PJ 46
CHAPTER 11

REC #2 HATONN

SUN., MARCH 8, 1992 2:52 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 205

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1992
CIA: PROPAGANDA & DISINFORMATION

THE RADIOS

Until 1971, the CIA's largest propaganda operations by far were Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). RFE broadcast to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, while RL was aimed at the Soviet Union. These os­tensibly private stations had been started by the agency in the early 1950's at the height of the Cold War. They operated un­der the cover provided by their New York-based boards of di­rectors, which were made up principally of distinguished statesmen, retired military leaders, and corporate executives. With studios in Munich and transmitters in West Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Taiwan, the two stations broadcast thou­sands of hours of programs a year into the Communist coun­tries. Their combined annual budgets ranged from $30 to $35 million, and the CIA financed over 95 percent of the costs. A particularly deceptive aspect of the RFE operation was, and is, the annual fund-raising drive carried out in the United States. Under the auspices of the Advertising Council, RFE solicits funds with the clear implication that if money is not donated by the American public the station will no longer be able to func­tion and the "truth" will not get through to Eastern Europe. Although between $12 and $20 million in free advertising time was made available in 1969, for example, less than $100,000 was raised from a not terribly alarmed public.

In their early years, both RFE and RL quite stridently pro­moted the "rolling back" of the Iron Curtain. (Radio Liberty was originally named Radio Liberation.) The tone of their broadcasts softened considerably in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, when RFE was subjected to severe criticism for its role in seeming to incite continued, but inevitably futile, resistance by implying that American assistance would be forthcoming. During and after the Hungarian events, it became quite clear that the United States would not actively participate in freeing the captive nations, and the emphasis at both RFE and RL was changed to promote liberalization within the Communist system through peaceful change. The CIA continued, however, to finance both stations, to provide them with key personnel and to control program content.

The ostensible mission of RFE and RL was to provide accu­rate information to the people of Eastern Europe. In this aim they were largely successful and their programs reached millions of listeners. While RFE and RL broadcasts contained a certain amount of distortion, they were, especially in the early years, considerably more accurate than the Eastern European media. But to many in the CIA the primary value of the radios was to sow discontent in Eastern Europe and, in the process, to weaken the Communist governments. Hard-liners in the agency pointed to the social agitation in Poland which brought Wladyslaw Go­mulka to power in 1959, the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the fall of Czech Stalinist Antonin Novotny in 1967 as events which RFE helped to bring about. Others in the CIA did not specifically connect RFE or RL to such dramatic occurrences but instead stressed the role of the two stations in the more gradual de-Stalinization and liberalization of Eastern Europe.

Like most propaganda operations, RFE's and RL's principal effect had been to contribute to existing trends in their target ar­eas and sometimes to accentuate those trends. Even when events in Eastern Europe have worked out to the agency's satisfaction, any direct contribution by the radios would be nearly impossible to prove. In any case, whatever the success of the two stations, the CIA intended from the beginning that they play an activist role in the affairs of Eastern Europe--well beyond being simply sources of accurate news. For, in addition to transmitting information to Eastern Europe and harassing the Communist governments, RFE and RL have also provided the Clandestine Services with covert assets which could be used against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The two radio stations, with their large staffs of Eastern Eu­ropean refugees, are a ready-made source of agents, contacts, information, and cover for operations. Among further radio-de­rived sources of intelligence was the comparatively large num­ber of letters RFE and RL received from their listeners in East­ern Europe. Delivered by mail and by travelers coming to the West, these letters were considered by the agency's clandestine operators to be an intelligence-collection resource. RFE and RL emigre' personnel used the letters and other information avail­able to the stations to prepare written analyses of what was hap­pening in the East. Much of this analysis, however, was thought to be of doubtful value back at CIA headquarters, and was held in low esteem throughout the U.S. intelligence com­munity.

However debatable the direct effect of RFE and RL on events in Eastern Europe, the governments of the Communist countries obviously were quite disturbed by the stations. Extensive efforts were made to jam their signals, and by the late 1950's the Communist intelligence services were actively trying to discredit the stations and to infiltrate the radios' staffs. In many cases, they succeeded, and by the mid-1960's the general view at CIA headquarters was that the two facilities were widely penetrated by communist agents and that much of the analysis coming out of Munich was based on false information planted by opposition agents. During this same time the spirit of East-West detente was growing, and many officers in the CIA thought that RFE and RL had outlived their usefulness. Supporters of the stations were finding it increasingly difficult at budget time to justify their yearly costs. Even the Eastern European governments were showing a declining interest in the stations, and the jamming efforts fell off considerably.

CNN REPLACES RFE & RL

The agency carried out several internal studies on the utility of RFE and RL, and the results in each case favored phasing out CIA funding. But after each study a few old-timers in the CIA, whose connections with the stations went back to their begin­nings, would come up with new and dubious reasons why the radios should be continued. The emotional attachment of these veteran operators to RFE and RL was extremely strong. Also defending the stations were those influential personalities, like former N.A.T.O. chief Lucius Clay, CBS president Frank Stanton, and General Motors chairman James Roche, who made up the radios' boards of directors. All of these efforts ran counter to attempts of the CIA's own Planning, Programming and Budgeting Staff to end agency support. Additionally, the CIA's top management appeared reluctant to part with the sta­tions because of a fear that if the $30 to $35 million in annual payments were ended, that money would be irrevocably lost to the CIA. Each internal agency study which called for the end of the CIA's involvement invariably led to nothing more than yet another study being made. [H: CNN and Ted Turner have simply replaced the "radio" with "TV" and is the CIA/Elite representative in all of the world. Note that in the "Gulf War" CNN was the only station allowed on site to any extent and the only one allowed around the clock war news. The world was sucked in and didn't even notice that there was no choice--worse, there was no "news" allowed to reach you--just scripted speeches and rerun file pictures day after dreary day--except for those things which could show your imperialism and atrocities.]

Thus, bureaucratic inertia, the unwillingness of the USIA to take over the radios' functions, and well-placed lobbying efforts by RFE and RL boards of directors combined to keep CIA funds flowing into both stations through the 1960's. Even when agency financing of the stations became widely known during the 1967 scandal surrounding the CIA's penetration and manip­ulation of the National Student Association, the agency did not reduce its support. In the aftermath of that scandal, President Johnson's special review group, the Katzenbach Committee, recommended that the CIA not be allowed to finance "any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations". Still, with the approval of the White House, the agency did not let go of RFE or RL. [H: The "Katzenbach Committee" reminds me of the same set of "fixed" circumstances that you had with the "Warren" Commission investigation of JFK's death--Warren is "one of 'em!". If you will bother to look it up, Earl Warren in a prominent member of the Committee of 300 just as is Richard Helms and Gerald Ford. Do you ac­tually think the ones who orchestrated the murder would find themselves "guilty"? By the way, now you can go to the list in the "300" book and note that so too was the Watergate Committee a direct institution of the Committee of 300. This is WHY YOU MUST HAVE INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE UPON WHICH TO BASE YOUR CON­CLUSIONS OR YOU SHALL HAVE INCORRECT CON­CLUSIONS.]

No change occurred until January 1971, when Senator Clif­ford Case of New Jersey spoke out against the CIA subsidies to the radios and proposed legislation for open funding.

Case's move attracted quite a bit of attention in the media and it became obvious that the Senator was not going to back down in the face of administration pressure. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled hearings on Case's bill and the Senator threatened to call former RFE employees as witnesses, the CIA decided that the time had come to divest itself of the two stations (at least publicly). Open congressional funding be­came a reality, and by the end of 1971 CIA financial involvement in RFE and RL was officially ended. Whether the agency has also dropped all its covert assets connected with them is not known, but, given past experience, that is not likely. For the time being, the largest threat to the future of RFE and RL would seem to be not Congress, which will probably vote money in­definitely, but the West German government of Willy Brandt. Now that the stations are in the open, Bonn faces pressure from the Eastern European countries to forbid them to broadcast on German soil.

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but he still might at some point accept the argument, as part of an effort to further the East-West detente, that RFE and RL rep­resent unnecessary obstacles to improved relations.

OTHER PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS

The CIA has always been interested in reaching and encour­aging dissidents in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the early days of the Cold War, the agency sent its own agents and substantial amounts of money behind the Iron Curtain to keep things stirred up, mostly with disastrous results. In more recent times, operations against Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. have become less frequent and less crude. The agency, however, has continued to maintain its contacts with emigre' groups in Western Europe and the United States. These groups are sometimes well informed on what is happening in their home countries and they often provide a conduit for the CIA in its dealings with dissidents in those countries.

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has found the emigre' group to be of only marginal usefulness.

Another organization heavily subsidized by the CIA was the Asia Foundation. Established by the agency in 1956, with a carefully chosen board of directors, the foundation was designed to promote academic and public interest in the East. It sponsored scholarly research, supported conferences and symposia, and ran academic exchange programs, with a CIA subsidy that reached $8 million dollars a year. While most of the founda­tion's activities were legitimate, the CIA also used it, through penetrations among the officers and members, to fund anti-Communist academicians in various Asian countries, to dissemi­nate throughout Asia a negative vision of mainland China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and to recruit foreign agents and new case officers. Although the foundation often served as a cover for clandestine operations, its main purpose was to pro­mote the spread of ideas which were anti-communist and pro­American--sometimes subtly and sometimes stridently. [H: I am immediately asked if this "Asia Foundation" is directly connected with the Committee of 300. Indeed--if it is CIA it MUST be directly connected because the CIA is a major op­erating force for the Committee. There is not room to list and re-list, change and reinstate names in the listings--for change is the illusion and confusion. A shock will be when you realize that the major environmental movements and organizations are in direct service to the "300". More money will be made by these money-mongers by the so-called "cleaning up" of the environment than could ever have been made by polluting it in the first place. Environ­mental controls are placed in such a manner as to disallow "business" to flourish as the major bankster corporations take their business and industry to nations in free-trade sta­tus which offer slave-labor wages and no pollution laws with which to contend--while keeping America's industry at stand-still through restrictions.]

PROPAGANDIZING AMERICA

The focus of the Asia Foundation's activities was overseas, but the organization's impact tended to be greater in the Ameri­can academic community than in the Far East. Large numbers of American intellectuals participated in foundation programs, and they--usually unwittingly--contributed to the popularizing of CIA ideas about the Far East. Designed--and justified at budget time--as an overseas propaganda operation, the Asia Foundation also was regularly guilty of propagandizing the American people with agency views on Asia.

The agency's connection with the Asia Foundation came to light just after the 1967 exposure of CIA subsidies to the Na­tional Student Association. The foundation clearly was one of the organizations which the CIA was banned from financing and, under the recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee, the decision was made to end CIA funding. A complete cut-off after 1967, however, would have forced the foundation to shut down, so the agency made it the beneficiary of a large "severance payment" in order to give it a couple of years to de­velop alternative sources of funding. Assuming the CIA has not resumed covert financing, the Asia Foundation has apparently made itself self-sufficient by now (1974).

During the 1960's the CIA developed proprietary companies of a new type for use in propaganda operations. These propri­etaries are more compact and more covert than relatively un­wieldy and now exposed fronts like the Asia Foundation and Radio Free Europe.

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More and more, as the United States cuts back its overt aid pro­grams and withdraws from direct involvement in foreign coun­tries, the agency probably will be called upon to carry out simi­lar missions in other nations.

* * *

USING DEFECTORS FOR PROPAGANDA

The CIA has also used defectors from Communist govern­ments for propaganda purposes--a practice which has had more impact in this country than overseas. These defectors, without any prodding by the CIA, would have interesting stories to tell of politics and events in their homelands, but almost all are im­mediately taken under the CIA's control and subjected to ex­tensive secret debriefings at a special defector reception center near Frankfurt, West Germany, or, in the cases of particularly knowledgeable ones, at agency "safe houses" in the United States. In return for the intelligence supplied about the defec­tor's former life and work, the CIA usually takes care of his re­settlement in the West, even providing a new identity if neces­sary. Sometimes, after the lengthy debriefing has been finished, the agency will encourage--and will help--the defector to write articles or books about his past life. As he may still be living at a CIA facility or be dependent on the agency for his livelihood, the defector would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize his fu­ture by not cooperating. The CIA does not try to alter the de­fector's writings drastically; it simply influences him to leave out certain information because of security considerations, or because the thrust of the information runs counter to existing American policy. The inclusion of information justifying U.S. or CIA practices is, of course, encouraged, and the CIA will provide whatever literary assistance is needed by the defector. While such books tend to show the Communist intelligence ser­vices as diabolical and unprincipled organs (which they are), almost never do these books describe triumphs by the opposition services over the CIA. Although the other side does indeed win on occasion, the agency would prefer that the world did not know that. And the defector dependent on the CIA will hardly act counter to its interests.

In helping the defector with his writing, the agency often steers him toward a publisher. Even some of the public-rela­tions aspect of promoting his book may be aided by the CIA, as in the case of Major Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence offi­cer who defected in 1968. Prior to the 1972 publication of his book, THE DECEPTION GAME, Bittman was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, which quoted him on U.S. intelligence's use of the disinformation techniques. "It was our opinion," the former Czech operative said, "that the Americans had more ef­fective means than this sort of trickery--things such as eco­nomic-aid programs--that were more influential than any black propaganda operation."

While Bittman may well have been reflecting attitudes held by his former colleagues in Czech intelligence, his words must be considered suspect. The Czechs almost certainly know something about the CIA's propaganda and disinformation pro­grams, just as the CIA knows of theirs. But Bittman's state­ment, taken along with his extensive descriptions of Czech and Russian disinformation programs, reflects exactly the image the CIA wants to promote to the American public--that the commu­nists are always out to defraud the West, while the CIA, skill­fully uncovering these deceits, eschews such unprincipled tac­tics.

CIA BOOK PUBLISHING

To the CIA, propaganda through book publishing has long been a successful technique. In 1953 the agency backed the publication of a book called THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET SOCIETY, which was written by Walt Rostow, later President Johnson's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and other members of the staff of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The center had been set up with CIA money in 1950 and this book was published in two versions, one classified (for the CIA and government pol­icy-makers) and the other unclassified (for the public). Both versions, except in some minor details, promoted the thesis that the Soviet Union is an imperialistic power bent on world con­quest, and that it is the responsibility of the United States to blunt the Communist menace.

Most CIA book operations, however, are more subtle and clandestine. A former CIA official who specialized in Soviet af­fairs recalls how one day in 1967 a CIA operator on the Covert Action Staff showed him a book called THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND COMMUNIST CHINA by a German named Kurt Muller. The book looked in­teresting to the Soviet expert, and he asked to borrow it. The Covert Action man replied, "Keep it. We've got hundreds more downstairs." Muller's book was something less than an unbi­ased treatment of the subject; it was highly critical of Commu­nist foreign assistance to the Third World. The Soviet specialist is convinced that the agency had found out Muller was interested in Communist foreign-aid programs, encouraged him to write a book which would have a strong anti-communist slant, provided him with information, and then helped to get the book published and distributed.

Financing books is a standard technique used by all intelli­gence services. [H: Our books must certainly be a thorn in the backsides because we sure could use a bit of "help" in publication of all our information. We get a lot in input and destruction from these groups but surely NO HELP!] Many writers are glad to write on subjects which will further their own careers, and with a slant that will contribute to the propaganda objectives of a friendly agency. Books of this sort, however, add only a false aura of respectability and authority to the information the intelligence agency would like to see spread--even when that information is perfectly accurate--because they are by definition restricted from presenting an objective analysis of the subject under consideration. And once exposed, both the writer and his data become suspect. [H: I'm sure any of you readers could name many such writers and their books--memoirs are the most nauseating in my opinion, and all the "big boys" write them. As with Oliver North, the book was written and ready before he knew there was a book "he" was writing.]

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Spies, however, do not keep journals. They simply do not take that kind of risk, nor do they have the time to do so while they are leading double lives. [H: Notes are different and also, when it is known a "fall" is going to come down--they start taking a lot of notes.]

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THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

Allen Dulles [H: Member of the Committee of 300] seemed to be rubbing salt in their wounds when he wrote in THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE that the Penkovsky defection had shaken the Soviet intelligence services with the knowledge that the West had located Russian officials willing to work "in place for long periods of time" and others who "have never been 'surfaced' and (who) for their own protection must remain unknown to the public."

And, of course, the publication of THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS opened the Soviets up to the embarrassment of having the world learn that the top level of their government had been penetrated by a Western spy. Furthermore, Penkovsky's success as an agent made the CIA look good, both to the American people and
to the rest of the world. Failures such as the Bay of Pigs might be forgiven and forgotten if the agency could recruit agents like Penkovsky to accomplish the one task the CIA is weakest at--gathering intelligence from inside the Soviet Union or China.

The facts were otherwise, however. In the beginning, Penkovsky was not a CIA spy. He worked for British Intel­ligence. He had tried to join the CIA in Turkey, but he had been turned down, in large part because the Soviet Bloc Di­vision of the Clandestine Services was overly careful not to be taken in by the KGB provocateurs and double agents. To the skittish CIA operators, Penkovsky seemed too good to be true, especially in the period following the Burgess-McLean catastrophe. The CIA had also suffered several recent defeats at the hands of the KGB in Europe, and it was understandably re­luctant to be duped again.

Penkovsky, however, was determined to spy for the West, and in 1960 he made contact with British intelligence, which eventu­ally recruited him. The British informed the CIA of Penkovsky's availability and offered to conduct the operation as a joint project. CIA operators in Moscow and elsewhere par­ticipated in the elaborated clandestine techniques used to re­ceive information from Penkovsky and to debrief the Soviet spy on his visits to Western Europe.

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The Penkovsky Papers was a best-seller round the world, and especially in the United States. Its publication certainly caused discomfort in the Soviet Union.

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Richard Helms years later again referred to Penkovsky in this vein, although not by name, when he claimed in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians . . . helped us" in uncov­ering the Soviet move. One person taken in by this deceit was Senator Milton Young of North Dakota, who serves on the CIA oversight subcommittee. In a 1971 Senate debate on cutting the intelligence budget, the Senator said, "And if you want to read something very interesting and authoritative where intelligence is concerned, read the Penkovsky Papers . . . this is a very interesting story, on why the intelligence we had in Cuba was so important to us, and on what the Russians were thinking and just how far they would go."

CUBAN MISSILES

Yet the CIA intelligence analysts who were working on the Cuban problem at the time of the missile crisis and preparing the agency's intelligence reports for the President up to and after the discovery of the Soviet missiles saw no such information from Penkovsky or any other Soviet spy. The key intelligence that led to the discovery of the missiles came from the analysis of satellite photography of the U.S.S.R., Soviet ship movements, U-2 photographs of Cuba, and information supplied by Cuban refugees. Penkovsky's technical background information, pro­vided well before the crisis, was of some use--but not of major or critical importance.

Several scholars of the Soviet Union have independently characterized The Penkovsky Papers as being partly bogus and as not having come from Penkovsky's "journal". The respected Soviet expert and columnist for the Manchester Guardian and the Washington Post, Victor Zorza, wrote that "the book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency." Zorza pointed out that Penkovsky had neither the time nor the opportunity to have produced such a manuscript; that the book's publisher (Doubleday and Company) and translator (Peter Deri­abin, himself a KGB defector to the CIA) both refused to pro­duce the original Russian manuscript for inspection; and that The Penkovsky Papers contained errors of style, technique, and fact that Penkovsky would not have made. [H: This is exactly the same situation that you have with the so-called "Holocaust" books and specifically one in point is THE DI­ARY OF ANNE FRANK. This was proven to be written by someone--but not Anne Frank! So, who had the most to gain by offering false information regarding something like the "Holocaust"? When you answer these kinds of questions you are beginning to gain insight.]

British intelligence also was not above scoring a propaganda victory of its own in the Penkovsky affair. Penkovsky's contact officer had been MI-6's Grenville Wynne, who, working under the cover of being a businessman, had been arrested at the same time as Penkovsky and later exchanged for the Soviet spy Gor­don Lonsdale. When Wynne returned to Britain, MI-6 helped him write a book about his experiences, called CON­TACT ON GORKY STREET. British intelligence wanted the book published in part to make some money for Wynne, who had gone through the ordeal of a year and a half in Soviet pris­ons, brut the MI-6's main motive was to counteract the extremely unfavorable publicity that had been generated by the defection of its own senior officer, Harold "Kim" Philby, in 1963, and the subsequent publication of his memoirs prepared under the aus­pices of the KGB.

Interestingly, nowhere in CONTACT ON GORKY STREET does Wynne cite the help he received from the CIA. The reason for this omission could have been professional jealousy on the part of British intelligence, good British manners (i.e., not men­tioning the clandestine activities of a friendly intelligence ser­vice), or most likely, an indication of the small role played by the CIA in the operation.

KRUCHEV'S BOOK

Another book-publishing effort in which the CIA may or may not have been involved--to some degree--was KRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, and the second volume of Krushchev memoirs scheduled for publication this year (1974). While these autobio­graphical and somewhat self-serving works unquestionably originated with the former Soviet premier himself, there are a number of curious circumstances connected with their transmis­sion from Moscow to Time Inc. in New York, and to its book-publishing division, Little, Brown and Company. Time Inc. has been less than forthcoming about how it gained access to the 180 hours of taped reminiscences upon which the books are based, and how the tapes were taken out of the U.S.S.R. without the knowledge of the Soviet government or the ubiquitous and pro­ficient KGB. The whole operation--especially its political impli­cation--was simply too important to have been permitted without at least tacit approval by Soviet authorities. Unlike Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Krushchev was subsequently neither denounced nor exiled by Moscow's all-powerful party chiefs.

Most of the explanations offered by Time Inc. to clarify the various mysteries involved in this episode have a slightly disin­genuous air. They may be true, but a number of highly re­garded American and British scholars and intelligence officers dealing with Soviet affairs find them difficult to accept in toto. Why, for example, did Time Inc. find it necessary to take the risky step of sending a copy of the bound galleys of the book to its Moscow bureau--secretly via Helsinki--before it was pub­lished? The complete story of the Krushchev memoirs, in short, may never be publicly known. And if it is, it may turn out to be another example of secret U.S.-Soviet cooperation, of two hos­tile powers giving wide circulation to information that each wants to see published, while collaborating to keep their opera­tions away from the eyes of the general public on both sides. After all, the publication of the first volume in 1971 had a rela­tively happy effect--it supported Moscow's anti-Stalinists, and in turn increased the prospects for detente.
* * *

OUR ENEMY REVEALED
If you are still among the living, breathing, walking and "thinking" masses--do you not begin to believe that there has been much collusion against you-the-people? Remember that Krushchev is the one who hammered his shoe upon the table and said "we will bury you"! Wait, and they shall! You just didn't know who your enemy was and that it was mainly your own government. Pogo said it best: "I have found my enemy and he is me."

Further, in this event of subterfuge and planned extortion and lies, hidden agendas and secret clandestine plottings--do you still believe that NO-ONE HAS TAMPERED WITH THE BOOKS YOU CALL DIVINE? HOW SO? WHY WOULD THE MOST IMPORTANT TOOLS AGAINST THE ADVERSARY BE LEFT UNTAMPERED WHILE YOU ALLOWED ALL THE REST TO BECOME THE TOTAL LIE? PONDER IT WELL, FOR YOU HAVE BEEN "HAD".

Dharma, I recognize that you have worked beyond that which will allow your arms to heal but we shall probably have some hours of inability to write so we needed to work this extra while. Ones ask why these ones give and give without reward and/or ceasing or complaint. Dharma responds by saying it is all she can do in behalf of this nation and "my human species" and somewhere in here--this load is not heavy for these "are my brothers and the only physical world I have; so, anything less than all I have is simply not enough."

If each would only effort to leave the legacy of truth and free­dom unto your children and this planet which has given you life--what a wondrous world you would become--if only each would take his own load and walk together. Salu.

PJ 46
CHAPTER 12

REC #1 HATONN

WED., MARCH 11, 1992 7:16 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 208

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1992

Let us share a moment of truth and love so that the passage may be beauteous and not bound in perceptions of hopelessness. Realize that in the permanent bindings of oppression the bough and the sapling are bent and grow into bent and twisted frames. The tree however, when released, grows again toward the light and that portion unbounded grows straight and wondrous from the point of the bending. If the sapling is released it grows ever straight and tall unto the sun. So it is with Man if he will but cast away the bindings of disinformation and misperception--for thus comes the miracles. The mind which is unbound will con­jure the wherewithall to accomplish any task for at its command are all the powers of heaven and all the wonders of God.

How much do you do each day to secure the approval of an­other? Do you, in the ending, approve of self? I can promise you that if you do ALL to find approval of that which you know is the Truth and Light of God so that ALL ye do is worthy of ALL to see and know--YE SHALL HAVE APPROVAL OF SELF. You can secure other people's approval, if you do right and effort diligently--but your own is worth a thousand of it.... To err is but to "live"--all that proves life unto experience is the experience itself and the growth therefrom. May you be willing to "do enough--TO PROVE LIFE". GOD AWAITS!

MISSING SHIP OF MISSILES

The news shouts: "It is reported that there was a ship possibly loaded with missiles which it was reportedly a possibility Bush would have boarded" and, "...the ship in the Gulf has made port--unseen by spying U.S. guard ships." What an insult to your intelligence. For three days you have been at stand-off war over the ships with the missiles headed for Iran. Now they tell you that with all your convoy of spy ships--"it made port un­seen"? Then further insults you by telling you casually that your president "thought about having it boarded and seized"! Worse--you let them do this to you! While the U.S. continues to murder women and children in Iraq through a continuing embargo--you allow the lies to flow like water through the spillway. DOES NOT ANYTHING MAKE YOU AROUSED ENOUGH TO STOP THIS MADNESS?

CUBA

How critical is the Cuban situation? Didn't any of you see son, Jeb, on Larry King Live? Didn't any of you hear what Jerry Brown said to you? When asked about Castro and what he would do about Castro if elected, Jerry Brown responded by saying: "....and by the time there is an election there won't be a Castro in power". Are you not tired of "being the last to know"? Aren't you weary of getting information from some Space Cadet with a spy console? Are you not sick to death of having the insulting lies thrown at you from manipulated ma­chines? WAKE UP AND LIVE!

EVIL IN THE ALL-AMERICAN CITIES

How can you tell that there is evil in the controllers of your cities, counties and states? Because they ARE THERE! If you could see the steamy side of every city you would vomit with disgust at the night-slease of spreading evil. In the "all-Ameri­can" city of Bakersfield, as a for instance, there is a group which gathers regularly in the catacombs of some dank building. They have catered food, drink and drugs. They do ritualistic crime, they experience snuff pornography and writhe around in their own vomitus, excretions and sweat--moving from one slimy partner to another for open sexual rituals of every de­grading kind. These groups are comprised of your top leaders, judges and lawyers--the political elite of the city and county. And YOU EXPECT GOD TO MAKE IT RIGHT FOR YOU NICE PEOPLE? YOU ALLOW THIS TO GO ON--FOR YOU REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE. SATANISM IS RAMPANT IN EVERY CITY AND TOWN--AND YOU REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE IT. SO BE IT FOR UNTIL YOU-THE-PEOPLE WAKE UP AND PARTICIPATE--SO SHALL IT WORSEN. IN THE ENDING TIMES IT IS WRITTEN--"THE EVIL SHALL BECOME MORE EVIL AND THE HOLY SHALL BE MORE HOLY--AND EVIL SHALL REIGN". WHERE ARE YOU, WORLD??

HOPE

You accuse Hatonn of "doom and gloom"? How could it possi­bly be worse than you have come to experience? I bring only Truth and the way out of it--IS THAT NOT HOPE? I show you what is wrong and how to fix it--IS THAT NOT HOPE? I tell you how to come again into God's Light and move in glory--IS THAT NOT HOPE? IF YE THINK ME EVIL, SATANIC AND OF DARKNESS--THEN YE ARE LOST IN HOPE­LESSNESS AND IT IS NOT OF MY DOING! YE WILL LOOK AT SELF ONE DAY FOR WHEN YE FIND YOUR ENEMY IT SHALL BE IN THE MIRROR. INACTION IS THE SAME AS NEGATIVE ACTION--THEREFORE, YE ARE FOR GOD OR YE ARE AGAINST HIM AND THE CHOOSING IS AT HAND.

Dharma, chela, let us move on into the subject of this Journal, the CIA. Thank you.

CIA: ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

The soul of the spy is somehow the model of us all.
Jacques Barzun.

Intelligence agencies, in the popular view, are organizations of glamorous master spies who, in the best tradition of James Bond, daringly uncover the evil intentions of a nation's enemies. In reality, however, the CIA has had comparatively little success in acquiring intelligence through secret agents. This classical form of espionage has for many years ranked considerably be­low space satellites, a source of important foreign information to the U.S. government. Even open sources (the press and other communications media) and official channels (diplomats, mili­tary attaches, and the like) provide more valuable information than the Clandestine Services of the CIA. Against its two prin­cipal targets, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the effec­tiveness of CIA spies is virtually nil. With their closed societies and powerful internal-security organizations, the Communist countries have proved practically impenetrable to the CIA.

To be sure, the agency has pulled off an occasional espionage coup, but these have generally involved "walk-in"--defectors who take the initiative in offering their services to the agency. Remember that in 1955, when Oleg Penkovsky first approached CIA operators in Ankara, Turkey, to discuss the possibility of becoming an agent, he was turned away because it was feared that he might be a double agent. Several years later he was re­cruited by bolder British intelligence officers. Nearly all of the other Soviets and Chinese who either spied for the CIA or de­fected to the West did so without being actively recruited by America's leading espionage agency.

Technically speaking, anyone who turns against his govern­ment is a defector. A successfully recruited agent or a walk-in who offers his services as a spy is known as a defector-in-place. He has not yet physically deserted his country, but has in fact defected politically in secret. Refugees and emigres are also de­fectors, and the CIA often uses them as spies when they can be persuaded to risk return to their native lands. In general, a de­fector is a person who has recently bolted his country and is simply willing to trade his knowledge of his former gov­ernment's activities for political asylum in another nation; that some defections are accompanied by a great deal of publicity is generally due to the CIA's desire to obtain public approbation of its work.

[H: I want to discuss some things at this point. Beware of defectors for often they come as "counter-spies". In other words as "set-ups" to infiltrate and take over as has the KGB within your CIA and police departments. The more important is the reference to "walk-ins". Beware of anyone who claims to be a walk-in of ANY KIND. God does NOT USE WALK-INS--IF GOD NEEDS REPRESENTATION--HE CREATES THE PRESENCE BY CHANGE OF DI­RECTION. WALK-INS AS SUCH, ARE UTILIZED BE­INGS OF EVIL INTENT FOR THE ADVERSARY (SATAN) HAS ABILITY TO UTILIZE THAT WHICH IS ALREADY IN CREATION AND WITHIN THE PHYSI­CAL--IN OTHER WORDS--HE MUST USE YOU. GOD OF CREATION HAS NO NEED OF SUCH MAN FAC­TURED SUBSTANCE OR INTENT. So beware and use cau­tion when determining the extent of truth to a person's pro­jection and claim that "I am a walk-in". They are most of­ten simply telling you that in ignorance THEY ARE TOOLS OF EVIL FOR THE EGO HAS FORGOTTEN TO CAST OUT THE EVIL PROJECTION. THE CLUES ARE NU­MEROUS IF YOU HAVE "KNOWING" AND THE "WIGGLE AND SQUIRM" WILL ALWAYS BE TO GET YOU TO ABANDON YOUR GUIDELINES OF TRUTH FOR PHYSICAL PLANE EXPERIENCES WITHOUT THE LAWS OF GOD AND CREATION--MOST SUBTLE AND CORROSIVE--GRADUALLY ENTRAPPING YOU.]

Escapees from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are handled by the CIA's defector reception center at Camp King near Frankfurt, West Germany (1974). There they are subjected to extensive debriefing and interrogation by agency officers who are experts at draining from them their full informational poten­tial. Some defectors are subjected to questioning that lasts for months; a few are interrogated for a year or more.

A former CIA chief of station in Germany remembers with great amusement his role in supervising the lengthy debriefing of a Soviet lieutenant, a tank-platoon commander, who fell in love with a Czech girl and fled with her to the West after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The ex-agency se­nior officer relates how he had to play marriage counselor when the couple's relationship started to sour, causing the lieutenant to lose his willingness to talk. By saving the romance, the chief of station succeeded in keeping the information flowing from the Soviet lieutenant. Although a comparatively low-level Soviet defector of this sort would seem to have small potential provid­ing useful intelligence, the CIA has had so little success in penetrating the Soviet military that the lieutenant underwent months of questioning. Through him, agency analysts were able to learn much about how Soviet armor units, and the ground forces in general, are organized, their training and tactical procedures, and the mechanics of their participation in the build-up that pre­ceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This was hardly intelli­gence of strategic importance, but the CIA's Clandestine Ser­vices have no choice but to pump each low-level Soviet defector for all he is worth.

The same former chief of station also recalls with pride the defection of Yevgeny Runge, a KGB illegal (or "deep cover" agent) in late 1967. Runge, like the more infamous Colonel Rudolf Abel from Brooklyn and Gordon Lonsdale of London, was a Soviet operator who lived for years under an assumed identity in West Germany. Unlike his colleagues, however, he was not exposed and arrested. Instead, Runge defected to the CIA when he lost interest in his clandestine work. According to the ex-agency official, Runge was of greater intelligence value to the U.S. government than Penkovsky. This assessment, however, is highly debatable because Runge provided no infor­mation which the CIA's intelligence analysts found to be useful in determining Soviet strategic capabilities or intentions. On the other hand, the KGB defector did reveal much concerning the methods and techniques of Soviet clandestine intelligence op­erations in Germany. To CIA operators who have been unsuc­cessful in penetrating the Soviet government and who have con­sequently become obsessed with the actions of the opposition, the defection of an undercover operator like Runge represents a tremendous emotional windfall, and they are inclined to publi­cize it as an intelligence coup.

Once the CIA is satisfied that a defector has told all that he knows, the resettlement team takes over. The team's objective is to find a place for the defector to live where he will be free from the fear of reprisal and happy enough neither to disclose his connections with the CIA nor, more important, to be tempted to return to his native country. Normally, the team works out a cover story for the defector, invents a new identity for him, and gives him enough money (often a lifetime pension) to make the transition to a new way of life. The most important defectors are brought to the United States (either before or after their debriefing), but the large majority are permanently settled in Western Europe, Canada, or Latin America. On occasion, a defector will be hired as a contract employee to do specialized work as a translator, interrogator, counterintelligence analyst, or the like, for the Clandestine Services.

The defector's adjustment to his new country is often quite difficult. For security reasons, he is usually cut off from any contact with his native land and, therefore, from his former friends and those members of his family who did not accompany him into exile. He may not even know the language of the country where he is living. Thus, a large percentage of defec­tors become psychologically depressed with their new lives once the initial excitement of resettlement wears off. A few have committed suicide. To try to keep the defector content, the CIA assigns a case officer to each one for as long as is thought nec­essary. The case officer stays in regular contact with the de­fector and helps solve any problems that may arise. With a par­ticularly volatile defector, the agency maintains even closer surveillance, including telephone taps and mail intercepts, to guard against unwanted developments.

In some instances, case officers will watch over the defector for the rest of his life. More than anything else, the agency wants no defector to become so dissatisfied that he will be tempted to return to his native country. Of course, redefection usually results in a propaganda victory for the opposition; of greater consequence, however, is the fact that the redefector probably will reveal everything he knows about the CIA in order to ease his penalty for having defected in the first place. More­over, when a defector does return home, the agency has to con­tend with the nagging fear that all along it has been dealing with a double agent and that all the intelligence he revealed was part of a plot to mislead the CIA. The possibilities for deception in the defector game are endless, and the Communist intelligence services have not failed to take advantage of them. [H: The in­filtration of Mossad (Israeli) counter-agents is the most effective method utilized to gain control of the American Government through the use of Political Action Committees and shrewd management, bribery and blackmail. Remem­ber chelas, the organizations representing Israel are birthed and conjured by the British Intelligence service.]

BUGS AND OTHER DEVICES

Strictly speaking, classical espionage uses human beings to gather information; technical espionage employs machines, such as photographic satellites, long-range electronic sensors, and communications-intercept stations. Technical collection systems were virtually unknown before World War II, but the same technological explosion which has affected nearly every other aspect of modern life over the last twenty-five years has also drastically changed the intelligence trade. Since the war, the United States has poured tens of billions of dollars into devel­oping ever more advanced machines to keep track of what other countries--especially Communist countries--are doing. Where once the agent sought secret information with little support be­yond his own wits, he now is provided with a dazzling assort­ment of audio devices, miniaturized cameras, and other exotic tools.

[H: Please note that today (March, 1992) the government is demanding that the telephone company institute a system allowing easier access to tapping into the lines to monitor all telephones! That means YOU, BROTHERS AND SISTERS--YOU! FURTHER, THE MOVE TO THIS MORE MAS­SIVELY EXPENSIVE SYSTEM IS VERY EXPENSIVE TO INSTITUTE--SO THE LAW WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TELEPHONE USERS (YOU) PAY FOR THE SERVICE. NO, I JEST NOT--GO READ YOUR PAPERS! I mentioned this a few days ago in a "Today's Watch" and I have a dozen clippings regarding the matter. Is it not sort of like getting murdered by torture and paying the torturer AND the mur­derer to do the job on you?]

Within the CIA's Clandestine Services, the Technical Ser­vices Division (TSD) is responsible for developing most of the equipment used in the modern spying game. Some of the para­phernalia is unusual: a signal transmitter disguised as a false tooth, a pencil which looks and writes like an ordinary pencil but can also write invisibly on special paper, a bizarre automo­bile rear-view mirror that allows the driver to observe not the traffic behind but the occupants of the back seat instead. Except for audio devices, special photographic equipment and secret communications systems, there is in fact little applicability for even the most imaginative tools in real clandestine operations.

Secret intelligence services in past times were interested only in recruiting agents who had direct accesss to vital foreign in­formation. Today the CIA and other services also search for the guard or janitor who is in a position to install a bug or a phone tap in a sensitive location. Even the telephone and telegraph companies of other countries have become targets for the agency. In addition to the foreign and defense ministries, the CIA operators usually try to penetrate the target nation's communications systems--a task which is on occasion aided by American companies, particularly the International Telephone and Telegraph Company. Postal services also are subverted for espionage purposes.

Most agency operators receive training in the installation and servicing of bugs and taps, but the actual planting of audio surveillance devices is usually carried out by TSD specialists brought in from headquarters or a regional operational support center, like ( DELETED ). The more complex the task, the more likely it is that headquarters specialists will be utilized to do the job. On some operations, however, agents will be spe­cially trained by TSD experts, or even the responsible case offi­cer, in the skills of installing such equipment.

Audio operations vary, of course, in complexity and sensitiv­ity--that is, in risk potential. A classic, highly dangerous op­eration calls for a great deal of planning during which the site is surveyed in extensive detail. Building and floor plans must be acquired or developed from visual surveillance. The texture of the walls, the colors of interior paints, and the like must be de­termined. Activity in the building and in the room or office where the device is to be installed must be observed and recorded to ascertain when the area is accessible. The move­ments of the occupants and any security patrols must be also known. When all this has been accomplished, the decision is made as to where and when to plant the bug. Usually, the site will be entered at night or on a weekend and, in accordance with carefully pre-planned and tightly timed actions, the audio device will be installed. High-speed, silent drills may be used to cut into the wall and, after installation of the bug, the damage will be repaired with quick-drying plaster and covered by a paint ex­actly matching the original. The installation may also be ac­complished from an adjoining room, or one above or below (if a ceiling or floor placement is called for).

The agency's successes with bugs and taps have usually been limited to the non-communist countries, where the relatively lax internal-security systems do not deny the CIA operations the freedom of movement necessary to install eavesdropping de­vices. A report on clandestine activities in Latin America during the 1960's by the CIA Inspector General, for exam­ple, revealed that a good part of the intelligence collected by the agency in that region came from audio devices. In quite a few of the Latin nations, the report noted, the CIA was regularly intercepting the telephone conversations of impor­tant officials and had managed to place bugs in the homes and offices of many key personnel, up to and including cabi­net ministers. In some allied countries the agency shares in the information acquired from audio surveillance conducted by the host intelligence service, which often receives techni­cal assistance from the CIA for this very purpose--and may be penetrated by the CIA in the process.

Audio devices are fickle. As often as not, they fail to work after they have been installed, or they function well for a few days, then suddenly fall silent. Sometimes they are quickly dis­covered by the local security services, or, suspecting that a room may be bugged, the opposition employs effective countermeasures. The Soviet KGB has the habit of renting homes and offices in foreign countries and then building new interior walls, floors, and ceilings covering the original ones in key rooms--thus completely baffling the effectiveness of any bugs that may have been installed. The simplest way to negate audio surveillance--and it is a method universally employed--is to raise the noise level in the room by constantly playing a radio or a hi-fi set. The music and other extraneous noises tend to mask the sounds of the voices that the bug is intended to cap­ture; unlike the human ear, audio devices cannot distinguish among sounds.

CIA technicians are constantly working on new listening de­vices in the hope of improving the agency's ability to eavesdrop. Ordinary audio equipment, along with other clandestine devices, are developed by the Technical Services Division. In addition to espionage tools, the TSD devises gadgets for use in other covert activities, such as paramilitary operations. Plastic explosives, incapacitating and lethal drugs, and silent weapons--high-pow­ered crossbows, for example--are designed and fabricated for special operations. The more complex or sophisticated instru­ments used by the CIA's secret operators are, however, pro­duced by the agency's Directorate of Science and Technology. This component also assists other groups within the CIA engag­ing in clandestine research and development.

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The D/S & T, furthermore, assists the Office of Communi­cations in devising new and improved methods of communi­cations intercept and security countermeasures.

Although the experts in the Science and Technology Direc­torate have done much outstanding work in some areas--for ex­ample, overhead reconnaissance--their performance in the audio field for clandestine application is often less than satisfactory. One such device long under development was a laser beam which could be aimed at a closed window from outside and used to pick up the vibrations of the sound waves caused by a conver­sation inside the room. This system was successfully tested in the field--in West Africa--but it never seemed to function prop­erly elsewhere, except in the United States. [H: Now, eighteen years later--there are more sophisticated devices which go unaltered right through walls and don't even need windows to vibrate.] Another

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When CIA operators are successful in planting a bug or making a tap, they send the information thus acquired back to the Clandestine Services at headquarters in Langley with the source clearly identified. However, when the Clandestine Ser­vices, in turn, pass the information on to the intelligence ana­lysts in the agency and elsewhere in the federal government, the source is disguised or the information is buried in a report from a real agent. For example, the Clandestine Services might credit the information to "a source in the foreign ministry who has reported reliably in the past" or "a Western businessman with wide contacts in the local government". In the minds of the covert operators, it is more important to protect the source than to present the information straightforwardly. This may guarantee "safe" sources, but it also handicaps the analysts in making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.

This withholding of information within the government for security reasons is not a new phenomenon in the intelligence business. The joint congressional committee investigating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor found that "the fact the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more im­portance than the information obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Wash­ington completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan."

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The fertile imagination of the S&T Directorate experts during the following years produced many more unique col­lection schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly highrisk potential. The silliest of all, however, called for the cre­ation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the de­nied area, where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the project died [at that time] on the drawing boards and

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The technical difficulties involved in the (DELETED) system and the (DELETED) device were too great and too time-con­suming for either to be fully developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence-satellite surveillance programs were achieved. Other clandestine collection devices--a few more sensibly contrived, but most of dubious value--were also developed by the agency's technicians and may now be in oper­ation. The CIA's technical experts often feel compelled to build exotic systems only because of the mechanical challenge they pose. Such efforts might be justified by an intelligence require­ment; unfortunately, too many intelligence requirements are not honestly based on the needs of the policy-makers but are instead generated by and for the CIA and the other intelligence-commu­nity members alone.

THE TECHNICAL COLLECTION EXPLOSION

While technology has increasingly tended to mechanize classical espionage, its most important impact on the intelligence trade has been in large-scale collection--satellites, long-range sensors, and the interception of communications. These techni­cal espionage systems have become far and away the most im­portant sources of information on America's principal adver­saries. Overhead-reconnaissance programs have provided much detailed information on Soviet and Chinese missile programs, troop movements, and other military developments. They have also produced valuable information regarding North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam and North Korean military prepa­rations against South Korea. And such collection has frequently contributed to the U.S. government's knowledge of events in the Middle East.

[H: You must keep uppermost in mind that this information was written before 1974 AND that it deals with the CIA. The fact that Soviet space technology so far surpasses that of the U.S. or any other nation as to make yours look like a game of cops and robbers. You have to come to realize that it no longer is nation against nation in the spying business for the Elite of the world are against YOU-THE-PEOPLE and it has nothing to do with nationality. The technological advances are far out front of anything available at the writ­ing of this original document--but the important point is that now ALL THAT TECHNOLOGY IS TURNED AGAINST YOU-THE-PEOPLE FOR TOTAL SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU--CONSTANTLY.]

As technical collection becomes more refined, classical spies have, of course, become nearly obsolete in clandestine opera­tions against the more important target countries. So, too, has the shift to technical espionage caused America's intelligence costs to skyrocket to more than $6 billion yearly. Not only are classical spies relatively cheap, but technical collection systems, producing incredible amounts of information, require huge numbers of people to process and analyze this mass of raw data.

In terms of money spent and personnel involved, the CIA is very much a junior partner to the Pentagon in the technical-espionage field. The Defense Department has an overall in­telligence budget of about $5 billion a year, some 75 to 80 percent of which is spent on technical collection and pro­cessing. The CIA's technical programs, however, amount to no more than $150 million yearly. (This is exclusive of sev­eral hundred million in funds annually supplied by the Pen­tagon for certain community-wide programs, such as satel­lite development, in which the agency shares.) Similarly, there are tens of thousands of people--both military and civilian--working for the Defense Department in the technical fields, whereas the CIA only has about 1,500 such per­sonnel.

Still, the agency has made a substantial contribution to re­search and development in technical espionage. Over the years, CIA scientists have scored major successes by developing the U­2 and SR-71 [and now even more sophisticated craft are per­fected] spy planes, in perfecting the first workable photo­graphic-reconnaissance satellites, and in producing outstanding advances in stand-off, or long-range, electronic sensors, such as over-the-horizon radars and stationary satellites. A good part of these research and operating costs have been funded by the Pentagon and in several instances the programs were ultimately converted into joint CIA-Pentagon operations or "captured" by the military services.

* * *

It is time for a much needed break and rest. It is likely most confusing to you as to "why" I spend these hours in unfolding this type of information--but how much do you already know? How much did your parents know? How much did your grand­parents know that you utilize this day? Where did your world start to go insane?? Look carefully behind you--see your par­ents, your grandparents--then look forward at your sons and daughters. Look on farther, and see your sons' and your daughters' children and their children's children even unto the Seventh Generation. In this manner are the Native Americans taught to see the patterns as the whole--unto the Seventh Gener­ation. Think carefully upon this point for you yourself are a Seventh Generation and a hundredth and a thousandth--HOW DID IT COME TO THIS CHAOS AND CONFUSION? HOW WILL IT BE FOR THE SEVENTH GENERATION FOR­WARD?? WHAT LEGACY WILL YOU LEAVE TO YOUR GENERATIONS TO COME?? I OFFER THIS IN LOVE AND WILLINGNESS TO SHARE THE ROAD AND THE BURDEN IF YOU WILL TAKE MY HAND---AHO!

Sit with me and listen, precious brothers--LISTEN TO THE WIND, THE AIR--THE VERY BREATH OF CREATION AS IT SPEAKS TO YOU--YEA, SHOUTS UNTO YOU TO HEAR. Listen to the air, you can see it and you can hear it--even taste it. Woniya waken--the holy air--which renews by its very breath as spirit, life, breath and renewal--it is LIFE speak­ing to you in pleading for your taking up of that "life" in the living of it. Conte ista--see with the eye of the heart and you shall know life and so, too, shall you find the path unto freedom of the soul.

MITAKUYE OYASIN,
HATONN