassador had a right to know of any covert operations in his jurisdiction, although in special cases (as a result of requests from the local Chief of State or the Secretary of State) the (CIA) chief of station was instructed to withhold informa­tion from the Ambassador. Indeed, in one case the restriction was imposed upon the specific exhortation of the Ambassador in question, who preferred to remain ignorant of certain activities.

    One ambassador, John C. Pritzlaff, Jr., refused to play such a passive role and, in a fashion highly uncharacteristic of American envoys, stood up to the CIA. In the process, Prit­zlaff, a political appointee, became something of a hero to the few State Department officers familiar with the way he virtually banned CIA covert activities from his country of assignment, Malta. The problem started early in 1970 when retired Admiral George Anderson took a trip through the Mediterranean coun­tries and became alarmed that leftist Dom Mintoff might win the Maltese elections scheduled for the end of the year. As a Navy man, Anderson was a strong sea-power advocate, and he feared Malta might be lost to N.A.T.O. forces and become a base for the Soviet fleet. Although he was not yet head of PFIAB, he used his White House connections to urge the Clandestine Ser­vices to intervene in the Maltese elections. The agency was not enthusiastic about the project, partly because of its lack of "assets" on the island, but it agreed to send a clandestine opera­tive to make a study of how the election could be fixed. Ambas­sador Pritzlaff, in telegram after telegram, resisted even this temporary assignment of an agency operative to his country. In the end, the Clandestine Services did not intervene and Mintoff was elected. N.A.T.O. retained access to the island through British bases.

    Anderson's fears seemed partially justified, however, in 1971, when Mintoff precipitated a mini-crisis by expelling the N.A.T.O. commander from the island and by greatly increasing the cost to Britain of keeping its facilities there. In an incident reminiscent of Cyprus President Makarios' blackmail of U.S. intelligence several years before, the U.S. government was forced to contribute several million dollars to help the British pay the higher rent for the Maltese bases.

    * * *

    POWER OF THE "GOLDEN RULE"

    As we bring these practices into your attention, I can only hope that you are seeing the correlation with what "has" happened and what "is" happening. Any time you have your President, as with Bush yesterday, answering "No" to a question which is OBVIOUSLY correct and his answer a lie, you have this CIA doctrine of "plausible denial" in play. The President knows ex­actly what he is doing and, when caught in the lie--HE NEVER HAS TO OWN UP TO HAVING LIED BECAUSE ULTI­MATELY YOU HAVE TO REALIZE THAT "PLAUSIBLE DENIAL" IS A PART OF THE GAME--EXACTLY AS THE KOL NEDRE (VOW OF ALL VOWS) IS A FUNCTIONING PART OF THE TALMUD FOLLOWERS--ZIONISTS. "Even if caught in the lie, it simply does not count!" and can be at­tached to "National Security" and you-the-people can't do a blamed thing about it. President George Bush knows exactly what he is doing and when he tells you he KNOWS his Power--HE DOES!! IF YOU WRITE THE RULES YOU HAVE A MASSIVE ADVANTAGE. It is the old "Power of the Golden Rule"--HE WHO HAS THE POWER AND THE GOLD--RULES!

    Mr. Bush may well go and stare at the sunrise on Easter Sunday and go get attention in church and might well pray to some god or another--BUT IT SURE AIN'T MINE! GOD BLESSES NOT EVIL. While you and your babies hunt little chicken and chocolate eggs--he is putting all of your eggs into his basket and you end up with none.

    HOW DO WE GET OUT THIS INFORMATION?

    Some information it is almost impossible to bring unto you. The time, however, has come on your globe when the power brokers are ready to bring in all the chips. Two things take place--THEY WANT YOU TO KNOW OF THEIR POWER AND WHO TO ATTEND, and the proven "assumption" is that you are already brain-dead and will not listen, see or hear.

    "They" also know that we will NEVER tell you to take up arms against them for it is obvious that you will be the ones killed and you are of God's remnant. This battle will not be won by bul­lets, chelas, for it is a spiritual confrontation at its higher level of experience. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ACTUALLY WANT YOU TO KNOW WHILE THEY PRETEND TO BE AGAINST YOU GETTING THE WORD. They know it is dangerous for them but the information has already been pre­sented--it is a matter of you finding it and accepting it. The fur­ther assumption is that you are not going to entertain some "space" person or invisible "higher" Source.

    How then, can Dr. Coleman, for example, present his "stuff"? Because he has been allowed to come within our shield--as long as he serves them also. The "enemy" has full surveillance of all this equipment and the LIMITATIONS ARE KNOWN BY THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES. Accidents occur because sometimes there are brave and daring young officers who actually still think they are serving goodness. Coleman writes nothing which has not already been presented. This is a time of compiling and pulling into your attention that which IS--with ability to CON­FIRM.

    Do not misunderstand my relationship with one, John Coleman. I keep him within my protection as long as he asks same. His actions bespeak very human attributes with which I take great exception--but this, in itself, must be confirmation for you as readers. I honor TRUTH and each being has opportunity and freedom to act within his own guidelines. Indiscretions become between him and God and is none of my business except as it impacts my work and my people. This is why total separation is kept sacrosanct. Further, to utilize his "presently accepted" la­bel (name) on documents of this type of unfoldment is either in­tended or foolish indeed--so you must be the judge of such. If, however, one does all "else" to cover identity and then insists on having his NAME and obvious location advertised to the world--there is something amiss??

    Am I showing lack of care by printing this little dissertation? I certainly hope you can see that I am NOT. I care greatly but I honor all choices--however, NO MAN shall set the standards for THE HOSTS and human EGO shall not be rewarded for its own disservice which endangers others who are set into jeopardy be­cause of the errors of the one. Or, perhaps it is no error of dis­cernment--perhaps more is known and realized than meets the outward eye. However, just as I have honored other writers who have gifted you with insight and great information--so too, shall I honor others. Thus far his work has been fairly accurate but without public documentation such as, say, Eustace Mullins--but that, too, is desirable considering resources and differing methods of gaining information. As a matter of fact, most of the information has come directly from Eustace Mullins and other writers. If an author does not know, then it is unfortunate for the author in point--not the ones who have priorly written. MY INTENT IS TO GIVE CREDIT WHERE DUE AND HONOR ONES WHO DARE TO SPEAK TRUTH UNTO YOU WHO ARE ABOUT TO DIE IF YOU HEAR NOT! WORSE YET--YOU SHALL NOT ASCEND IN THE FLESH AFTER THE DEATH RITUAL, SOME THREE DAYS LATER, FOR YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN THE MESSAGE OF THE "CHRISTOS".

    I do not advocate much of what this man outlays, from being in favor of the "death" penalty to the acceptance of the Geneva Bible. But this does not make his TRUTH about the Committee of 300 less valid. I would not, further, endanger his life or those of his family by declaring him to be in my immediate ser­vice for he is not and, therefore, his safety is not always in my ability or concern. This is a most important bit of information to you readers, please.

    This is exactly the same as my relationship with America West--except that the Greens ask to be in my protection at all times for their service is great and directed primarily toward God and ser­vice unto God as in this very work. They, however, are pub­lishers and distributors of books--they have every freedom to print and disperse anything they desire. You will find no "cult" herein nor even "group" as you recognize the term to mean in "mutual belief". This means that you as reader are as responsi­ble and as included as any one of any of our crew. YOU be­come the "group".

    And, moreover, great blessings be upon this "group" for ye are the physical hands and feet of God and the Hosts come in His service to bring YOU home. Salu.

    YOU ARE "IN" THE SYSTEM WHETHER OR NOT YOU LIKE OF IT--THEREFORE, YOU ARE WISE TO WORK WITHIN THE SYSTEM TO THE EXTENT OF BEING WITHIN THE LAWS WHEREIN YOU CAN DO SO FOR TO SET SELF UP AS A TARGET FOR ATTENTION SIMPLY HAMPERS GOD'S OWN WORKING PLAN. GOD NEEDS NO MORE DEAD MARTYRS--THERE ARE TOO MANY OF YOU "WALKING AROUND DEAD" (ESPECIALLY BE­TWEEN THE EARS). YOU ARE ALREADY WITHIN THE SYSTEM! DO NOT BE FOOLISH.

    There is full understanding of OUR PRESENCE and our posi­tion and frankly, sleepy ones, THEY are not in the least con­cerned about you or your awakening to any great extent--IT IS ASSUMED THAT EVIL HAS WON! The plan is to now in­troduce the presence of aliens but in such a way as to terrify the population of the globe and unite all of you into "fighting" the "hostile aliens". Your only danger is already on your place and in all the high places of your land.

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    PJ 49
    CHAPTER 5

    REC #2 HATONN

    MON., APRIL 20, 1992 10:22 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 248

    MONDAY, APRIL 20, 1992
    As news flows back to you regarding the ineffectuality and total unworthiness of your weapons systems, your military and your government these days, do you not see the implications?

    "60" MINUTES is giving you enough to unbefuddle your minds. They just showed an old interview with Noriega and the picture is totally clear of the interim intrigues. The same with the Apache helicopters and their unworthiness. The materials are total junk--so where do the billions of dollars go? Hidden in­trigues set forth by the governors, your Administration, Chiefs of Staff, CIA Directors and the Global Elite.

    If you fail to study this information we bring unto you then you shall NOT change a thing on your planet and you shall perish in enslavement of the masses.

    I ask that Quade's Sacramento speech be put to print along with Gritz's. Both project incorrect assumptions but are worthy for the confirmation given in each. If, however, ones who are in error even in part and refuse to avail themselves of the further information in order to see and comprehend the "whole" then you shall NEVER find solutions to that which confronts you on and within the physical plane of experience. For instance, if you still think you can rise up against the Puppet Masters with guns--you are not in full understanding of your plight. THEY HAVE BIGGER AND BETTER WAYS AND GUNS TO CONTROL YOU AND ISOLATE YOU. YOU PLAY INTO THEIR HANDS BY THIS TYPE OF CONFRONTATION. It is time to understand GOD and PURPOSE and get with the ac­cess to knowledge which we freely pour forth for you to the ex­tent that you moan and complain constantly at the quantity of it all. GOD IS NOT GOING TO DO IT FOR YOU AND NEI­THER ARE THE HOSTS--WE COME TO TELL YOU HOW AND SHOW THE WAY--YOU WILL DO IT OR YOU WILL GO DOWN IN DEFEAT. TO GO DOWN DOES NOT MEAN TO RISE UP ON CLOUDS WITH ANGELS--IT MEANS TO GO DOWN IN THE PHYSICAL WITH INABILITY TO GROW BEYOND UNTIL ANOTHER EXPRESSION IN MANIFESTATION. WHY WOULD YE CONTINUE TO DO THINGS IN ERROR WHEN TRUTH IS BEFORE YOU? PONDER IT.

    Do you have any idea of the relative tiny number 144,000 is to 6-1/2 BILLION? I thought not! A place is prepared for well over the 7- ½ billion persons you ACTUALLY have on your planet--but I assure you if it all came to a close this day--our craft would not be crowded. All on your planet can be housed on MY MOTHER-SHIP but this day you wouldn't even have enough coming aboard to lay a foundation for the new structuring of the gift in store for you. You are going to learn to think in wisdom beyond that which seems apparent or you will be destined to remain in the narrow perspective until you do. So be it.

    * * *

    CONTROLLING THE CIA: CONGRESS

    Congressional control of the CIA can be broken down into two distinct periods: before and after Watergate. In the agency's first twenty-six years, the legislative branch was gen­erally content to vote the CIA more than enough money for its needs, without seriously questioning how the funds would be spent. In fact, only a handful of Congressmen even knew the amount appropriated, since all the money was hidden in the budgets of other government agencies, mainly the Defense De­partment. To be sure, four separate subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services committees were responsible for monitoring the CIA, but their supervision was minimal or nonexistent. In the House, the names of the members were long kept secret but they were generally the most senior (and thus often the most conservative) men on their respective commit­tees. (Allen Dulles was reported by the New York Times in April 1966 to have had "personal control" over which con­gressmen would be selected.) In August 1971, House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana broke with past practice and dipped down his committee's seniority ladder to appoint Lucien Nedzi, a hard-working liberal from Michigan, head of the oversight subcommittee. Hebert, however, kept complete control of the subcommittee's staff, and Nedzi is the only non-conservative among the panel's five permanent and two ex officio members. When Hebert made his unusual choice, it was widely speculated that he was trying to defuse outside criticism of the subcommittee's performance by naming a liberal as chairman, and that he felt he could keep Nedzi isolated. Nedzi had little time for overseeing the CIA during 1972, his first full year as chairman, because he faced tough primary and re-election challenges. In 1973 he launched a comprehensive inquiry into the agency's role in the Watergate affair but it re­mains (in 1974) to be seen whether his subcommittee will delve any deeper into CIA covert operations than the House panels have done in the past. In the Senate the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees have traditionally met together to maintain joint oversight of the CIA. As is true in the House, the members have almost all been conservative, aging, military-ori­ented legislators.

    NO WATCHDOGS ALLOWED

    Many Congressmen and Senators--but by no means a major­ity--believe that these oversight arrangements are inadequate and since 1947 nearly 150 separate pieces of legislation have been introduced to increase congressional surveillance of the CIA. None has passed either chamber, and the House has never even had a recorded vote on the subject. The Senate, by a 59-27 margin in 1956, and by 61-28 in 1966, has turned down propos­als for expanded and more active watchdog committees for the agency and the rest of the intelligence community. To strengthen his case for maintaining the status quo at the time of the 1966 vote, Senator Richard Russell, then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, agreed that starting in 1967 the three senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee would be allowed unofficially to sit in on the joint oversight subcom­mittee's meetings. But after this arrangement was in effect for several years, Senator John Stennis, Russell's successor as chairman, simply stopped holding sessions. There was not a single one in either 1971 or 1972. Stennis is generally believed to have ended the subcommittee's functions because foreign-policy liberals J. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington would have been present for the secret deliberations. Neither man was trusted at the time by either the CIA or by the conservative Sen­ators who have kept oversight of the CIA as their own private preserve. In the absence of any joint subcommittee meetings, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee, all of whom were staunch hawks and administration supporters, met privately to go over the agency's budget.

    Senator Symington challenged this arrangement on November 23, 1971, when, without prior warning, he introduced a floor amendment which would have put a $4 billion limit on govern­ment-wide intelligence spending--roughly $2 billion less than what the administration was requesting. Although Symington's amendment was defeated 51-36, it produced perhaps the most illuminating debate on intelligence ever heard in the Senate.

    Symington berated the fact that the Senate was being asked to vote billions of dollars for intelligence with only five Senators knowing the amount; and in a colloquy with the Appropriations chairman, the late Allen Ellender, Symington established that even those five Senators had limited knowledge of the CIA's operations. Ellender replied to Symington's question on whether or not the appropriations subcommittee had approved the financing of a 36,000-man "secret" army in Laos:

    I did not know anything about it....I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it published in the newspapers some time ago.

    Laos was, of course, the CIA's largest operation at the time that supposed overseer Ellender admitted ignorance about it. Richard Russell, too, had had a similar lack of interest in what the CIA was doing. He had once even told CIA Director Helms--privately--that there were certain operations he simply did not want to know about. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, who served for many years as ranking Republican on the oversight subcommittee, expressed the same view publicly in 1966: "It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have."

    KEEPING IT SECRET

    Faced with this rejection of responsibility on the part of the congressional monitors, the CIA has chosen to keep the sub­committee largely in the dark about its covert operations--unless a particular activity, such as the 1967 black-propaganda effort against mainland China, has been successful in the agency's eyes and could be bragged about to the legislators. Helms did make frequent visits to Capitol Hill to give secret briefings, but these usually concerned current intelligence matters and esti­mates of the communist countries' military capabilities--not the doings of the Clandestine Services. Yet Helms won a reputation among lawmakers as a man who provided straight information.

    Although Helms had been for many years providing current intelligence and estimates to congressional committees in secret oral briefings, the CIA officially opposed legislation introduced in 1972 by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky which would have provided the appropriate committees with the same sort of data in the form of regular CIA reports. The bill was fa­vorably approved by the Foreign Relations Committee but sub­sequently died in Armed Services. Director-designate William Colby told the latter committee in July 1973 that he thought this information could be supplied on an informal basis "without legislation".

    Senator J. William Fuibright, who sat in Helms' briefings to the joint oversight committee until they were discontinued in 1971, described the proceedings to author Patrick McGarvey for the latter's CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS:

    The ten minute rule is in effect, so the members have little if any chance to dig deep into a subject. The director of CIA spends most of the time talking about the Soviet missile threat and so on. The kind of information he provides is interesting, but it really is of little help in trying to find out what is going on in intelligence. He actually tells them only what he wants them to know. It seems to me that the men on the committee are more interested in shielding CIA from its critics than in anything else.

    Once a year the CIA does come before the appropriations subcommittees in both houses to make its annual budget request. These sessions, however, are completely on the agency's terms. Prior to the meeting, CIA electronics experts make an elaborate show of sweeping the committee rooms for bugging devices, and blankets are thrown over the windows to prevent outside surveillance. The transcripts of the sessions are considered so secret that copies are locked up at CIA headquarters. Not one is left with the subcommittees for future study. Committee staff members, who normally do most of the substantive preparation for hearings, are banned at the CIA's request.

    A relatively similar procedure is followed when an individual Senator or Congressman writes to the CIA about a covert oper­ation. Instead of sending a letter in return, an agency represen­tative offers to brief the legislator personally on the matter, on the condition that no staff members are present. This procedure puts the busy lawmaker at a marked disadvantage, since his staff is usually more familiar with the subject than he is--and proba­bly wrote the original letter.

    DISTRACTION SPECIALISTS

    Allen Dulles set the tone for the CIA budget presentations in the 1950's when he commented to a few assistants preparing him for his annual appearance, "I'll just tell them a few war sto­ries." A more current example of the CIA's evasive tactics oc­curred in 1966 when the Senate appropriations subcommittee was thought to have some hard questions to ask about the growing costs of technical espionage programs. DCI Helms re­sponded to the senatorial interest by bringing with him the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Dr. Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon, who loaded himself up with a bag full of spy gadgets--a camera hidden in a tobacco pouch, a radio transmitter hidden in false teeth, a tape recorder in a cigarette case, and so on. This equipment did not even come from Wheelon's part of the agency but was manufactured by the Clandestine Services; if, however, the Senators wanted to talk about "technical" matters, Helms and his assistant were perfectly willing to distract them with James Bond-type equipment.

    Wheelon started to discuss the technical collection programs but as he talked he let the Senators inspect the gadgets. Pre­dictably, the discussion soon turned to the spy paraphernalia. One persistent Senator asked two questions about the new and expensive technical collection systems the CIA was then putting into operation, but Wheelon deftly turned the subject back to the gadgets. When the Senator asked his question a third time, Chairman Russell told him to hold his inquiry until the CIA men were finished. But the Senators became so enthralled with the equipment before them that no more questions were asked. Seven years later, the same panel would investigate the 1971 as­sistance furnished by the Clandestine Service to E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy for the "plumbers" operations--assis­tance comprised of many of the same gadgets that amused the Senators in 1966.

    WARMUP YIELDS $100 MILLION

    In 1967 the CIA, as usual, prepared its budget request with a dazzling collection of slides and pictures, emphasizing the agency's role in fighting Communism around the world and producing intelligence on the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and China. Also included in the "canned" briefing was a description of the CIA's technical collection expertise, its work with computers and other information-processing systems, and even its advanced techniques in printing--but, again, no "dirty tricks". The presentation was rehearsed several times at CIA headquarters while calls were awaited from Capitol Hill to set specific dates. A Congressman serving on the House appropri­ations oversight group was even invited to come out to the agency to see one of the dry runs. A few days later a staff man on the House panel telephoned the CIA to say that the Con­gressman who had seen the rehearsal said that everything seemed in order and that the Chairman simply did not have the time to hear the presentation, but that the committee would ap­prove the full budget request of nearly $700 million anyway. Shortly thereafter a similar call came from the Senate commit­tee. The chairman had apparently been told by his opposite number in the House that the CIA request seemed reasonable, and on the strength of the House recommendation the Senate would also approve the full amount without a hearing.

    Thus, in 1967 the CIA did not even appear in front of its budgetary oversight committees. The experience that year was extreme, but it does illustrate how little congressional supervi­sion the agency has been subject to over the years.

    Many congressional critics of the CIA have advocated broad­ening the membership of the CIA oversight subcommittees to include legislators who will hold the agency up to the same sort of scrutiny that other government departments receive. They argue that in the equally sensitive field of atomic energy a joint congressional committee has kept close track of the Atomic En­ergy Commission without any breach in security. However, some liberals who advocate greater control of the CIA fear that a joint CIA committee analogous to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee might easily be "captured" by the agency, just as the atomic energy committee has, to a large extent, been co-opted by the AEC.

    Those who oppose increased congressional control of the agency claim that if the CIA is to operate effectively, total se­crecy must be maintained, and that expanding the functions and the membership of the oversight subcommittees would mean much greater likelihood of breaches in security. They fear that larger subcommittees would necessarily lead to the presence of administration opponents who might exploit agency secrets for political gains. Moreover, it is said that friendly foreign intelli­gence services would be reluctant to cooperate or share secrets with the agency if they knew that their activities would be re­vealed to the American Congress.

    FLOOD OF CHANGE: WATERGATE

    No matter what the merits of the arguments for close con­gressional control, there was no chance that a majority of either house would vote for any appreciable change until the Watergate affair broke wide open in early 1973. Suddenly the long-dor­mant oversight subcommittees began to meet frequently to in­vestigate the degree of CIA involvement in the illegal activities sponsored by the White House and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The obvious abuses of power by the administra­tion and its supporters stirred even conservative legislators into demands for corrective action. And the administration, in trying to justify its excesses on the grounds of protecting the "national security"--a justification largely unacceptable to Congress--seri­ously weakened the position of those who claimed "national se­curity" grounds. Furthermore, there was a widespread public and media outcry against concentration of power in the White House, and against President Nixon's penchant for taking uni­lateral actions without the approval or even the advice of Congress. The CIA, as the President's loyal tool--tainted to some extent by involvement in Watergate-related activities--also became vulnerable.

    The four oversight subcommittees which met so frequently in the first six months of 1973 are still made up of the same over­whelmingly conservative members. But, pushed by either their own revulsion over Watergate or by public reaction to it, they seem likely to take some action to increase congressional surveillance of the CIA.

    For example, John Stennis, the Senate Armed Services chairman, declared on July 20, 1973: "The experience of the CIA in Laos, as well as the more recent disclosures here at home have caused me to definitely conclude that the entire CIA act should be entirely reviewed." This is the same Stennis who, nineteen months earlier, when the CIA's "secret" war in Laos was at its peak stated:

    The agency is conducted in a splendid way....As has been said, spying is spying. But if we are going to have an intelligence agency....it cannot be run as if you were running a tax collector's office or the HEW or some other such department. You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some and take what is coming.

    Yet from all indications, Stennis had become sincerely con­vinced that the chief executive, on his own, should never again be able to take the country into a Vietnam-type conflict. [H: I hope this is more than just a big horrendous laugh to you in light of the subsequent activities of your President, Advisors, Fixed Congressmen, wars, conflicts, foreign disruptions of nations and appointment of his own criminal favorite to even head the CIA. You are going to stop this or you are going to be laughing out of the other side of your face for half your face will be blown away and the rest of your body incarcer­ated in those nice "homeless camps" now vacated and ready for your filling.] On October 18, 1973, he introduced legisla­tion--while reserving his right to change it after study and hear­ings extending into 1974--which would modify the CIA's legal base. First, it would limit the agency's domestic activities to "those which are necessary and appropriate to its foreign intelli­gence mission", apparently defining this in a way to abolish covert activities in the United States. Second, it would set up tighter procedures for congressional oversight, while "recognizing essential security requirements".

    A simple majority in either chamber would be sufficient to change the system of CIA oversight. As much as the agency wants to keep its activities secret, it would have little choice but to comply with serious congressional demands for more infor­mation and more supervision. The power of the purse gives the legislative branch the means to enforce its will on a reluctant CIA, and even one house standing alone could use this power as a control mechanism. That is, assuming that Congress is willing to accept the responsibility.

    * * *

    BUSH/CIA ANSWERS TO NO GOV'T AGENTS

    We are going to interrupt the body of this writing now to point out a few obvious circumstances. If you have been keeping in­formed you will have no trouble with this information--if not, then you probably can still see the potential advantage in what I bring.

    You must be aware that the CIA--through its newer connections and total infiltration within the White House--answers actually to no-one in your government as you believe it to be structured and simply thumbs its nose at anyone who even questions its activi­ties. George Bush treats your questions as not even worthy of reply--much less truth in reply.

    How can the CIA work around these restrictions which, even though badly orchestrated, still have some potential merit? They have become operatives outside your government by simply uti­lizing funding, etc., where obvious and then, on the secret oper­ations, setting up myriads of corporations which are funded by your money and added to by their massive drug trade and blackmail tactics to foreign states, selling and trading of arms, mercenary armies and wars. All proceeds are funnelled through false fronts and opaque blinds. Whoever crosses the path in de­fiance is taken out--such as Noriega, etc. The drug trade in Panama is thriving better than ever before and the prime re­ceiver of the drugs are the people of the United States and the money goes to the Elite in your government and within the Elite of the One World Order.

    I remind all readers who are within my working focus at this time--if you are only doing lip-service, I suggest you go of your own accord away from my "troops" or you shall be disclosed. You took the son of God and slew Him that you might later claim HIS blood for your salvation without worthy actions, deeds or belief as in Truth. You shall not longer hide behind the robes of the innocent in your greed to satisfy ego demands.

    EGO INTENT ALWAYS WEARS A "SIGN"

    I shall not utilize as recognizable information, that which comes from ones who are unwilling to study every portion I bring unto them. They may go their way without rancor but they shall no longer deceive my people. The mark upon a being is far more easily seen than is suspected by the one in point for ego intent is always required to wear a "sign". I shall no longer give hearing to those who would not follow my way for they are working for their own benefit and not for brother, nation or God. And re­member--THE SINS OF THE FATHER ARE RESTED UPON THE SONS--EVERY TIME! ARE YOU WORTHY OF YOUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS?? PONDER IT CAREFULLY.

    If you offer something of your own writing for my consideration and for publication within MY JOURNALS AND PAPER--how know ye that it is not already published several times if you have read not all of my material? I assure you that this is what is happening time after time after time and confirmation is one thing, waste of time and space is quite another!

    Do not simply give me that which is coming from a subcommit­tee hearing with your opinions appended--I am quite capable of monitoring all the junk and lies of a subcommittee hearing. This is NOT intelligence gathering, this is subterfuge.

    This is not to say that ones may be allowed to overlook that information, just be sure YOU give it its proper relevance. It is far more important that man knows in his own location, what is coming down--from information gained by observance and leak­age--i.e., the expected massive catastrophic earthquake in Southern California by September of this year--as projected BY THE ONES IN CHARGE OF IT WITH CONCURRENT TRAINING OF VARIOUS TEAMS TO HANDLE IT. I do not need a repeat of the nasties as such for you have been given enough proof of the take-over by the Elite of your government.

    ROSS PEROT

    If Ross Perot, for instance, is ill-informed--INFORM HIM, do not simply disagree with his platform--GO FORTH AND IN­FORM HIM OF TRUTH AND I SHALL BE MOST HAPPY TO MEET WITH HIM.

    I do not, however, have any intentions whatsoever to produce miracles and/or magic as you expect for your confirmation and truth. God is based on far greater understanding than a light show of negligible confirmation. This transition is being thrust forth by the teams of God in purpose and intent and, like all projects and programs, there is a central place of headquarters--we do not hap-hazardly flit about nipping earlobes. Your planet is at destruction and your nation all but fallen--I shall not delay for your indecisions and quibbling to any extent for very much longer. If ones wish to WIN this game--you will come and find out your truth and you do that by studying that which is being given for your final instructions and information--HERE IT IS BEING GIVEN FORTH! God has no need to meet your sched­ule nor your demands--remember, He is Creator--you the Cre­ated! Moreover, you "will not profit in His name" without His presence and you all seem to miss the fact of it in your eager­ness to grasp the input of "some other MAN". GOD IS AT HAND WITH TRUTH AND DIRECTION AND THAT SIM­PLY IS THE WAY IT IS. IF THE STYLE OF PRESENTA­TION IS NOT TO YOUR LIKING OR PREFERENCE THEN I HAVE NOTHING MORE TO OFFER UNTO YOU AND YOU SHALL SPEND A LONG, LONG TIME IN THE TRAINING BY YOUR ENEMY. MY PEOPLE ALREADY HAVE PASSAGE OFF THIS PLACE OF CONFUSION AND CHAOS--DO YOU????

    Let us have a break and then we shall write about the cute games of the CIA and the press. You are going to open your eyes and ears one of these days and wish you had truly listened with hearing and seen with vision.

    Hatonn to clear.



    PJ 49
    CHAPTER 6

    REC #2 HATONN

    THU., APRIL 23, 1992 8:57 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 251

    THURSDAY. APRIL 23. 1992

    CONTROLLING THE CIA
    Since we have already written so much in depth regarding the controlled media and press, I shall stay right with the subject of the relationship with the CIA and Press since the subject in point is the CIA and not specifically "Press" as a general subject.

    Remember that herein large portions of this material are being related from documents published in 1974 and, at this time, be­cause of other intent involved in not naming the author, we shall continue to refer to same as I.M. Anonymous (IMA). This is because much material originally in his documents were deleted by the CIA and through court actions he is prevented from ever publishing the deleted information. I have no wish to go about repeating information which is available to all if you but go forth and get the books in point; however, some documents are no longer allowed printing or publishing and the information is so valuable that it is necessary you have the foundation upon which to base current understanding.

    The author in point is still very, very active as a patriot and when I can discern total security--I shall give great honor to this man because you-the-public must know to whom you owe free­dom if, in fact, you can reclaim it. The intelligence cults, now integrated, are the enforcement arm of the Elite Globalists and will make up the controlling force utilized as the army of the United Nations One World Government. The CIA, for in­stance, IS the President's (U.S.) private army and government controlling force who now makes war, starts wars and gleans profits from those wars while utilizing taxpayer funds and by­passing government oversight.

    As a reminder as to format: I am efforting to stay very close to total use of the document in point. My comments are in brack­ets ([H:]) while we are reproducing from the document. Please understand that while on the subject of the Intelligence Forces I have not used the document in point except wherein you will find deletions noted. You must know how these Secret Forces work or you haven't a prayer of overcoming your adversary.

    CIA AND THE PRESS

    In a recent interview (1974 publication), a nationally syndi­cated columnist with close ties to the CIA was asked how he would have reacted in 1961 if he had uncovered advance infor­mation that the agency was going to launch the Bay of Pigs in­vasion of Cuba. He replied somewhat wistfully, "The trouble with the establishment is that I would have gone to one of my friends in the government and he would have told me why I shouldn't write the story. And I probably wouldn't have written the story."

    It was rather fitting that this columnist, when queried about exposing a CIA operation, should have put his answer in terms of the "establishment" (of which he is a recognized member), since much of what the American people have learned--or have not learned--about the agency has been filtered through an "old-boy network" of journalists friendly to the CIA. There have been exceptions but, by and large, the CIA has attempted to dis­courage, alter, and even suppress independent investigative inquiries into agency activities.

    The CIA's principal technique for fending off the press has been to wrap itself in the mantle of "national security". Re­porters have been extremely reluctant to write anything that might endanger an ongoing operation or, in Tom Wicker's words, "get an agent killed in Timbuktu". The CIA has, for its part, played upon these completely understandable fears and used them as a club to convince newsmen that certain stories should never be written. And many reporters do not even have to be convinced, either because they already believe that the CIA's activities are not the kind of news that the public has a right to know or because in a particular case they approve of the agency's aims and methods.

    For example, on September 23, 1970, syndicated columnist Charles Bartlett was handed, by a Washington-based official of ITT, an internal ITT report sent in by the company's two repre­sentatives in Chile, Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez. This eight-page document--marked PERSONAL AND CONFIDEN­TIAL--said that the American Ambassador to Chile had received the "green light to move in the name of President Nixon.... (with) maximum authority to do all possible--short of a Dominican Republic-type action--to keep Allende from taking power." It stated that the Chilean army, "has been assured full material and financial assistance by the U.S. military establish­ment," and that ITT had "pledged its financial support if needed" to the anti-Allende forces. The document also included a lengthy rundown of the political situation in Chile.

    With the material for an expose in his hands, Bartlett did not launch an immediate investigation. Instead, he did exactly what ITT hoped he would do: he wrote a column about the dangers of a "classic Communist-style assumption of power" in Chile. He did see some hope that "Chile will find a way to avert the inau­guration of Salvador Allende," but thought there was little the United States could "profitably do" and that "Chilean politics should be left to the Chileans." He did not inform his readers that he had documentary evidence indicating that Chilean poli­tics were being left to the CIA and ITT.

    Asked why he did not write more, Bartlett replied in a 1973 telephone interview, "I was only interested in the political analy­sis. I didn't take seriously the Washington stuff--the description of machinations within the U.S. government. (The ITT men who wrote the report had not been in Washington; they had been in Chile.) Yet, by Bartlett's own admission, his September 28 column was based on the ITT report--in places, to the point of paraphrase. he wrote about several incidents occurring in Chile that he could not possibly have verified in Washington. Most reporters will not use material of this sort unless they can check it out with an independent source, so Bartlett was showing extraordinary faith in the reliability of his informants. But he used their material selectively--to write an anti-Allende scare piece, not to blow the whistle on the CIA and ITT.

    An ITT official gave the same report to Time's Pentagon corre­spondent, John Mulliken. Mulliken covered neither the CIA nor Chile as part of his regular beat, and he sent the ITT document to Time's headquarters in New York for possible action. As far as he knows, Time never followed up on the story. He at­tributes this to "bureaucratic stupidity--the system, not the peo­ple." He explains that Time had shortly before done a long arti­cle on Chile, and New York "didn't want to do any more."

    Thus, the public did not learn what the U.S. government and ITT were up to in Chile until the spring of 1972 when columnist Jack Anderson published scores of ITT internal documents con­cerning Chile. Included in the Anderson papers, as one of the most important exhibits, was the very same document that had been given eighteen months earlier to Bartlett and Time maga­zine.

    Jack Anderson is very much a maverick among Washington journalists, and he will write about nearly anything he learns--and can confirm--about the U.S. government and the CIA. With a few other notable exceptions, however, the great major­ity of the American press corps has tended to stay away from topics concerning the agency's operations. One of the reasons for this is that the CIA, being an extremely secretive organiza­tion, is a very hard beat to cover. Newsmen are denied access to its heavily guarded buildings, except in tightly controlled cir­cumstances. No media outlet in the country has ever assigned a full-time correspondent to the agency, and very few report on its activities even on a part-time basis. Except in cases where the CIA wants to leak some information, almost all CIA personnel avoid any contact whatsoever with journalists. In fact, agency policy decrees that employees must inform their superiors im­mediately of any and all conversations with reporters, and the ordinary operator who has too many of these conversations tends to become suspect in the eyes of his co-workers.

    BRITISH SECRECY ENVIED

    For the general view in the CIA (as in some other parts of the federal government) is that the press is potentially an enemy force--albeit one that can be used with great success to serve the agency's purposes. Former Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory was speaking for most of his colleagues when in a February 26, 1967, television interview he said that press dis­closures of agency funding of the National Student Association and other private groups were "a commentary on the immaturity of our society". With the pronounced Anglophile bias and envy of Britain's Official Secrets Act so common among high CIA of­ficials, he compared the situation to our "free motherland in England" where, if a similar situation comes up, "everybody shushes up in the interest of their national security and...what they think is the interest of the free world civilization."

    Former CIA official William J. Barnds was even more critical of journalistic probes of the agency in a January 1969 article in the influential quarterly Foreign Affairs:

    The disclosure of intelligence activities in the press in recent years is a clear national liability. These disclosures have created a public awareness that the U.S. government has, at least at times, resorted to covert operations in inappropriate situations, failed to maintain secrecy and failed to review ongoing op­erations adequately. The public revelations of those weaknesses, even though they are now partially cor­rected, hampers CIA (and the U.S. government) by limiting those willing to cooperate with it and its ac­tivities. As long as such disclosures remain in the public mind, any official effort to improve CIA's image is as likely to backfire as to succeed.

    Barnds had been with the agency's Office of National Esti­mates until he joined the staff of the Council on Foreign Rela­tions in the mid-1960's. In 1968 he was the secretary of the CFR session where Richard Bissell laid out his views on covert operations.

    Barnds' admission that the CIA has certain weaknesses is un­usual coming from a former (or present) agency official, but very few in the CIA would disagree with his statement that press stories about intelligence operations are a "national liability".

    The CIA's concern about how to deal with reporters and how to use the press to best advantage dates back to the agency's be­ginnings. During the 1950's the agency was extremely wary of any formal relations with the media, and the standard answer to press inquiries was that the CIA "does not confirm or deny pub­lished reports."

    To be sure, there was a CIA press office, but it was not a very important part of the agency's organization. To CIA insid­ers, its principal function seemed to be to clip newspaper articles about the CIA and to forward them to the interested component of the agency. The press office was largely bypassed by Direc­tor Allen Dulles and a few of his chief aides who maintained contact with certain influential reporters.

    Dulles often met his "friends" of the press on a background basis and he and his Clandestine Services chief, Frank Wisner, were extremely interested in getting across to the American people the danger posed to the country by international Commu­nism. They stressed the CIA's role in combating the communist threat and Dulles liked to brag, after the fact, about successful agency operations. The reporters who saw him were generally fascinated by his war stories of the intelligence trade. Wisner was particularly concerned with publicizing anti-Communist emigre groups (many of which were subsidized or organized by the CIA) and he often encouraged reporters to write about their activities.

    According to an ex-CIA official who worked closely with Wisner, the refugees from the "captive nations" were used by the CIA to give credence to the idea that the United States was truly interested in "rolling back the Iron Curtain". This same former CIA man recalls Dulles and Wisner frequently telling subordinates, in effect: "Try to do a better job in influencing the press through friendly intermediaries."

    REPORTERS ARE UNOFFICIAL SPIES

    Nevertheless, the agency's press relations during the Dulles era were generally low-keyed. Reporters were not inclined to write unfavorable or revealing stories about the CIA, and the agency, for its part, received a good deal of useful information from friendly newsmen. Reporters like Joseph Alsop, Drew Pearson, Harrison Salisbury, and scores of others regularly sat down with CIA experts to be debriefed after they returned from foreign travels. These newsmen in no way worked for the agency but they were glad to provide the incidental information that a traveler might have observed, such as the number of smokestacks on a factory or the intensity of traffic on a railroad line. The Washington bureau chief of a large newspaper re­members being asked, after he returned from Eastern Europe, "to fill in the little pieces which might fit into the jigsaw puz­zle." This type of data was quite important to the intelligence analyst in the days before the technical espionage programs could supply the same information. The agency's Intelligence Directorate routinely conducted these debriefings of reporters, as it does today. Selected newsmen, however, participated in a second kind of debriefing conducted by the Clandestine Ser­vices. In these the emphasis was on the personalities of the for­eign officials encountered by the newsmen (as part of the un­ending probe for vulnerabilities) and the operation of the inter­nal-security systems in the countries visited.

    At the same time the CIA was debriefing newsmen, it was looking for possible recruits in the press corps or hoping to place a CIA operator under "deep cover" with a reputable media outlet. The identities of these bogus "reporters" were (and are) closely guarded secrets. As late as November 1973, according to Oswald Johnston's Washington Star-News report (confirmed by other papers), there were still about forty full-time reporters and free-lancers on the CIA payroll. Johnston reported that CIA Director Colby had decided to cut the "five full-time staff corre­spondents with general-circulation news organizations", but that the other thirty-five or so "stringers" and workers for trade pub­lications would be retained. American correspondents often have much broader entree to foreign societies than do officials of the local American embassy, which provides most CIA oper­ators with their cover, and the agency simply has been unable to resist the temptation to penetrate the press corps, although the major media outlets have almost all refused to cooperate with the CIA.

    William Attwood, now (1974) publisher of Newsday, re­members vividly that when he was foreign editor of Look during the 1950's a CIA representative approached him and asked if Look needed a correspondent in New Delhi. The agency of­fered to supply the man for the job and pay his salary. Attwood turned the agency down.

    Clifton Daniel, former managing editor of the New York Times and now that paper's Washington bureau chief, states that in the late 1950's "I was very surprised to learn that a corre­spondent of an obscure newspaper in an obscure part of the world was a CIA man. That bothered me." Daniel promptly checked the ranks of Times reporters for similar agency con­nections, but found "there did not seem to be any." He believes that one reason why the Times was clean was that "our people knew they would be fired" if they worked for the agency.

    In 1955 Sam Jaffe applied for a job with CBS News. While he was waiting for his application to be processed a CIA official whom Jaffe identifies as Jerry Rubins visited his house in Cali­fornia and told him, "If you are willing to work for us, you are going to Moscow," with CBS. Jaffe was flabbergasted, since he did not even know at that point if CBS would hire him, and he assumes that someone at CBS must have been in on the ar­rangement or otherwise the agency would never have known he had applied for work. Moreover, it would have been highly un­usual to send a new young reporter to such an important over­seas post. Rubins told Jaffe that the agency was "willing to re­lease certain top-secret information to you in order that you try and obtain certain information for us." Jaffee refused and was later hired by CBS for a domestic assignment.

    Before the CIA's successful armed invasion of Guatemala in 1954, a Time reporter dropped off the staff to participate, by his own admission, in the agency's paramilitary operations in that country. After the Guatemalan government had been over­thrown, he returned to the Time offices in New York and asked for his old job back. According to another Time staffer, the managing editor asked the returned CIA man if he were still with the agency. The man said no. The managing editor asked, "If you were still really with the CIA and I asked you about it, what would you say?" The returned CIA man replied, "I'd have to say no." Time rehired him anyway.

    CIA men have turned up as "reporters" in foreign countries for little-known publications which could not possibly afford to pay their salaries without agency assistance. Stanley Karnow, formerly the Washington Post's Asian correspondent, recalls, "I remember a guy who came to Korea with no visible means of support. He was supposed to be a correspondent for a small pa­per in New York. In a country where it takes years to build up acquaintances, he immediately had good contacts, and he dined with the CIA station chief. It was common knowledge he worked for the agency."

    U-2 DOWNING STARTS "CREDIBILITY GAP"

    The Dulles years ended with two disasters for the CIA that newspapers learned of in advance but refused to share fully with their readers. First came the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in 1960. Chalmers Roberts, long the Washington Post's diplomatic correspondent, confirms in his book FIRST ROUGH DRAFT that he and "some other newsmen" knew about the U-2 flights in the late 1950's and "remained silent". Roberts explains, "Retrospectively, it seems a close question as to whether this was the right decision, but I think it probably was. We took the position that the national interest came before the story because we knew the United States very much needed to discover the secrets of Soviet mis­silery."

    Most reporters at the time would have agreed with Richard Bissell that premature disclosure would have forced the Soviets "to take action". Yet Bissell admitted that "after five days" the Soviers were fully aware that the spy planes were overflying their country and that the secrecy maintained by the Soviet and American governments was an example "of two hostile govern­ments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public on both sides."

    The whole U-2 incident may well have been a watershed event. For much of the American press and public it was the first indi­cation that their government lied and it was the opening wedge in what would grow during the Vietnam years into the "credibility gap". But as the Eisenhower Administration came to an end, there was still a national consensus that the fight against Communism justified virtually any means. The press was very much a part of the consensus, and this did not start to crack until it became known that the CIA was organizing an armed invasion of Cuba.

    Five months before the landing took place at the Bay of Pigs, the Nation published a secondhand account of the agency's ef­forts to train Cuban exiles for attacks against Cuba and called upon "all U.S. news media with correspondents in Guatemala", where the invaders were being trained, to check out the story. The New York Times responded on January 10, 1961, with an article describing the training, with U.S. assistance, of an anti-Castro force in Guatemala. At the end of the story, which men­tioned neither the CIA nor a possible invasion, was a charge by the Cuban Foreign Minister that the U.S. government was preparing "mercenaries" in Guatemala and Florida for military action against Cuba. Turner Catledge, then the managing editor of the Times, declared in his book MY LIFE AND THE TIMES: "I don't think that anyone who read the story would have doubted that something was in the wind, that the United States was deeply involved, or that the New York Times was onto the story."

    As the date for the invasion approached, the New Republic ob­tained a comprehensive account of the preparations for the oper­ation, but the liberal magazine's editor-in-chief, Gilbert Harri­son, became wary of the security implications and submitted the article to President Kennedy for his advice. Kennedy asked that it not be printed and Harrison, a friend of the President, com­plied. At about the same time, New York Times reporter Tad Szulc uncovered nearly the complete story and the Times made preparations to carry it on April 7, 1961, under a four-column headline. But Times publisher Orvil Dryfoos and Washington bureau chief James Reston both objected to the article on national-security grounds and it was edited to eliminate all mention of CIA involvement or an "imminent" invasion. The truncated story, which mentioned only that 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans were being trained in the United States and Central America "for the liberation of Cuba", no longer merited a banner headline was reduced to a single column on the front page. Times editor Clifton Daniel later explained that Dryfoos had ordered the story toned down "above all, out of concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba."

    * * *

    Here seems to be a good place to take a break. Please ponder the last sentence. "...preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba." Shouldn't that give you cold chills? This was for the business Elite and was a total CIA involvement for the President and his men--nothing at all to do with national-se­curity or defense of your nation--or even a viable moral chal­lenge. This is where you have come to, America, and it must be faced.

    Hatonn to stand-by.

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  • 새 글 작성이 불가능함
  • 응답글 작성이 불가능함
  • 파일 첨부가 불가능함
  • 내 글 수정이 불가능함
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