PJ#046, TANGLED WEBS, VOL. IV

**wave** · 2011-01-18, 02:58

PJ 46

CHAPTER 11

REC #2 HATONN

SUN., MARCH 8, 1992 2:52 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 205

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1992

CIA: PROPAGANDA & DISINFORMATION

THE RADIOS

Until 1971, the CIA's largest propaganda operations by far were Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). RFE broadcast to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, while RL was aimed at the Soviet Union. These ostensibly private stations had been started by the agency in the early 1950's at the height of the Cold War. They operated under the cover provided by their New York-based boards of directors, which were made up principally of distinguished statesmen, retired military leaders, and corporate executives. With studios in Munich and transmitters in West Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Taiwan, the two stations broadcast thousands of hours of programs a year into the Communist countries. Their combined annual budgets ranged from $30 to $35 million, and the CIA financed over 95 percent of the costs. A particularly deceptive aspect of the RFE operation was, and is, the annual fund-raising drive carried out in the United States. Under the auspices of the Advertising Council, RFE solicits funds with the clear implication that if money is not donated by the American public the station will no longer be able to function and the "truth" will not get through to Eastern Europe. Although between $12 and $20 million in free advertising time was made available in 1969, for example, less than $100,000 was raised from a not terribly alarmed public.

In their early years, both RFE and RL quite stridently promoted the "rolling back" of the Iron Curtain. (Radio Liberty was originally named Radio Liberation.) The tone of their broadcasts softened considerably in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, when RFE was subjected to severe criticism for its role in seeming to incite continued, but inevitably futile, resistance by implying that American assistance would be forthcoming. During and after the Hungarian events, it became quite clear that the United States would not actively participate in freeing the captive nations, and the emphasis at both RFE and RL was changed to promote liberalization within the Communist system through peaceful change. The CIA continued, however, to finance both stations, to provide them with key personnel and to control program content.

The ostensible mission of RFE and RL was to provide accurate information to the people of Eastern Europe. In this aim they were largely successful and their programs reached millions of listeners. While RFE and RL broadcasts contained a certain amount of distortion, they were, especially in the early years, considerably more accurate than the Eastern European media. But to many in the CIA the primary value of the radios was to sow discontent in Eastern Europe and, in the process, to weaken the Communist governments. Hard-liners in the agency pointed to the social agitation in Poland which brought Wladyslaw Gomulka to power in 1959, the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the fall of Czech Stalinist Antonin Novotny in 1967 as events which RFE helped to bring about. Others in the CIA did not specifically connect RFE or RL to such dramatic occurrences but instead stressed the role of the two stations in the more gradual de-Stalinization and liberalization of Eastern Europe.

Like most propaganda operations, RFE's and RL's principal effect had been to contribute to existing trends in their target areas and sometimes to accentuate those trends. Even when events in Eastern Europe have worked out to the agency's satisfaction, any direct contribution by the radios would be nearly impossible to prove. In any case, whatever the success of the two stations, the CIA intended from the beginning that they play an activist role in the affairs of Eastern Europe--well beyond being simply sources of accurate news. For, in addition to transmitting information to Eastern Europe and harassing the Communist governments, RFE and RL have also provided the Clandestine Services with covert assets which could be used against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The two radio stations, with their large staffs of Eastern European refugees, are a ready-made source of agents, contacts, information, and cover for operations. Among further radio-derived sources of intelligence was the comparatively large number of letters RFE and RL received from their listeners in Eastern Europe. Delivered by mail and by travelers coming to the West, these letters were considered by the agency's clandestine operators to be an intelligence-collection resource. RFE and RL emigre' personnel used the letters and other information available to the stations to prepare written analyses of what was happening in the East. Much of this analysis, however, was thought to be of doubtful value back at CIA headquarters, and was held in low esteem throughout the U.S. intelligence community.

However debatable the direct effect of RFE and RL on events in Eastern Europe, the governments of the Communist countries obviously were quite disturbed by the stations. Extensive efforts were made to jam their signals, and by the late 1950's the Communist intelligence services were actively trying to discredit the stations and to infiltrate the radios' staffs. In many cases, they succeeded, and by the mid-1960's the general view at CIA headquarters was that the two facilities were widely penetrated by communist agents and that much of the analysis coming out of Munich was based on false information planted by opposition agents. During this same time the spirit of East-West detente was growing, and many officers in the CIA thought that RFE and RL had outlived their usefulness. Supporters of the stations were finding it increasingly difficult at budget time to justify their yearly costs. Even the Eastern European governments were showing a declining interest in the stations, and the jamming efforts fell off considerably.

CNN REPLACES RFE & RL

The agency carried out several internal studies on the utility of RFE and RL, and the results in each case favored phasing out CIA funding. But after each study a few old-timers in the CIA, whose connections with the stations went back to their beginnings, would come up with new and dubious reasons why the radios should be continued. The emotional attachment of these veteran operators to RFE and RL was extremely strong. Also defending the stations were those influential personalities, like former N.A.T.O. chief Lucius Clay, CBS president Frank Stanton, and General Motors chairman James Roche, who made up the radios' boards of directors. All of these efforts ran counter to attempts of the CIA's own Planning, Programming and Budgeting Staff to end agency support. Additionally, the CIA's top management appeared reluctant to part with the stations because of a fear that if the $30 to $35 million in annual payments were ended, that money would be irrevocably lost to the CIA. Each internal agency study which called for the end of the CIA's involvement invariably led to nothing more than yet another study being made. [H: CNN and Ted Turner have simply replaced the "radio" with "TV" and is the CIA/Elite representative in all of the world. Note that in the "Gulf War" CNN was the only station allowed on site to any extent and the only one allowed around the clock war news. The world was sucked in and didn't even notice that there was no choice--worse, there was no "news" allowed to reach you--just scripted speeches and rerun file pictures day after dreary day--except for those things which could show your imperialism and atrocities.]

Thus, bureaucratic inertia, the unwillingness of the USIA to take over the radios' functions, and well-placed lobbying efforts by RFE and RL boards of directors combined to keep CIA funds flowing into both stations through the 1960's. Even when agency financing of the stations became widely known during the 1967 scandal surrounding the CIA's penetration and manipulation of the National Student Association, the agency did not reduce its support. In the aftermath of that scandal, President Johnson's special review group, the Katzenbach Committee, recommended that the CIA not be allowed to finance "any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations". Still, with the approval of the White House, the agency did not let go of RFE or RL. [H: The "Katzenbach Committee" reminds me of the same set of "fixed" circumstances that you had with the "Warren" Commission investigation of JFK's death--Warren is "one of 'em!". If you will bother to look it up, Earl Warren in a prominent member of the Committee of 300 just as is Richard Helms and Gerald Ford. Do you actually think the ones who orchestrated the murder would find themselves "guilty"? By the way, now you can go to the list in the "300" book and note that so too was the Watergate Committee a direct institution of the Committee of 300. This is WHY YOU MUST HAVE INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE UPON WHICH TO BASE YOUR CONCLUSIONS OR YOU SHALL HAVE INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS.]

No change occurred until January 1971, when Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey spoke out against the CIA subsidies to the radios and proposed legislation for open funding.

Case's move attracted quite a bit of attention in the media and it became obvious that the Senator was not going to back down in the face of administration pressure. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled hearings on Case's bill and the Senator threatened to call former RFE employees as witnesses, the CIA decided that the time had come to divest itself of the two stations (at least publicly). Open congressional funding became a reality, and by the end of 1971 CIA financial involvement in RFE and RL was officially ended. Whether the agency has also dropped all its covert assets connected with them is not known, but, given past experience, that is not likely. For the time being, the largest threat to the future of RFE and RL would seem to be not Congress, which will probably vote money indefinitely, but the West German government of Willy Brandt. Now that the stations are in the open, Bonn faces pressure from the Eastern European countries to forbid them to broadcast on German soil.

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but he still might at some point accept the argument, as part of an effort to further the East-West detente, that RFE and RL represent unnecessary obstacles to improved relations.

OTHER PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS

The CIA has always been interested in reaching and encouraging dissidents in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the early days of the Cold War, the agency sent its own agents and substantial amounts of money behind the Iron Curtain to keep things stirred up, mostly with disastrous results. In more recent times, operations against Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. have become less frequent and less crude. The agency, however, has continued to maintain its contacts with emigre' groups in Western Europe and the United States. These groups are sometimes well informed on what is happening in their home countries and they often provide a conduit for the CIA in its dealings with dissidents in those countries.

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has found the emigre' group to be of only marginal usefulness.

Another organization heavily subsidized by the CIA was the Asia Foundation. Established by the agency in 1956, with a carefully chosen board of directors, the foundation was designed to promote academic and public interest in the East. It sponsored scholarly research, supported conferences and symposia, and ran academic exchange programs, with a CIA subsidy that reached $8 million dollars a year. While most of the foundation's activities were legitimate, the CIA also used it, through penetrations among the officers and members, to fund anti-Communist academicians in various Asian countries, to disseminate throughout Asia a negative vision of mainland China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and to recruit foreign agents and new case officers. Although the foundation often served as a cover for clandestine operations, its main purpose was to promote the spread of ideas which were anti-communist and proAmerican--sometimes subtly and sometimes stridently. [H: I am immediately asked if this "Asia Foundation" is directly connected with the Committee of 300. Indeed--if it is CIA it MUST be directly connected because the CIA is a major operating force for the Committee. There is not room to list and re-list, change and reinstate names in the listings--for change is the illusion and confusion. A shock will be when you realize that the major environmental movements and organizations are in direct service to the "300". More money will be made by these money-mongers by the so-called "cleaning up" of the environment than could ever have been made by polluting it in the first place. Environmental controls are placed in such a manner as to disallow "business" to flourish as the major bankster corporations take their business and industry to nations in free-trade status which offer slave-labor wages and no pollution laws with which to contend--while keeping America's industry at stand-still through restrictions.]

PROPAGANDIZING AMERICA

The focus of the Asia Foundation's activities was overseas, but the organization's impact tended to be greater in the American academic community than in the Far East. Large numbers of American intellectuals participated in foundation programs, and they--usually unwittingly--contributed to the popularizing of CIA ideas about the Far East. Designed--and justified at budget time--as an overseas propaganda operation, the Asia Foundation also was regularly guilty of propagandizing the American people with agency views on Asia.

The agency's connection with the Asia Foundation came to light just after the 1967 exposure of CIA subsidies to the National Student Association. The foundation clearly was one of the organizations which the CIA was banned from financing and, under the recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee, the decision was made to end CIA funding. A complete cut-off after 1967, however, would have forced the foundation to shut down, so the agency made it the beneficiary of a large "severance payment" in order to give it a couple of years to develop alternative sources of funding. Assuming the CIA has not resumed covert financing, the Asia Foundation has apparently made itself self-sufficient by now (1974).

During the 1960's the CIA developed proprietary companies of a new type for use in propaganda operations. These proprietaries are more compact and more covert than relatively unwieldy and now exposed fronts like the Asia Foundation and Radio Free Europe.

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More and more, as the United States cuts back its overt aid programs and withdraws from direct involvement in foreign countries, the agency probably will be called upon to carry out similar missions in other nations.

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USING DEFECTORS FOR PROPAGANDA

The CIA has also used defectors from Communist governments for propaganda purposes--a practice which has had more impact in this country than overseas. These defectors, without any prodding by the CIA, would have interesting stories to tell of politics and events in their homelands, but almost all are immediately taken under the CIA's control and subjected to extensive secret debriefings at a special defector reception center near Frankfurt, West Germany, or, in the cases of particularly knowledgeable ones, at agency "safe houses" in the United States. In return for the intelligence supplied about the defector's former life and work, the CIA usually takes care of his resettlement in the West, even providing a new identity if necessary. Sometimes, after the lengthy debriefing has been finished, the agency will encourage--and will help--the defector to write articles or books about his past life. As he may still be living at a CIA facility or be dependent on the agency for his livelihood, the defector would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize his future by not cooperating. The CIA does not try to alter the defector's writings drastically; it simply influences him to leave out certain information because of security considerations, or because the thrust of the information runs counter to existing American policy. The inclusion of information justifying U.S. or CIA practices is, of course, encouraged, and the CIA will provide whatever literary assistance is needed by the defector. While such books tend to show the Communist intelligence services as diabolical and unprincipled organs (which they are), almost never do these books describe triumphs by the opposition services over the CIA. Although the other side does indeed win on occasion, the agency would prefer that the world did not know that. And the defector dependent on the CIA will hardly act counter to its interests.

In helping the defector with his writing, the agency often steers him toward a publisher. Even some of the public-relations aspect of promoting his book may be aided by the CIA, as in the case of Major Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelligence officer who defected in 1968. Prior to the 1972 publication of his book, THE DECEPTION GAME, Bittman was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, which quoted him on U.S. intelligence's use of the disinformation techniques. "It was our opinion," the former Czech operative said, "that the Americans had more effective means than this sort of trickery--things such as economic-aid programs--that were more influential than any black propaganda operation."

While Bittman may well have been reflecting attitudes held by his former colleagues in Czech intelligence, his words must be considered suspect. The Czechs almost certainly know something about the CIA's propaganda and disinformation programs, just as the CIA knows of theirs. But Bittman's statement, taken along with his extensive descriptions of Czech and Russian disinformation programs, reflects exactly the image the CIA wants to promote to the American public--that the communists are always out to defraud the West, while the CIA, skillfully uncovering these deceits, eschews such unprincipled tactics.

CIA BOOK PUBLISHING

To the CIA, propaganda through book publishing has long been a successful technique. In 1953 the agency backed the publication of a book called THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET SOCIETY, which was written by Walt Rostow, later President Johnson's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and other members of the staff of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The center had been set up with CIA money in 1950 and this book was published in two versions, one classified (for the CIA and government policy-makers) and the other unclassified (for the public). Both versions, except in some minor details, promoted the thesis that the Soviet Union is an imperialistic power bent on world conquest, and that it is the responsibility of the United States to blunt the Communist menace.

Most CIA book operations, however, are more subtle and clandestine. A former CIA official who specialized in Soviet affairs recalls how one day in 1967 a CIA operator on the Covert Action Staff showed him a book called THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND COMMUNIST CHINA by a German named Kurt Muller. The book looked interesting to the Soviet expert, and he asked to borrow it. The Covert Action man replied, "Keep it. We've got hundreds more downstairs." Muller's book was something less than an unbiased treatment of the subject; it was highly critical of Communist foreign assistance to the Third World. The Soviet specialist is convinced that the agency had found out Muller was interested in Communist foreign-aid programs, encouraged him to write a book which would have a strong anti-communist slant, provided him with information, and then helped to get the book published and distributed.

Financing books is a standard technique used by all intelligence services. [H: Our books must certainly be a thorn in the backsides because we sure could use a bit of "help" in publication of all our information. We get a lot in input and destruction from these groups but surely NO HELP!] Many writers are glad to write on subjects which will further their own careers, and with a slant that will contribute to the propaganda objectives of a friendly agency. Books of this sort, however, add only a false aura of respectability and authority to the information the intelligence agency would like to see spread--even when that information is perfectly accurate--because they are by definition restricted from presenting an objective analysis of the subject under consideration. And once exposed, both the writer and his data become suspect. [H: I'm sure any of you readers could name many such writers and their books--memoirs are the most nauseating in my opinion, and all the "big boys" write them. As with Oliver North, the book was written and ready before he knew there was a book "he" was writing.]

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Spies, however, do not keep journals. They simply do not take that kind of risk, nor do they have the time to do so while they are leading double lives. [H: Notes are different and also, when it is known a "fall" is going to come down--they start taking a lot of notes.]

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THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

Allen Dulles [H: Member of the Committee of 300] seemed to be rubbing salt in their wounds when he wrote in THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE that the Penkovsky defection had shaken the Soviet intelligence services with the knowledge that the West had located Russian officials willing to work "in place for long periods of time" and others who "have never been 'surfaced' and (who) for their own protection must remain unknown to the public."

And, of course, the publication of THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS opened the Soviets up to the embarrassment of having the world learn that the top level of their government had been penetrated by a Western spy. Furthermore, Penkovsky's success as an agent made the CIA look good, both to the American people and
to the rest of the world. Failures such as the Bay of Pigs might be forgiven and forgotten if the agency could recruit agents like Penkovsky to accomplish the one task the CIA is weakest at--gathering intelligence from inside the Soviet Union or China.

The facts were otherwise, however. In the beginning, Penkovsky was not a CIA spy. He worked for British Intelligence. He had tried to join the CIA in Turkey, but he had been turned down, in large part because the Soviet Bloc Division of the Clandestine Services was overly careful not to be taken in by the KGB provocateurs and double agents. To the skittish CIA operators, Penkovsky seemed too good to be true, especially in the period following the Burgess-McLean catastrophe. The CIA had also suffered several recent defeats at the hands of the KGB in Europe, and it was understandably reluctant to be duped again.

Penkovsky, however, was determined to spy for the West, and in 1960 he made contact with British intelligence, which eventually recruited him. The British informed the CIA of Penkovsky's availability and offered to conduct the operation as a joint project. CIA operators in Moscow and elsewhere participated in the elaborated clandestine techniques used to receive information from Penkovsky and to debrief the Soviet spy on his visits to Western Europe.

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The Penkovsky Papers was a best-seller round the world, and especially in the United States. Its publication certainly caused discomfort in the Soviet Union.

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Richard Helms years later again referred to Penkovsky in this vein, although not by name, when he claimed in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians . . . helped us" in uncovering the Soviet move. One person taken in by this deceit was Senator Milton Young of North Dakota, who serves on the CIA oversight subcommittee. In a 1971 Senate debate on cutting the intelligence budget, the Senator said, "And if you want to read something very interesting and authoritative where intelligence is concerned, read the Penkovsky Papers . . . this is a very interesting story, on why the intelligence we had in Cuba was so important to us, and on what the Russians were thinking and just how far they would go."

CUBAN MISSILES

Yet the CIA intelligence analysts who were working on the Cuban problem at the time of the missile crisis and preparing the agency's intelligence reports for the President up to and after the discovery of the Soviet missiles saw no such information from Penkovsky or any other Soviet spy. The key intelligence that led to the discovery of the missiles came from the analysis of satellite photography of the U.S.S.R., Soviet ship movements, U-2 photographs of Cuba, and information supplied by Cuban refugees. Penkovsky's technical background information, provided well before the crisis, was of some use--but not of major or critical importance.

Several scholars of the Soviet Union have independently characterized The Penkovsky Papers as being partly bogus and as not having come from Penkovsky's "journal". The respected Soviet expert and columnist for the Manchester Guardian and the Washington Post, Victor Zorza, wrote that "the book could have been compiled only by the Central Intelligence Agency." Zorza pointed out that Penkovsky had neither the time nor the opportunity to have produced such a manuscript; that the book's publisher (Doubleday and Company) and translator (Peter Deriabin, himself a KGB defector to the CIA) both refused to produce the original Russian manuscript for inspection; and that The Penkovsky Papers contained errors of style, technique, and fact that Penkovsky would not have made. [H: This is exactly the same situation that you have with the so-called "Holocaust" books and specifically one in point is THE DIARY OF ANNE FRANK. This was proven to be written by someone--but not Anne Frank! So, who had the most to gain by offering false information regarding something like the "Holocaust"? When you answer these kinds of questions you are beginning to gain insight.]

British intelligence also was not above scoring a propaganda victory of its own in the Penkovsky affair. Penkovsky's contact officer had been MI-6's Grenville Wynne, who, working under the cover of being a businessman, had been arrested at the same time as Penkovsky and later exchanged for the Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale. When Wynne returned to Britain, MI-6 helped him write a book about his experiences, called CONTACT ON GORKY STREET. British intelligence wanted the book published in part to make some money for Wynne, who had gone through the ordeal of a year and a half in Soviet prisons, brut the MI-6's main motive was to counteract the extremely unfavorable publicity that had been generated by the defection of its own senior officer, Harold "Kim" Philby, in 1963, and the subsequent publication of his memoirs prepared under the auspices of the KGB.

Interestingly, nowhere in CONTACT ON GORKY STREET does Wynne cite the help he received from the CIA. The reason for this omission could have been professional jealousy on the part of British intelligence, good British manners (i.e., not mentioning the clandestine activities of a friendly intelligence service), or most likely, an indication of the small role played by the CIA in the operation.

KRUCHEV'S BOOK

Another book-publishing effort in which the CIA may or may not have been involved--to some degree--was KRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, and the second volume of Krushchev memoirs scheduled for publication this year (1974). While these autobiographical and somewhat self-serving works unquestionably originated with the former Soviet premier himself, there are a number of curious circumstances connected with their transmission from Moscow to Time Inc. in New York, and to its book-publishing division, Little, Brown and Company. Time Inc. has been less than forthcoming about how it gained access to the 180 hours of taped reminiscences upon which the books are based, and how the tapes were taken out of the U.S.S.R. without the knowledge of the Soviet government or the ubiquitous and proficient KGB. The whole operation--especially its political implication--was simply too important to have been permitted without at least tacit approval by Soviet authorities. Unlike Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Krushchev was subsequently neither denounced nor exiled by Moscow's all-powerful party chiefs.

Most of the explanations offered by Time Inc. to clarify the various mysteries involved in this episode have a slightly disingenuous air. They may be true, but a number of highly regarded American and British scholars and intelligence officers dealing with Soviet affairs find them difficult to accept in toto. Why, for example, did Time Inc. find it necessary to take the risky step of sending a copy of the bound galleys of the book to its Moscow bureau--secretly via Helsinki--before it was published? The complete story of the Krushchev memoirs, in short, may never be publicly known. And if it is, it may turn out to be another example of secret U.S.-Soviet cooperation, of two hostile powers giving wide circulation to information that each wants to see published, while collaborating to keep their operations away from the eyes of the general public on both sides. After all, the publication of the first volume in 1971 had a relatively happy effect--it supported Moscow's anti-Stalinists, and in turn increased the prospects for detente.

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OUR ENEMY REVEALED

If you are still among the living, breathing, walking and "thinking" masses--do you not begin to believe that there has been much collusion against you-the-people? Remember that Krushchev is the one who hammered his shoe upon the table and said "we will bury you"! Wait, and they shall! You just didn't know who your enemy was and that it was mainly your own government. Pogo said it best: "I have found my enemy and he is me."

Further, in this event of subterfuge and planned extortion and lies, hidden agendas and secret clandestine plottings--do you still believe that NO-ONE HAS TAMPERED WITH THE BOOKS YOU CALL DIVINE? HOW SO? WHY WOULD THE MOST IMPORTANT TOOLS AGAINST THE ADVERSARY BE LEFT UNTAMPERED WHILE YOU ALLOWED ALL THE REST TO BECOME THE TOTAL LIE? PONDER IT WELL, FOR YOU HAVE BEEN "HAD".

Dharma, I recognize that you have worked beyond that which will allow your arms to heal but we shall probably have some hours of inability to write so we needed to work this extra while. Ones ask why these ones give and give without reward and/or ceasing or complaint. Dharma responds by saying it is all she can do in behalf of this nation and "my human species" and somewhere in here--this load is not heavy for these "are my brothers and the only physical world I have; so, anything less than all I have is simply not enough."

If each would only effort to leave the legacy of truth and freedom unto your children and this planet which has given you life--what a wondrous world you would become--if only each would take his own load and walk together. Salu.

PJ 46

CHAPTER 12

REC #1 HATONN

WED., MARCH 11, 1992 7:16 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 208

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1992

Let us share a moment of truth and love so that the passage may be beauteous and not bound in perceptions of hopelessness. Realize that in the permanent bindings of oppression the bough and the sapling are bent and grow into bent and twisted frames. The tree however, when released, grows again toward the light and that portion unbounded grows straight and wondrous from the point of the bending. If the sapling is released it grows ever straight and tall unto the sun. So it is with Man if he will but cast away the bindings of disinformation and misperception--for thus comes the miracles. The mind which is unbound will conjure the wherewithall to accomplish any task for at its command are all the powers of heaven and all the wonders of God.

How much do you do each day to secure the approval of another? Do you, in the ending, approve of self? I can promise you that if you do ALL to find approval of that which you know is the Truth and Light of God so that ALL ye do is worthy of ALL to see and know--YE SHALL HAVE APPROVAL OF SELF. You can secure other people's approval, if you do right and effort diligently--but your own is worth a thousand of it.... To err is but to "live"--all that proves life unto experience is the experience itself and the growth therefrom. May you be willing to "do enough--TO PROVE LIFE". GOD AWAITS!

MISSING SHIP OF MISSILES

The news shouts: "It is reported that there was a ship possibly loaded with missiles which it was reportedly a possibility Bush would have boarded" and, "...the ship in the Gulf has made port--unseen by spying U.S. guard ships." What an insult to your intelligence. For three days you have been at stand-off war over the ships with the missiles headed for Iran. Now they tell you that with all your convoy of spy ships--"it made port unseen"? Then further insults you by telling you casually that your president "thought about having it boarded and seized"! Worse--you let them do this to you! While the U.S. continues to murder women and children in Iraq through a continuing embargo--you allow the lies to flow like water through the spillway. DOES NOT ANYTHING MAKE YOU AROUSED ENOUGH TO STOP THIS MADNESS?

CUBA

How critical is the Cuban situation? Didn't any of you see son, Jeb, on Larry King Live? Didn't any of you hear what Jerry Brown said to you? When asked about Castro and what he would do about Castro if elected, Jerry Brown responded by saying: "....and by the time there is an election there won't be a Castro in power". Are you not tired of "being the last to know"? Aren't you weary of getting information from some Space Cadet with a spy console? Are you not sick to death of having the insulting lies thrown at you from manipulated machines? WAKE UP AND LIVE!

EVIL IN THE ALL-AMERICAN CITIES

How can you tell that there is evil in the controllers of your cities, counties and states? Because they ARE THERE! If you could see the steamy side of every city you would vomit with disgust at the night-slease of spreading evil. In the "all-American" city of Bakersfield, as a for instance, there is a group which gathers regularly in the catacombs of some dank building. They have catered food, drink and drugs. They do ritualistic crime, they experience snuff pornography and writhe around in their own vomitus, excretions and sweat--moving from one slimy partner to another for open sexual rituals of every degrading kind. These groups are comprised of your top leaders, judges and lawyers--the political elite of the city and county. And YOU EXPECT GOD TO MAKE IT RIGHT FOR YOU NICE PEOPLE? YOU ALLOW THIS TO GO ON--FOR YOU REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE. SATANISM IS RAMPANT IN EVERY CITY AND TOWN--AND YOU REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE IT. SO BE IT FOR UNTIL YOU-THE-PEOPLE WAKE UP AND PARTICIPATE--SO SHALL IT WORSEN. IN THE ENDING TIMES IT IS WRITTEN--"THE EVIL SHALL BECOME MORE EVIL AND THE HOLY SHALL BE MORE HOLY--AND EVIL SHALL REIGN". WHERE ARE YOU, WORLD??

HOPE

You accuse Hatonn of "doom and gloom"? How could it possibly be worse than you have come to experience? I bring only Truth and the way out of it--IS THAT NOT HOPE? I show you what is wrong and how to fix it--IS THAT NOT HOPE? I tell you how to come again into God's Light and move in glory--IS THAT NOT HOPE? IF YE THINK ME EVIL, SATANIC AND OF DARKNESS--THEN YE ARE LOST IN HOPELESSNESS AND IT IS NOT OF MY DOING! YE WILL LOOK AT SELF ONE DAY FOR WHEN YE FIND YOUR ENEMY IT SHALL BE IN THE MIRROR. INACTION IS THE SAME AS NEGATIVE ACTION--THEREFORE, YE ARE FOR GOD OR YE ARE AGAINST HIM AND THE CHOOSING IS AT HAND.

Dharma, chela, let us move on into the subject of this Journal, the CIA. Thank you.

CIA: ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

The soul of the spy is somehow the model of us all.
Jacques Barzun.

Intelligence agencies, in the popular view, are organizations of glamorous master spies who, in the best tradition of James Bond, daringly uncover the evil intentions of a nation's enemies. In reality, however, the CIA has had comparatively little success in acquiring intelligence through secret agents. This classical form of espionage has for many years ranked considerably below space satellites, a source of important foreign information to the U.S. government. Even open sources (the press and other communications media) and official channels (diplomats, military attaches, and the like) provide more valuable information than the Clandestine Services of the CIA. Against its two principal targets, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the effectiveness of CIA spies is virtually nil. With their closed societies and powerful internal-security organizations, the Communist countries have proved practically impenetrable to the CIA.

To be sure, the agency has pulled off an occasional espionage coup, but these have generally involved "walk-in"--defectors who take the initiative in offering their services to the agency. Remember that in 1955, when Oleg Penkovsky first approached CIA operators in Ankara, Turkey, to discuss the possibility of becoming an agent, he was turned away because it was feared that he might be a double agent. Several years later he was recruited by bolder British intelligence officers. Nearly all of the other Soviets and Chinese who either spied for the CIA or defected to the West did so without being actively recruited by America's leading espionage agency.

Technically speaking, anyone who turns against his government is a defector. A successfully recruited agent or a walk-in who offers his services as a spy is known as a defector-in-place. He has not yet physically deserted his country, but has in fact defected politically in secret. Refugees and emigres are also defectors, and the CIA often uses them as spies when they can be persuaded to risk return to their native lands. In general, a defector is a person who has recently bolted his country and is simply willing to trade his knowledge of his former government's activities for political asylum in another nation; that some defections are accompanied by a great deal of publicity is generally due to the CIA's desire to obtain public approbation of its work.

[H: I want to discuss some things at this point. Beware of defectors for often they come as "counter-spies". In other words as "set-ups" to infiltrate and take over as has the KGB within your CIA and police departments. The more important is the reference to "walk-ins". Beware of anyone who claims to be a walk-in of ANY KIND. God does NOT USE WALK-INS--IF GOD NEEDS REPRESENTATION--HE CREATES THE PRESENCE BY CHANGE OF DIRECTION. WALK-INS AS SUCH, ARE UTILIZED BEINGS OF EVIL INTENT FOR THE ADVERSARY (SATAN) HAS ABILITY TO UTILIZE THAT WHICH IS ALREADY IN CREATION AND WITHIN THE PHYSICAL--IN OTHER WORDS--HE MUST USE YOU. GOD OF CREATION HAS NO NEED OF SUCH MAN FACTURED SUBSTANCE OR INTENT. So beware and use caution when determining the extent of truth to a person's projection and claim that "I am a walk-in". They are most often simply telling you that in ignorance THEY ARE TOOLS OF EVIL FOR THE EGO HAS FORGOTTEN TO CAST OUT THE EVIL PROJECTION. THE CLUES ARE NUMEROUS IF YOU HAVE "KNOWING" AND THE "WIGGLE AND SQUIRM" WILL ALWAYS BE TO GET YOU TO ABANDON YOUR GUIDELINES OF TRUTH FOR PHYSICAL PLANE EXPERIENCES WITHOUT THE LAWS OF GOD AND CREATION--MOST SUBTLE AND CORROSIVE--GRADUALLY ENTRAPPING YOU.]

Escapees from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are handled by the CIA's defector reception center at Camp King near Frankfurt, West Germany (1974). There they are subjected to extensive debriefing and interrogation by agency officers who are experts at draining from them their full informational potential. Some defectors are subjected to questioning that lasts for months; a few are interrogated for a year or more.

A former CIA chief of station in Germany remembers with great amusement his role in supervising the lengthy debriefing of a Soviet lieutenant, a tank-platoon commander, who fell in love with a Czech girl and fled with her to the West after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The ex-agency senior officer relates how he had to play marriage counselor when the couple's relationship started to sour, causing the lieutenant to lose his willingness to talk. By saving the romance, the chief of station succeeded in keeping the information flowing from the Soviet lieutenant. Although a comparatively low-level Soviet defector of this sort would seem to have small potential providing useful intelligence, the CIA has had so little success in penetrating the Soviet military that the lieutenant underwent months of questioning. Through him, agency analysts were able to learn much about how Soviet armor units, and the ground forces in general, are organized, their training and tactical procedures, and the mechanics of their participation in the build-up that preceded the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This was hardly intelligence of strategic importance, but the CIA's Clandestine Services have no choice but to pump each low-level Soviet defector for all he is worth.

The same former chief of station also recalls with pride the defection of Yevgeny Runge, a KGB illegal (or "deep cover" agent) in late 1967. Runge, like the more infamous Colonel Rudolf Abel from Brooklyn and Gordon Lonsdale of London, was a Soviet operator who lived for years under an assumed identity in West Germany. Unlike his colleagues, however, he was not exposed and arrested. Instead, Runge defected to the CIA when he lost interest in his clandestine work. According to the ex-agency official, Runge was of greater intelligence value to the U.S. government than Penkovsky. This assessment, however, is highly debatable because Runge provided no information which the CIA's intelligence analysts found to be useful in determining Soviet strategic capabilities or intentions. On the other hand, the KGB defector did reveal much concerning the methods and techniques of Soviet clandestine intelligence operations in Germany. To CIA operators who have been unsuccessful in penetrating the Soviet government and who have consequently become obsessed with the actions of the opposition, the defection of an undercover operator like Runge represents a tremendous emotional windfall, and they are inclined to publicize it as an intelligence coup.

Once the CIA is satisfied that a defector has told all that he knows, the resettlement team takes over. The team's objective is to find a place for the defector to live where he will be free from the fear of reprisal and happy enough neither to disclose his connections with the CIA nor, more important, to be tempted to return to his native country. Normally, the team works out a cover story for the defector, invents a new identity for him, and gives him enough money (often a lifetime pension) to make the transition to a new way of life. The most important defectors are brought to the United States (either before or after their debriefing), but the large majority are permanently settled in Western Europe, Canada, or Latin America. On occasion, a defector will be hired as a contract employee to do specialized work as a translator, interrogator, counterintelligence analyst, or the like, for the Clandestine Services.

The defector's adjustment to his new country is often quite difficult. For security reasons, he is usually cut off from any contact with his native land and, therefore, from his former friends and those members of his family who did not accompany him into exile. He may not even know the language of the country where he is living. Thus, a large percentage of defectors become psychologically depressed with their new lives once the initial excitement of resettlement wears off. A few have committed suicide. To try to keep the defector content, the CIA assigns a case officer to each one for as long as is thought necessary. The case officer stays in regular contact with the defector and helps solve any problems that may arise. With a particularly volatile defector, the agency maintains even closer surveillance, including telephone taps and mail intercepts, to guard against unwanted developments.

In some instances, case officers will watch over the defector for the rest of his life. More than anything else, the agency wants no defector to become so dissatisfied that he will be tempted to return to his native country. Of course, redefection usually results in a propaganda victory for the opposition; of greater consequence, however, is the fact that the redefector probably will reveal everything he knows about the CIA in order to ease his penalty for having defected in the first place. Moreover, when a defector does return home, the agency has to contend with the nagging fear that all along it has been dealing with a double agent and that all the intelligence he revealed was part of a plot to mislead the CIA. The possibilities for deception in the defector game are endless, and the Communist intelligence services have not failed to take advantage of them. [H: The infiltration of Mossad (Israeli) counter-agents is the most effective method utilized to gain control of the American Government through the use of Political Action Committees and shrewd management, bribery and blackmail. Remember chelas, the organizations representing Israel are birthed and conjured by the British Intelligence service.]

BUGS AND OTHER DEVICES

Strictly speaking, classical espionage uses human beings to gather information; technical espionage employs machines, such as photographic satellites, long-range electronic sensors, and communications-intercept stations. Technical collection systems were virtually unknown before World War II, but the same technological explosion which has affected nearly every other aspect of modern life over the last twenty-five years has also drastically changed the intelligence trade. Since the war, the United States has poured tens of billions of dollars into developing ever more advanced machines to keep track of what other countries--especially Communist countries--are doing. Where once the agent sought secret information with little support beyond his own wits, he now is provided with a dazzling assortment of audio devices, miniaturized cameras, and other exotic tools.

[H: Please note that today (March, 1992) the government is demanding that the telephone company institute a system allowing easier access to tapping into the lines to monitor all telephones! That means YOU, BROTHERS AND SISTERS--YOU! FURTHER, THE MOVE TO THIS MORE MASSIVELY EXPENSIVE SYSTEM IS VERY EXPENSIVE TO INSTITUTE--SO THE LAW WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TELEPHONE USERS (YOU) PAY FOR THE SERVICE. NO, I JEST NOT--GO READ YOUR PAPERS! I mentioned this a few days ago in a "Today's Watch" and I have a dozen clippings regarding the matter. Is it not sort of like getting murdered by torture and paying the torturer AND the murderer to do the job on you?]

Within the CIA's Clandestine Services, the Technical Services Division (TSD) is responsible for developing most of the equipment used in the modern spying game. Some of the paraphernalia is unusual: a signal transmitter disguised as a false tooth, a pencil which looks and writes like an ordinary pencil but can also write invisibly on special paper, a bizarre automobile rear-view mirror that allows the driver to observe not the traffic behind but the occupants of the back seat instead. Except for audio devices, special photographic equipment and secret communications systems, there is in fact little applicability for even the most imaginative tools in real clandestine operations.

Secret intelligence services in past times were interested only in recruiting agents who had direct accesss to vital foreign information. Today the CIA and other services also search for the guard or janitor who is in a position to install a bug or a phone tap in a sensitive location. Even the telephone and telegraph companies of other countries have become targets for the agency. In addition to the foreign and defense ministries, the CIA operators usually try to penetrate the target nation's communications systems--a task which is on occasion aided by American companies, particularly the International Telephone and Telegraph Company. Postal services also are subverted for espionage purposes.

Most agency operators receive training in the installation and servicing of bugs and taps, but the actual planting of audio surveillance devices is usually carried out by TSD specialists brought in from headquarters or a regional operational support center, like ( DELETED ). The more complex the task, the more likely it is that headquarters specialists will be utilized to do the job. On some operations, however, agents will be specially trained by TSD experts, or even the responsible case officer, in the skills of installing such equipment.

Audio operations vary, of course, in complexity and sensitivity--that is, in risk potential. A classic, highly dangerous operation calls for a great deal of planning during which the site is surveyed in extensive detail. Building and floor plans must be acquired or developed from visual surveillance. The texture of the walls, the colors of interior paints, and the like must be determined. Activity in the building and in the room or office where the device is to be installed must be observed and recorded to ascertain when the area is accessible. The movements of the occupants and any security patrols must be also known. When all this has been accomplished, the decision is made as to where and when to plant the bug. Usually, the site will be entered at night or on a weekend and, in accordance with carefully pre-planned and tightly timed actions, the audio device will be installed. High-speed, silent drills may be used to cut into the wall and, after installation of the bug, the damage will be repaired with quick-drying plaster and covered by a paint exactly matching the original. The installation may also be accomplished from an adjoining room, or one above or below (if a ceiling or floor placement is called for).

The agency's successes with bugs and taps have usually been limited to the non-communist countries, where the relatively lax internal-security systems do not deny the CIA operations the freedom of movement necessary to install eavesdropping devices. A report on clandestine activities in Latin America during the 1960's by the CIA Inspector General, for example, revealed that a good part of the intelligence collected by the agency in that region came from audio devices. In quite a few of the Latin nations, the report noted, the CIA was regularly intercepting the telephone conversations of important officials and had managed to place bugs in the homes and offices of many key personnel, up to and including cabinet ministers. In some allied countries the agency shares in the information acquired from audio surveillance conducted by the host intelligence service, which often receives technical assistance from the CIA for this very purpose--and may be penetrated by the CIA in the process.

Audio devices are fickle. As often as not, they fail to work after they have been installed, or they function well for a few days, then suddenly fall silent. Sometimes they are quickly discovered by the local security services, or, suspecting that a room may be bugged, the opposition employs effective countermeasures. The Soviet KGB has the habit of renting homes and offices in foreign countries and then building new interior walls, floors, and ceilings covering the original ones in key rooms--thus completely baffling the effectiveness of any bugs that may have been installed. The simplest way to negate audio surveillance--and it is a method universally employed--is to raise the noise level in the room by constantly playing a radio or a hi-fi set. The music and other extraneous noises tend to mask the sounds of the voices that the bug is intended to capture; unlike the human ear, audio devices cannot distinguish among sounds.

CIA technicians are constantly working on new listening devices in the hope of improving the agency's ability to eavesdrop. Ordinary audio equipment, along with other clandestine devices, are developed by the Technical Services Division. In addition to espionage tools, the TSD devises gadgets for use in other covert activities, such as paramilitary operations. Plastic explosives, incapacitating and lethal drugs, and silent weapons--high-powered crossbows, for example--are designed and fabricated for special operations. The more complex or sophisticated instruments used by the CIA's secret operators are, however, produced by the agency's Directorate of Science and Technology. This component also assists other groups within the CIA engaging in clandestine research and development.

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The D/S & T, furthermore, assists the Office of Communications in devising new and improved methods of communications intercept and security countermeasures.

Although the experts in the Science and Technology Directorate have done much outstanding work in some areas--for example, overhead reconnaissance--their performance in the audio field for clandestine application is often less than satisfactory. One such device long under development was a laser beam which could be aimed at a closed window from outside and used to pick up the vibrations of the sound waves caused by a conversation inside the room. This system was successfully tested in the field--in West Africa--but it never seemed to function properly elsewhere, except in the United States. [H: Now, eighteen years later--there are more sophisticated devices which go unaltered right through walls and don't even need windows to vibrate.] Another

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When CIA operators are successful in planting a bug or making a tap, they send the information thus acquired back to the Clandestine Services at headquarters in Langley with the source clearly identified. However, when the Clandestine Services, in turn, pass the information on to the intelligence analysts in the agency and elsewhere in the federal government, the source is disguised or the information is buried in a report from a real agent. For example, the Clandestine Services might credit the information to "a source in the foreign ministry who has reported reliably in the past" or "a Western businessman with wide contacts in the local government". In the minds of the covert operators, it is more important to protect the source than to present the information straightforwardly. This may guarantee "safe" sources, but it also handicaps the analysts in making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.

This withholding of information within the government for security reasons is not a new phenomenon in the intelligence business. The joint congressional committee investigating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor found that "the fact the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance than the information obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan."

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The fertile imagination of the S&T Directorate experts during the following years produced many more unique collection schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly highrisk potential. The silliest of all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area, where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the project died [at that time] on the drawing boards and

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The technical difficulties involved in the (DELETED) system and the (DELETED) device were too great and too time-consuming for either to be fully developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence-satellite surveillance programs were achieved. Other clandestine collection devices--a few more sensibly contrived, but most of dubious value--were also developed by the agency's technicians and may now be in operation. The CIA's technical experts often feel compelled to build exotic systems only because of the mechanical challenge they pose. Such efforts might be justified by an intelligence requirement; unfortunately, too many intelligence requirements are not honestly based on the needs of the policy-makers but are instead generated by and for the CIA and the other intelligence-community members alone.

THE TECHNICAL COLLECTION EXPLOSION

While technology has increasingly tended to mechanize classical espionage, its most important impact on the intelligence trade has been in large-scale collection--satellites, long-range sensors, and the interception of communications. These technical espionage systems have become far and away the most important sources of information on America's principal adversaries. Overhead-reconnaissance programs have provided much detailed information on Soviet and Chinese missile programs, troop movements, and other military developments. They have also produced valuable information regarding North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam and North Korean military preparations against South Korea. And such collection has frequently contributed to the U.S. government's knowledge of events in the Middle East.

[H: You must keep uppermost in mind that this information was written before 1974 AND that it deals with the CIA. The fact that Soviet space technology so far surpasses that of the U.S. or any other nation as to make yours look like a game of cops and robbers. You have to come to realize that it no longer is nation against nation in the spying business for the Elite of the world are against YOU-THE-PEOPLE and it has nothing to do with nationality. The technological advances are far out front of anything available at the writing of this original document--but the important point is that now ALL THAT TECHNOLOGY IS TURNED AGAINST YOU-THE-PEOPLE FOR TOTAL SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU--CONSTANTLY.]

As technical collection becomes more refined, classical spies have, of course, become nearly obsolete in clandestine operations against the more important target countries. So, too, has the shift to technical espionage caused America's intelligence costs to skyrocket to more than $6 billion yearly. Not only are classical spies relatively cheap, but technical collection systems, producing incredible amounts of information, require huge numbers of people to process and analyze this mass of raw data.

In terms of money spent and personnel involved, the CIA is very much a junior partner to the Pentagon in the technical-espionage field. The Defense Department has an overall intelligence budget of about $5 billion a year, some 75 to 80 percent of which is spent on technical collection and processing. The CIA's technical programs, however, amount to no more than $150 million yearly. (This is exclusive of several hundred million in funds annually supplied by the Pentagon for certain community-wide programs, such as satellite development, in which the agency shares.) Similarly, there are tens of thousands of people--both military and civilian--working for the Defense Department in the technical fields, whereas the CIA only has about 1,500 such personnel.

Still, the agency has made a substantial contribution to research and development in technical espionage. Over the years, CIA scientists have scored major successes by developing the U2 and SR-71 [and now even more sophisticated craft are perfected] spy planes, in perfecting the first workable photographic-reconnaissance satellites, and in producing outstanding advances in stand-off, or long-range, electronic sensors, such as over-the-horizon radars and stationary satellites. A good part of these research and operating costs have been funded by the Pentagon and in several instances the programs were ultimately converted into joint CIA-Pentagon operations or "captured" by the military services.

* * *

It is time for a much needed break and rest. It is likely most confusing to you as to "why" I spend these hours in unfolding this type of information--but how much do you already know? How much did your parents know? How much did your grandparents know that you utilize this day? Where did your world start to go insane?? Look carefully behind you--see your parents, your grandparents--then look forward at your sons and daughters. Look on farther, and see your sons' and your daughters' children and their children's children even unto the Seventh Generation. In this manner are the Native Americans taught to see the patterns as the whole--unto the Seventh Generation. Think carefully upon this point for you yourself are a Seventh Generation and a hundredth and a thousandth--HOW DID IT COME TO THIS CHAOS AND CONFUSION? HOW WILL IT BE FOR THE SEVENTH GENERATION FORWARD?? WHAT LEGACY WILL YOU LEAVE TO YOUR GENERATIONS TO COME?? I OFFER THIS IN LOVE AND WILLINGNESS TO SHARE THE ROAD AND THE BURDEN IF YOU WILL TAKE MY HAND---AHO!

Sit with me and listen, precious brothers--LISTEN TO THE WIND, THE AIR--THE VERY BREATH OF CREATION AS IT SPEAKS TO YOU--YEA, SHOUTS UNTO YOU TO HEAR. Listen to the air, you can see it and you can hear it--even taste it. Woniya waken--the holy air--which renews by its very breath as spirit, life, breath and renewal--it is LIFE speaking to you in pleading for your taking up of that "life" in the living of it. Conte ista--see with the eye of the heart and you shall know life and so, too, shall you find the path unto freedom of the soul.

MITAKUYE OYASIN,
HATONN

**wave** · 2011-01-18, 03:05

PJ 46

CHAPTER 13

REC #2 HATONN

WED., MARCH 11, 1992 3:15 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 208

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1992

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE (CONT'D)

NSA: CODE BREAKING

America's first experience in technical espionage came in the form of radio intercepts and code-breaking, an art known as communications intelligence (COMINT). Although Secretary of State Henry Stimson closed down the cryptanalytical section of the State Department in 1929 with the explanation that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," COMINT was revived, and played an important part in U.S. intelligence activities during World War II. In the immediate postwar period this activity was initially reduced, then expanded once again as the Cold War intensified. In 1952 the President, by secret executive order, established the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept and decipher the communications of both the nation's enemies and friends and to ensure that U.S. codes were secure from similar eavesdropping. The NSA, though placed under the control of the Defense Department, soon established an independent bureaucratic identity of its own--and at present (1974) has a huge budget of well over a billion dollars per annum and a workforce of some 25,000 personnel.

Before the NSA can break into and read foreign codes and ciphers, it must first intercept the encoded and encrypted messages of the target country. To make these intercepts, it must have listening posts in locations where the signal waves of the transmitters that send the messages can be acquired. Radio traffic between foreign capitals and embassies in Washington can be easily picked off by listening equipment located in suburban Maryland and Virginia, but communications elsewhere in the
world are not so easily intercepted. Thus, the NSA supports hundreds of listening posts around the globe, such posts usually being operated by other U.S. government agencies. Most commonly used to run the NSA's overseas facilities are the armed services' cryptological agencies: the Army Security Agency, the Navy Security Service, and the Air Force Security Agency. These three military organizations come under the NSA's policy coordination; the messages they intercept are sent back to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, near Washington.

Perhaps the most controversial NSA base (operated by the Army) is at ( DELETED) in ( DELETED ). A Senate subcommittee investigating American commitments abroad, chaired by Stuart Symington, revealed in 1970 that this heretofore secret facility had been secured from the Haile Selassie regime in return for hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic assistance--without most members of Congress ever being aware of its existence. [H: This is true of almost everything they do--including go to war.] The Symington subcommittee also discovered a similar NSA facility (operated by the Navy) at ( DELETED) in ( DELETED) which also had been kept secret from Congress. Both these bases have been used to intercept communications for the Middle East and Africa and both required the U.S. government to offer an implicit--but secret--commitment to the host government.

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UNBREAKABLE CODES

Although the NSA engineered some successes against the Eastern European countries and Communist China in the early days, for at least the last fifteen years it has been completely unable to break into the high-grade cipher systems and codes of these nations. Against such major targets, the NSA has been reduced to reading comparatively unimportant communications between low-level military components and the equally inconsequential routine exchanges between low-grade bureaucrats and economic planners. This is far short of learning the Soviet Union's or China's most vital secrets.**David Kahn, author of the definitive work on modern cryptology, The Code Breakers, explained in the June 22, 1973, New York Times why NSA has had and will continue to have so little luck with reading advanced communications systems like the Soviets': "Cryptology has advanced, in the last decade or so, to systems that, though not unbreakable in the absolute, are unbreakable in practice. They consist essentially of mathematical programs for computer-like cipher machines. They engender so many possibilities that, even given torrents of intercepts and scores of computers to batter them with, cryptanalysts could not reach a solution for thousands of years. Moreover, the formulas are so constructed that even if the cryptanalyst has the ideal situation--the original plain text of one of the foreign cryptograms--he cannot recreate the formula by comparing the two and then use it to crack the next message that comes along."

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... One such benefit is derived from traffic analysis, the technique by which the NSA gleans some useful information through the study of communication patterns. A principal assistant of the NSA Director observed at the same meeting that another justification for the agency's continuing programs against the Soviets and Chinese is the hope that "maybe we'll get a break sometime, like the Pueblo" . He was, of course, referring to the capture in 1968 of the NSA spy ship by North Korea. Much of the Pueblo's cryptological machinery was seized intact by the North Koreans and probably turned over to the Soviets. While these machines were not associated with the highest grade U.S. military or diplomatic systems, the Soviets would have been able to use them to read messages previously sent through certain American military channels and intercepted and stored by the Soviets. The NSA has for many years been recording and storing not-yet-"broken" Soviet and Chinese messages, and can presume the same has been done with American communications; for our part, there are literally boxcars and warehouses full of incomprehensible tapes of this sort at NSA's Fort Meade Headquarters.

MORE SUCCESSFUL AGAINST THIRD
WORLD & ALLIES

As with so many other parts of the American intelligence apparatus, the NSA has had considerably more success operating against the Third World countries and even against some of our allies. With what is reportedly the largest bank of computers in the world and thousands of cryptanalysts, the NSA has had little trouble with the codes and ciphers of these nations. Two of the highly secret agency's young officers, William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1960, mentioned thirty to forty nations whose systems the NSA could read. In addition, Martin and Mitchell told of a practice under which the NSA provided encoding and cryptographic machines to other nations, then used its knowledge of the machinery to read the intercepted messages of these countries. This practice still flourishes.

One of the countries that Martin and Mitchell specifically named as being read by the NSA at that time was Egypt--the United Arab Republic. After making their revelation at a Moscow press conference,

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The Soviets probably were, too.

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A "break", in the terminology of the cryptanalyst, is a success scored not through deciphering skill, but because of an error on the part of another country's communications clerks or, on rare occasions, a failure in the cipher equipment. A few years ago, a new code clerk arrived at a foreign embassy in Washington and promptly sent a message "in the clear" (i.e., unenciphered), to his Foreign Ministry. Realizing that he should have encrypted the transmission, he sent the same message again, but this time in cipher. With the "before and after" messages in hand, the NSA had little difficulty thereafter, of course, reading that country's secret communications. Malfunctioning or worn-out cryptographic equipment results in triumphs for the NSA by unintentionally establishing repetitious patterns which detract from the random selections that are vital to sophisticated ciphers. A rough analogy would be a roulette wheel which, because of poor construction or excessive wear, develops certain predictable characteristics discernible to a keen observer who is then able to take advantage because of his special knowledge.

Another type of break comes as a result of a physical (rather than cerebral) attack on another country's communications system. The attack may be a clandestine operation to steal a code book or cipher system, the suborning of a communications clerk, or the planting of an audio device in an embassy radio room. Within the CIA's Clandestine Services, a special unit of the Foreign Intelligence (i.e., espionage) Staff specializes in these attacks. This approach apparently appealed to President Nixon when he approved of the 1970 Houston plan for domestic espionage which surfaced during the Watergate scandal. The plan called for breaking into foreign embassies in Washington because it would be "possible by this technique to secure the material with which the NSA can crack foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions of dollars attempting to break these codes by machines. One surreptitious entry can do the job successfully at no dollar cost." While the Houston plan might have been effective against Third World countries with unsophisticated cryptological systems, it was unlikely to score any significant gains against major powers--even if there had been any successful break-ins. David Kahn explains why: "Code-books could be photographed, because today's cipher secrets reside in electronic circuits, some of them integrated on a pinhead, some of them embodied in printed-circuit boards with up to fifteen layers." When it is successful, the information it acquires is sent to the NSA to help that agency with its COMINT efforts.

In 1970, NSA Director Admiral Noel Gayler and his top deputies admitted privately that a good part of the NSA's successes came from breaks, and they emphasized that the agency was extremely adept at exploiting these non-cryptanalytical windfalls. Nevertheless, breaks are never mentioned in the authorized U.S. government "leaks" concerning the NSA's activities that from time to time appear in the press. In its controlled revelations to the public, the NSA deliberately tries to create the impression that it is incredibly good at the art of deciphering secret foreign communications and that its triumphs are based purely on its technical skills.

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MULTILATERAL SPYING

A side effect of the NSA's programs to intercept diplomatic and commercial messages is that rather frequently certain information is acquired about American citizens, including members of Congress and other federal officials, which can be highly embarrassing to those individuals. This type of intercepted message is handled with even greater care than the NSA's normal product, which itself is so highly classified that a special security clearance is needed to see it. Such information may, for example, derive from a Senator's conversation with a foreign ambassador in Washington who then cables a report of the talk to his Foreign Ministry.

A more serious embarrassment happened in 1970 during the course of delicate peace talks on the Middle East. A State Department official had a conversation about the negotiations with an Arab diplomat who promptly reported what he had been told to his government. His cable disclosed that the State Department man had either grossly misstated the American bargaining position or the diplomat had badly misunderstood what had been told him. In any case, high State Department officers were quite disturbed about the misrepresented position and the incident did not reflect well on the competence of the American official in the eyes of his superiors.

Not even the CIA is immune to such prying by the NSA. On one occasion the Director of Central Intelligence was supplied with an intercepted message concerning his deputy. According to this message, a transmission from a Western European ambassador to his Foreign Office, the CIA's number-two man had a few evenings earlier at a dinner party hosted by the ambassador indiscreetly opined on several sensitive U.S. policy positions. The ambassador's interpretation of the conversation was contradicted by the Deputy Director--to the apparent satisfaction of the DCI--and the matter was quietly dropped.

Some NSA-intercepted communications can cause surprising problems within the U.S. government if they are inadvertently distributed to the wrong parties. When particularly sensitive foreign-policy negotiations are under way which may be compromised internally by too much bureaucratic awareness, the White House's usual policy has been to issue special instructions to the NSA to distribute messages mentioning these negotiations only to HENRY KISSINGER and his immediate staff.

BCCI: CLINTON.

[H: Several inquiries have come back to me in a bit of chiding manner by way of stating that I was wrong about Clinton's connection to BCCI--that they had now brought up bad and conflicting business interests but nothing on BCCI. Forget the quarrel, chelas, the only reason it has not hit the public forum yet is that so many of the candidates, the President, Vice-President and right through the ranks--ARE ALSO TO THEIR EYEBALLS IN THE BCCI SCANDAL AND ALL WOULD "CATCH THEMSELVES" IF IT BROKE LOOSE--IT IS SIMPLY BLACKMAIL. Don't worry about poor old Clifford Clark and his denial of involvement--perish the thought: CLIFFORD CLARK IS AN ACTIVE AND DIRECT MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE OF 300.]

* * *

EMBASSIES TAPPED

The FBI operates a wiretap program against numerous foreign embassies in Washington which, like some of the NSA intercept operations, also provides information about Americans. In cooperation with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (a Bell subsidiary), FBI agents regularly monitor the phones in the offices of all Communist governments represented here; on occasion, the embassies of various non-Communist countries have their phones tapped, especially when their nations are engaged in negotiations with the U.S. government or when important developments are taking place in these countries.

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Wiretaps on foreign embassies, justified on the grounds of preserving national security, must be approved by the State Department before they are installed by the FBI. As it is often State which requests the FBI to activate the listening devices, approval is almost always given. The transcripts of such conversations are never marked as having come from wiretaps, but instead carry the description "from a source who had reported reliably in the past". Such reliable "sources" include State Department officials themselves--the CIA has, on occasion, intercepted communications between American ambassadorial officials and their colleagues in Washington.

In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies and Washington--for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work under State cover. In theory, CIA clerks are not supposed to read the messages they process for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realizes that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which supposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.

When in 1968 Ambassador to Iran Armin Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief in Teheran, Meyer switched his communications with State in Washington to one of these "secure" channels, called "Roger". But the CIA had nonetheless figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington; the CIA Director thus received a copy of each intercepted cable. Written on top of each cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confidential because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

SATELLITES AND OTHER SYSTEMS

The most important source of technical intelligence gathered by the U.S. is that collected by photographic and electronic reconnaissance satellites. Most are launched into north-south orbits designed to carry them over such targets as the U.S.S.R. and China with maximum frequency as they circle around the earth. Others are put into orbits synchronized with the rotation of the globe, giving the illusion that they are stationary. All satellite programs come under the operational authority of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), a component of the Secretary of the Air Force's office. The NRO spends well over a billion dollars every year for satellites and other reconnaissance systems. While the Defense Department provides all the money, policy decisions on how the funds will be allocated are made by the Executive Committee for Reconnaissance, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Requirements for satellite collection are developed by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), which is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence agencies. A special committee of the USIB designates the specific targets each satellite will cover.

Employing high-resolution and wide-angle cameras, the photographic satellites have for years provided voluminous and detailed information on Soviet and Chinese military developments and other matters of strategic importance; conversely, except for special cases such as the Arab-Israeli situation, there has been little reason to apply satellite reconnaissance against other, less powerful countries.

Some photographic satellites are equipped with color cameras for special missions, and some even carry infrared sensing devices which measure heat emissions from ground targets to determine, for example, if a site is occupied or what the level of activity is at certain locations. There are satellites that have television cameras to speed up the delivery of their product to the photo interpreters who analyze, or read out, the film packages of the spies in the sky. But, good as they are, photographic satellites have inherent limitations. They cannot see through clouds, nor can they see into buildings or inside objects.

In addition to photographic satellites, U.S. intelligence possesses a wide array of other reconnaissance satellites which perform numerous electronic sensing tasks. These satellites collect data on missile testing, on radars and the emissions of other high-power electronic equipment, and on communications traffic. Electronic satellites are in some cases supported by elaborate ground stations, both in friendly foreign countries and in the United States, that feed targeting directions to the sensors, receive the collected data from the satellites, and transmit the processed data to the intelligence agencies in Washington.

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U.S. USING OBSOLETE TECHNOLOGY

Until satellites became operational in the early 1960's, spy planes and ships were valuable sources of information, serving as supplements to the product of the NSA, then the best material available to U.S. intelligence. Air Force and CIA aircraft frequently flew along the perimeters of the Communist countries and even over their territory in search of badly needed electronic and photographic information. Spy ships operated by the Navy--like the Pueblo--sailed along the coasts listening in on communications and other electronic signals. Although these programs were considered to be great successes by the intelligence community, occasional blunders such as the 1959 U-2 Affair and the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964 (the two U.S. destroyers "torpedoed" by North Vietnamese boats were on a clandestine spy mission) had a serious and detrimental effect on world politics. Aggressive technical intelligence collection efforts have also led to the capture of the Pueblo, the Israeli attack on the Liberty in 1967, and shoot-down of RB-47s by the Soviets, and of EC-121s and several U-2s by the Chinese.

Despite the risks incurred by such provocative collection actions in the name of intelligence, the Pentagon continues to sponsor these now obsolete programs. Satellites and long-range stand-off (i.e., non-penetrating) systems have deeply reduced, if not eliminated, the need for spy flights and cruises. [H: What this author is not telling here is that these obsolete means ARE necessary, for the U.S. satellite system for spying on Russia has been almost entirely taken-out by the Soviets thus negating most of your crucial spy network from space.] But the armed services have spent billions of dollars to develop the spy planes and ships (just as the CIA and the NSA have invested in outmoded listening posts ringing the U.S.S.R. and China); consequently, there has been a stubborn bureaucratic reluctance to take these collectors out of service. The "drone"--pilotless aircraft--flights over China, for example, were continued even after the Chinese started shooting them down on a regular and embarrassing basis, and after they had proven nearly useless. State Department reconnaissance intelligence experts insisted that the Air Force maintained the drone activity even though the information thus gathered was of marginal value because it had nowhere else to use such spy equipment. Similarly, Air Force SR-71s have continued to fly over North Korea despite that country's lack of meaningful intelligence targets. With the Soviet Union declared off-bounds for secret overflights since 1960, and China since 1971, the Air Force can devise no other way of justifying the operational need for these aircraft.

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MORE DATA LESS EFFICIENCY

Clearly, the prevailing theology in the U.S. intelligence community calls for the collection of as much information as possible. Little careful consideration is given to the utility of the huge amounts of material so acquired. The attitude of "collection for collection's sake" has resulted in mountains of information which can only overwhelm intelligence analysts charged with interpreting it. Further, such material contributes little to the national requirements though it may prove interesting to certain highly specialized analysts, particularly in the Pentagon. There has been little coordination between the managers of the various technical espionage programs, and even less between the collectors and the policy-makers. Each of the many agencies which carry out such programs has a vested bureaucratic interest in keeping its particular system in being, and the extreme compartmentalization of the operations has made it almost impossible for the programs to be evaluated as a whole. Former CIA Director Helms failed almost completely in his assigned mission of bringing a more rational and coordinated approach to the myriad technical espionage systems. It is not likely that his successors will do much better. No CIA Director has ever been able to manage the intelligence community.

Despite the roughly $5 billion already being spent each year on technical systems and on processing the great amounts of data collected, there remains significant pressure within the intelligence community to collect still more information.

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ARMED FOR BLACKMAIL

This secrecy is unquestionably needed to protect the actual workings of the system, but then the operation of the ABM was no less classified, and the national security did not seem to be injured by the ABM debate in Congress. However, the very word "intelligence" seems to make our legislators bow and genuflect. [H: Could that be because there is so much "intelligence" gathered and useable against each one of the ones in Congress?] They have in the past bestowed virtual blank checks on the various intelligence agencies, allowing these organizations to do practically anything they desired. The Soviets have a fairly clear idea of the functions performed by American satellites and other collection systems; there would seem to be little practical reason why the Congress and the American people must be kept completely in the dark.

Furthermore, technical espionage of any kind has a limited value. It can identify and measure missile development and troop movements, but it cannot tell what foreign leaders are planning to do with those missiles and troops. In 1968 the U.S. intelligence community had a relatively clear picture of the Soviet preparations for military action against Czechoslovakia; it had no means whatever of knowing whether or not an actual attack would be made. That kind of information could have been provided only by a human spy inside the Kremlin, and the CIA had none of those, and small prospect for recruiting any. The United States knew what could happen, but intelligence consumers have an insatiable appetite for knowledge of what will happen. Their clamoring makes for more and bigger collections systems to attempt to satisfy their demands.

* * *

DAHMER: CONTROLLED BY WHOM?

As we close this chapter I am asked to comment on the latest press releases which say that Dahmer, who killed and ate victims, was first met by space aliens and then programmed to kill on orders and the whole scenario is directed and caused directly by aliens. Well, chelas, it may be "by aliens" but 'taint any space aliens I know. I believe you will find the theory quite accurate as to mind control and publicity but those things of brainwashing are directed STRAIGHT FROM THE HELL OF YOUR PLACE--NOT THE HEAVENS. SO BE IT.

I have amply warned you that the assault on your senses would be coming in every heinous way possible to terrify you of anything coming from outer space--it is a last-ditch effort to keep God out of your tending. It is up to you that which you believe--but use your clues and really look at what they tell you and show you--does it really appear to be of God? Terror and fear are the most physical tools of all evildom and at some point along here you ones will stop being gullible to the game and you will prevail. As long as you believe the lies--you will continue to get nothing but lies.

Thank you for your late work and may you all read and understand in the Light of Truthful perception for it is only through the Truth that you can find your way into freedom which has all but been totally lost to you. What is the true level of your freedom? Do you pay taxes? Then you are not free! Ponder it. Even if you think you completely own your home--think again--for if you fail to pay your taxes, the home and property can be confiscated for the amount of taxes--be it only a dollar.

Good evening,

Hatonn to clear.

PJ 46

CHAPTER 14

REC #1 HATONN

THU., MARCH 12, 1992 8:04 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 209

THURSDAY, MARCH 12. 1992

TODAY'S WATCH

In the wondrous beauty of a new day do YOU take time to pause and thank God for the gifting of another opportunity for service? Regardless of circumstance--you have opportunity to experience and "live". Do your thoughts remain totally upon self and your circumstances or do you thank and bless your brother?

I note that altars unto every idol are springing up as ones search for peace and to calm their tattered nerves before a day begins (in order to strengthen) and after a day ends(in order to release). The idea is positive but all the little idols unto every resource is foolishness--God is there within--simply speak with HIM. If you must have an altar--make it something of HIS and not pottery and carvings by hands of another man. Try a flower, a plant or simple SILENCE.

UNTAMPERED BIBLE?

I am asked if there are ANY untampered New Testaments? Yes, AND THEY CALLED HIS NAME IMMANUEL. Next in line of clarity would be THE JEFFERSON BIBLE. All other Bibles are written by Saul of Tarsus to control the people and focus them into the physical "controls". The "Christ" experienced as example. Ones wish to say that when the Christ said that "except through me shall ye enter into the Kingdom of God our Father" that he meant "I am THE WAY" and not come to "show the way". Nay, except through practicing that which was given and shown unto you by the Teacher--is the WAY, therefore, except through that Christed path of living would you enter into and within the gates of the Father's house. The "native Americans" call it walking the red road. The Teacher is NEVER the way--doing that which a great Teacher brings unto you IS THE WAY. KNOWING without ACTION is nothing and is "judged" as negative action. In KNOWING the heart will act in that KNOWING or the person condemns self to "refusal" to act according to that knowledge.

WORLD EVENTS

So today, it is claimed that the ship carrying missiles to Iran was not even followed. This, after they told you for days that the military was going to board and confiscate items on the ship.

In the next sentence, "Israel denies selling Patriots to China." Come, come--Israel's only product is arms. Moreover, the Patriots are so terrible in manufacture and usefulness that it would be nice if all enemies had such ineffective weaponry.

That, however, is not the point--if you have open lies in one breath and possible lies in the next--which might you consider as a possibility?

UNITED NATIONS

Bush is coming down hard again on Iraq! The U.N. speakers from Great Britain are wielding the sword. You-the-people allowed the Gulf War to be popular and Bush needs "popular" so guess what is being set up in front of you! The military is at full alert and ready to finish Iraq. Nay, chelas, you are going to start Armageddon wherein the Holocaust will surpass anything ever known to man. In the confusion your President's children can take Cuba.

You should have compassion and pity the blind--but to refuse to see disallows such care. Ponder it. If you march to Satan's drummer then ye shall end up in Satan's camp--so be it.

MITAKUYE OYASIN

Let us return to IMA's CIA for we have meetings today, Dharma.

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE
(CONTINUED)

COUNTERESPIONAGE

Counterespionage, the clandestine warfare waged between rival intelligence agencies, is usually referred to more delicately in the spy business as counterintelligence. Essentially, it consists of preventing the opposition from penetrating your own secret service while at the same time working to penetrate the opposition's--to learn what he is planning against you. As practiced by the CIA and the Soviet KGB, counterespionage is a highly complex and devious activity. It depends on cunning entrapments, agents provocateurs, spies and counterspies, double and triple crosses. It is the stuff that spy novels are made of, with limitless possibilities for deception and turns of plot.

While foreign intelligence organizations with longer histories have traditionally emphasized counterespionage, U.S. intelligence was slow to develop such a capability. To Americans during World War II and immediately thereafter, counterespionage meant little more than defensive security measures such as electrified fences, watchdogs, and codes. The obscure subtleties and intricate conspiracies of counterespionage seemed alien to the American character and more suited to European back alleys and the Orient Express. But the demands of the Cold War and the successes scored by the KGB in infiltrating Western intelligence services gradually drew the CIA deeply into the counterespionage game.

CIA/FBI RELATIONSHIP

Primary responsibility for U.S. internal security rests with the FBI, but inevitably there has been friction between the agency and the bureau in their often overlapping attempts to protect the nation against foreign spies. In theory, the CIA cooperates with the FBI in counterespionage cases by handling the overseas aspects and letting the bureau take care of all the action within the United States. In actual fact, the agency tends to keep within its own control, even domestically, those operations which are designed to penetrate opposition intelligence services; the basically defensive task of preventing the Soviets from recruiting American agents in the United States is left to the FBI. While the FBI also on occasion goes on the defensive by trying to recruit foreign intelligence agents, the bureau's first inclination seems to be to arrest or deport foreign spies rather than to turn them, as the CIA tries to do, into double agents. This fundamental difference in approach limits the degree of FBI-CIA cooperation in counterespionage and confirms the general view within the agency that FBI agents are rather unimaginative police-officer types, and thus incapable of mastering the intricacies of counterespionage work. (The FBI, on the other hand, tends to see CIA counterintelligence operators as dilettantes who are too clever for their own good.) Although the CIA has had almost no success in penetrating the Soviet and other oppositional services, it nonetheless continues to press for additional operational opportunities in the United States, claiming that the FBI is not sophisticated enough to cope with the KGB.

Within the CIA, the routine functions of security--physical protection of buildings, background investigations of personnel, lie-detector tests--are assigned to the Office of Security, a component of the housekeeping part of the agency, the M&S Directorate. Counterespionage policy and some actual operations emanate from the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of the Clandestine Services. As with the bulk of espionage activities, however, most operations are carried out by the area division (Far East, Western Hemisphere, etc.), which are also responsible. The area divisions tend to see espionage value or information-gathering value in counterespionage operations, which are referred to in CIA files as joint FI/CI projects--Fl (Foreign Intelligence) being the Clandestine Services' euphemism for espionage.

Almost every CIA station or base overseas has one or more officers assigned to it for counterespionage purposes. The first priority for these counterspy specialists is to monitor agency espionage and covert-action operations to make sure that the opposition has not penetrated or in some other way compromised the activity. All reports submitted by CIA case officers and their foreign agents are carefully studied for any indication of enemy involvement. The counterintelligence men know all too well that agents, wittingly or unwittingly, can be used by the KGB as deceptions to feed false information to the CIA, or employed as provocations to disrupt carefully laid operational plans. Foreign agents can also be penetrations, or double agents, whose task it is to spy on the CIA's secret activities. When a double agent is discovered in an operation, consideration is given to "turning" him--that is, making him a triple agent. Or perhaps he can be unwittingly used to deceive or provoke the opposition.

If a KGB officer tries to recruit a CIA staff employee, the counterespionage experts may work out a plan to entrap the enemy operator, then publicly expose him or attempt to "turn" him. Or they may encourage the agency employee to pretend to cooperate with the Soviets in order to learn more about what kind of information the KGB wants to collect, to discover more about KGB methods and equipment, or merely to occupy the time and money of the KGB on a fruitless project. CIA counterespionage specialists do not necessarily wait for the KGB to make a recruitment effort, but instead may set up an elaborate trap, dangling one of their own as bait for the opposition.

Further, beyond safeguarding the CIA's own covert operations, counterespionage officers actively try to penetrate the opposition services. Seeking to recruit agents in Communist and other intelligence services, they hope both to find out what secret actions the opposition is planning to take against the CIA, and to thwart or deflect those initiatives.

Counterespionage, like covert action, has become a career specialty in the CIA; some clandestine operators do no other type of work during their years with the agency. These specialists have developed their own clannish subculture within the Clandestine Services, and even other CIA operators often find them excessively secretive and deceptive. The function of the counterespionage officer is to question and verify every aspect of CIA operations; taking nothing at face value, they tend to see deceit everywhere. In an agency full of extremely mistrustful people, they are the professional paranoids. It is commonly thought within the CIA that the Counterintelligence Staff operates on the assumption that the agency--as well as other elements of the U.S. government--is penetrated by the KGB. The chief of the CI Staff is said to keep a list of the fifty or so key positions in the CIA which are most likely to have been infiltrated by the opposition, and he reportedly keeps the persons in those positions under constant surveillance. Some CIA officers speculate--and a few firmly believe--that the only way to explain the poor performance in recruiting Soviet agents--and conducting clandestine intelligence operations in general against the U.S.S.R.--is that KGB penetration inside the agency has been for years sending back advance warnings.

MORE KGB IN CIA THAN AMERICANS

[H: I must note at this point as a reminder. This may have been speculation at the time of IMA's writing--although I suspect he simply had no "proof" and therefore failed to speak with assurance--however, it has been known for years now that there are more KGB in your Central Intelligence service than Americans. The entire thrust has been to unify for the Soviets and American Government have been in coalition for decades--as allies. The point is to have a hard-hitting, cold and powerful police force--by the time the U.N. takes control (which is NOW).]

Many experienced CIA operators believe that counter-espionage operations directed against opposition services receive a disproportionate amount of attention and resources within the Clandestine Services, for even if a spy were recruited in the KGB (which almost never happens), he would likely be of less intelligence value than a penetration at a similar level elsewhere in the Soviet government or Communist Party. To be sure, the spy could probably provide the CIA with some information on foreign agents working for the KGB, perhaps the type of intelligence received from them and other foreign sources, and maybe a few insights into KGB operations against the United States and other countries. But he would know little about the intentions of the Soviet leadership or Moscow's military and nuclear secrets--the most crucial information of all to those officials responsible for looking after the national security of the United States. The KGB officer, like most clandestine operators, is usually better versed on developments in foreign countries than those in his own nation. Although it is interesting to know what the KGB operators know and how they acquired their knowledge, that in itself is of little significance in achieving U.S. intelligence goals. The justification for the counterintelligence effort, although usually couched in intricate, sophisticated argument, amounts to little more than "operations for operations' sake". Admittedly, there can occasionally be a positive intelligence windfall from a counterespionage operation; an agent recruited in a foreign service may have access to information on his own government's secret policies and plans. Penkovsky, who was in Soviet military intelligence (GRU), provided his British and American case officers with reams of documents concerning the Soviet armed forces and their advanced weapons-development programs, in addition to clandestine operational information and doctrine. Agents working for other foreign services have from time to time made similar, although less valuable, contributions. But the CIA's preoccupation with this type of clandestine operation, often to the exclusion of a search for more important secrets, is at least questionable.

* * *

CIA'S SOVIET BLOC DIVISION

Within the Clandestine Services, the Soviet Bloc (SB) Division, quite obviously, is the most counterespionage-oriented of all the area divisions. The rationale generally given for this emphasis is that it is nearly impossible to recruit even the lowest-level spy in the U.S.S.R. because of the extremely tight internal-security controls in force there. Among the few Soviets who can, however, move about freely despite these restrictions are KGB and other intelligence officers. They are, furthermore, part of that small group of Soviet officials who regularly come in contact with Westerners (often searching for their own recruits). And they are among those officials most likely to travel outside the Soviet Union, where recruitment approaches by CIA operators (or induced defections) can more easily be arranged. Being the most accessible and least supervised of all Soviet citizens, KGB officers are, therefore, potentially the most recruitable.

Outside the Soviet Union, according to the SB Division's rationale, recruitment of non-KGB agents is almost as difficult as in the U.S.S.R. Most other Soviets, including the highest officials, are usually under KGB surveillance; they travel or live in groups, or are otherwise unreachable by the agency's clandestine operators. Once again, it is only the opposition intelligence officer who has the freedom of movement which allows for secret contact with foreigners. The division's efforts are therefore concentrated on seeking out potential agents among the KGB.

There is much truth in the Soviet Bloc Division's view of this operational problem, but the fact that the agency's operators have recruited no high-level Soviet spies and included almost no significant defection from the U.S.S.R. in well over a decade raises serious questions concerning the CIA's competence as a clandestine intelligence organization. [H: No, it only presents "proof" of what I say--there ceased to be intent as the organizations actually "merged" right under your noses. Moreover, there is no change in current practices even though the mouths and papers tout no Cold War. The facts are that the merging operations have been under-way for United Nations One World Government and enforcement for over 30 years.] In fact, since the early 1960's there have been practically no CIA attempts to recruit a Soviet agent, and only a handful of defection inducements; Oleg Penkovsky, it must be remembered, was turned away when he first tried to defect.

To be sure, there is reason for extreme care. Most Soviet defectors who bolt to the West are greeted by the agency with great caution because they may be KGB deceptions or provocations. The clandestine operators are so unsure of their ability to evaluate the intentions and establish the legitimacy of most defectors that the CIA has set up an inter-agency committee within the U.S. intelligence community to review all defector cases. This bureaucratic layering not only works to reduce the number of defectors accepted by the U.S. government (perhaps wisely), but also serves to spread the blame if mistakes are made.

Despite the CIA's extreme caution, however, a few defectors, some of them KGB undercover officers, have managed to accomplish their goal of escaping and establishing, as it is known in the clandestine trade, their bona fides, in spite of the agency's doubts. Svetlana Stalin succeeded simply because the CIA officers on the scene in India, with the encouragement of Ambassador Chester Bowles, refused to be held back by the SB Division's bureaucratic precautions.

* * *

It has been well established that the CIA cannot spy, in the classical sense, against its major target, the Soviet Union. Nor does the CIA seem to be able to conduct effective counterespionage (in the offensive aspect) against the Soviets. It even has difficulty dealing with the gratuitous opportunities presented by walk-ins and defectors. Much of this obviously can be attributed to the inherent difficulties involved in operating in a closed society like the U.S.S.R.'s, and against a powerful, unrelenting opposition organization like the KGB; and some of the lack of success can, too, be explained by the CIA's incompetence. But there is more to the failure against the Soviet target than insurmountable security problems or ineptitude. The CIA's Clandestine Services are, to a large extent, fearful of and even intimidated by the Soviet KGB because they have so frequently been outmaneuvered by it.

CIA PRIVATE ARMY OF THE ADMINISTRATION

[H: We will get to the real purpose of the CIA as we move along but I feel it distracting for you who are perceiving the truth of the matter to continue to avoid the issue of what the CIA actually is "for". It is and has been a private army for the Administration's activities. The real interest has never been toward the Soviets--but toward avoiding to have to "declare" war in any other segment of the globe until such time as you-the-people would be content to fight and die for no purpose whatsoever except the greedy private gain of the ones in power. If there would be no war then your undercover operatives could easily start one in which you would be locked into enjoining. This is why you have discontent in the ranks and ones moving out of the Intelligence Community--because of the subterfuge regarding intent and actual mission. Ones joined the forces to serve nation and human citizens only to find the rot and corruption which they ended up serving in blindness. With a lock on information spread and media/press total control--where do you gain insight and truth? So it is--if you think it difficult to face your own sleepy actions, consider the man who has killed hundreds or thousands of innocents only to find it was for protection of CRIME!]

Most Soviet spying successes against the major Western powers have involved penetrations of their intelligence services. The KGB, with its origins in the highly conspiratorial czarist secret police, has often appeared to professional observers to be more adept at penetrating foreign intelligence organizations than in recruiting ordinary spies.

Most notorious among the KGB's infiltrations of Western intelligence (at least those that have been discovered) was Harold "Kim" Philby, who spied for Moscow for over twenty years while a very high-ranking official of Britain's MI-6. In his memoirs (unquestionably full of KGB disinformation) Philby expressed little professional respect for the CIA's talents in counterespionage. But he did admit that it was an agency officer (ironically, an ex-FBI agent) who ultimately saw through his masquerade and was responsible for exposing him to British authorities. There have been several other highly damaging KGB penetrations of British intelligence, French and German intelligence, and the services of most of the smaller N.A.T.O. countries. And KGB agents have been uncovered on several occasions in U.S. intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, several of the military security agencies, and the intelligence section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But as far as is publicly known, no career officer of the CIA has ever been proved to be an enemy spy. There have been some odd dismissals of clandestine officers from time to time for reasons that have smacked of more than mere incompetence or corruption, but none of these has ever officially been designated as a penetration. On the other hand, foreign agents recruited by the agency have sometimes been found to be working for an opposition service. Whenever such a penetration is discovered in a CIA operation, the agency's counterespionage specialists compile a damage report assessing how much information has been revealed to the subject and the possible repercussions of such disclosures on other CIA activities. Similarly, agency counterespionage officers participate in the preparation of damage reports when a penetration is exposed elsewhere in the U.S. intelligence community.

LT. COL. WHALEN

One such report was prepared in cooperation with the Defense Department in 1966 when Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Whalen, a U.S. Army intelligence officer working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was arrested as a KGB spy. The investigation disclosed that Whalen had had access to almost all the U.S. national intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic military capabilities during the "missile gap" controversy several years earlier. Evidently, he had delivered copies of these top-secret documents to his KGB employers.

However, the results of Whalen's actions were, upon examination, as surprising as they were discouraging to U.S. intelligence. A principal reason why CIA and Pentagon analysts believed there was a missile gap during the late 1950's and early 1960's was the numerous references in speeches made at the time by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders alluding to the development and deployment of Soviet long-range nuclear missiles. These announcements, carefully timed to correspond to the progressive phases of intercontinental ballistic missile research, testing, production, and operational introduction to the armed forces, were studied in great detail by the Kremlin-watchers of the U.S. intelligence community. Learning from American scientists working on U.S. missile programs what was technically feasible in the field of ICBM development, and having already witnessed the startling demonstration of Soviet space technology demonstrated in the launching of Sputnik, the intelligence analysts assumed the worst--that the Soviets were well ahead of the United States in the missile race. The analysts noted in their estimates that the statements of the Soviet leaders were a significant factor in making this judgment.

Let us break at this point since it is time for your meeting. Salu. Please get some rest this afternoon.
Thank you.

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