Tags, 상세검색
PJ 46CHAPTER 13REC #2 HATONNWED., MARCH 11, 1992 3:15 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 208WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1992ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE (CONT'D)NSA: CODE BREAKING
America's first experience in technical espionage came in the form of radio intercepts and code-breaking, an art known as communications intelligence (COMINT). Although Secretary of State Henry Stimson closed down the cryptanalytical section of the State Department in 1929 with the explanation that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," COMINT was revived, and played an important part in U.S. intelligence activities during World War II. In the immediate postwar period this activity was initially reduced, then expanded once again as the Cold War intensified. In 1952 the President, by secret executive order, established the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept and decipher the communications of both the nation's enemies and friends and to ensure that U.S. codes were secure from similar eavesdropping. The NSA, though placed under the control of the Defense Department, soon established an independent bureaucratic identity of its own--and at present (1974) has a huge budget of well over a billion dollars per annum and a workforce of some 25,000 personnel.
Before the NSA can break into and read foreign codes and ciphers, it must first intercept the encoded and encrypted messages of the target country. To make these intercepts, it must have listening posts in locations where the signal waves of the transmitters that send the messages can be acquired. Radio traffic between foreign capitals and embassies in Washington can be easily picked off by listening equipment located in suburban Maryland and Virginia, but communications elsewhere in the
world are not so easily intercepted. Thus, the NSA supports hundreds of listening posts around the globe, such posts usually being operated by other U.S. government agencies. Most commonly used to run the NSA's overseas facilities are the armed services' cryptological agencies: the Army Security Agency, the Navy Security Service, and the Air Force Security Agency. These three military organizations come under the NSA's policy coordination; the messages they intercept are sent back to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, near Washington.
Perhaps the most controversial NSA base (operated by the Army) is at ( DELETED) in ( DELETED ). A Senate subcommittee investigating American commitments abroad, chaired by Stuart Symington, revealed in 1970 that this heretofore secret facility had been secured from the Haile Selassie regime in return for hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic assistance--without most members of Congress ever being aware of its existence. [H: This is true of almost everything they do--including go to war.] The Symington subcommittee also discovered a similar NSA facility (operated by the Navy) at ( DELETED) in ( DELETED) which also had been kept secret from Congress. Both these bases have been used to intercept communications for the Middle East and Africa and both required the U.S. government to offer an implicit--but secret--commitment to the host government.
15 LINES DELETEDUNBREAKABLE CODESAlthough the NSA engineered some successes against the Eastern European countries and Communist China in the early days, for at least the last fifteen years it has been completely unable to break into the high-grade cipher systems and codes of these nations. Against such major targets, the NSA has been reduced to reading comparatively unimportant communications between low-level military components and the equally inconsequential routine exchanges between low-grade bureaucrats and economic planners. This is far short of learning the Soviet Union's or China's most vital secrets.**David Kahn, author of the definitive work on modern cryptology, The Code Breakers, explained in the June 22, 1973, New York Times why NSA has had and will continue to have so little luck with reading advanced communications systems like the Soviets': "Cryptology has advanced, in the last decade or so, to systems that, though not unbreakable in the absolute, are unbreakable in practice. They consist essentially of mathematical programs for computer-like cipher machines. They engender so many possibilities that, even given torrents of intercepts and scores of computers to batter them with, cryptanalysts could not reach a solution for thousands of years. Moreover, the formulas are so constructed that even if the cryptanalyst has the ideal situation--the original plain text of one of the foreign cryptograms--he cannot recreate the formula by comparing the two and then use it to crack the next message that comes along."
7 ½ LINES DELETED
... One such benefit is derived from traffic analysis, the technique by which the NSA gleans some useful information through the study of communication patterns. A principal assistant of the NSA Director observed at the same meeting that another justification for the agency's continuing programs against the Soviets and Chinese is the hope that "maybe we'll get a break sometime, like the Pueblo" . He was, of course, referring to the capture in 1968 of the NSA spy ship by North Korea. Much of the Pueblo's cryptological machinery was seized intact by the North Koreans and probably turned over to the Soviets. While these machines were not associated with the highest grade U.S. military or diplomatic systems, the Soviets would have been able to use them to read messages previously sent through certain American military channels and intercepted and stored by the Soviets. The NSA has for many years been recording and storing not-yet-"broken" Soviet and Chinese messages, and can presume the same has been done with American communications; for our part, there are literally boxcars and warehouses full of incomprehensible tapes of this sort at NSA's Fort Meade Headquarters.
MORE SUCCESSFUL AGAINST THIRD
WORLD & ALLIES
As with so many other parts of the American intelligence apparatus, the NSA has had considerably more success operating against the Third World countries and even against some of our allies. With what is reportedly the largest bank of computers in the world and thousands of cryptanalysts, the NSA has had little trouble with the codes and ciphers of these nations. Two of the highly secret agency's young officers, William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1960, mentioned thirty to forty nations whose systems the NSA could read. In addition, Martin and Mitchell told of a practice under which the NSA provided encoding and cryptographic machines to other nations, then used its knowledge of the machinery to read the intercepted messages of these countries. This practice still flourishes.
One of the countries that Martin and Mitchell specifically named as being read by the NSA at that time was Egypt--the United Arab Republic. After making their revelation at a Moscow press conference,
18 LINES DELETED
The Soviets probably were, too.
23 1/3 LINES DELETED
A "break", in the terminology of the cryptanalyst, is a success scored not through deciphering skill, but because of an error on the part of another country's communications clerks or, on rare occasions, a failure in the cipher equipment. A few years ago, a new code clerk arrived at a foreign embassy in Washington and promptly sent a message "in the clear" (i.e., unenciphered), to his Foreign Ministry. Realizing that he should have encrypted the transmission, he sent the same message again, but this time in cipher. With the "before and after" messages in hand, the NSA had little difficulty thereafter, of course, reading that country's secret communications. Malfunctioning or worn-out cryptographic equipment results in triumphs for the NSA by unintentionally establishing repetitious patterns which detract from the random selections that are vital to sophisticated ciphers. A rough analogy would be a roulette wheel which, because of poor construction or excessive wear, develops certain predictable characteristics discernible to a keen observer who is then able to take advantage because of his special knowledge.
Another type of break comes as a result of a physical (rather than cerebral) attack on another country's communications system. The attack may be a clandestine operation to steal a code book or cipher system, the suborning of a communications clerk, or the planting of an audio device in an embassy radio room. Within the CIA's Clandestine Services, a special unit of the Foreign Intelligence (i.e., espionage) Staff specializes in these attacks. This approach apparently appealed to President Nixon when he approved of the 1970 Houston plan for domestic espionage which surfaced during the Watergate scandal. The plan called for breaking into foreign embassies in Washington because it would be "possible by this technique to secure the material with which the NSA can crack foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions of dollars attempting to break these codes by machines. One surreptitious entry can do the job successfully at no dollar cost." While the Houston plan might have been effective against Third World countries with unsophisticated cryptological systems, it was unlikely to score any significant gains against major powers--even if there had been any successful break-ins. David Kahn explains why: "Code-books could be photographed, because today's cipher secrets reside in electronic circuits, some of them integrated on a pinhead, some of them embodied in printed-circuit boards with up to fifteen layers." When it is successful, the information it acquires is sent to the NSA to help that agency with its COMINT efforts.
In 1970, NSA Director Admiral Noel Gayler and his top deputies admitted privately that a good part of the NSA's successes came from breaks, and they emphasized that the agency was extremely adept at exploiting these non-cryptanalytical windfalls. Nevertheless, breaks are never mentioned in the authorized U.S. government "leaks" concerning the NSA's activities that from time to time appear in the press. In its controlled revelations to the public, the NSA deliberately tries to create the impression that it is incredibly good at the art of deciphering secret foreign communications and that its triumphs are based purely on its technical skills.
23 LINES DELETED
* * *
MULTILATERAL SPYING
A side effect of the NSA's programs to intercept diplomatic and commercial messages is that rather frequently certain information is acquired about American citizens, including members of Congress and other federal officials, which can be highly embarrassing to those individuals. This type of intercepted message is handled with even greater care than the NSA's normal product, which itself is so highly classified that a special security clearance is needed to see it. Such information may, for example, derive from a Senator's conversation with a foreign ambassador in Washington who then cables a report of the talk to his Foreign Ministry.
A more serious embarrassment happened in 1970 during the course of delicate peace talks on the Middle East. A State Department official had a conversation about the negotiations with an Arab diplomat who promptly reported what he had been told to his government. His cable disclosed that the State Department man had either grossly misstated the American bargaining position or the diplomat had badly misunderstood what had been told him. In any case, high State Department officers were quite disturbed about the misrepresented position and the incident did not reflect well on the competence of the American official in the eyes of his superiors.
Not even the CIA is immune to such prying by the NSA. On one occasion the Director of Central Intelligence was supplied with an intercepted message concerning his deputy. According to this message, a transmission from a Western European ambassador to his Foreign Office, the CIA's number-two man had a few evenings earlier at a dinner party hosted by the ambassador indiscreetly opined on several sensitive U.S. policy positions. The ambassador's interpretation of the conversation was contradicted by the Deputy Director--to the apparent satisfaction of the DCI--and the matter was quietly dropped.
Some NSA-intercepted communications can cause surprising problems within the U.S. government if they are inadvertently distributed to the wrong parties. When particularly sensitive foreign-policy negotiations are under way which may be compromised internally by too much bureaucratic awareness, the White House's usual policy has been to issue special instructions to the NSA to distribute messages mentioning these negotiations only to HENRY KISSINGER and his immediate staff.
BCCI: CLINTON.
[H: Several inquiries have come back to me in a bit of chiding manner by way of stating that I was wrong about Clinton's connection to BCCI--that they had now brought up bad and conflicting business interests but nothing on BCCI. Forget the quarrel, chelas, the only reason it has not hit the public forum yet is that so many of the candidates, the President, Vice-President and right through the ranks--ARE ALSO TO THEIR EYEBALLS IN THE BCCI SCANDAL AND ALL WOULD "CATCH THEMSELVES" IF IT BROKE LOOSE--IT IS SIMPLY BLACKMAIL. Don't worry about poor old Clifford Clark and his denial of involvement--perish the thought: CLIFFORD CLARK IS AN ACTIVE AND DIRECT MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE OF 300.]
* * *
EMBASSIES TAPPED
The FBI operates a wiretap program against numerous foreign embassies in Washington which, like some of the NSA intercept operations, also provides information about Americans. In cooperation with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (a Bell subsidiary), FBI agents regularly monitor the phones in the offices of all Communist governments represented here; on occasion, the embassies of various non-Communist countries have their phones tapped, especially when their nations are engaged in negotiations with the U.S. government or when important developments are taking place in these countries.
17 ½ LINES DELETED
Wiretaps on foreign embassies, justified on the grounds of preserving national security, must be approved by the State Department before they are installed by the FBI. As it is often State which requests the FBI to activate the listening devices, approval is almost always given. The transcripts of such conversations are never marked as having come from wiretaps, but instead carry the description "from a source who had reported reliably in the past". Such reliable "sources" include State Department officials themselves--the CIA has, on occasion, intercepted communications between American ambassadorial officials and their colleagues in Washington.
In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies and Washington--for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work under State cover. In theory, CIA clerks are not supposed to read the messages they process for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realizes that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which supposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.
When in 1968 Ambassador to Iran Armin Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief in Teheran, Meyer switched his communications with State in Washington to one of these "secure" channels, called "Roger". But the CIA had nonetheless figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington; the CIA Director thus received a copy of each intercepted cable. Written on top of each cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confidential because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.
SATELLITES AND OTHER SYSTEMS
The most important source of technical intelligence gathered by the U.S. is that collected by photographic and electronic reconnaissance satellites. Most are launched into north-south orbits designed to carry them over such targets as the U.S.S.R. and China with maximum frequency as they circle around the earth. Others are put into orbits synchronized with the rotation of the globe, giving the illusion that they are stationary. All satellite programs come under the operational authority of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), a component of the Secretary of the Air Force's office. The NRO spends well over a billion dollars every year for satellites and other reconnaissance systems. While the Defense Department provides all the money, policy decisions on how the funds will be allocated are made by the Executive Committee for Reconnaissance, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Requirements for satellite collection are developed by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence agencies. A special committee of the USIB designates the specific targets each satellite will cover.
Employing high-resolution and wide-angle cameras, the photographic satellites have for years provided voluminous and detailed information on Soviet and Chinese military developments and other matters of strategic importance; conversely, except for special cases such as the Arab-Israeli situation, there has been little reason to apply satellite reconnaissance against other, less powerful countries.
Some photographic satellites are equipped with color cameras for special missions, and some even carry infrared sensing devices which measure heat emissions from ground targets to determine, for example, if a site is occupied or what the level of activity is at certain locations. There are satellites that have television cameras to speed up the delivery of their product to the photo interpreters who analyze, or read out, the film packages of the spies in the sky. But, good as they are, photographic satellites have inherent limitations. They cannot see through clouds, nor can they see into buildings or inside objects.
In addition to photographic satellites, U.S. intelligence possesses a wide array of other reconnaissance satellites which perform numerous electronic sensing tasks. These satellites collect data on missile testing, on radars and the emissions of other high-power electronic equipment, and on communications traffic. Electronic satellites are in some cases supported by elaborate ground stations, both in friendly foreign countries and in the United States, that feed targeting directions to the sensors, receive the collected data from the satellites, and transmit the processed data to the intelligence agencies in Washington.
4 LINES DELETED
U.S. USING OBSOLETE TECHNOLOGY
Until satellites became operational in the early 1960's, spy planes and ships were valuable sources of information, serving as supplements to the product of the NSA, then the best material available to U.S. intelligence. Air Force and CIA aircraft frequently flew along the perimeters of the Communist countries and even over their territory in search of badly needed electronic and photographic information. Spy ships operated by the Navy--like the Pueblo--sailed along the coasts listening in on communications and other electronic signals. Although these programs were considered to be great successes by the intelligence community, occasional blunders such as the 1959 U-2 Affair and the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964 (the two U.S. destroyers "torpedoed" by North Vietnamese boats were on a clandestine spy mission) had a serious and detrimental effect on world politics. Aggressive technical intelligence collection efforts have also led to the capture of the Pueblo, the Israeli attack on the Liberty in 1967, and shoot-down of RB-47s by the Soviets, and of EC-121s and several U-2s by the Chinese.
Despite the risks incurred by such provocative collection actions in the name of intelligence, the Pentagon continues to sponsor these now obsolete programs. Satellites and long-range stand-off (i.e., non-penetrating) systems have deeply reduced, if not eliminated, the need for spy flights and cruises. [H: What this author is not telling here is that these obsolete means ARE necessary, for the U.S. satellite system for spying on Russia has been almost entirely taken-out by the Soviets thus negating most of your crucial spy network from space.] But the armed services have spent billions of dollars to develop the spy planes and ships (just as the CIA and the NSA have invested in outmoded listening posts ringing the U.S.S.R. and China); consequently, there has been a stubborn bureaucratic reluctance to take these collectors out of service. The "drone"--pilotless aircraft--flights over China, for example, were continued even after the Chinese started shooting them down on a regular and embarrassing basis, and after they had proven nearly useless. State Department reconnaissance intelligence experts insisted that the Air Force maintained the drone activity even though the information thus gathered was of marginal value because it had nowhere else to use such spy equipment. Similarly, Air Force SR-71s have continued to fly over North Korea despite that country's lack of meaningful intelligence targets. With the Soviet Union declared off-bounds for secret overflights since 1960, and China since 1971, the Air Force can devise no other way of justifying the operational need for these aircraft.
20 LINES DELETED
MORE DATA LESS EFFICIENCY
Clearly, the prevailing theology in the U.S. intelligence community calls for the collection of as much information as possible. Little careful consideration is given to the utility of the huge amounts of material so acquired. The attitude of "collection for collection's sake" has resulted in mountains of information which can only overwhelm intelligence analysts charged with interpreting it. Further, such material contributes little to the national requirements though it may prove interesting to certain highly specialized analysts, particularly in the Pentagon. There has been little coordination between the managers of the various technical espionage programs, and even less between the collectors and the policy-makers. Each of the many agencies which carry out such programs has a vested bureaucratic interest in keeping its particular system in being, and the extreme compartmentalization of the operations has made it almost impossible for the programs to be evaluated as a whole. Former CIA Director Helms failed almost completely in his assigned mission of bringing a more rational and coordinated approach to the myriad technical espionage systems. It is not likely that his successors will do much better. No CIA Director has ever been able to manage the intelligence community.
Despite the roughly $5 billion already being spent each year on technical systems and on processing the great amounts of data collected, there remains significant pressure within the intelligence community to collect still more information.
12 ½ LINES DELETEDThis secrecy is unquestionably needed to protect the actual workings of the system, but then the operation of the ABM was no less classified, and the national security did not seem to be injured by the ABM debate in Congress. However, the very word "intelligence" seems to make our legislators bow and genuflect. [H: Could that be because there is so much "intelligence" gathered and useable against each one of the ones in Congress?] They have in the past bestowed virtual blank checks on the various intelligence agencies, allowing these organizations to do practically anything they desired. The Soviets have a fairly clear idea of the functions performed by American satellites and other collection systems; there would seem to be little practical reason why the Congress and the American people must be kept completely in the dark.
ARMED FOR BLACKMAIL
Furthermore, technical espionage of any kind has a limited value. It can identify and measure missile development and troop movements, but it cannot tell what foreign leaders are planning to do with those missiles and troops. In 1968 the U.S. intelligence community had a relatively clear picture of the Soviet preparations for military action against Czechoslovakia; it had no means whatever of knowing whether or not an actual attack would be made. That kind of information could have been provided only by a human spy inside the Kremlin, and the CIA had none of those, and small prospect for recruiting any. The United States knew what could happen, but intelligence consumers have an insatiable appetite for knowledge of what will happen. Their clamoring makes for more and bigger collections systems to attempt to satisfy their demands.
* * *
DAHMER: CONTROLLED BY WHOM?
As we close this chapter I am asked to comment on the latest press releases which say that Dahmer, who killed and ate victims, was first met by space aliens and then programmed to kill on orders and the whole scenario is directed and caused directly by aliens. Well, chelas, it may be "by aliens" but 'taint any space aliens I know. I believe you will find the theory quite accurate as to mind control and publicity but those things of brainwashing are directed STRAIGHT FROM THE HELL OF YOUR PLACE--NOT THE HEAVENS. SO BE IT.
I have amply warned you that the assault on your senses would be coming in every heinous way possible to terrify you of anything coming from outer space--it is a last-ditch effort to keep God out of your tending. It is up to you that which you believe--but use your clues and really look at what they tell you and show you--does it really appear to be of God? Terror and fear are the most physical tools of all evildom and at some point along here you ones will stop being gullible to the game and you will prevail. As long as you believe the lies--you will continue to get nothing but lies.
Thank you for your late work and may you all read and understand in the Light of Truthful perception for it is only through the Truth that you can find your way into freedom which has all but been totally lost to you. What is the true level of your freedom? Do you pay taxes? Then you are not free! Ponder it. Even if you think you completely own your home--think again--for if you fail to pay your taxes, the home and property can be confiscated for the amount of taxes--be it only a dollar.
Good evening,
Hatonn to clear.
PJ 46CHAPTER 14
REC #1 HATONN
THU., MARCH 12, 1992 8:04 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 209
THURSDAY, MARCH 12. 1992In the wondrous beauty of a new day do YOU take time to pause and thank God for the gifting of another opportunity for service? Regardless of circumstance--you have opportunity to experience and "live". Do your thoughts remain totally upon self and your circumstances or do you thank and bless your brother?
TODAY'S WATCH
I note that altars unto every idol are springing up as ones search for peace and to calm their tattered nerves before a day begins (in order to strengthen) and after a day ends(in order to release). The idea is positive but all the little idols unto every resource is foolishness--God is there within--simply speak with HIM. If you must have an altar--make it something of HIS and not pottery and carvings by hands of another man. Try a flower, a plant or simple SILENCE.
UNTAMPERED BIBLE?
I am asked if there are ANY untampered New Testaments? Yes, AND THEY CALLED HIS NAME IMMANUEL. Next in line of clarity would be THE JEFFERSON BIBLE. All other Bibles are written by Saul of Tarsus to control the people and focus them into the physical "controls". The "Christ" experienced as example. Ones wish to say that when the Christ said that "except through me shall ye enter into the Kingdom of God our Father" that he meant "I am THE WAY" and not come to "show the way". Nay, except through practicing that which was given and shown unto you by the Teacher--is the WAY, therefore, except through that Christed path of living would you enter into and within the gates of the Father's house. The "native Americans" call it walking the red road. The Teacher is NEVER the way--doing that which a great Teacher brings unto you IS THE WAY. KNOWING without ACTION is nothing and is "judged" as negative action. In KNOWING the heart will act in that KNOWING or the person condemns self to "refusal" to act according to that knowledge.
WORLD EVENTS
So today, it is claimed that the ship carrying missiles to Iran was not even followed. This, after they told you for days that the military was going to board and confiscate items on the ship.
In the next sentence, "Israel denies selling Patriots to China." Come, come--Israel's only product is arms. Moreover, the Patriots are so terrible in manufacture and usefulness that it would be nice if all enemies had such ineffective weaponry.
That, however, is not the point--if you have open lies in one breath and possible lies in the next--which might you consider as a possibility?
UNITED NATIONS
Bush is coming down hard again on Iraq! The U.N. speakers from Great Britain are wielding the sword. You-the-people allowed the Gulf War to be popular and Bush needs "popular" so guess what is being set up in front of you! The military is at full alert and ready to finish Iraq. Nay, chelas, you are going to start Armageddon wherein the Holocaust will surpass anything ever known to man. In the confusion your President's children can take Cuba.
You should have compassion and pity the blind--but to refuse to see disallows such care. Ponder it. If you march to Satan's drummer then ye shall end up in Satan's camp--so be it.
MITAKUYE OYASIN
Let us return to IMA's CIA for we have meetings today, Dharma.
ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE
(CONTINUED)COUNTERESPIONAGE
Counterespionage, the clandestine warfare waged between rival intelligence agencies, is usually referred to more delicately in the spy business as counterintelligence. Essentially, it consists of preventing the opposition from penetrating your own secret service while at the same time working to penetrate the opposition's--to learn what he is planning against you. As practiced by the CIA and the Soviet KGB, counterespionage is a highly complex and devious activity. It depends on cunning entrapments, agents provocateurs, spies and counterspies, double and triple crosses. It is the stuff that spy novels are made of, with limitless possibilities for deception and turns of plot.
While foreign intelligence organizations with longer histories have traditionally emphasized counterespionage, U.S. intelligence was slow to develop such a capability. To Americans during World War II and immediately thereafter, counterespionage meant little more than defensive security measures such as electrified fences, watchdogs, and codes. The obscure subtleties and intricate conspiracies of counterespionage seemed alien to the American character and more suited to European back alleys and the Orient Express. But the demands of the Cold War and the successes scored by the KGB in infiltrating Western intelligence services gradually drew the CIA deeply into the counterespionage game.
CIA/FBI RELATIONSHIP
Primary responsibility for U.S. internal security rests with the FBI, but inevitably there has been friction between the agency and the bureau in their often overlapping attempts to protect the nation against foreign spies. In theory, the CIA cooperates with the FBI in counterespionage cases by handling the overseas aspects and letting the bureau take care of all the action within the United States. In actual fact, the agency tends to keep within its own control, even domestically, those operations which are designed to penetrate opposition intelligence services; the basically defensive task of preventing the Soviets from recruiting American agents in the United States is left to the FBI. While the FBI also on occasion goes on the defensive by trying to recruit foreign intelligence agents, the bureau's first inclination seems to be to arrest or deport foreign spies rather than to turn them, as the CIA tries to do, into double agents. This fundamental difference in approach limits the degree of FBI-CIA cooperation in counterespionage and confirms the general view within the agency that FBI agents are rather unimaginative police-officer types, and thus incapable of mastering the intricacies of counterespionage work. (The FBI, on the other hand, tends to see CIA counterintelligence operators as dilettantes who are too clever for their own good.) Although the CIA has had almost no success in penetrating the Soviet and other oppositional services, it nonetheless continues to press for additional operational opportunities in the United States, claiming that the FBI is not sophisticated enough to cope with the KGB.
Within the CIA, the routine functions of security--physical protection of buildings, background investigations of personnel, lie-detector tests--are assigned to the Office of Security, a component of the housekeeping part of the agency, the M&S Directorate. Counterespionage policy and some actual operations emanate from the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of the Clandestine Services. As with the bulk of espionage activities, however, most operations are carried out by the area division (Far East, Western Hemisphere, etc.), which are also responsible. The area divisions tend to see espionage value or information-gathering value in counterespionage operations, which are referred to in CIA files as joint FI/CI projects--Fl (Foreign Intelligence) being the Clandestine Services' euphemism for espionage.
Almost every CIA station or base overseas has one or more officers assigned to it for counterespionage purposes. The first priority for these counterspy specialists is to monitor agency espionage and covert-action operations to make sure that the opposition has not penetrated or in some other way compromised the activity. All reports submitted by CIA case officers and their foreign agents are carefully studied for any indication of enemy involvement. The counterintelligence men know all too well that agents, wittingly or unwittingly, can be used by the KGB as deceptions to feed false information to the CIA, or employed as provocations to disrupt carefully laid operational plans. Foreign agents can also be penetrations, or double agents, whose task it is to spy on the CIA's secret activities. When a double agent is discovered in an operation, consideration is given to "turning" him--that is, making him a triple agent. Or perhaps he can be unwittingly used to deceive or provoke the opposition.
If a KGB officer tries to recruit a CIA staff employee, the counterespionage experts may work out a plan to entrap the enemy operator, then publicly expose him or attempt to "turn" him. Or they may encourage the agency employee to pretend to cooperate with the Soviets in order to learn more about what kind of information the KGB wants to collect, to discover more about KGB methods and equipment, or merely to occupy the time and money of the KGB on a fruitless project. CIA counterespionage specialists do not necessarily wait for the KGB to make a recruitment effort, but instead may set up an elaborate trap, dangling one of their own as bait for the opposition.
Further, beyond safeguarding the CIA's own covert operations, counterespionage officers actively try to penetrate the opposition services. Seeking to recruit agents in Communist and other intelligence services, they hope both to find out what secret actions the opposition is planning to take against the CIA, and to thwart or deflect those initiatives.
Counterespionage, like covert action, has become a career specialty in the CIA; some clandestine operators do no other type of work during their years with the agency. These specialists have developed their own clannish subculture within the Clandestine Services, and even other CIA operators often find them excessively secretive and deceptive. The function of the counterespionage officer is to question and verify every aspect of CIA operations; taking nothing at face value, they tend to see deceit everywhere. In an agency full of extremely mistrustful people, they are the professional paranoids. It is commonly thought within the CIA that the Counterintelligence Staff operates on the assumption that the agency--as well as other elements of the U.S. government--is penetrated by the KGB. The chief of the CI Staff is said to keep a list of the fifty or so key positions in the CIA which are most likely to have been infiltrated by the opposition, and he reportedly keeps the persons in those positions under constant surveillance. Some CIA officers speculate--and a few firmly believe--that the only way to explain the poor performance in recruiting Soviet agents--and conducting clandestine intelligence operations in general against the U.S.S.R.--is that KGB penetration inside the agency has been for years sending back advance warnings.
MORE KGB IN CIA THAN AMERICANS
[H: I must note at this point as a reminder. This may have been speculation at the time of IMA's writing--although I suspect he simply had no "proof" and therefore failed to speak with assurance--however, it has been known for years now that there are more KGB in your Central Intelligence service than Americans. The entire thrust has been to unify for the Soviets and American Government have been in coalition for decades--as allies. The point is to have a hard-hitting, cold and powerful police force--by the time the U.N. takes control (which is NOW).]
Many experienced CIA operators believe that counter-espionage operations directed against opposition services receive a disproportionate amount of attention and resources within the Clandestine Services, for even if a spy were recruited in the KGB (which almost never happens), he would likely be of less intelligence value than a penetration at a similar level elsewhere in the Soviet government or Communist Party. To be sure, the spy could probably provide the CIA with some information on foreign agents working for the KGB, perhaps the type of intelligence received from them and other foreign sources, and maybe a few insights into KGB operations against the United States and other countries. But he would know little about the intentions of the Soviet leadership or Moscow's military and nuclear secrets--the most crucial information of all to those officials responsible for looking after the national security of the United States. The KGB officer, like most clandestine operators, is usually better versed on developments in foreign countries than those in his own nation. Although it is interesting to know what the KGB operators know and how they acquired their knowledge, that in itself is of little significance in achieving U.S. intelligence goals. The justification for the counterintelligence effort, although usually couched in intricate, sophisticated argument, amounts to little more than "operations for operations' sake". Admittedly, there can occasionally be a positive intelligence windfall from a counterespionage operation; an agent recruited in a foreign service may have access to information on his own government's secret policies and plans. Penkovsky, who was in Soviet military intelligence (GRU), provided his British and American case officers with reams of documents concerning the Soviet armed forces and their advanced weapons-development programs, in addition to clandestine operational information and doctrine. Agents working for other foreign services have from time to time made similar, although less valuable, contributions. But the CIA's preoccupation with this type of clandestine operation, often to the exclusion of a search for more important secrets, is at least questionable.
* * *
CIA'S SOVIET BLOC DIVISION
Within the Clandestine Services, the Soviet Bloc (SB) Division, quite obviously, is the most counterespionage-oriented of all the area divisions. The rationale generally given for this emphasis is that it is nearly impossible to recruit even the lowest-level spy in the U.S.S.R. because of the extremely tight internal-security controls in force there. Among the few Soviets who can, however, move about freely despite these restrictions are KGB and other intelligence officers. They are, furthermore, part of that small group of Soviet officials who regularly come in contact with Westerners (often searching for their own recruits). And they are among those officials most likely to travel outside the Soviet Union, where recruitment approaches by CIA operators (or induced defections) can more easily be arranged. Being the most accessible and least supervised of all Soviet citizens, KGB officers are, therefore, potentially the most recruitable.
Outside the Soviet Union, according to the SB Division's rationale, recruitment of non-KGB agents is almost as difficult as in the U.S.S.R. Most other Soviets, including the highest officials, are usually under KGB surveillance; they travel or live in groups, or are otherwise unreachable by the agency's clandestine operators. Once again, it is only the opposition intelligence officer who has the freedom of movement which allows for secret contact with foreigners. The division's efforts are therefore concentrated on seeking out potential agents among the KGB.
There is much truth in the Soviet Bloc Division's view of this operational problem, but the fact that the agency's operators have recruited no high-level Soviet spies and included almost no significant defection from the U.S.S.R. in well over a decade raises serious questions concerning the CIA's competence as a clandestine intelligence organization. [H: No, it only presents "proof" of what I say--there ceased to be intent as the organizations actually "merged" right under your noses. Moreover, there is no change in current practices even though the mouths and papers tout no Cold War. The facts are that the merging operations have been under-way for United Nations One World Government and enforcement for over 30 years.] In fact, since the early 1960's there have been practically no CIA attempts to recruit a Soviet agent, and only a handful of defection inducements; Oleg Penkovsky, it must be remembered, was turned away when he first tried to defect.
To be sure, there is reason for extreme care. Most Soviet defectors who bolt to the West are greeted by the agency with great caution because they may be KGB deceptions or provocations. The clandestine operators are so unsure of their ability to evaluate the intentions and establish the legitimacy of most defectors that the CIA has set up an inter-agency committee within the U.S. intelligence community to review all defector cases. This bureaucratic layering not only works to reduce the number of defectors accepted by the U.S. government (perhaps wisely), but also serves to spread the blame if mistakes are made.
Despite the CIA's extreme caution, however, a few defectors, some of them KGB undercover officers, have managed to accomplish their goal of escaping and establishing, as it is known in the clandestine trade, their bona fides, in spite of the agency's doubts. Svetlana Stalin succeeded simply because the CIA officers on the scene in India, with the encouragement of Ambassador Chester Bowles, refused to be held back by the SB Division's bureaucratic precautions.
* * *
It has been well established that the CIA cannot spy, in the classical sense, against its major target, the Soviet Union. Nor does the CIA seem to be able to conduct effective counterespionage (in the offensive aspect) against the Soviets. It even has difficulty dealing with the gratuitous opportunities presented by walk-ins and defectors. Much of this obviously can be attributed to the inherent difficulties involved in operating in a closed society like the U.S.S.R.'s, and against a powerful, unrelenting opposition organization like the KGB; and some of the lack of success can, too, be explained by the CIA's incompetence. But there is more to the failure against the Soviet target than insurmountable security problems or ineptitude. The CIA's Clandestine Services are, to a large extent, fearful of and even intimidated by the Soviet KGB because they have so frequently been outmaneuvered by it.
CIA PRIVATE ARMY OF THE ADMINISTRATION
[H: We will get to the real purpose of the CIA as we move along but I feel it distracting for you who are perceiving the truth of the matter to continue to avoid the issue of what the CIA actually is "for". It is and has been a private army for the Administration's activities. The real interest has never been toward the Soviets--but toward avoiding to have to "declare" war in any other segment of the globe until such time as you-the-people would be content to fight and die for no purpose whatsoever except the greedy private gain of the ones in power. If there would be no war then your undercover operatives could easily start one in which you would be locked into enjoining. This is why you have discontent in the ranks and ones moving out of the Intelligence Community--because of the subterfuge regarding intent and actual mission. Ones joined the forces to serve nation and human citizens only to find the rot and corruption which they ended up serving in blindness. With a lock on information spread and media/press total control--where do you gain insight and truth? So it is--if you think it difficult to face your own sleepy actions, consider the man who has killed hundreds or thousands of innocents only to find it was for protection of CRIME!]
Most Soviet spying successes against the major Western powers have involved penetrations of their intelligence services. The KGB, with its origins in the highly conspiratorial czarist secret police, has often appeared to professional observers to be more adept at penetrating foreign intelligence organizations than in recruiting ordinary spies.
Most notorious among the KGB's infiltrations of Western intelligence (at least those that have been discovered) was Harold "Kim" Philby, who spied for Moscow for over twenty years while a very high-ranking official of Britain's MI-6. In his memoirs (unquestionably full of KGB disinformation) Philby expressed little professional respect for the CIA's talents in counterespionage. But he did admit that it was an agency officer (ironically, an ex-FBI agent) who ultimately saw through his masquerade and was responsible for exposing him to British authorities. There have been several other highly damaging KGB penetrations of British intelligence, French and German intelligence, and the services of most of the smaller N.A.T.O. countries. And KGB agents have been uncovered on several occasions in U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, several of the military security agencies, and the intelligence section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
But as far as is publicly known, no career officer of the CIA has ever been proved to be an enemy spy. There have been some odd dismissals of clandestine officers from time to time for reasons that have smacked of more than mere incompetence or corruption, but none of these has ever officially been designated as a penetration. On the other hand, foreign agents recruited by the agency have sometimes been found to be working for an opposition service. Whenever such a penetration is discovered in a CIA operation, the agency's counterespionage specialists compile a damage report assessing how much information has been revealed to the subject and the possible repercussions of such disclosures on other CIA activities. Similarly, agency counterespionage officers participate in the preparation of damage reports when a penetration is exposed elsewhere in the U.S. intelligence community.
LT. COL. WHALEN
One such report was prepared in cooperation with the Defense Department in 1966 when Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Whalen, a U.S. Army intelligence officer working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was arrested as a KGB spy. The investigation disclosed that Whalen had had access to almost all the U.S. national intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic military capabilities during the "missile gap" controversy several years earlier. Evidently, he had delivered copies of these top-secret documents to his KGB employers.
However, the results of Whalen's actions were, upon examination, as surprising as they were discouraging to U.S. intelligence. A principal reason why CIA and Pentagon analysts believed there was a missile gap during the late 1950's and early 1960's was the numerous references in speeches made at the time by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders alluding to the development and deployment of Soviet long-range nuclear missiles. These announcements, carefully timed to correspond to the progressive phases of intercontinental ballistic missile research, testing, production, and operational introduction to the armed forces, were studied in great detail by the Kremlin-watchers of the U.S. intelligence community. Learning from American scientists working on U.S. missile programs what was technically feasible in the field of ICBM development, and having already witnessed the startling demonstration of Soviet space technology demonstrated in the launching of Sputnik, the intelligence analysts assumed the worst--that the Soviets were well ahead of the United States in the missile race. The analysts noted in their estimates that the statements of the Soviet leaders were a significant factor in making this judgment.
Let us break at this point since it is time for your meeting. Salu. Please get some rest this afternoon.
Thank you.
