Tags, 상세검색
PJ 48CHAPTER 15
REC #1 HATONN
WED., APRIL 8, 1992 9:37 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 236
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1992Yesterday the colors flew in the Bush campaign. Quayle ad-dressed a group of pro-Israel potential voters and began his speech: "FELLOW ZIONISTS". He further stated that never had relations with Israel actually been better and that the disagreements over the "Patriots" was no longer causing dissension between the nations' leaders. Oh barf!
LOCAL CURRENT BULLETINS
Next, I hope all of you have watched the hearings on the efficacy of the Patriot systems. It is as good as any Mel Brooks production--slap-stick lies and distortions and total fabrications. For instance, the Chairman asked the officer (military) in charge of the Patriot systems AND an assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about many things but one fun thing was the interrogation regarding stories to the public. One incident quoted Schwarzkopf as stating that out of 32 missiles, 31 had been intercepted. The officers seemed to know nothing about the statement so could not verify the statement one way or another. They next dealt with Bush telling the Americans that "...out of 42 missiles, 41 had intercepts, although not all incidents resulted in total kills." Here is the response: "Well, but you don't realize, Mr. Chairman, that 'intercept' does not mean 'strike', it only means that the missiles were noted and fired at." The Chairman responded by stating: "Oh, then you are telling us that 'intercept' doesn't mean 'to intercept'?" Response, "Yes sir, it only means that, in some instances, they pass close to each other." Chairman: "So, you are now telling us and all the American public that 'intercept' simply means the passing of a missile and an anti-missile missile going in different directions? And that the Patriots served their purpose?" Officer: "Yes sir, hey kept Israel from entering the war which would have resulted in a lot of bloodshed." Then, somehow in the incident wherein all of your men were killed in the barracks--"Well, neither battery worked because one was 'down' and the other had 'software failure' from overuse!"
I warn you ones again--I told you the wool was tightly bound over your receptors and that the Patriots were worthless junk AT THE TIME--what kind of confirmation do you need before you will give God a chance to be heard???? So be it for these are only little tidbits of entertaining productions with the lies totally visible and little attention even given to them.
The Japanese economy cannot sustain in this immediate plunge--the banks must fail. I remind you--if you are in one of those "other banks"--get out. Get your T-Bills and everything you have in them--out. If you must continue banking then get into Bank of America for it is one of the ones intended to sustain a bit longer. How long is a bit longer? Not very!
You still have a bit of time, but very little, to make some shifts with your funds, the price of gold is down also but has to rise according to the Elite themselves in prediction. And you still have some time to "incorporate in Nevada" if you work fast to "begin" coverage of self and assets and still come under protection of some kind of a "Grandfather" clause for these immediate and prior corporations. I ask that contact information be made available herein for ones to get information--it is all I can do for you--we do not do it FOR you. THERE IS NOTHING TO BACK THE ECONOMY IN JAPAN WHICH WAS, AS YOURS, BASED ON INSIDER RIP-OFF IN REAL ESTATE--GO BACK AND READ ABOUT IT A MONTH OR SO AGO IN THE LIBERATOR FOR I HAVE NO TIME TO ATTEND IT FURTHER. IT IS WAKE-UP CALL, AMERICA, FOR YOU HAVE SLEPT PAST THE ALARM CLOCK.
Back to the CIA, Dharma, for we need to rip right through this information so we can move on in updating and other urgent topical subjects. I will postpone the "Cuba" outlay until after I finish this topic of Intelligence and Policy so that the outlay makes more sense to you so let us just move right along, please.
CIA: INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
ABUSING THE PRODUCT
Unfortunately, intelligence reports are often sent to the nation's leaders in a far from pure form, especially when the subject is Soviet military capabilities. Yet, estimating the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons is probably the intelligence community's most important task, since the Soviet Union, on a strategic basis, is the only country in the world that offers a real threat to the security of the United States. [H: That is, other than the United States herself!] (The Chinese strategic threat is more potential than real.) [REMEMBER: This was written and published in 1974! The danger is now immediate and very real indeed.] Every President since World War II has wanted to know about any dangerous imbalances between American and Soviet forces, and presidential decisions on whether or not to go ahead with the development of new and expensive weapons systems have been based, to a great extent, on intelligence estimates of how strong the Russians are (although domestic political considerations and the views of America's allies also play a large role).
The Pentagon knows all too well that to justify its constant demands for new weapons and larger forces, intelligence must show that the Soviets are moving into a position of strength. Senator Stuart Symington has pointed out that scare stories about Soviet military strength appear at congressional budget time in springtime Washington as regularly as the cherry blossoms. To support a request for additional ships, the Navy will often magnify an increased threat from the Soviet fleet. The Air Force can much more easily obtain funds for a new bomber if it can show that the Soviets are developing one. Similar justifications can be--and have been--made for missiles, tanks, and even the continuance of American programs for chemical and biological warfare. Military analysts have tended to take a "worst case" view of the Soviets, from which they predict the most dire possible consequences from Soviet action. Major General Daniel Graham, formerly chief of estimates at the DIA, described the process in an April 1973 article in Army Magazine: "To put it bluntly, there is a considerable body of opinion among decision-makers, in and out of DOD (Department of Defense), which regards threat estimates prepared by the military as being self-serving, budget-oriented, and generally inflated." While Graham conceded that the lack of confidence in military estimates is "fully understandable", stemming "from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed 'bomber gap', 'missile gap', and 'megaton gap", he asserted that military intelligence has now vastly improved and is capable of making objective estimates. While most observers of the intelligence community would agree with his assessment of the military's bad record in estimates, few outside the Pentagon would accept his assertion that objectivity has returned to the Pentagon's appraisals of the Soviets, although these appraisals are unquestionably closer to reality than they were ten years ago.
Graham illustrated another basic point that "is beginning to be understood in military planner circles". He stated:
Estimates of future enemy forces and hardware are by nature of intent--not just capability. The old arguments about "capability versus intent" are heard less now in DOD. It remains true that intelligence should emphasize capability in descriptions of current and near-future enemy forces. But the minute you tackle the usual problem of estimating enemy forces (or hardware) a year or so into the future, you have entered the realm of intent. For example, since World War II the Soviets have never to our knowledge deployed forces of fielded hardware as fast as their total capability permitted. To estimate that they would do so with regard to some weapon system or type of force in the future would make little sense.... It is remarkable how long it has taken some of our military users to wise up to it.
[H: It appears to me they have wised up very well. Perhaps you-the-people just didn't understand that the capability and the "intent" of the Patriot system were different than your expectations. The intent couldn't be known for that would be top secret under "national security" regulations. The fact is, America and World, you HAVE BEEN "HAD"!]
DEFENSE ESTIMATE CONFLICTS
As a result of the military's propensity to overestimate, the CIA (usually supported by the State Department) is almost always suspicious of Pentagon positions. Thus, the agency tends to resist and counter military judgments, which in turn has led to CIA underestimation. In the national-security bureaucracy, the agency's tendency to be wrong on the low side, while occurring far less frequently than the Pentagon's errors, is considered more serious, since if estimates of Soviet capabilities run too high, that provides a margin for safety to the military planners, who may well spend billions of dollars reacting to a non-existent threat but who at least do not endanger the country by developing too few weapons.
This continuing conflict between the military agencies and the civilians in the intelligence community was most evident in the preparation of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) which, until 1973, were considered the highest form of national intelligence.
In the internal CIA reshuffling begun by James Schlesinger during his short stay at the agency and continued by Director Colby, the twelve-to-fourteen-man Board of National Estimates and its staff of forty to fifty specialists have been largely phased out--along with the production of thoroughly researched and well-thought-out community-wide NIEs. These documents, long the epitome of finished intelligence production, were found to be inadequate for the more immediate foreign-policy purposes of Henry Kissinger and the Nixon Administration. Thus, the BNE has been replaced by a group of eight senior officers known as National Intelligence Officers who on short notice produce brief (no more than ten- or twelve-page) assessments of whatever international situation is of immediate concern to Kissinger's NSC staff.
The net result of this change has been that long-term estimates on broad subjects (e.g., the Outlook on Latin America Over the Next Decade, Soviet Strategic Strike Capabilities for the Next Five Years, etc.) have given way to short-term predictions which are little more than extensions of current intelligence analysis. But the intelligence system is the servant of the policymaker and must meet his needs and demands. Even so, the CIA's new estimating system has failed to satisfy the NSC staff and the White House. The tactical approach to world problems has proved to be of no more value--and probably less--than the traditional strategic view.
In the past, while the majority of the fifty or more NIE's written each year dealt with political matters, both the CIA and the Pentagon devoted the most work and attention to estimates that dealt with foreign military capabilities--especially the Soviet Union's. These NIE's, on such subjects as Soviet strategic strike forces, air defense forces, and general purpose forces, influenced large decisions about the American military budget, and each branch of the service as well as the DIA (representing the Defense Department) as a whole would fight fiercely to have its point of view included.
MISSILES FOR THE ARMY
For example, in the 1963-to-1965 period when the Pentagon was seeking funds to build an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system, the military services joined together to promote the idea that Moscow was in the process of deploying its own ABM which would nullify the offensive nuclear threat of American strategic forces. Thus, the Pentagon reasoned, the United States would no longer have the power to stop the Soviets from taking bold initiatives in Western Europe and the Third World, and the security of the United States itself would be threatened. Although the military may have believed sincerely that the Soviets were outdistancing the United States and that Moscow would go on the offensive once it had an advantage, the benefits to be received by the armed services through an ABM system were still tremendously large. The Army stood to receive billions of dollars to build the system (and, not incidentally, get itself into the strategic-missile field, which the Air Force and Navy had managed to pre-empt). The Air Force could justify its requests for more long-range missiles in order to overcome the Soviet ABM defenses, and the Navy, on similar grounds, could ask for additional funds for its missile-equipped submarines.
The CIA and the State Department, on the other hand, did not see the Soviet ABM construction to be such a large threat to the United States. Neither ascribed such hostile intentions to the Soviets as the Pentagon did, and many analysts were not even convinced that any sort of ABM could ever be developed which could effectively stop the other side's intercontinental missiles. (In fact, quite a few cynical observers of the 1972 S.A.L.T. agreements believe that the reason the American and Soviet governments agreed to a limitation of two ABM sites each was that neither country had real confidence that its own ABM would work properly and thus was just as happy to be able to divert the money to other sorts of weaponry.)
While the ABM debate was raging within the intelligence community, both the civilian and the military analysts had access to the same fragmentary information about what the Soviets were doing in the field. There was tremendous pressure for additional intelligence and the USIB was frequently setting new collection requirements. Overt sources such as U.S. diplomats and Soviet periodicals produced some data, and Air Force spy planes flying along the fringes of the Soviet Union picked up more. Huge radars and other electronic sensors located in ( DELETED ) also made a contribution. And the most valuable information was supplied by the photographic satellites.
Yet, the overall picture on the Soviet ABM was incomplete, and the analysts were forced to make conclusions without having all of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle before them. Often they turned to experts at the private "think tanks" for advice. They also consulted with American corporations--especially Bell Laboratories--that were performing research and development for the U.S. ABM in the hope that some of the fragmentary data amassed would make sense to the people working on similar systems at home.
Both the civilian and the military analysts agreed that the Soviets were constructing some sort of new defense system at Leningrad, and something else at Moscow. Most of the civilians believed that the Leningrad system was aimed against American bombers, and that the Moscow system was probably an ABM defense still undergoing research and development. The military claimed that the Leningrad site was actually an ABM, and that research had been completed for a more advanced ABM system which would be constructed around Moscow.
In those years from 1963 to 1965 the military entered foot-note after footnote in the NIE's, and the views of a divided community went forward to the White House. The Johnson Ad-ministration made hundreds of millions of dollars of development funds available to the Army for the American ABM, al-though the Pentagon would have liked even more money to speed up development. Several years later, intelligence learned that the Leningrad system was indeed aimed against planes, not missiles (although the military quickly maintained--and still do today--that the Leningrad site could be quickly "upgraded" to have ABM capability), but that at Moscow the Soviets were building a true but limited ABM. The civilian estimate had been much closer to the truth than the military's, but the Pentagon got the funding it wanted from the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations to proceed with the deployment of an ABM system.
* * *NEWS LEAKS FOR FUNDING
These intelligence wars are not just fought out in the privacy of the intelligence community. All the members have on occasion selectively disclosed secret data to the press and to members of Congress in support of their budgetary requests. But as columnist Joseph Kraft has written, "...far, far more than the civilians in the government, the uniformed military are in the habit of leaking information to serve their own interests." The sanctity of classified information seems to fall apart when fights for additional funds are under way in Congress. Former Assistant CIA Director for Research Herbert Scoville, Jr., was absolutely correct when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 28, 1972, that "The history of the past twenty years is dotted with example after example of intelligence being misused to promote within the Congress the programs of individual organizations or even of the administration as a whole."
Newsmen friendly to the Pentagon, such as Joseph Alsop (who helped promote the Pentagon's mythical bomber, missile, megaton, and ABM gaps, and is currently pushing the military's latest fright gimmick, the "technological" gap), and William Beecher, have long received leaks of material marked HIGHER THAN TOP SECRET' to buttress the military's case in a particular dispute. Included have been numerous reports based on satellite photography and communications intercepts--collection methods so sensitive that the overwhelming majority of government employees with security clearances are not authorized access to the information received.
Beecher, for many years the New York Times' Pentagon correspondent, left the paper in early 1973 to become a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Ironically, his 1969 story about the secret American bombing of Cambodia and his 1971 piece on the classified American bargaining position at the S.A.L.T. talks were credited by the Nixon Administration as being among the principal reasons, along with the more important leak of the Pentagon Papers, for the formation in June 1971 of the so-called White House plumbers to stop unauthorized disclosures in the press.
When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and other Defense officials publicly quoted and leaked such one-sided intelligence during the 1969 congressional debate over the ABM that some-one--probably in the CIA or the State Department--countered by providing the New York Times with the draft of a USIB estimate that refuted most of the Pentagon arguments about the danger posed by the Soviet ABM. In 1971 the Defense Department passed satellite-photo-based material concerning alleged Soviet construction of a new and larger type of missile to military-spending champion Senator Henry Jackson. Calling the development "ominous indeed", Jackson warned the country on March 7 about what the Soviets were supposedly doing, at the same time that Congress was considering the military budget. Melvin Laird corroborated Jackson's disclosure three days later in a television interview, and on April 22 cited fresh intelligence "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new--and apparently extensive--ICBM construction program." Additionally, the threat described by Jackson and Laird was made even more vivid by a spate of unattributed supporting leaks.
Finally, an anonymous CIA employee struck back at the Pentagon. He knew that the agency had concluded that the Soviets were only "hardening" their missile sites rather than deploying a huge new missile system, and that over two-thirds of the excavations mentioned by Jackson and Laird were intended for an older and relatively small ICBM. So this CIA man publicly disclosed the agency's secret finding, according to the New York Times of May 26, 1971, through "non-government arms control experts" and "Senate Republican sources". Even though the CIA appraisal turned out to be much closer to the truth than the Pentagon's gloomy version, at least for another year, no one in the U.S. intelligence community knew for sure what the Soviet missile builders were really doing. In the meantime, the military scare stories--offset to some extent by the CIA's counter-leaks--undoubtedly had a psychological effect on the Congress which, in 1971, as usual, approved almost the whole Pentagon budget request.
CONGRESS: LAST TO KNOWThe tragedy of all this maneuvering is that, despite the $6 billion paid out every year for intelligence, neither the Congress nor the public receives a true or worthwhile picture of Soviet military capabilities. Intelligence professionals explain that the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved in collecting this information makes the high degree of secrecy necessary, and they have resisted congressional attempts to create a regular procedure for sharing data with the legislative branch. Yet the professionals do not hesitate to leak the most highly classified intelligence when it serves their departmental interests. Moreover, the intelligence community regularly provides friendly foreign countries with detailed estimates of Soviet military strength, and during the S.A.L.T. talks the nation's negotiators even told their Soviet counterparts how much the United States really knew about Soviet missiles. Yet the American Congress, which has the constitutional responsibility to approve funds for the military budget, cannot get the same information.
In fact, the American S.A.L.T. negotiators were so explicit in their descriptions of Soviet capabilities that at one point, the ranking Soviet general took an American military man aside and asked that the U.S. not give the Soviet civilian negotiators such detailed information on Soviet missiles.
Congress, however, has always had the legislative power to insist that the CIA and the rest of the community share with it information on Soviet military capabilities--or any other subject, for that matter. Yet, to date, Congress as a whole has refused to take such action, despite the loud protests of a vocal minority. And Congress' unwillingness to take even so small a step to make itself better informed about the data used to justify military spending is symptomatic of the legislative branch's much larger failing: its refusal to exercise any degree of meaningful control over American intelligence activities.
* * *
EXPECT E.T. FARCE
It is very hard to tell from where will come valid information, is it not?
So, hold your breath, chelas, while I tell you something which our old "Hatonn is a hoax" buddy is telling the public. It is worthy of note for it is exactly that which I explain to you in detail. I do not wish to comment much on the information but rather, to allow you to see that Truth is Truth is Truth and discernment must be made in ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AND WITH ALL SPEAKERS. Dr. Coleman, for example, takes great exceptions with me and I with him, for I feel that until the "ego" is brought under control and information is gleaned in meaning from my work--then anyone and no one can possibly comment with accurate opinion regarding same. I KNOW what is in the work of other writers and expounders of facts and some conclusions are invalid.
Cooper: "I am performing a duty that I think has to be done, and I believe that history will be my judge.
"I attempt to present both sides of the UFO question. That is...(1) that there is evidence that extraterrestrials are real, and (2) it could also be the greatest hoax ever perpetrated in the history of the world in order to create an 'external threat' that will help bring about the one world government.
"Concerning that it is possible that both hypotheses could be correct, I still maintain that the alleged or actual existence of extraterrestrials is being used to bring about a One World Government. The extraterrestrials provide the existing governments of Earth with the 'external threat' that will force a one world government to come into existence."
Do I denounce Bill Cooper? Of course not and, further, I offer my hand in friendship and I salute him for some of his material. I do find it quite wondrous that after these months of accusations of "plagiarism" from Bill Cooper that now information pours in upon me saying that Bill Cooper is obviously and openly plagiarizing your (Hatonn's) material. He is even printing the Protocols of the Zionists, etc. Come, come chelas, be patient for it is the time of sorting and all do not come into understanding nor the "ability" to "believe" easily.
If intent be salvation and insight within the just laws of God and Creation--there can be no separation--only lack of realization. Put aside the "distractors" and glean the value presented in that which is Truth. Salu.
The Truth of MY PRESENCE and that of my fellow-travelers
shall come soon enough! Good day
PJ 48CHAPTER 16
REC #1 HATONNSAT., APRIL 11, 1992 8:14 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 239
SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 1992
EVOLVEMENT OF CASTRO-CUBA
With the nationalization of American businesses on the island, Castro was openly thumbing his nose at the United States. Eisenhower, with few options, could only sit still and take it. South America, as Eisenhower noted, judged Castro as "a champion of the downtrodden and the enemy of the privileged" and would be up in arms at the thought of United States interference with this new Latino hero. Castro's seething revolutionary ideas, Ike feared, might spread through the economically parched nations south of America's border.
In contrast to Castro's popularity was the Vice President's trip to Latin America. In Lima, Peru, Richard Nixon and his wife were greeted by rocks and spit. Even more unfriendly was Caracas, Venezuela, where the windows of Nixon's limousine, stalled in the midst of an anti-American demonstration, were shattered by rioters carrying placards and heavy rocks.
Eisenhower's concern over the safety of his Vice President led to the assemblage of a sizable invasion force to physically extract him if necessary. "We could get no reports from the outside," the President explained at the time, "and not knowing whether the Venezuelan Government might not want some aid from us, we simply put it at the places where it would be available in reasonable amounts..." The "reasonable" force consisted of an aircraft carrier, a missile cruiser, six destroyers, and a helicopter detachment, assembled thirty miles off the Venezuelan coast, plus four companies of Army paratroopers and Marines, numbering some one thousand troops, which were rushed to quick-striking bases at Ramay Air Force base, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Clearly Latin America was a volatile and unpredictable place, where the popularity and politics of a man like Castro might spread quickly. Something would have to be done; what was needed, as Eisenhower put it, was "a third force", a solution other than Castro's obvious Communist leanings or the brutal despotism of Batista. But what could be done? And who to do it?
Not surprisingly, Eisenhower in March 1960 turned to the CIA to formulate a plan to get rid of Castro. The CIA concocted a reprise of the plan that had worked so well in Guatemala. A small cadre of several dozen carefully chosen Cuban refugees from among the Cuban exile community in Miami would be trained at the U.S. Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama. These men would then train a larger group of approximately one hundred and fifty other Cubans, who would be infiltrated into Cuba in small groups to build up an anti-Castro underground that, with American aid, would rise up and depose Castro. Meanwhile, as in Guatemala, an important component of the plan, a propaganda radio station, was set in place. Called Radio Swan, it was constructed in the spring of 1960 on Swan Island, an uninhabited speck ninety-seven miles off the Honduran coast.
RICHARD BISSELL
Radio Swan and the rest of the Cuban operation were under the command of one of the CIA's most striking figures. Richard Bissell, chief of the agency's covert operations. Standing over six feet tall, Bissell struck everyone as a dynamo of energy and ideas. An Ivy League economist and, later, government bureaucrat, he had never been a spy in his life but Allen Dulles sought him out in 1954 because he was known as a bureaucrat who actually got things done.
Bissell's rise in the CIA was meteoric. Although he was not, like most in the agency's hierarchy, a veteran of the OSS, he took to the craft of espionage like few others. The former academic showed no fear of taking risks; quite the contrary, the professor seemed to relish them. He had been the administrator in charge of the successful U-2 spy plane and the aura of the U2's success, combined with Bissell's enormous energies and managerial skill, made Dulles think Bissell could run the CIA's large-scale covert operations.
Bissell took the Cuban assignment with the same frenetic energy given to the building of spy planes, but quickly discovered the building of an underground movement would take longer than expected. "Their mission," Bissell later recalled, "would have been to build a fairly professional underground such as existed in France under German occupation." But the French underground's enemy was a foreign occupying power; in Cuba, the opponent was a leader who was solidifying his position every day, building a large military force and a two-hundred-thousand-man militia with Soviet arms, making it much more difficult to overthrow him.
As Castro grew stronger, the CIA's plan became larger and more varied. Much attention was focused on various schemes to undermine Castro's authority, or make him look ridiculous. The schemes were hatched by the CIA's spy lab, the Technical Services Division. One idea, designed to disrupt Castro's longwinded television speeches, was to spray the broadcasting studio with BZ, an LSD-like hallucinogenic drug. [H: Yes indeed, this IS the same CIA and, actually, some of the same people who are fighting the "War on Drugs" and overthrowing foreign nations--like today, Peru. These people remain above the law and the law is totally controlled by them so you have no justice--just blatant miscarriage of justice. Plea-bargaining is typical--plead guilty to something you "didn't" do and you can get off for that which you "did" do. Is this "JUSTICE"? For instance, look at Keating, who was sentenced to ten years in prison--do you realize that Keating did NOTHING ILLEGAL? He was totally and completely immoral even if he did finally plead for leniency on the basis of being a "Godly Christian family man", but as to the actual "laws of the land"--he was totally within those laws. The Elite even helped him--remember the Senators and Representatives? It actually went all the way to the Governor of California and the Presidency. Keating simply "took the rap for the bigger fish who again got away and, furthermore, got away WITH ALL THE PROPERTY IN POINT--AND ARE NOW BUYING AND SELLING THROUGH THE RTC AT CENTS ON THE DOLLAR--YOU-THE-PEOPLE ARE PICKING UP THE TAB.] Another plan was to inject a similar drug into a box of Castro's favorite Cuban cigars, and still another was to cause his beard to fall out by exposing him to a strong depilatory chemical. All of these comic plots were eventually abandoned, but they set a train of thought in motion: once the CIA began thinking about ways to make Castro's beard fall out, it was but a short step to their next question--why not kill him and solve the whole problem?
[H: Ah indeed, this Intelligence Service is made up of ones like Oliver North who can look like a caterwauling patriot with tears in his eyes at the mere mention of your flag and country while off the stand his book is being written FOR him, and he continues to LEAD the nation deeper into the black pit--using the name of Jesus, Christ and God all the way to the slaughter house. Do you ones not hear the messages? You were told just yesterday as a formal report that you were deceived and set-up in deceitful lies via the media in the Gulf War--and still you defend your ignorance like a banner of justice. THERE IS NO JUSTICE IN AMERICA ANY LONGER! So, where do you go from here? I suggest you get RIGHT with GOD because the future is bleak indeed!
ATOMIC POWERED DISC CRAFT EXPLOSION
You in this very area of Tehachapi, Palmdale, Lancaster and all parts around just escaped total annihilation yester-day afternoon. At the underground testing facilities there were two terrible disasters in the afternoon on Friday, 4/10/92 (that's right now)--THE MUSHROOM SHAPED CLOUDS WHICH FOLLOWED WERE EXACTLY WHAT THEY APPEARED TO BE! We efforted to clean them but some downwind people are going to have a nasty outbreak of "flu" as soon as the authorities can figure out what kind to call it. YOU ARE ALREADY IN THE WAR! That was the reason for my inattention in our meeting--you were just about to be blown to molecules. So, what happened? One of your atomic powered disc craft blew up in the launch tube. A lot of workers and scientists WILL NOT BE COMING HOME.]
By July of 1960, Allen Dulles and others were now wondering aloud about what would happen if Fidel, his brother, Raul, and Che Guevara all suddenly disappeared. The agency approved a payment of ten thousand dollars to a Cuban to arrange an "accident to neutralize" Raul. The attempt was never made. By mid-August the CIA had focused again on Castro's ubiquitous cigar; what had been fraternity house pranks dreamed up by the Technical Services people became serious: instead of soaking the cigars with LSD derivative to temporarily disorient Castro, the new plan called for dipping them with a deadly toxin that would kill Castro the minute he took a puff.
CIA HIRES THE MAFIA
However exotic these gambits, Richard Bissell was not satisfied. He wanted more options, more ways to get at Castro. The CIA now reached out in another direction, one that led to one of the most bizarre alliances in U.S. history: the agency went into business with the Mafia.
So, going back to that nice money we spoke about before? It had been flown out of Cuba aboard several planes the day be-fore--all of it. Whatever the CIA might have thought of Castro, the prescient American mobsters who ran the casinos knew enough about Castro to realize that Cuba's casino business was about to end. Castro fully intended to take the money and se-cure the Cuban National Bank.
As with all intrigues a perceived convergence of interests was soon to occur: the CIA wanted to get rid of Castro; the agency assumed the American Mafia had their own grievances against Castro. The CIA's Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, proposed that the CIA hire the Mafia to dispose of Castro. The CIA believed that the mob had the motivation and experience to get just such a nasty job done.
Edwards did not personally know of any gangsters, but he knew a man who did: Robert Maheu, an ex-FBI agent and occasional CIA asset. Maheu was chief aide to billionaire Howard Hughes and ran Hughes's operations in Las Vegas. Maheu agreed to help, and offered underworld figure Johnny Roselli $150,000 of the CIA's (yours) money to have Castro killed. Roselli, whose underworld connections dated all the way back to Al Capone, agreed to help. [H: I bet you didn't realize that you take out contracts and pay the criminals to do the jobs, did you?] According to Maheu, the deciding factor in Roselli's decision to cooperate was sudden surge of patriotism. "He said he felt that he had an obligation to his government," Maheu later recalled with a straight face, "and he finally agreed to participate."
Roselli, a small-time mobster, immediately informed his boss, Sam ("Momo") Giancana, the Mafia godfather of Chicago whose empire included Las Vegas. The involvement of Giancana was a serious mistake for the CIA, since he was the subject of an intensive FBI racketeering investigation. Giancana, no fool, saw his opportunity to win the federal government's gratitude, and indicated enthusiastic willingness to kill Castro. [H: Still have "faith" in your JUSTICE system?]
The CIA first suggested a good old-fashioned gangland-style murder . Giancana, who had been behind bars some sixty-three times, declined the recommendation as too dangerous. Poison, Giancana argued, would be a much safer means of eliminating the Cuban leader. Soon a pattern emerged: various assassination attempts would be suggested or attempted, only to have Giancana regretfully report that they had failed, for one reason or another.
It was a supreme con job, and Giancana played the game for more than a year. Meanwhile, Giancana would shout to puzzled FBI agents surveilling him, "Hey, why don't you guys leave me alone? We're on the same side!" It was not long before the agents discovered what Giancana was up to, and J. Edgar Hoover prepared one of his famous masterfully phrased memos for the CIA, wondering if the agency was aware that a notorious Mafia leader was involved in an assassination plot against Fidel Castro.
Just how much specific knowledge Eisenhower had of this and other assassination activities remains unclear even today. Is it possible that the CIA would have carried out such an operation entirely on its own? It was the age of "plausible denial" and, as Bissell himself later noted, almost certainly Eisenhower was not presented with what Bissell called a "nakedly labeled" assassination plan, but may have said, "I want that man gotten rid of," which meant to Bissell, "any means are legitimate."
The same ambiguity arises in connection with Eisenhower's successor, John Kennedy, whose administration was marked by other, similar assassination plots against Castro. Again, there is no known evidence that Kennedy gave direct approval for such operations. One thing is clear: Kennedy was totally committed to destroying the Castro regime. During the election campaign of 1960, he hammered hard on the issue of Cuba, accusing Nixon and Eisenhower of "tolerating a Communist regime only ninety miles off the Florida coast". By the end of the campaign, Kennedy had all but advocated open intervention in Cuba on behalf of the "fighters of freedom" (a phrase Ronald Reagan would slightly alter two decades later for his own band of Latin exiles).
A similar theme echoed through Kennedy's inauguration address on January 20, 1961. In his now famous speech Kennedy proclaimed that the United States would pay any price, bear any burden to assure liberty. He also had a special message for those south of the border: "Let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house." Kennedy, only moments into his administration, had drawn a line in the geopolitical dirt and had dared anyone to cross it. The inaugural words came easy, but the youngest President in American history would soon learn just how heavy a price he would have to bear for them.
OPERATION ZAPATA
Before taking the presidential oath of office, Kennedy knew that the CIA had ready a plan to back up his tough talk. Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed the President-elect on what was known as Operation Zapata. Bissell's classic underground World War II parachute drop operation against Castro had mushroomed. Now the plan looked more like a small version of the Normandy invasion.
The metamorphosis took place while Kennedy was still out on the campaign trail. During this time the CIA realized it had underestimated the strength of Castro's forces and overestimated the resistance to them. The few anti-Castro guerrillas still in Cuba, Bissell concluded, were starving in the mountains, with no experience or understanding in how to build an underground.
Cuba was not to be a repeat of the CIA's successful operation in Guatemala. The quicker recourse was rather large and noisy: an invasion force consisting of a small navy and air force, an army brigade of fifteen hundred Cuban exiles, and supporting roles provided by the CIA and the U.S. Navy.
The invasion plan called for the Navy to transport the brigade from Nicaragua to the shores of Cuba where a beachhead would be established and a new government proclaimed. As with the Normandy invasion, the key to success, the CIA planners realized, was controlling the skies. Sixteen World War II vintage B-26 bombers, flown by Cuban pilots from Guatemala, would strike first, without warning, to destroy Castro's planes on the ground. With the skies belonging to the rebels and a toehold firmly secured, the fifteen hundred exiles would then engage Castro's militia of two hundred thousand.
For the scheme to really work, there would have to follow very shortly an uprising by the Cubans throughout the island. The hope was to create, in Bissell's words, a "fluid situation". E. Howard Hunt, the CIA's political officer on Zapata, tells a different story. According to him, once the beachhead was secured, a provisional Cuban government (with Hunt as the U.S. representative) was to be flown in from Miami. Shortly thereafter, fifteen thousand U.S. Marines would come ashore in support of the new government.
Either way, the invasion operation was an extraordinary inheritance from Eisenhower. "He had been astonished at its magnitude and daring." From that moment on he had grave doubts. And others, even inside the CIA, were having their own misgivings. The operation was huge and complicated as only Clandestine Operations can, as children in intrigue, complicate it. David Atlee Phillips was one of the most uncomfortable. Phillips had been a major part of the radio propaganda effort during the Guatemala campaign that ousted Arbenz in 1954. Then it had been so simple. Cuba and Castro, Phillips knew from first-hand experience in Cuba, were not the same as Guatemala and Arbenz. As he reviewed Bissell's invasion plans in the CIA's war room, he sensed something was very wrong: "There's a maxim in the intelligence business that you can't hide a hippopotamus with a handerkerchief. You certainly can't cover a tank on a Caribbean beach with one."
JFK DOUBTS CUBAN INVASION
Whatever Phillip's apprehensions, he wasn't sharing his hippopotamus maxims with Bissell. Not that it really mattered, for the new commander in chief already had plenty of doubts about the invasion. There was also a big problem in shutting down the operation: how to quietly disperse an army of fifteen hundred American-trained Cubans? Allen Dulles would later describe the operation as "an orphan child JFK had adopted from the Republicans. He had no real love or affection for it." Clearly, Kennedy's political instincts were warning him of the dangers ahead, no matter which way he moved. The President had not gotten a really good handle on the operation, and he sought a second opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Cuban Brigade, trained and ready, awaiting D-Day on an isolated Guatemalan coffee plantation, passed muster with the Joint Chiefs. Dulles went even further, telling the President, "I stood at this very desk and said to President Eisenhower about a similar operation in Guatemala, 'I believe it will work.' And I say to you now, Mr. President, that the prospects are even better than our prospects were in Guatemala."
There were few dissenters to the plan. Capitol Hill was all but asleep on the invasion, except for Senator J. William Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In contrast to the public uproar a dissenting Senator might create today, Fulbright's reaction was to prepare for the President a private but prescient memorandum detailing the possible consequences should the operation fail. There were few naysayers inside the White House. One of the exceptions was presidential adviser and Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger. When his arguments against the operation were overruled, Schlesinger offered one final, closing word of ad-vice. If the invasion was to take place, someone lower than the President should give the go-ahead, "someone whose head can be placed in the block if things go terribly wrong." Even historians understood the theory of plausible denial.
There were no realistic hopes of keeping the invasion under wraps. It was simply too massive. The invasion was certainly no secret by April 12, 1961, when, in a White House news conference, the question was put straightforwardly to the President. Kennedy, in his answer, told the truth, but not the whole truth: "There will not be, under any circumstances, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces."
FIASCO IN THE MAKING
To further reduce the invasion racket, the White House had its own ideas on how to muffle the operation. The original landing site, Trinidad, was dropped in favor of a less populated area some distance away: the Bay of Pigs. In changing the site, Kennedy eliminated a critical backup plan: in the event the invasion failed, the CIA's contingency plan called for the survivors to scatter into the Escambray Mountains and carry on their guerrilla war. But the Bay of Pigs was surrounded by swamps, which meant it lacked an escape route. The invading force might land with less noise, but now it had no options.
The guerrilla air force was another problem. A whole flock of the B-26 planes suddenly carrying out bombing runs on Cuba would surely point directly back to the United States. Allowing sixteen bombers to attack Cuba simultaneously, Kennedy reasoned, strained plausible deniability far beyond its limits. The surprise first air strike, with its critical mission of destroying Castro's air force while still on the ground, was cut in half--only eight bombers flew instead of sixteen--with the result that only half of Castro's air force was destroyed [H: You'll have to refer back to earlier descriptions of what happened that air cover was denied.]
And so the invasion force headed for disaster. On Monday morning April 18, 1961, as the force moved toward shore, the skies belonged to Castro. A single Cuban Air Force jet sank two of the brigade's ships. One of them, the Houston, carried two battalions of men and the brigade's entire stock of reserve ammunition. The rest of the exiles, trapped on the beach, pounded by Castro's planes and brand-new Soviet artillery pieces, fought for three days before surrendering. Brigade 2506--named after the dog tag number of a recruit killed in a training accident--was crushed. Of its 1,500 men, 80 of them died fighting, 37 drowned, 48 escaped, and the rest surrendered, later to be ransomed for cash, medical supplies, and farm tractors. The CIA's air force suffered an equivalent disaster: 12 of the planes were shot down, with 14 killed, including 4 Alabama Air National Guard fliers who had formally "resigned" from the National Guard and were flying as civilian "volunteers".
At the CIA command post 1,200 miles away, appalled CIA officers listened to the radio messages that, like the pealing of a funeral bell, tolled disaster. Among them was David Atlee Phillips, who only a few years before had participated in the celebratory gathering at the White House after the Guatemala operation. There would be no such gathering after the Bay of Pigs.
As the radio messages came in, one of the men in the room scratched his wrists so nervously and absent-mindedly that Phillips noticed that they began to bleed profusely. Another CIA man, a veteran of a tank battalion during World War II, vomited into a wastebasket. As the invasion crumbled and the radio messages began to die away, one of the last was from the brigade's military commander. Standing in the shallows, he said, "I'm throwing away my gear now. There's nothing left to fight with." He cursed the CIA. Then he cursed the United States.
AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS
"There's an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan. I'm the responsible officer of the Government, and that is quite obvious." That was John Kennedy's public response to the Bay of Pigs. In private, Kennedy confided in his brother: how could they all have been so wrong--the CIA, the Pentagon, and his most trusted advisers? And how could he have been so utterly stupid? His instincts had warned him: he had simply failed to listen.
In the wreckage of Operation Zapata, Kennedy eased Allen Dulles into retirement. Richard Bissell followed shortly after, in February 1962. A quarter of a century later, Bissell recalled Kennedy's anger as rather mild, given the magnitude of the failure: "There was no pettiness in the reaction. Privately he spoke about cutting the agency down to size, but in the end really nothing was done."
The White House bitterness over the failure of the Bay of Pigs, however, would run deep for a long time to come. There was already, as one White House staffer noted, a mood of revenge in the air. Richard Bissell, in his last few months at the CIA, was called in on the White House carpet, remembered one agency official, and "chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General, for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime."
Getting rid of Castro, Bobby Kennedy announced, was "the top priority in the U.S. government--all else is secondary. No time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared." As Defense Secretary Robert McNamara later put it, "We were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." Just what the alternative, the possible "third force" to replace Castro, might be, no one seemed to know, or care. [H: If you have been paying attention--YOU KNOW!] The effort now had little to do with geopolitical issues; Castro, the man, was the target.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
The response to the White House pressure was a major CIA covert program, Operation Mongoose, managed by a new set of players. President Kennedy considered installing his brother Bobby as CIA Director following the Bay of Pigs, but political expediency led to the choice of an outsider, John McCone, a wealthy Republican industrialist. McCone was named director, but Bobby was given free rein to oversee Mongoose out of the Attorney General's office. Despite their differences in politics and age, the two men came to be close allies. "Mongoose was a program of infiltrations of annoying, but not strategic matters," was McCone's assessment. "It was really operated under Bobby Kennedy. We had no problems whatsoever."
McCone may have had no problems, but not so his new Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Helms, who had been in the spying trade since the OSS days of World War H. He had been Bissell's deputy director of covert operations, and had now moved up to replace him as the chief of covert operations. Helms had carefully kept his distance from Zapata; as other CIA officers were to note admiringly, there was not a single piece of paper in connection with the operation that contained Helms' name. Now he was charged with winning back Cuba and the agency's reputation. As Helms later put it, "We wanted to earn our spurs with the President."
The CIA had not yet earned its spurs, but Bobby Kennedy was goading Helms with constant demands to do something about Castro. "Bobby Kennedy," Helms later recalled, "was very hands-on in this period. He was the one who had the whip in hand."
General Edward Lansdale, a veteran of counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and Vietnam, was brought in to coordinate the interdepartmental effort of State, Defense, and CIA, a task which, as Lansdale described it, was to "put the American genius to work, quickly and effectively". Like Bissell before him, Lansdale's original plan called for building up internal Cuban resistance to Castro, but just as Bissell experienced, White house pressure and impatience, combined with the slow process of building a viable underground network (plus the CIA's inherent preference for boom and bang operations), soon turned the operation, once again, into a paramilitary campaign.
Operation Mongoose became a full-court press of covert action designed to destabilize, then destroy, the Castro regime. Mongoose included no outright invasion, but just about everything short of that: hit-and-run raids by Cuban exiles against Cuban economic targets, propaganda broadcasts, and infiltration of small teams of guerrillas, Soon Miami was the largest CIA station in the world. The unit, called Task Force W, was supported by at least two hundred CIA officers and two thousand Cuban exiles.
CUBAN MISSILE CRISISMongoose came to an abrupt, if temporary, halt in October 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis. The analytic branch of the CIA had previously all but discounted the possibility of Soviet nuclear missiles based in Cuba, believing that Khrushchev could not be so foolhardy. But the Soviet hopes for success rested on just such a surprise; the missiles would have to be operational before being discovered, when the United States would have no option but to live with them. But Bissell's favorite project, the high-flying U-2 spy plane, grounded for over a year from flights over the Soviet Union following the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers, was over San Cristobal near Havana on October 14, 1962, and brought back photographic evidence of construction of missile sites. The CIA intelligence-gathering and analysis provided to Kennedy and his advisers over the next two weeks proved critical to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis. Nearly twenty years after the sneak assault on Pearl Harbor, the intelligence apparatus set up to give forewarning of any similar surprise attack accomplished its mission. It was the CIA's finest hour.
The crisis was resolved when Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, while Kennedy privately guaranteed to dismantle aging Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Kennedy also promised there would be no invasion of Cuba, but the highly secret CIA assassination efforts, put on hold prior to the Cuban invasion, had already been reactivated. In April 1962 the CIA was back in touch with their old acquaintances, Roselli and Giancana. But the new plot dissolved in opera bouffe, caused mostly by a little problem of the heart.
In October 1960 Momo Giancana was a busy but jealous man. On the CIA payroll while still running the Chicago Mafia, he heard rumors that his Las Vegas girlfriend, singer Phyllis McGuire, was having an affair with comedian Dan Rowan. Giancana, in a fit of jealousy, demanded of Maheu that something be done. Maheu, once again the CIA's contact man with the Mafia, consoled Giancana by agreeing to find proof of the infidelity. Maheu hired a private detective to bug the trysting site. But the job was botched; the technician was arrested and the FBI notified. The private detective was not about to take the rap alone, and revealed to FBI agents that he had been hired by Maheu. In turn, Maheu admitted the Giancana connection and urged the CIA to quash any prosecution for fear that the Castro assassination plot would be revealed.
With that move, J. Edgar Hoover was provided with everything he needed to know. He could scarcely believe all that had suddenly fallen into his lap: the CIA, which he still considered a hated rival, was back in business with the Mafia, and was again trying to assassinate Fidel Castro. But there was more. His agents, in surveilling Giancana, discovered that among his other mistresses was one Judith Campbell--who also happened to be involved in a relationship with President Kennedy, as the agents found out by trailing her to the White House. A check into White House telephone records showed that Kennedy called her often.
HOOVER BLACKMAILS JFK
A man who recognized opportunity and knew what to do with it, Hoover had a quiet, private luncheon with Kennedy, during which he outlined the Giancana-CIA-Campbell-Kennedy connection. No record exists of what was said, but Hoover's modus operandi would have been to inform the President of the delicate matter and vow his "discretion". In other words, Hoover was now privy to the kind of information that would make him politically inviolable so long as Kennedy was in office; any rumors of the Kennedys seeking a new FBI chief would end immediately. White House telephone logs show that the last of some seventy phone conversations between Kennedy and Judith Campbell occurred just a few hours after the meeting with Hoover.
But the assassination plots went on. Giancana, hoping his role in the attempts to kill Castro would win him Justice Department forgiveness on racketeering charges, told the CIA that the Mafia knew a cook at one of Castro's favorite Havana restaurants. The cook, Giancana claimed, would be willing to slip some form of liquid poison into Castro's soup. The CIA prepared a liquid toxin, but then Giancana stalled further, claiming that the cook was getting cold feet.
Meanwhile, the CIA's Technical Services Division was pursuing a second track. Having struck out with the toxins, the spy lab began tinkering with new ideas. One scheme called for arming a seashell with a powerful bomb, which would explode when Castro was underwater at his favorite scuba-diving site. The lethal seashell was never built. A second plan called for using attorney James Donovan as an unwitting assassin. The former OSS agent had recently negotiated the exchange of convicted KGB agent Rudolf Abel and U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, and was negotiating with Castro for the release of the more than eleven hundred Cuban exiles captured at the Bay of Pigs. The CIA plan called for Donovan to unknowingly deliver a contaminated diving suit to Castro as a present. Loaded with fungus and pathogenic tubercle bacillus, the suit would have given the Cuban leader a nasty skin disorder and a fatal lung disease. [H: Let's see now, that was in or around 1960 and this is 1992--over thirty years ago--do you think the ideas are not more sophisticated now? The head "Evil Mind" is your King assisted and instructed by the Evil King of the Global Elite--and he was birthed and trained in Skull and Bones and CIA.] The little fungus plot failed only because Donovan, in his ignorance, bought his own, uncontaminated diving suit as a genuine gift to offer Castro.
The most important CIA asset in the assassination plots was a high-ranking Cuban official, Rolando Cubela, code-named AM/Lash. He was particularly anxious to get his hands on grenades and a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. Cubela was later offered a ballpoint pen rigged with a hypodermic needle so small "that the victim would not notice its insertion." On November 22, 1963, the CIA handed the poison pen over to AM/Lash. That same day, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas.
Richard Bissell by now had lost his enthusiasm for assassination in the quarter century since he had first become involved in such games: "I think I, for one, placed too much reliance on the ability to keep things like that permanently secret after the event, but even aside from that pragmatic consideration, I think it was a mistake. I just think assassination is a weapon to be employed by a government entity only in very, very few situations, if any." Richard Helms, when he took over Bissell's job, dismissed the assassination plots hatched in his department as "crazy schemes". As for the CIA's connections with the Mafia, Helms continued to keep his distance, knowing that much of the truth was buried when Giancana was killed. Giancana, by the way, was shot seven times in the throat while preparing breakfast in his Chicago kitchen in June 1975. Roselli was hacked to pieces, stuffed inside an oil drum, and dropped into the sea near Miami in July 1976. Both men had been too friendly with the government for the mob's liking [H:--or just the opposite. For the thugs are now running your United States Government.]
Has the CIA ever assassinated, directly, a foreign leader? Well, of course, but the most notorious leader assassinated by the CIA remains J. F. Kennedy. The American plots against Fidel Castro are openly recognized to number eight, and Castro has claimed that there was actually a total of twenty-four CIA at-tempts against his life. The Castro was publicly shut down in or around 1967--at least the title code-name was changed to protect the guilty. Johnson decided to end what he called a "damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean". But by then, the Kennedy annoyance was put to sleep--in the graves.
At any rate Johnson had bigger fish to fry in Viet Nam.
* * *
I think this is enough to give you a picture of the Cuban situation and for you to realize that the real cause of actions were not what were presented to you-the-people any more than have been any subsequent actions by your Government.
Let us just close this JOURNAL here for I am aware that we will overrun our space if I rattle on much longer.
Please know that if you do not become aware of what "has been" and "IS", there is no way you can do anything other than "shadow" box and never find solutions for the real problems are kept from you. May you be given insight to see and understand so that you can receive guidance and direction.
