PJ 48
CHAPTER 13
REC #1 HATONN
MON., APRIL 6, 1992 9:43:54 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 234
MONDAY, APRIL 6, 1992
CIA: INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
It is probably time to remind you that the portions of this document which bear "deletions" come directly from a book written by one whom I call "I Am Anonymous" (IMA) for this interim time in focus. The CIA deleted the information where same is indicated. I am asked about this often now, so I recognize that you ones are reading the information out of proper order. I explained all of this in detail at the beginning of writing about the CIA Cult of Intelligence. I give full credit for the work utilized from the author in point and I fully intend to fill in the blanks, with or without his input for he is under court order never to divulge the missing information. You are playing with "rough" individuals and I intend to protect persons who assist in this transition--you who object will simply have to do so with my blessings and compassion for your lack of understanding--your desire to know it all does not surpass the right of individuals who have risked it all, to share with you, the danger of undue exposure. So be it. Please, let us continue so that we can move on to other pressing information discussions. I ask to stay right with this topic until we can conclude it as to the era when first presented. Thank you.
ANALYSIS vs. OPERATIONS
Many, but by no means all, intelligence professionals agree that the primary and, indeed, paramount purpose of the intelligence process is to produce meaningful, timely information on foreign developments after a careful analysis of secret and open sources. The finished product should be balanced in perspective and objective in presentation. Under no circumstances is intelligence supposed to advise a particular course of action. The intelligence function, when properly performed, is strictly an informational service.
This is the theory, but in actual practice the U.S. intelligence community has deeply intruded--and continues to--into the policy-making arena. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that a $6 billion activity with more than 150,000 employees working in over 100 countries would do otherwise. Nevertheless, it should be understood that when someone like Richard Helms publicly declares, as he did in 1971, "We make no foreign policy," he may be technically correct in the sense that CIA officials must receive approval from the White House for their main programs; but he is absolutely incorrect in leaving the impression that the intelligence community, apart from supplying information, does not have a profound determinative effect on the formulation and carrying out the American foreign policy.
The very existence of the CIA as an instrument for secret intervention in other countries' internal affairs changes the way the nation's highest leaders look at the world. They know that if open political or economic initiatives fail, they can call on the CIA to bail them out. One suspects that the Eisenhower administration might have made more of an effort during its last ten months to prevent relations with Cuba from reaching the breaking point if the President had not already given his approval to the clandestine training of a refugee army to overthrow the Castro regime.
EFFECTS OF SECRECY CLOAK ON U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY
The extreme secrecy in which the CIA works increases the chances that a President will call it into action. He does not have to justify the agency's activities to Congress, the press, or the American people; so, barring premature disclosure, there is no institutional force within the United States to stop him from doing what he wants. Furthermore, the secrecy of CIA operations allows a President to authorize actions in other countries which, if conducted openly, would brand the United States as an outlaw nation. International law and the United Nations charter clearly prohibit one country from interfering in the internal affairs of another, but if the interference is done by a clandestine agency whose operations cannot readily be traced back to the United States, then a President has a much freer hand. He does not even have to worry about adverse public reaction at home or abroad. For example, after Salvador Allende had been elected President of Chile in 1970, President Nixon was asked at a press conference why the United States was willing to intervene militarily in Vietnam to prevent a communist takeover but would not do the same thing in Chile to prevent a Marxist from taking power; he replied that "for the United States to have intervened in a free election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all around Latin America that would have been far worse than what happened in Chile."
The President failed to mention that he had approved
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but by keeping his action secret, he was able to avoid--at least for the time being--the "adverse political reaction" which he feared. If there had been no CIA to do the job covertly, the U.S. government almost certainly would not have tried to involve itself in the Chilean elections, since it was obviously not willing to own up to its actions.
Clandestine operations can appear to a President as a panacea, as a way of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire without going through all the effort and aggravation of tortuous diplomatic negotiations. And if the CIA is somehow caught in the act, the "deniability" of these operations, in theory, saves a President from taking any responsibility--or blame. Additionally, the CIA is equipped to act quickly in a crisis. [H: Please read this portion again for you have witnessed this "cover" in action in two MAJOR scandals where the President claims no information or involvement.] It is not hindered nearly as much by a cumbersome bureaucracy as is the Pentagon, and it has proved its ability to move with little advance notice, as it did in the Congo during the early 1960's, to put an "instant air force" into action. And the agency's field personnel do not demand the support facilities of their military colleagues. In Laos forty or fifty career CIA officers assisted by several hundred contractees ran an entire "secret war", whereas the Pentagon, given the same mission, probably would have set up a military-assistance command with thousands of personnel (as it did in Vietnam) at a much greater cost to the United States. Also, CIA operators are much less likely than the military to grouse publicly that political restrictions are forcing them to fight "with one arm tied behind our back", and this makes the agency attractive to a President who has no desire to engage in a running battle with his generals over the tactics to be used in a particular situation.
The CIA does not originate an American commitment to a country. The President and the State Department do that. But once CIA operations are started in a foreign land, the U.S. stake in that nation's future increases. Certainly the American interest would be even larger if the President decided to send in combat troops instead of his covert warriors, but such open intervention would have to be justified publicly. In the 1950's and early 1960's neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy wanted to make such a commitment in Vietnam or Laos. Yet, by using foreign-aid funds and heavy doses of covert operations, they were able to create and then keep alive anti-communist governments in both countries. When these palliatives proved insufficient later in the 1960's, President Johnson chose to send American ground troops into Vietnam and to begin the systematic bombing of Laos by the U.S. Air Force. It might be argued that the CIA's covert operations put off the day when more massive amounts of American power would be needed, but it also might be said that if the agency had not managed to keep the governments in Saigon and Vientiane functioning for such a long time, the United States would never have intervened openly at all.
In neither Vietnam nor Laos was the CIA acting without the approval of the nation's highest policy-makers. Indeed, all the agency's major covert-action operations are approved by the 40 Committee, and the President himself closely reviews this committee's decisions. But even approved clandestine activities have a way of taking on a life of their own, as field operatives loosely interpret the general guidelines that come down from the White House through Langley. By not closely supervising CIA covert operations, the nation's highest leaders have allowed the agency to affect foreign policy profoundly. For example, during the CIA revolt against the leftist Guatemalan regime in 1954, an agency plane bombed a British freighter which was suspected of carrying arms to the embattled government troops. In fact the ship was loaded with coffee and cotton, and, fortunately, no one was injured when only one of the bombs exploded. Richard Bissell admitted to the New York Times on April 28, 1966, that the attack on the British vessel was a "sub-incident" that "went beyond the established limits of policy". Bissell continued, "you can't take on operations of this scope, draw boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure that those boundaries will not be overstepped."
CIA B-26's BOMB GUATEMALA
The CIA got involved in another "sub-incident" while it was training Cuban exiles at secret bases in Guatemala for an invasion of their homeland. In November 1960 a rebellion broke out against the Guatemalan government which had been so gracious in allowing the agency to use its territory as the jumping-off point for the Cuban operation. The CIA returned the favor by sending its B-26 bombers to help crush the insurgency. It is not clear whether White House permission was given for these attacks, but there was no question that the CIA had again interfered in Guatemalan internal politics--this time to make sure that no new Guatemalan government would oust it from its secret bases. Once embarked on the attempt to overthrow Castro, the agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba he would set in motion agency paramilitary activities against Guatemala.
CIA operations can have another unforeseen effect on American foreign policy: they can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, within five days after the CIA pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, the U.S. government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering that at that moment the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against the Sukarno regime, these would have been strange actions indeed for the U.S. government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot.
A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie-detector expert was flown into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building. [H: AT THIS POINT AN ENTIRE LENGTHY FOOTNOTE (18 LINES) WAS DELETED. The lie-detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon under arrest. The Singapore government and the British, who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, were both disturbed by the incident. Negotiations then ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the U.S. government offered $3.3 million to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA officials were subsequently freed, and the newly installed Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the Singapore leader. In a 1965 speech Lee mentioned the affair as an example of the type of activity engaged in by the CIA. The State Department issued a routine denial furnished by the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of apology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as embarrassing the U.S. government and making headlines around the world, the incident caused the State Department to revamp its internal system for making announcements about intelligence matters.
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In general the presence of American intelligence facilities in a foreign country can have an important effect on American policy toward that country, especially in the Third World. Closely aligned countries, such as
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But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes form domestic opposition forces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism" and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment and keep it in place--as ( DELETED ) discovered.
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Both host governments have been severely criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both have been handsomely rewarded in American military and economic assistance well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. While comparatively modest amounts of aid would probably have been supplied even if there had been no bases, the large size of the programs represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intelligence facilities.
PAKISTAN BASE FOR U-2's--TAIWAN FOR
TECH SPYING
Similarly, from 1956 until the end of 1969 the U.S. Air Force operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan which was primarily an intelligence facility. For several years before Francis Gary Power's abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA's U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal takeoff point for reconnaissance flights over and along the edges of the Soviet Union. In addition,
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From the early days of the Eisenhower administration, the United States had allied itself more closely with Pakistan than with India in those two countries' continuing struggle. Yet at least some experts on the region believe that an important factor in the American "tilt" toward Pakistan, at least until the late 1960's, was the desire to hold on to the base at Peshawar.
Another site of large American technical espionage installations iS the island of Taiwan. In this instance the United States did not have to provide the Nationalist Chinese government with much inducement to allow the construction of the facilities, since they were aimed against the Nationalists' archenemy on the mainland and some of the information gathered was shared with the Chiang Kai-shek government. Furthermore, in the fifteen or so years after the Nationalists' expulsion from China, the CIA closely cooperated with Chiang's intelligence service to run covert missions against the mainland, and the Nationalists were so dependent on the United States for their very existence that they were in no position to extract a large payment from the United States for the intelligence bases. Yet, by giving the CIA and the other agencies a free hand to build virtually any kind of facility they chose, the Chiang government made it much more difficult for the United States to disengage from Taiwan and build better relations with China. Many of the most important installations for the surveillance of the mainland are located on the island, and they represent an investment valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. All American military forces, including those engaged in intelligence work, will have to be removed from Taiwan before the United States meets the Chinese conditions for complete normalization of relations between the two countries.
ISRAELI'S ATTACK LIBERTY--JOINT CHIEF'S SAY
RETALIATE
Recent history is full of other examples of technical espionage programs having a profound effect on U.S. foreign policy. The shoot-down of the U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 caused the cancellation of the Eisenhower-Khruschev summit meeting. The spy ship Liberty, while trying to monitor the action during the 1967 Six Day War, moved in too close (because a "warning" message from Washington was misrouted) and was intentionally shot up by Israeli planes and boats. Thirty-four Americans were killed. As a result, according to former DIA and CIA staffer Patrick McGarvey in his book CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "proposed a quick, retaliatory air strike on the Israeli naval base which launched the at-tack." The Chiefs' recommendations was turned down. Mc-Garvey continues:
The next year the North Koreans seized a similar ship, the Pueblo, and interned its crew. Again we were on the brink of war because of intelligence, the supposed secret arm of government. The JCS again recommended an air strike. The Pueblo incident was followed by the shoot-down of a United States reconnaissance plane (A Navy EC-121) off the coast of North Korea a little over a year later. And again JCS wanted to mount an air strike.
There have been other disastrous reconnaissance flights-- these over China--that have gone virtually unreported in the American press. Some of these have been mentioned by the New China News Agency, but have apparently been dismissed in the West as communist propaganda. [H: What about the U-2 which was just brought down off South Korea within the past three or four months? It was brought down, crew killed and yet, after two days--nothing!] They include the shooting down of several CIA U-2 planes flown by Nationalist pilots and even more U.S. Air Force pilotless "drone" aircraft (The Chinese claim nineteen downed between 1964 and 1969) over the Chinese mainland. American SR-71s also flew regularly over China (and continue to do so over North Korea) until all reconnaissance flights were stopped as a result of Henry Kissinger's first trip to Peking in 1971 [that you knew about].
At the very time in October 1969 when the United States was trying to resume diplomatic contact with the Chinese, Air Force Intelligence, with the approval of the 40 Committee, sent a drone over southern China. On October 28 the New China News Agency reported the downing of "a U.S. imperialist, pilotless, high altitude plane", but
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Another extremely provocative drone flight was proposed by the Pentagon in the period after the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970. The mission was approved by the 40 Commit-tee over the strong objections of the State Department which estimated that roughly one in three of these aircraft would be shot down.
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The official justification for all the espionage missions carried out by intelligence planes and ships is to gather intelligence which helps to protect the national security of the United States. But with literally hundreds of flights and cruises scheduled each month along the borders of and over unfriendly countries, inevitably there are embarrassing failures. That these abortive missions on occasion cause international crises is understood by the policy-makers who rather routinely give their approval, and is presumably figured in as one of the costs of acquiring the intelligence. Yet it is frightening to realize that some of these spying forays could have led--and could in the future lead--to armed conflict. Missions that violate the territorial integrity of foreign countries are clear violations of sovereignty and any country that shoots at an intruder inside its borders is completely within its legal rights.
END QUOTING
* * *
In your Constitution there is no mention of intelligence, or spies, or intelligence agencies, or internal security--nothing of what is called the "American national security state" and certainly nothing about wars being staged by Clandestine Forces or internal security apparatus that form the most intriguing aspect of the greatest military and economic power the world has ever seen.
PARADOXICAL DILEMMA; CONSTITUTION vs, SECRECY
A curious paradox, and it is one created by that very document. The Constitution guarantees individual liberties, the right of the minority to dissent, and privacy. But it also gives the President of the United States broad powers in the conduct of foreign policy--and, implicitly, intelligence operations--thus creating a dilemma for American democracy. The problem centers on the questions of secrecy: the conduct of foreign policy and intelligence operations is largely secret, and secrecy is anathema to democracy. The Constitution specifically states that ALL will be done publicly and openly. The evil intent speaks for itself for God is totally OPEN and evil always hides behind secret intent and ritual. You be the "judge".
What you Americans have allowed is the moving of your enemy against the Constitution, within your very being, nurtured it and in every way demanded and now the "Piper" must be paid for he will not simply go away nor will he give up his toys.
You are going to have to make your choices of direction and get up and DO SOMETHING. I do not, for instance, accept "I can't" for never will God give you that which "CAN'T BE DONE." So, DO IT--get off your "buts"; you know, those "but if I do, what might - -" and "but they might do - - -" and "but if - - -". It rests with YOU--not your neighbor or your buddy or your government--YOU!
PJ 48
CHAPTER 14
REC #1 HATONN
TUE., APRIL 7, 1992 1:47 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 235
TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1992
CIA: INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY, CONT'D
While Allen Dulles professed to believe that U.S. foreign policy should be based on intelligence estimates developed by an agency with "no axes to grind and....itself...not wedded to any particular policy," his actions were not always true to these words. Consequently, he made possible the Bay of Pigs--the classic case of what can happen when intelligence is misused in the carrying out of a clandestine operation.
The problem started on the eve of Fidel Castro's triumphant march into Havana in January 1959 while CIA analysts were preparing a report for the White House stating that the rebels' success was due largely to the corruption of the Batista regime and the resulting popular disgust among the Cuban people. Allen Dulles personally intervened in the intelligence process and rewrote this report to suit his own political biases. In Dulles' view, Castro's victory was not a natural development that could have been expected in light of the faults of Batista. Dulles' Calvinistic mind may well have seen the hand of the Devil at work, and he predicted that there would be a slaughter in Havana which would put the French Revolution to shame. "Blood will flow in the streets," he wrote passionately in the CIA report to the White House.
For the most part, however, the agency's analysts took a more moderate tone in the months that followed. They stressed that Castro's Cuba, while something of an annoyance, was in no way a direct threat to the security of the United States. The Intelligence Directorate also tried to explain that Castro, despite his socialistic leanings, was fiercely independent and a devout nationalist, much like Indonesia's Sukarno, Egypt's Nasser, and Ghana's Nkrumah--all opponents of Western domination of the Third World but certainly not agents of any international communist conspiracy. Most important for future events, the analysts wrote that, regardless of the emotional reports flowing from Cuban refugees concerning political unrest on the island, Castro appeared to have general support of the populace.
Dulles did not accept this finding of his intelligence analysts, nor did he promote their point of view at the White House. Instead, he seized upon the reporting of the Clandestine Services as more truly reflective of events in Cuba. Dulles had always believed that the field operator was a more reliable judge of events than the intelligence analyst back at headquarters. Prior to Castro's takeover, there had not even been a full-time CIA analyst of Cuban problems in the Intelligence Directorate, and the two that were added after January 1959 never really won Dulles' trust. He preferred to read the assessments of the Clandestine Services' officers, who did their own evaluation of the clandestine reports received from secret agents.
CIA FLAWS LED TO BAY OF PIGS
Sometime during late 1959 Dulles decided that the best solution for the Cuban problem would be to invade Cuba with an army of Cuban refugees and to overthrow Castro. He was unquestionably influenced by the reports of the Clandestine Services, which, unlike those of the Intelligence Directorate, stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime, its internal frictions, and its economic troubles. In March 1960, President Eisenhower, at Dulles' urging and with Dulles' facts at hand, gave his approval for the CIA to start recruiting and training the ill-fated invasion force. Robert Amory, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, was never officially told the invasion was in the works so that his experts could analyze the chances of success. Dulles was convinced that Cuba was ripe for an invasion, and as he was the President's chief intelligence advisor, that was that.
When the CIA's military force failed to topple Castro in the spring of 1961, the agency's Intelligence Directorate temporarily gained equal footing with the Clandestine Services. This did not occur because there was any new found appreciation of the analysts' work but rather because the operators were in a general state of disgrace after the Bay of Pigs. John McCone took over as Director in November 1961, and after rising above his initial distrust of the entire organization, he ultimately saw the need for and the value of high-quality national intelligence.
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... Castro, whose secret agents had penetrated the CIA's operations long before the Bay of Pigs, knew perfectly well what the CIA was doing, and the ongoing American attacks against his rule may well have been an important factor in his decision in the spring of 1962 to allow the Soviet Union to install offensive nuclear weapons in his country. Assassination of Castro seemed to have been a recurrent idea in the CIA during these years. E. Howard Hunt claims to have recommended it before the Bay of Pigs, only to be turned down. In November of 1961, President Kennedy mentioned the idea in a private chat with Tad Szule, then of the New York Times. Kennedy asked the newsman, "How would you feel if the United States assassinated Castro?" When Szule said he thought it was a very poor idea, Kennedy said, "I'm glad you feel that way because suggestions to that effect keep coming to me and I believe very strongly the United States should not be a party to political assassination." Lyndon Johnson told his former aide, Leo Janos, as recounted in a July 1973 Atlantic article, "We had been operating a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean." Janos elaborated, "A year or so before Kennedy's death a CIA-backed assassination team had been picked up in Havana. Johnson speculated that Dallas had been a retaliation for this thwarted attempt, although he couldn't prove it."
CUBA\RUSS MISSILE CRISIS
The Cuban missile crisis that developed as a result produced one of the finest hours for the CIA and the intelligence community, although the last National Intelligence Estimate, prepared by the CIA a little over a month before President Kennedy went on nationwide television to announce the Cuban "quarantine", declared that it was unlikely that the Soviets would install nuclear-tipped missiles on the island. The fact remains, however, that the CIA and the other intelligence agencies did discover the Soviet missiles in time for the President to take action, and they presented the facts to Kennedy with no policy recommendations or slanting which could have limited his options. This was how the intelligence process was supposed to work.
The affair started in the late spring of 1962 when CIA analysts noted that the Soviets were sending an increased amount of military assistance to Cuba. These shipments were not viewed with particular alarm in the agency, since there was still much to be done in the Soviet re-equipping of the Cuban army forces, which was then under way. Furthermore, the CIA had ways of keeping track of what arms flowed into Cuba.
Since January 1961, when the Eisenhower Administration had broken diplomatic relations with the Castro regime, there had been no agency operators working out of an American Embassy in Havana, but the
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Additionally, a steady flow of refugees was arriving in Miami and being debriefed by agency officers permanently assigned there. As was true before the Bay of Pigs, the stories told by many of these refugees were hysterical but occasionally some valuable nugget of information would be gleaned from their tales.
Based on President Kennedy's request, the USIB had set Cuba as a Priority National Intelligence Objective (PNIO), and the various military intelligence agencies had been assigned extensive collection requirements by the USIB. New requirements were almost continually levied in response to the specific needs of the analysts. The Air Force and the Navy carefully watched the shipping lanes and photographed Soviet ships destined for Cuba. Surveillance was provided by the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, by the Atlantic fleet (which even had a listening post at Guantanamo Bay inside Cuba), and by the Air Force. U.S. intelligence photographed ship movements and listened in electronically on Cuban communications. The National Security Agency tuned its huge antennae in on Soviet shipping and Cuban communications. ITT had operated much of the Cuban communications system before Castro's nationalizations, and the company worked closely with the CIA and NSA to intercept messages. Much of the old equipment was still in use, and the NSA was collecting large amounts of information. Finally, the CIA was flying two U-2 missions each month over Cuba, and the photographs taken by these spy planes were quickly turned over to the analysts.
SOVIET BUILDUP SWELLS
So while Soviet military (and economic) assistance to Castro was on the upswing in the late spring of 1962, there seemed little cause for alarm in the CIA or elsewhere in the U.S. government. Moscow had recently eased tensions in Berlin, much to the relief of Washington policy-makers whose strong stand in that divided city appeared to have paid off. But still there were a few ominous signs. The CIA learned that Soviet military personnel were being secretly used in combat roles as submarine crews in Indonesia and as bomber crews in Yemen, a drastic departure from previous Soviet practice. Then, by July the analysts noted further increases in the arms being shipped to Cuba, along with the arrival of a large number of young men from the Soviet Union--who Moscow claimed were technical advisors to assist in economic development programs. The CIA doubted this, for, among other reasons, all the "civilians" were young, seemed to have a military bearing, and wore only two kinds of sport shirt. It was becoming clear that the Soviets were supplying too much military equipment for the Cuban armed forces to absorb. A small group of CIA analysts, expert in deciphering the ways Moscow and its allies conducted their foreign aid programs, became convinced that an unprecedented military build-up was occurring in Cuba. Their efforts during August to alert top U.S. officials to this threat were hampered, surprisingly, by military intelligence agencies, namely the DIA and the NSA, which viewed the intensified Soviet activity on the island as mostly economic assistance. Perhaps it was because the CIA had performed so poorly with its inaccurate reporting on Cuba as a prelude to the Bay of Pigs that even the hawkish U.S. military establishment was now leery of the agency's ability to assess the Cuban situation. In any event, both the DIA and the NSA saw fit to counter the CIA intelligence reports with rebuttals in late August 1962.
The basic reason that the CIA analysts were able to monitor the Soviet arms build-up more closely than the other intelligence agencies, which had essentially the same information available, was the more refined technique that the CIA had developed, including a special analytical tool known as "crate-ology"--a unique method of determining the contents of the large crates carried on the decks of the Soviet ships delivering arms. With a high degree of accuracy, the specialists could look at photographs of these boxes, factor in information about the ship's embarkation point and Soviet military production schedules, and deduce whether the crates contained transport aircraft or jet fighters. While the system was viewed with caution by many in the intelligence community, CIA Director John McCone accepted its findings, and his confidence in the technique proved to be justified.
MISSILES BELOW DECK
Nevertheless, the CIA's analysts did not spot the first shipments of Soviet offensive missiles, which arrived in Cuba during the early part of September. The Soviets escaped the scrutiny of the "crate-ologists" by sending the weapons in the holds of huge freighters, not in crates carried on deck as had been their usual practice when delivering bulky military equipment. On September 19, the USIB approved the National Intelligence Estimates which, while noting the disturbing Soviet arms buildup, declared it unlikely that the Russians would bring in nuclear-tipped missiles. During this period McCone personally suspected the worst of the Soviets, but, to his credit, he did not put his private views forward as the CIA position since, as he would later say, it was based on "intuition", not "hard intelligence". Nevertheless, he did urge the White House to approve an increased schedule of U-2 flights. The President agreed in early October, but, at Defense Secretary McNamara's urging, responsibility for the reconnaissance missions was turned over from the CIA to the Air Force because of the danger that Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) posed to more frequent flights.
Just as the new wave of U-2's was starting surveillance of Cuba, on October 9, 1962, the mainland Chinese used a SAM to bring down a CIA U-2 flown by a Nationalist Chinese pilot. A SAM of the same model had knocked Francis Gary Powers out of the air over the Soviet Union two years earlier and would down an Air Force plane over Cuba late in October at the height of the missile crisis.
On October 14 an Air Force U-2 brought back photographs of six medium-range ballistic-missile sites which were nearing operational readiness and four intermediate range sites in the early stage of construction. CIA analysts were able to verify these pictures indisputably with the help of information previously provided by satellite surveillance of similar installations in the U.S.S.R. and from documents supplied by Penkovsky, and also by comparing the
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And thus the Cuban missile crisis began.
RUSS BOMBERS IN CUBA
By the end of October, Nikita Khrushchev had been outmaneuvered 'by Kennedy and he promised to withdraw his country's offensive weapons from Cuba, in return for an American pledge not to invade the island. (This was a pledge that the CIA, with White House approval, seems to have violated systematically by continuing its guerrilla raids on Cuba until the late 1960's.) The CIA and several military intelligence agencies maintained their surveillance despite persistent rumors in the press that the Soviets had hidden some of the missiles in caves. The CIA even noted that a group of IL-28 jet bombers had been removed from a hiding place which the agency had (unknown to I the Soviets) previously discovered.
President Kennedy chose later to view the missile crisis as a nearly disastrous intelligence failure, since the CIA had been unable to give early warning of the Soviet offensive build-up and had predicted in its last estimate the unlikelihood of Soviet missiles being placed on the island. He was not willing to concede that the agency's warning of heavily increased Soviet military activity on the island during the summer months (when military intelligence was claiming otherwise) compensated for the CIA's inability to predict that nuclear-missile sites would be constructed--even though it was as a direct result of the agency's warning that surveillance of the island was intensified and ultimately led to the discovery of the missiles. To what extent the President still mistrusted the CIA for its Bay of Pigs blunder is unclear, but Kennedy obviously expected better information.
The Cuban missile crisis illustrated the inherent limitations of intelligence, among the most important of which is that certain events simply cannot be predicted with accuracy or confidence. Khrushchev's decision to install nuclear missiles in Cuba was not knowable until the Soviets had actually embarked on that course of action. Careful psychological studies of Khrushchev's character could provide suppositions that he might act in an unpredictable way, but to have known exactly what he would do would have required divine analytical wisdom or spies in the inner reaches of the Kremlin--neither of which the CIA possessed. As for those people in the intelligence community whose visceral feelings led them to expect the worst of Khrushchev and Castro before either had contemplated the missile gamble--to have accepted their speculations as intelligence would have been the height of irresponsibility. Allen Dulles and his Clandestine Services lieutenants had had their own gut reactions to events in Cuba nearly two years earlier, and when their "feelings" were presented to the nation's leaders as intelligence, the outcome was the Bay of Pigs. John McCone proved himself a much more responsible intelligence officer than his predecessor when, unlike Dulles, he refused to impose his own suspicions upon the President. Hindsight may indicate that the Dulles technique, employed by McCone, would have had more favorable results--but hindsight is too easy.
The CIA and the rest of the intelligence community conducted extensive post-mortems of the missile crisis. They found that enough bits and pieces of information and other tenuous evidence had been available to have warranted an earlier judgment that the Soviets were installing their missiles. Bureaucratic entanglements and frictions, coupled with some degree of human imperfection, however, prevented even the most astute intelligence officers from determining the true purpose of Khrushchev's actions. Yet intelligence seems to have done the best it could in the existing circumstances; the one or two accurate agent reports picked up during September were buried among thousands of useless, inaccurate, or misleading ones. The collection of huge amounts of secret information from a multitude of sources and the availability of analytical staffs even larger than those available at the time are by themselves no guarantee that the CIA and the intelligence community will produce correct predictions. Intelligence is in essence a guessing game, albeit one that is grounded in fact, logic, and experience. It can be a useful tool to the policy-makers, but it is not, even in its purest form, a magic art.
* * *
HATONN: THINGS ARE STAGED TO DISTRACT YOU
As I speak on the various encounters and major actions set forth through the CIA I am continually amazed that even with our in-depth writing about the various situations, you are not informed as a citizenry. Things are staged so as to distract you from every important circumstance. As massive changes come upon you so, then, do the distractions increase until, as today, you have turmoil and uprising, chaos and terrorism in every part of the globe. Since these Clandestine Operations are kept secret, you don't know about them until after the fact and by then the trail is hidden in confusion and wonderment as to what happened, why (even to the lies they tell you) and certainly no one can figure out just what resulted. This is most especially true with a neighbor less than ninety miles from Florida.
I have told you exactly what happened and how your politicians were totally involved and still are, in an attempt to gain control and business interests in Cuba. The Bush family interests were uppermost at the time of the Cuban Bay of Pigs and still are. I do, however, realize as we write that most of you still don't know what the whole thing was about even as the government presented it to you. Therefore, Dharma, I see no alternative than to speak a bit about the subject.
The CLAIM was that Cuba was "going communist" and you couldn't have Commies on an island so close to you. The facts were that business interests were being taken back for Cuba by Fidel Castro's government. There was a great "civil" war going on and passions ran very deep in that Cuban civil war, and the American intelligence community was perplexed by events on the island overflowing with turbulence. This, of course, goes back to the 1950's when Fidel Castro was in his very early thirties. He wanted great things for Cuba and was optimistic that he would have his way.
The war went on for some time and Castro and his rebels quieted which gave cause for Batista to believe the confrontation was over. Government troops eventually even gave up hunting for the rebels, and announced, in a time of wishful thinking, that Castro and over half of his landing party had been slain. Far from dead, Castro, with his two companions, crawled out of the sugarcane field one day and fled into the Sierra Maestra to form a new guerrilla army. Just over two years later, on New Year's Day 1959, Castro led a triumphant procession of that army into Havana. A few hours before, dictator Fulgencio Batista had fled into exile, carrying nearly $300 million in cash with him, the proceeds of bribes paid by the owners of Havana's Mafia-run gambling casinos.
Fidel Castro was a charismatic, engaging, intelligent and voluble man whose political outlook seemed rather vague. Throughout his years in the mountains, when he was often portrayed in the American media as a dashing guerrilla leader, Castro had been careful to fudge his political agenda. He even drew flamboyant movie idols into his cause--such as the young Errol Flynn who enjoyed the exciting escapades of such daring adventure.
Sensitive to the political persuasions of Latin American revolutionaries--especially those operating in the country only ninety miles from the American mainland--the CIA made several assessments of this curious figure, which generally concluded he was not a Communist (even then there was no overabundance of true "brains" in the operation). Overlooked continually, somehow, was Castro's extensive involvement with Communist revolutionary organizations in Venezuela and Mexico during his two decades of political exile from Cuba. Also missed were Castro's own avowals to friends during that period proclaiming himself a Communist.
YOUR OWN NIT-WITS
During an executive session only a few days after Castro took power, Allen Dulles informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the new leader of Cuba did not have "Communist leanings". Yet only weeks earlier, the CIA Director had dropped off at the White House an intelligence report that greatly upset Eisenhower. "Communist and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," the report warned. "If Castro takes power, they will probably participate in the government." The CIA, unsure as to Castro's bona fides, was emitting mixed signals. But events in Cuba in the months following Castro's victory confirmed the worst fears.
The next that I am going to give you must draw your attention for this is what can happen when governments become subject to the rule of the man in authority--exactly where the United States is headed NOW. Note that in the confusion and upset in Peru this very 48 hours in living--the one taking charge Cancelled the Constitution of Peru.
So, first, Castro told the moderates in the July 26th Movement coalition that he would NOT RESTORE THE CUBAN CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES--AS HE HAD PROMISED IN ORDER TO WIN THEIR SUPPORT DURING THE WAR AGAINST BATISTA. SOUND FAMILIAR?? "Read my Lips!!" Less than two weeks after taking power, Castro re-legalized the Cuban Communist Party; in March, promised national elections were postponed. Amid arrests and executions, upper- and middle-class Cubans began fleeing the island to Miami; by 1960, over one hundred thousand Cubans had left. Finally, the nationalization of American businesses on the island, worth millions of dollars, caused a distinct frost on already chilly U.S.-Cuban relations.
We shall continue this at the next writing so that you can begin to look at segments as a part integrated into the whole. You, as a remnant, be it possible--must see the whole and relate to the timing of sequences which have brought you to this day in your counting.
It is hard to associate things which are only vaguely dim memories in your minds or are absent altogether and if present, are related only as lies instead of truthful facts.
PLANET EARTH: YEAR 2000
It is, however, ALL a part of the bits and pieces being played out by the Adversary to have control of ALL by year 2000. It is aptly called the Plan 2000. I have given you the following writing prior to this and I honor the writer who put it first to print, David Lewis:
In the grim years ahead, the time is 2000. The place: Earth,---now a desolate planet slowly dying by its own accumulated errors and follies. Its dying is the end result of man's wasteful years, his growth of technologies in the wrong direction, his fear of being conquered and his inability to cope with the reality that people are a human entity of God and not to be used or misused as a tool of whimsical temperament to deprive, starve or destroy at will.
By man's own choice, the earth in Global 2000 lies barren of its forests while sand dunes rapidly spread over the fertile farm lands that once served so well. Nearly two million species of plant life has withered on the burned stalks; birds, insects and animals have vanished from sight; the once sparkling rivers that gave life to the world are now dried and the river bottoms are likened to the skin of the crocodile. The fertile valleys, the golden wheat fields, citrus groves and millions of acres of vegetables are now only a faint recollection of the past. Aircraft no longer fly over your cities and the traffic congested streets are the silent ghosts of an era past. Sidewalks are no longer the foot paths for hurried feet for, although they barely remain, the memory is now lurking in the shadows of the blackened fog of radioactivity that shrouds the atmosphere.
Nearby and far off structures that once housed a metropolis of activity has changed from the architectural splendor into a dreaded nightmare of man's stubborn attempts to defy God and nature as he changes the atom into weapons of destruction. Yet with this aforehead knowledge firmly planted in the minds of most intelligent men, knowing that this era will come to a close, he is still propagating so rapidly that his momentum is carrying him even faster to a civilization demise.
This bleak and solemn scenario is not science fiction to any degree but a detailed study of the real world's future in Global 2000, which is a prophecy that is merely waiting to be played out. Global 2000 could grow into an even darker picture prior to this great historical event if you continue to speed up the intricate acts and threats of wars, thus painting an absolute shocking picture of the world fifteen years from now. END QUOTE
God did not plan our future but, knowing man as He does, His prophecies will ring true on that day of Global 2000 and 2001. Man has insisted on his own follies and has learned little by his mistakes, thus he has paved his own road to the abyss of hell-- taking with him--all of mankind.
Today you live in an era where nearly everything is geared to-ward armament and destruction. Your guns are in readiness, your attitudes are tense, faces grim with the progressing news of world events. Frustration mounting and nerves frayed to near short circuits. You have approached that time in your society where it is now fashionable to burn all candles at both ends, outwardly demonstrate your greed and selfishness, stimulate riots and discontent and scoff at those who still show some Christ-oriented type of "goodness" background.
To unmeasurable regret, government officials throughout the world have planted the seeds of deceit, spoken unforgivable words in their constant wrangling and planning, intrigues and conspiracies, prepared many guises in order to cover the actual intentions, led the masses to complete ignorance and have aided the communistic parties where they in turn can begin to take over your freedoms within your great nation once founded "under God" and now devoid of all allowance of God--now run, rather, by totally Godless men. Yet, in a war of nerves to the Americans and people of the world, they lead you to believe there will be no impending dangers--while they silently proceed with their plans toward a One World Government, a One World Order, A One World Religion, and for a money control--A One World Bank. Is this the freedom promised you under your Constitution?
You are now dealing with that actual "tomorrow" now arrived. It is based solely on the truth of man's great follies and how you might survive those later days. What you can no longer do is back away from the conclusions of this fact anymore than you can sidestep the conclusions of Global 2000 now upon you--the stakes are far too high for the United States and for all mankind! Salu.
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