PJ 49
CHAPTER 5
REC #2 HATONN
MON., APRIL 20, 1992 10:22 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 248
MONDAY, APRIL 20, 1992
As news flows back to you regarding the ineffectuality and total unworthiness of your weapons systems, your military and your government these days, do you not see the implications?
"60" MINUTES is giving you enough to unbefuddle your minds. They just showed an old interview with Noriega and the picture is totally clear of the interim intrigues. The same with the Apache helicopters and their unworthiness. The materials are total junk--so where do the billions of dollars go? Hidden intrigues set forth by the governors, your Administration, Chiefs of Staff, CIA Directors and the Global Elite.
If you fail to study this information we bring unto you then you shall NOT change a thing on your planet and you shall perish in enslavement of the masses.
I ask that Quade's Sacramento speech be put to print along with Gritz's. Both project incorrect assumptions but are worthy for the confirmation given in each. If, however, ones who are in error even in part and refuse to avail themselves of the further information in order to see and comprehend the "whole" then you shall NEVER find solutions to that which confronts you on and within the physical plane of experience. For instance, if you still think you can rise up against the Puppet Masters with guns--you are not in full understanding of your plight. THEY HAVE BIGGER AND BETTER WAYS AND GUNS TO CONTROL YOU AND ISOLATE YOU. YOU PLAY INTO THEIR HANDS BY THIS TYPE OF CONFRONTATION. It is time to understand GOD and PURPOSE and get with the access to knowledge which we freely pour forth for you to the extent that you moan and complain constantly at the quantity of it all. GOD IS NOT GOING TO DO IT FOR YOU AND NEITHER ARE THE HOSTS--WE COME TO TELL YOU HOW AND SHOW THE WAY--YOU WILL DO IT OR YOU WILL GO DOWN IN DEFEAT. TO GO DOWN DOES NOT MEAN TO RISE UP ON CLOUDS WITH ANGELS--IT MEANS TO GO DOWN IN THE PHYSICAL WITH INABILITY TO GROW BEYOND UNTIL ANOTHER EXPRESSION IN MANIFESTATION. WHY WOULD YE CONTINUE TO DO THINGS IN ERROR WHEN TRUTH IS BEFORE YOU? PONDER IT.
Do you have any idea of the relative tiny number 144,000 is to 6-1/2 BILLION? I thought not! A place is prepared for well over the 7- ½ billion persons you ACTUALLY have on your planet--but I assure you if it all came to a close this day--our craft would not be crowded. All on your planet can be housed on MY MOTHER-SHIP but this day you wouldn't even have enough coming aboard to lay a foundation for the new structuring of the gift in store for you. You are going to learn to think in wisdom beyond that which seems apparent or you will be destined to remain in the narrow perspective until you do. So be it.
* * *
CONTROLLING THE CIA: CONGRESS
Congressional control of the CIA can be broken down into two distinct periods: before and after Watergate. In the agency's first twenty-six years, the legislative branch was generally content to vote the CIA more than enough money for its needs, without seriously questioning how the funds would be spent. In fact, only a handful of Congressmen even knew the amount appropriated, since all the money was hidden in the budgets of other government agencies, mainly the Defense Department. To be sure, four separate subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services committees were responsible for monitoring the CIA, but their supervision was minimal or nonexistent. In the House, the names of the members were long kept secret but they were generally the most senior (and thus often the most conservative) men on their respective committees. (Allen Dulles was reported by the New York Times in April 1966 to have had "personal control" over which congressmen would be selected.) In August 1971, House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana broke with past practice and dipped down his committee's seniority ladder to appoint Lucien Nedzi, a hard-working liberal from Michigan, head of the oversight subcommittee. Hebert, however, kept complete control of the subcommittee's staff, and Nedzi is the only non-conservative among the panel's five permanent and two ex officio members. When Hebert made his unusual choice, it was widely speculated that he was trying to defuse outside criticism of the subcommittee's performance by naming a liberal as chairman, and that he felt he could keep Nedzi isolated. Nedzi had little time for overseeing the CIA during 1972, his first full year as chairman, because he faced tough primary and re-election challenges. In 1973 he launched a comprehensive inquiry into the agency's role in the Watergate affair but it remains (in 1974) to be seen whether his subcommittee will delve any deeper into CIA covert operations than the House panels have done in the past. In the Senate the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees have traditionally met together to maintain joint oversight of the CIA. As is true in the House, the members have almost all been conservative, aging, military-oriented legislators.
NO WATCHDOGS ALLOWED
Many Congressmen and Senators--but by no means a majority--believe that these oversight arrangements are inadequate and since 1947 nearly 150 separate pieces of legislation have been introduced to increase congressional surveillance of the CIA. None has passed either chamber, and the House has never even had a recorded vote on the subject. The Senate, by a 59-27 margin in 1956, and by 61-28 in 1966, has turned down proposals for expanded and more active watchdog committees for the agency and the rest of the intelligence community. To strengthen his case for maintaining the status quo at the time of the 1966 vote, Senator Richard Russell, then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, agreed that starting in 1967 the three senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee would be allowed unofficially to sit in on the joint oversight subcommittee's meetings. But after this arrangement was in effect for several years, Senator John Stennis, Russell's successor as chairman, simply stopped holding sessions. There was not a single one in either 1971 or 1972. Stennis is generally believed to have ended the subcommittee's functions because foreign-policy liberals J. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington would have been present for the secret deliberations. Neither man was trusted at the time by either the CIA or by the conservative Senators who have kept oversight of the CIA as their own private preserve. In the absence of any joint subcommittee meetings, the five senior members of the Appropriations Committee, all of whom were staunch hawks and administration supporters, met privately to go over the agency's budget.
Senator Symington challenged this arrangement on November 23, 1971, when, without prior warning, he introduced a floor amendment which would have put a $4 billion limit on government-wide intelligence spending--roughly $2 billion less than what the administration was requesting. Although Symington's amendment was defeated 51-36, it produced perhaps the most illuminating debate on intelligence ever heard in the Senate.
Symington berated the fact that the Senate was being asked to vote billions of dollars for intelligence with only five Senators knowing the amount; and in a colloquy with the Appropriations chairman, the late Allen Ellender, Symington established that even those five Senators had limited knowledge of the CIA's operations. Ellender replied to Symington's question on whether or not the appropriations subcommittee had approved the financing of a 36,000-man "secret" army in Laos:
I did not know anything about it....I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it published in the newspapers some time ago.
Laos was, of course, the CIA's largest operation at the time that supposed overseer Ellender admitted ignorance about it. Richard Russell, too, had had a similar lack of interest in what the CIA was doing. He had once even told CIA Director Helms--privately--that there were certain operations he simply did not want to know about. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, who served for many years as ranking Republican on the oversight subcommittee, expressed the same view publicly in 1966: "It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have."
KEEPING IT SECRET
Faced with this rejection of responsibility on the part of the congressional monitors, the CIA has chosen to keep the subcommittee largely in the dark about its covert operations--unless a particular activity, such as the 1967 black-propaganda effort against mainland China, has been successful in the agency's eyes and could be bragged about to the legislators. Helms did make frequent visits to Capitol Hill to give secret briefings, but these usually concerned current intelligence matters and estimates of the communist countries' military capabilities--not the doings of the Clandestine Services. Yet Helms won a reputation among lawmakers as a man who provided straight information.
Although Helms had been for many years providing current intelligence and estimates to congressional committees in secret oral briefings, the CIA officially opposed legislation introduced in 1972 by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky which would have provided the appropriate committees with the same sort of data in the form of regular CIA reports. The bill was favorably approved by the Foreign Relations Committee but subsequently died in Armed Services. Director-designate William Colby told the latter committee in July 1973 that he thought this information could be supplied on an informal basis "without legislation".
Senator J. William Fuibright, who sat in Helms' briefings to the joint oversight committee until they were discontinued in 1971, described the proceedings to author Patrick McGarvey for the latter's CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS:
The ten minute rule is in effect, so the members have little if any chance to dig deep into a subject. The director of CIA spends most of the time talking about the Soviet missile threat and so on. The kind of information he provides is interesting, but it really is of little help in trying to find out what is going on in intelligence. He actually tells them only what he wants them to know. It seems to me that the men on the committee are more interested in shielding CIA from its critics than in anything else.
Once a year the CIA does come before the appropriations subcommittees in both houses to make its annual budget request. These sessions, however, are completely on the agency's terms. Prior to the meeting, CIA electronics experts make an elaborate show of sweeping the committee rooms for bugging devices, and blankets are thrown over the windows to prevent outside surveillance. The transcripts of the sessions are considered so secret that copies are locked up at CIA headquarters. Not one is left with the subcommittees for future study. Committee staff members, who normally do most of the substantive preparation for hearings, are banned at the CIA's request.
A relatively similar procedure is followed when an individual Senator or Congressman writes to the CIA about a covert operation. Instead of sending a letter in return, an agency representative offers to brief the legislator personally on the matter, on the condition that no staff members are present. This procedure puts the busy lawmaker at a marked disadvantage, since his staff is usually more familiar with the subject than he is--and probably wrote the original letter.
DISTRACTION SPECIALISTS
Allen Dulles set the tone for the CIA budget presentations in the 1950's when he commented to a few assistants preparing him for his annual appearance, "I'll just tell them a few war stories." A more current example of the CIA's evasive tactics occurred in 1966 when the Senate appropriations subcommittee was thought to have some hard questions to ask about the growing costs of technical espionage programs. DCI Helms responded to the senatorial interest by bringing with him the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Dr. Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon, who loaded himself up with a bag full of spy gadgets--a camera hidden in a tobacco pouch, a radio transmitter hidden in false teeth, a tape recorder in a cigarette case, and so on. This equipment did not even come from Wheelon's part of the agency but was manufactured by the Clandestine Services; if, however, the Senators wanted to talk about "technical" matters, Helms and his assistant were perfectly willing to distract them with James Bond-type equipment.
Wheelon started to discuss the technical collection programs but as he talked he let the Senators inspect the gadgets. Predictably, the discussion soon turned to the spy paraphernalia. One persistent Senator asked two questions about the new and expensive technical collection systems the CIA was then putting into operation, but Wheelon deftly turned the subject back to the gadgets. When the Senator asked his question a third time, Chairman Russell told him to hold his inquiry until the CIA men were finished. But the Senators became so enthralled with the equipment before them that no more questions were asked. Seven years later, the same panel would investigate the 1971 assistance furnished by the Clandestine Service to E. Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy for the "plumbers" operations--assistance comprised of many of the same gadgets that amused the Senators in 1966.
WARMUP YIELDS $100 MILLION
In 1967 the CIA, as usual, prepared its budget request with a dazzling collection of slides and pictures, emphasizing the agency's role in fighting Communism around the world and producing intelligence on the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and China. Also included in the "canned" briefing was a description of the CIA's technical collection expertise, its work with computers and other information-processing systems, and even its advanced techniques in printing--but, again, no "dirty tricks". The presentation was rehearsed several times at CIA headquarters while calls were awaited from Capitol Hill to set specific dates. A Congressman serving on the House appropriations oversight group was even invited to come out to the agency to see one of the dry runs. A few days later a staff man on the House panel telephoned the CIA to say that the Congressman who had seen the rehearsal said that everything seemed in order and that the Chairman simply did not have the time to hear the presentation, but that the committee would approve the full budget request of nearly $700 million anyway. Shortly thereafter a similar call came from the Senate committee. The chairman had apparently been told by his opposite number in the House that the CIA request seemed reasonable, and on the strength of the House recommendation the Senate would also approve the full amount without a hearing.
Thus, in 1967 the CIA did not even appear in front of its budgetary oversight committees. The experience that year was extreme, but it does illustrate how little congressional supervision the agency has been subject to over the years.
Many congressional critics of the CIA have advocated broadening the membership of the CIA oversight subcommittees to include legislators who will hold the agency up to the same sort of scrutiny that other government departments receive. They argue that in the equally sensitive field of atomic energy a joint congressional committee has kept close track of the Atomic Energy Commission without any breach in security. However, some liberals who advocate greater control of the CIA fear that a joint CIA committee analogous to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee might easily be "captured" by the agency, just as the atomic energy committee has, to a large extent, been co-opted by the AEC.
Those who oppose increased congressional control of the agency claim that if the CIA is to operate effectively, total secrecy must be maintained, and that expanding the functions and the membership of the oversight subcommittees would mean much greater likelihood of breaches in security. They fear that larger subcommittees would necessarily lead to the presence of administration opponents who might exploit agency secrets for political gains. Moreover, it is said that friendly foreign intelligence services would be reluctant to cooperate or share secrets with the agency if they knew that their activities would be revealed to the American Congress.
FLOOD OF CHANGE: WATERGATE
No matter what the merits of the arguments for close congressional control, there was no chance that a majority of either house would vote for any appreciable change until the Watergate affair broke wide open in early 1973. Suddenly the long-dormant oversight subcommittees began to meet frequently to investigate the degree of CIA involvement in the illegal activities sponsored by the White House and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The obvious abuses of power by the administration and its supporters stirred even conservative legislators into demands for corrective action. And the administration, in trying to justify its excesses on the grounds of protecting the "national security"--a justification largely unacceptable to Congress--seriously weakened the position of those who claimed "national security" grounds. Furthermore, there was a widespread public and media outcry against concentration of power in the White House, and against President Nixon's penchant for taking unilateral actions without the approval or even the advice of Congress. The CIA, as the President's loyal tool--tainted to some extent by involvement in Watergate-related activities--also became vulnerable.
The four oversight subcommittees which met so frequently in the first six months of 1973 are still made up of the same overwhelmingly conservative members. But, pushed by either their own revulsion over Watergate or by public reaction to it, they seem likely to take some action to increase congressional surveillance of the CIA.
For example, John Stennis, the Senate Armed Services chairman, declared on July 20, 1973: "The experience of the CIA in Laos, as well as the more recent disclosures here at home have caused me to definitely conclude that the entire CIA act should be entirely reviewed." This is the same Stennis who, nineteen months earlier, when the CIA's "secret" war in Laos was at its peak stated:
The agency is conducted in a splendid way....As has been said, spying is spying. But if we are going to have an intelligence agency....it cannot be run as if you were running a tax collector's office or the HEW or some other such department. You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some and take what is coming.
Yet from all indications, Stennis had become sincerely convinced that the chief executive, on his own, should never again be able to take the country into a Vietnam-type conflict. [H: I hope this is more than just a big horrendous laugh to you in light of the subsequent activities of your President, Advisors, Fixed Congressmen, wars, conflicts, foreign disruptions of nations and appointment of his own criminal favorite to even head the CIA. You are going to stop this or you are going to be laughing out of the other side of your face for half your face will be blown away and the rest of your body incarcerated in those nice "homeless camps" now vacated and ready for your filling.] On October 18, 1973, he introduced legislation--while reserving his right to change it after study and hearings extending into 1974--which would modify the CIA's legal base. First, it would limit the agency's domestic activities to "those which are necessary and appropriate to its foreign intelligence mission", apparently defining this in a way to abolish covert activities in the United States. Second, it would set up tighter procedures for congressional oversight, while "recognizing essential security requirements".
A simple majority in either chamber would be sufficient to change the system of CIA oversight. As much as the agency wants to keep its activities secret, it would have little choice but to comply with serious congressional demands for more information and more supervision. The power of the purse gives the legislative branch the means to enforce its will on a reluctant CIA, and even one house standing alone could use this power as a control mechanism. That is, assuming that Congress is willing to accept the responsibility.
* * *
BUSH/CIA ANSWERS TO NO GOV'T AGENTS
We are going to interrupt the body of this writing now to point out a few obvious circumstances. If you have been keeping informed you will have no trouble with this information--if not, then you probably can still see the potential advantage in what I bring.
You must be aware that the CIA--through its newer connections and total infiltration within the White House--answers actually to no-one in your government as you believe it to be structured and simply thumbs its nose at anyone who even questions its activities. George Bush treats your questions as not even worthy of reply--much less truth in reply.
How can the CIA work around these restrictions which, even though badly orchestrated, still have some potential merit? They have become operatives outside your government by simply utilizing funding, etc., where obvious and then, on the secret operations, setting up myriads of corporations which are funded by your money and added to by their massive drug trade and blackmail tactics to foreign states, selling and trading of arms, mercenary armies and wars. All proceeds are funnelled through false fronts and opaque blinds. Whoever crosses the path in defiance is taken out--such as Noriega, etc. The drug trade in Panama is thriving better than ever before and the prime receiver of the drugs are the people of the United States and the money goes to the Elite in your government and within the Elite of the One World Order.
I remind all readers who are within my working focus at this time--if you are only doing lip-service, I suggest you go of your own accord away from my "troops" or you shall be disclosed. You took the son of God and slew Him that you might later claim HIS blood for your salvation without worthy actions, deeds or belief as in Truth. You shall not longer hide behind the robes of the innocent in your greed to satisfy ego demands.
EGO INTENT ALWAYS WEARS A "SIGN"
I shall not utilize as recognizable information, that which comes from ones who are unwilling to study every portion I bring unto them. They may go their way without rancor but they shall no longer deceive my people. The mark upon a being is far more easily seen than is suspected by the one in point for ego intent is always required to wear a "sign". I shall no longer give hearing to those who would not follow my way for they are working for their own benefit and not for brother, nation or God. And remember--THE SINS OF THE FATHER ARE RESTED UPON THE SONS--EVERY TIME! ARE YOU WORTHY OF YOUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS?? PONDER IT CAREFULLY.
If you offer something of your own writing for my consideration and for publication within MY JOURNALS AND PAPER--how know ye that it is not already published several times if you have read not all of my material? I assure you that this is what is happening time after time after time and confirmation is one thing, waste of time and space is quite another!
Do not simply give me that which is coming from a subcommittee hearing with your opinions appended--I am quite capable of monitoring all the junk and lies of a subcommittee hearing. This is NOT intelligence gathering, this is subterfuge.
This is not to say that ones may be allowed to overlook that information, just be sure YOU give it its proper relevance. It is far more important that man knows in his own location, what is coming down--from information gained by observance and leakage--i.e., the expected massive catastrophic earthquake in Southern California by September of this year--as projected BY THE ONES IN CHARGE OF IT WITH CONCURRENT TRAINING OF VARIOUS TEAMS TO HANDLE IT. I do not need a repeat of the nasties as such for you have been given enough proof of the take-over by the Elite of your government.
ROSS PEROT
If Ross Perot, for instance, is ill-informed--INFORM HIM, do not simply disagree with his platform--GO FORTH AND INFORM HIM OF TRUTH AND I SHALL BE MOST HAPPY TO MEET WITH HIM.
I do not, however, have any intentions whatsoever to produce miracles and/or magic as you expect for your confirmation and truth. God is based on far greater understanding than a light show of negligible confirmation. This transition is being thrust forth by the teams of God in purpose and intent and, like all projects and programs, there is a central place of headquarters--we do not hap-hazardly flit about nipping earlobes. Your planet is at destruction and your nation all but fallen--I shall not delay for your indecisions and quibbling to any extent for very much longer. If ones wish to WIN this game--you will come and find out your truth and you do that by studying that which is being given for your final instructions and information--HERE IT IS BEING GIVEN FORTH! God has no need to meet your schedule nor your demands--remember, He is Creator--you the Created! Moreover, you "will not profit in His name" without His presence and you all seem to miss the fact of it in your eagerness to grasp the input of "some other MAN". GOD IS AT HAND WITH TRUTH AND DIRECTION AND THAT SIMPLY IS THE WAY IT IS. IF THE STYLE OF PRESENTATION IS NOT TO YOUR LIKING OR PREFERENCE THEN I HAVE NOTHING MORE TO OFFER UNTO YOU AND YOU SHALL SPEND A LONG, LONG TIME IN THE TRAINING BY YOUR ENEMY. MY PEOPLE ALREADY HAVE PASSAGE OFF THIS PLACE OF CONFUSION AND CHAOS--DO YOU????
Let us have a break and then we shall write about the cute games of the CIA and the press. You are going to open your eyes and ears one of these days and wish you had truly listened with hearing and seen with vision.
Hatonn to clear.
PJ 49
CHAPTER 6
REC #2 HATONN
THU., APRIL 23, 1992 8:57 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 251
THURSDAY. APRIL 23. 1992
CONTROLLING THE CIA
Since we have already written so much in depth regarding the controlled media and press, I shall stay right with the subject of the relationship with the CIA and Press since the subject in point is the CIA and not specifically "Press" as a general subject.
Remember that herein large portions of this material are being related from documents published in 1974 and, at this time, because of other intent involved in not naming the author, we shall continue to refer to same as I.M. Anonymous (IMA). This is because much material originally in his documents were deleted by the CIA and through court actions he is prevented from ever publishing the deleted information. I have no wish to go about repeating information which is available to all if you but go forth and get the books in point; however, some documents are no longer allowed printing or publishing and the information is so valuable that it is necessary you have the foundation upon which to base current understanding.
The author in point is still very, very active as a patriot and when I can discern total security--I shall give great honor to this man because you-the-public must know to whom you owe freedom if, in fact, you can reclaim it. The intelligence cults, now integrated, are the enforcement arm of the Elite Globalists and will make up the controlling force utilized as the army of the United Nations One World Government. The CIA, for instance, IS the President's (U.S.) private army and government controlling force who now makes war, starts wars and gleans profits from those wars while utilizing taxpayer funds and bypassing government oversight.
As a reminder as to format: I am efforting to stay very close to total use of the document in point. My comments are in brackets ([H:]) while we are reproducing from the document. Please understand that while on the subject of the Intelligence Forces I have not used the document in point except wherein you will find deletions noted. You must know how these Secret Forces work or you haven't a prayer of overcoming your adversary.
CIA AND THE PRESS
In a recent interview (1974 publication), a nationally syndicated columnist with close ties to the CIA was asked how he would have reacted in 1961 if he had uncovered advance information that the agency was going to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. He replied somewhat wistfully, "The trouble with the establishment is that I would have gone to one of my friends in the government and he would have told me why I shouldn't write the story. And I probably wouldn't have written the story."
It was rather fitting that this columnist, when queried about exposing a CIA operation, should have put his answer in terms of the "establishment" (of which he is a recognized member), since much of what the American people have learned--or have not learned--about the agency has been filtered through an "old-boy network" of journalists friendly to the CIA. There have been exceptions but, by and large, the CIA has attempted to discourage, alter, and even suppress independent investigative inquiries into agency activities.
The CIA's principal technique for fending off the press has been to wrap itself in the mantle of "national security". Reporters have been extremely reluctant to write anything that might endanger an ongoing operation or, in Tom Wicker's words, "get an agent killed in Timbuktu". The CIA has, for its part, played upon these completely understandable fears and used them as a club to convince newsmen that certain stories should never be written. And many reporters do not even have to be convinced, either because they already believe that the CIA's activities are not the kind of news that the public has a right to know or because in a particular case they approve of the agency's aims and methods.
For example, on September 23, 1970, syndicated columnist Charles Bartlett was handed, by a Washington-based official of ITT, an internal ITT report sent in by the company's two representatives in Chile, Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez. This eight-page document--marked PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL--said that the American Ambassador to Chile had received the "green light to move in the name of President Nixon.... (with) maximum authority to do all possible--short of a Dominican Republic-type action--to keep Allende from taking power." It stated that the Chilean army, "has been assured full material and financial assistance by the U.S. military establishment," and that ITT had "pledged its financial support if needed" to the anti-Allende forces. The document also included a lengthy rundown of the political situation in Chile.
With the material for an expose in his hands, Bartlett did not launch an immediate investigation. Instead, he did exactly what ITT hoped he would do: he wrote a column about the dangers of a "classic Communist-style assumption of power" in Chile. He did see some hope that "Chile will find a way to avert the inauguration of Salvador Allende," but thought there was little the United States could "profitably do" and that "Chilean politics should be left to the Chileans." He did not inform his readers that he had documentary evidence indicating that Chilean politics were being left to the CIA and ITT.
Asked why he did not write more, Bartlett replied in a 1973 telephone interview, "I was only interested in the political analysis. I didn't take seriously the Washington stuff--the description of machinations within the U.S. government. (The ITT men who wrote the report had not been in Washington; they had been in Chile.) Yet, by Bartlett's own admission, his September 28 column was based on the ITT report--in places, to the point of paraphrase. he wrote about several incidents occurring in Chile that he could not possibly have verified in Washington. Most reporters will not use material of this sort unless they can check it out with an independent source, so Bartlett was showing extraordinary faith in the reliability of his informants. But he used their material selectively--to write an anti-Allende scare piece, not to blow the whistle on the CIA and ITT.
An ITT official gave the same report to Time's Pentagon correspondent, John Mulliken. Mulliken covered neither the CIA nor Chile as part of his regular beat, and he sent the ITT document to Time's headquarters in New York for possible action. As far as he knows, Time never followed up on the story. He attributes this to "bureaucratic stupidity--the system, not the people." He explains that Time had shortly before done a long article on Chile, and New York "didn't want to do any more."
Thus, the public did not learn what the U.S. government and ITT were up to in Chile until the spring of 1972 when columnist Jack Anderson published scores of ITT internal documents concerning Chile. Included in the Anderson papers, as one of the most important exhibits, was the very same document that had been given eighteen months earlier to Bartlett and Time magazine.
Jack Anderson is very much a maverick among Washington journalists, and he will write about nearly anything he learns--and can confirm--about the U.S. government and the CIA. With a few other notable exceptions, however, the great majority of the American press corps has tended to stay away from topics concerning the agency's operations. One of the reasons for this is that the CIA, being an extremely secretive organization, is a very hard beat to cover. Newsmen are denied access to its heavily guarded buildings, except in tightly controlled circumstances. No media outlet in the country has ever assigned a full-time correspondent to the agency, and very few report on its activities even on a part-time basis. Except in cases where the CIA wants to leak some information, almost all CIA personnel avoid any contact whatsoever with journalists. In fact, agency policy decrees that employees must inform their superiors immediately of any and all conversations with reporters, and the ordinary operator who has too many of these conversations tends to become suspect in the eyes of his co-workers.
BRITISH SECRECY ENVIED
For the general view in the CIA (as in some other parts of the federal government) is that the press is potentially an enemy force--albeit one that can be used with great success to serve the agency's purposes. Former Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory was speaking for most of his colleagues when in a February 26, 1967, television interview he said that press disclosures of agency funding of the National Student Association and other private groups were "a commentary on the immaturity of our society". With the pronounced Anglophile bias and envy of Britain's Official Secrets Act so common among high CIA officials, he compared the situation to our "free motherland in England" where, if a similar situation comes up, "everybody shushes up in the interest of their national security and...what they think is the interest of the free world civilization."
Former CIA official William J. Barnds was even more critical of journalistic probes of the agency in a January 1969 article in the influential quarterly Foreign Affairs:
The disclosure of intelligence activities in the press in recent years is a clear national liability. These disclosures have created a public awareness that the U.S. government has, at least at times, resorted to covert operations in inappropriate situations, failed to maintain secrecy and failed to review ongoing operations adequately. The public revelations of those weaknesses, even though they are now partially corrected, hampers CIA (and the U.S. government) by limiting those willing to cooperate with it and its activities. As long as such disclosures remain in the public mind, any official effort to improve CIA's image is as likely to backfire as to succeed.
Barnds had been with the agency's Office of National Estimates until he joined the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in the mid-1960's. In 1968 he was the secretary of the CFR session where Richard Bissell laid out his views on covert operations.
Barnds' admission that the CIA has certain weaknesses is unusual coming from a former (or present) agency official, but very few in the CIA would disagree with his statement that press stories about intelligence operations are a "national liability".
The CIA's concern about how to deal with reporters and how to use the press to best advantage dates back to the agency's beginnings. During the 1950's the agency was extremely wary of any formal relations with the media, and the standard answer to press inquiries was that the CIA "does not confirm or deny published reports."
To be sure, there was a CIA press office, but it was not a very important part of the agency's organization. To CIA insiders, its principal function seemed to be to clip newspaper articles about the CIA and to forward them to the interested component of the agency. The press office was largely bypassed by Director Allen Dulles and a few of his chief aides who maintained contact with certain influential reporters.
Dulles often met his "friends" of the press on a background basis and he and his Clandestine Services chief, Frank Wisner, were extremely interested in getting across to the American people the danger posed to the country by international Communism. They stressed the CIA's role in combating the communist threat and Dulles liked to brag, after the fact, about successful agency operations. The reporters who saw him were generally fascinated by his war stories of the intelligence trade. Wisner was particularly concerned with publicizing anti-Communist emigre groups (many of which were subsidized or organized by the CIA) and he often encouraged reporters to write about their activities.
According to an ex-CIA official who worked closely with Wisner, the refugees from the "captive nations" were used by the CIA to give credence to the idea that the United States was truly interested in "rolling back the Iron Curtain". This same former CIA man recalls Dulles and Wisner frequently telling subordinates, in effect: "Try to do a better job in influencing the press through friendly intermediaries."
REPORTERS ARE UNOFFICIAL SPIES
Nevertheless, the agency's press relations during the Dulles era were generally low-keyed. Reporters were not inclined to write unfavorable or revealing stories about the CIA, and the agency, for its part, received a good deal of useful information from friendly newsmen. Reporters like Joseph Alsop, Drew Pearson, Harrison Salisbury, and scores of others regularly sat down with CIA experts to be debriefed after they returned from foreign travels. These newsmen in no way worked for the agency but they were glad to provide the incidental information that a traveler might have observed, such as the number of smokestacks on a factory or the intensity of traffic on a railroad line. The Washington bureau chief of a large newspaper remembers being asked, after he returned from Eastern Europe, "to fill in the little pieces which might fit into the jigsaw puzzle." This type of data was quite important to the intelligence analyst in the days before the technical espionage programs could supply the same information. The agency's Intelligence Directorate routinely conducted these debriefings of reporters, as it does today. Selected newsmen, however, participated in a second kind of debriefing conducted by the Clandestine Services. In these the emphasis was on the personalities of the foreign officials encountered by the newsmen (as part of the unending probe for vulnerabilities) and the operation of the internal-security systems in the countries visited.
At the same time the CIA was debriefing newsmen, it was looking for possible recruits in the press corps or hoping to place a CIA operator under "deep cover" with a reputable media outlet. The identities of these bogus "reporters" were (and are) closely guarded secrets. As late as November 1973, according to Oswald Johnston's Washington Star-News report (confirmed by other papers), there were still about forty full-time reporters and free-lancers on the CIA payroll. Johnston reported that CIA Director Colby had decided to cut the "five full-time staff correspondents with general-circulation news organizations", but that the other thirty-five or so "stringers" and workers for trade publications would be retained. American correspondents often have much broader entree to foreign societies than do officials of the local American embassy, which provides most CIA operators with their cover, and the agency simply has been unable to resist the temptation to penetrate the press corps, although the major media outlets have almost all refused to cooperate with the CIA.
William Attwood, now (1974) publisher of Newsday, remembers vividly that when he was foreign editor of Look during the 1950's a CIA representative approached him and asked if Look needed a correspondent in New Delhi. The agency offered to supply the man for the job and pay his salary. Attwood turned the agency down.
Clifton Daniel, former managing editor of the New York Times and now that paper's Washington bureau chief, states that in the late 1950's "I was very surprised to learn that a correspondent of an obscure newspaper in an obscure part of the world was a CIA man. That bothered me." Daniel promptly checked the ranks of Times reporters for similar agency connections, but found "there did not seem to be any." He believes that one reason why the Times was clean was that "our people knew they would be fired" if they worked for the agency.
In 1955 Sam Jaffe applied for a job with CBS News. While he was waiting for his application to be processed a CIA official whom Jaffe identifies as Jerry Rubins visited his house in California and told him, "If you are willing to work for us, you are going to Moscow," with CBS. Jaffe was flabbergasted, since he did not even know at that point if CBS would hire him, and he assumes that someone at CBS must have been in on the arrangement or otherwise the agency would never have known he had applied for work. Moreover, it would have been highly unusual to send a new young reporter to such an important overseas post. Rubins told Jaffe that the agency was "willing to release certain top-secret information to you in order that you try and obtain certain information for us." Jaffee refused and was later hired by CBS for a domestic assignment.
Before the CIA's successful armed invasion of Guatemala in 1954, a Time reporter dropped off the staff to participate, by his own admission, in the agency's paramilitary operations in that country. After the Guatemalan government had been overthrown, he returned to the Time offices in New York and asked for his old job back. According to another Time staffer, the managing editor asked the returned CIA man if he were still with the agency. The man said no. The managing editor asked, "If you were still really with the CIA and I asked you about it, what would you say?" The returned CIA man replied, "I'd have to say no." Time rehired him anyway.
CIA men have turned up as "reporters" in foreign countries for little-known publications which could not possibly afford to pay their salaries without agency assistance. Stanley Karnow, formerly the Washington Post's Asian correspondent, recalls, "I remember a guy who came to Korea with no visible means of support. He was supposed to be a correspondent for a small paper in New York. In a country where it takes years to build up acquaintances, he immediately had good contacts, and he dined with the CIA station chief. It was common knowledge he worked for the agency."
U-2 DOWNING STARTS "CREDIBILITY GAP"
The Dulles years ended with two disasters for the CIA that newspapers learned of in advance but refused to share fully with their readers. First came the shooting down of the U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in 1960. Chalmers Roberts, long the Washington Post's diplomatic correspondent, confirms in his book FIRST ROUGH DRAFT that he and "some other newsmen" knew about the U-2 flights in the late 1950's and "remained silent". Roberts explains, "Retrospectively, it seems a close question as to whether this was the right decision, but I think it probably was. We took the position that the national interest came before the story because we knew the United States very much needed to discover the secrets of Soviet missilery."
Most reporters at the time would have agreed with Richard Bissell that premature disclosure would have forced the Soviets "to take action". Yet Bissell admitted that "after five days" the Soviers were fully aware that the spy planes were overflying their country and that the secrecy maintained by the Soviet and American governments was an example "of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public on both sides."
The whole U-2 incident may well have been a watershed event. For much of the American press and public it was the first indication that their government lied and it was the opening wedge in what would grow during the Vietnam years into the "credibility gap". But as the Eisenhower Administration came to an end, there was still a national consensus that the fight against Communism justified virtually any means. The press was very much a part of the consensus, and this did not start to crack until it became known that the CIA was organizing an armed invasion of Cuba.
Five months before the landing took place at the Bay of Pigs, the Nation published a secondhand account of the agency's efforts to train Cuban exiles for attacks against Cuba and called upon "all U.S. news media with correspondents in Guatemala", where the invaders were being trained, to check out the story. The New York Times responded on January 10, 1961, with an article describing the training, with U.S. assistance, of an anti-Castro force in Guatemala. At the end of the story, which mentioned neither the CIA nor a possible invasion, was a charge by the Cuban Foreign Minister that the U.S. government was preparing "mercenaries" in Guatemala and Florida for military action against Cuba. Turner Catledge, then the managing editor of the Times, declared in his book MY LIFE AND THE TIMES: "I don't think that anyone who read the story would have doubted that something was in the wind, that the United States was deeply involved, or that the New York Times was onto the story."
As the date for the invasion approached, the New Republic obtained a comprehensive account of the preparations for the operation, but the liberal magazine's editor-in-chief, Gilbert Harrison, became wary of the security implications and submitted the article to President Kennedy for his advice. Kennedy asked that it not be printed and Harrison, a friend of the President, complied. At about the same time, New York Times reporter Tad Szulc uncovered nearly the complete story and the Times made preparations to carry it on April 7, 1961, under a four-column headline. But Times publisher Orvil Dryfoos and Washington bureau chief James Reston both objected to the article on national-security grounds and it was edited to eliminate all mention of CIA involvement or an "imminent" invasion. The truncated story, which mentioned only that 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans were being trained in the United States and Central America "for the liberation of Cuba", no longer merited a banner headline was reduced to a single column on the front page. Times editor Clifton Daniel later explained that Dryfoos had ordered the story toned down "above all, out of concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba."
* * *
Here seems to be a good place to take a break. Please ponder the last sentence. "...preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba." Shouldn't that give you cold chills? This was for the business Elite and was a total CIA involvement for the President and his men--nothing at all to do with national-security or defense of your nation--or even a viable moral challenge. This is where you have come to, America, and it must be faced.
Hatonn to stand-by.
Tags, 상세검색
