PJ 43
CHAPTER 15

REC #3 HATONN

MON, FEBRUARY 3, 1992 11:31 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 170

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1992

BACK TO THE CIA--CULT


It has been long since we penned on this subject so I will refresh you as to mode of presentation. I am utilizing material from one who PARTICIPATED in the story at point. I do not identify this person except as "I.M. Anonymous" (IMA) because I wish to work from an aspect of ability to publish material yet un­known to him as such. He has been prevented by government authority to print all his material--the CIA requiring preview of the publication and ability to redact and censor ALL. I am in the process of noting (as the author did in his work) the dele­tions as to numbered sentences, etc. My comments are in brackets as is customary when I utilize verbatim information, ([H:]).

As you are daily now walking through the hell of the CIA cover-ups and governmental changes of a Constitutional Repub­lic into a total One World Global Government set up through the U.N., I can only have compassion for you are getting a fully public blast of truth--in the JFK murder. Do not narrow your focus--to be of value, ALL documents on ALL assassinations and evil plans must be uncovered. Just imagine, as you read through the upcoming document, what is probably MISSING and watch as ones you know walk through in heinous crime without ability to touch the hem of their garments. There were other agencies before the CIA which were as heinous but you didn't realize it and the names were conveniently changed just like the "KGB"--the operations get worse and more criminal. They ALL circle back to originating right from the British Intel­ligence Service of the Crown of England--Even the Anti-Defamation League, which you thought to be Jewish. It is Jewish when referred to as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, etc. It is for the purpose of bringing the world into a New Order under Global Government--by year 2000. My sub­ject herein is the CIA and we will effort to restrict it pretty much to that matter. I will undoubtedly require at least two vol­umes to sort through the tangled web of deceit, lies and crime.

We were speaking, when we had to write on other topics, of the Clandestine Theory and we were to the topic heading of:

INTELLIGENCE VERSUS COVERT ACTION

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The primary and proper purpose of any national intelligence or­ganization is to produce "finished intelligence" for the govern­ment's policy-makers. Such intelligence, as opposed to the raw information acquired through espionage and other clandestine means, is data collected from all sources--secret, official, and open--which has been carefully collated and analyzed by substantive experts specifically to meet the needs of the national leadership. The process is difficult, time-consuming, and by no means without error. But it is the only prudent alternative to naked reliance on the unreliable reporting of spies. Most intelli­gence agencies, however, are nothing more than secret services, more fascinated by the clandestine operations--of which espi­onage is but one aspect--than they are concerned with the pro­duction of "finished intelligence". The CIA, unfortunately, is no exception to this rule. Tactics that require the employment of well-placed agents, the use of money, the mustering of mer­cenary armies, and a variety of other covert methods designed to influence directly the policies (or determine the life-spans) of foreign governments--such are the tactics that have come to dominate the CIA. This aspect of the modern intelligence busi­ness--intervention in the affairs of other countries--is known at the agency as covert action.

The United States began engaging in covert-action operations in a major way during World War II. Taking lessons from the more experienced British secret services, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) learned to use covert action as an offensive weapon against Germany and Japan. When the war ended, President Truman disbanded the OSS on the grounds that such wartime tactics as paramilitary operations, psychological war­fare, and political manipulation were not acceptable when the country was at peace. At the same time, however, Truman rec­ognized the need for a permanent organization to coordinate and analyze all the intelligence available to the various governmental departments. He believed that if there had been such an agency with the U.S. government in 1941, it would have been "difficult, if not impossible" for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor successfully. [H: Now keep in mind that the attack on Pearl Harbor was thoroughly known and assisted in the planning by your very government administration. So, the facts are not, once again, anywhere near the touted "reasons". It must become obvious that the presence of the secret organizations not only allowed such action but insured its perfection.]


It was, therefore, with "coordination of information" in mind that Truman proposed the creation of the CIA in 1947. Leading the opposition to Truman's "limited" view of intelligence, Allen Dulles stated, in a memorandum prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee, that "Intelligence work in time of peace will require other techniques, other personnel, and will have rather different objectives... We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces communism, not only in relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the west but in the internal political conflicts with the countries of Eu­rope, Asia, and South America". It was Dulles--to become CIA director six years later--who contributed to the eventual law the clause enabling the agency to carry out "such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National Security Coun­cil may from time to time direct". [H: Yes indeed, such as Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger and so on.] It was to be the fulcrum of the CIA's power.

Although fifteen years later Truman would claim that he had not intended the CIA to become the covert-action arm of the U.S. government, it was he who, in 1948, authorized the first post­war covert-action programs, although he did not at first assign the responsibility to the CIA. Indeed he created a largely separate organization called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), and named a former OSS man, Frank G. Wisner, Jr., to be its chief. Truman did not go to Congress for authority to form OPC. He did it with a stroke of the presidential pen, by issuing a secret National Security Council Intelligence directive. NSC 10/2. (The CIA provided OPC with cover and support, but Wisner reported directly to the secretaries of State and De­fense). Two years later, when General Walter Bedell Smith be­came CIA director, he moved to consolidate all major elements of national intelligence under his direct control. As part of this effort, he sought to bring Wisner's operations into the CIA. Truman eventually concurred, and on January 4, 1951, OPC, and the Office of Special Operations (a similar semi-independent organization established in 1948 for covert intelligence collec­tion) were merged into the CIA, forming the Directorate of Plans or, as it became known in the agency, the Clandestine Services. Allen Dulles was appointed first chief of the Clandes­tine Services; Frank Wisner was his deputy.

With its newly formed Clandestine Services and its involvement in the Korean War, the agency expanded rapidly. From less than 5,000 employees in 1950, the CIA grew to about 15,000 by 1955--and recruited thousands more as contract employees and foreign agents. During these years the agency spent well over a billion dollars to strengthen non-Communist governments in Western Europe, to subsidize political parties around the world, to found Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for propaganda broadcasts to Eastern Europe, to make guerrilla raids into mainland China, to create the Asia Foundation, to overthrow leftist governments in Guatemala and Iran, and to carry out a host of other covert-action programs.

While the agency considered most of its programs to have been successful, there were more than a few failures. Two notable examples were attempts in the late 1940's to establish guerrilla movements in Albania and in the Ukraine, in keeping with the then current national obsession of "rolling back the Iron Cur­tain". Almost none of the agents, funds, and equipment infiltrated by the agency into those two countries was ever seen or heard from again.

In the early 1950's another blunder occurred when the CIA tried to set up a vast underground apparatus in Poland for espionage and, ultimately, revolutionary purposes. The operation was supported by millions of dollars in agency gold shipped into Poland in installments. Agents inside Poland, using radio broadcasts and secret writing techniques, maintained regular contact with their CIA case officers in West Germany. In fact, the agents continually asked that additional agents and gold be sent to aid the movement. Occasionally an agent would even slip out of Poland to report on the operation's progress--and ask for still more agents and gold. It took the agency several years to learn that the Polish secret service had almost from the first day co-opted the whole network, and that no real CIA under­ground operations existed in Poland. The Polish service kept the operation going only to lure anti-Communist Polish emigre's back home--and into prison. And in the process the Poles were able to bilk the CIA of millions of dollars in gold.

One reason, perhaps the most important, that the agency tended from its very beginnings to concentrate largely on covert-action operations was the fact that in the area of traditional espionage (the collection of intelligence through spies) the CIA was able to accomplish little against the principal enemy, the Soviet Union. With its closed society, the U.S.S.R. proved virtually impenetrable. The few American intelligence officers entering the country were severely limited in their movements and closely followed. The Soviet Union's all-pervasive internal security system made the recruitment of agents and the running of clan­destine operations next to impossible. Similar difficulties were experienced by the CIA in Eastern Europe, but to a lesser degree. The agency's operators could recruit agents somewhat more easily there, but strict security measures and efficient se­cret-police establishments still greatly limited successes.

Nevertheless, there were occasional espionage coups, such as the time CIA operators found an Eastern European communist official able to provide them with a copy of Khrushchev's 1956 de-Stalinization speech, which the agency then arranged to have published in the New York Times. Or, from time to time, a highly knowledgeable defector would bolt to the West and give the agency valuable information. Such defectors, of course, usually crossed over of their own volition, and not because of any ingenious methods used by the CIA. A former chief of the agency's Clandestine Services, Richard Bissell, admitted years later in a secret discussion with selected members of the Council on Foreign Relations: "in practice, however, espionage has been disappointing.... The general conclusion is that against the Soviet bloc, or other sophisticated societies, espionage is not a primary source of intelligence, although it has had occasional brilliant successes". (This and all subsequent quotes from the Bissell speech come from the official minutes of the meeting. The minutes do not quote Bissell directly but, rather, paraphrase his remarks).

It had been Bissell and his boss Allen Dulles who by the mid-1950's had come to realize that if secret agents could not do the job, new ways would have to be found to collect intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist countries. Increasingly, the CIA turned to machines to perform its espionage mission. By the end of the decade, the agency had developed the U-2 spy plane. This high-altitude aircraft, loaded with cameras and electronic listening devices, brought back a wealth of informa­tion about Soviet defenses and weapons. Even more important was communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic trans­missions monitored at a cost of billions of dollars by the Defense department's National Security Agency (NSA).

Both Bissell and Dulles, however, believed that the successful use of human assets was the heart of the intelligence craft. Thus, it was clear to them that if the Clandestine Services were to survive in the age of modern technical espionage, the agency's operators would have to expand their covert-action op­erations--particularly in the internal affairs of countries where the agency could operate clandestinely.

In the immediate postwar years, CIA covert-action programs had been concentrated in Europe, as communist expansion into Western Europe seemed a real threat. The Red Army had al­ready occupied Eastern Europe--and the war-ravaged countries of the West, then trying to rebuild shattered economies, were particularly vulnerable. Consequently, the CIA subsidized po­litical parties, individual leaders, labor unions, and other groups, especially in West Germany, France, and Italy. It also supported Eastern European 'emigre' groups in the West as part of a program to organize resistance in the communist countries. "There were so many CIA projects at the height of the Cold War", wrote columnist Tom Braden in January 1973, "that it was almost impossible for a man to keep them in balance". Braden spoke from the vantage point of having himself been the CIA divisions chief in charge of many of these programs. By the end of the 1950's, however, pro-American governments had become firmly established in Western Europe, and the U.S. government, in effect, had given up the idea of "rolling back the Iron Curtain".

Thus, the emphasis within the Clandestine Services shifted to­ward the Third World. This change reflected to a certain extent the CIA's bureaucratic need as a secret agency to find areas where it could be successful. More important, the shift came as a result of a hardened determination that the United States should protect the rest of the world from Communism. A cornerstone of that policy was secret interventions in the internal affairs of countries particularly susceptible to socialist move­ments, either democratic or revolutionary. Years later, in a letter to Washington Post correspondent Chalmers Roberts, Allen Dulles summed up the prevailing attitude of the times. Referring to the CIA's coups in Iran and Guatemala, he wrote: "Where there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist takeover is threatened...we can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid".

The agency's orientation toward covert action was quite obvious to young officers taking operational training during the mid-1950's at "The Farm", the CIA's West Point, located near Williamsburg, Virginia, and operated under the cover of a mili­tary base called Camp Peary. Most of the methods and techniques taught there at that time applied to covert action rather than traditional espionage, and to a great extent training was ori­ented toward such paramilitary activities as infiltra­tion/exfiltration, demolitions, and nighttime parachute jumps. Agency officers, at the end of their formal clandestine educa­tion, found that most of the job openings were on the Covert Action Staff and in the Special Operations Division (the CIA's paramilitary component). Assignments to Europe became less coveted, and even veterans with European experience were transferring to posts in the emerging nations, especially in the Far East.

The countries making up the Third World offered far more tempting targets for covert action than those in Europe. These nations, underdeveloped and often corrupt, seemed made to or­der for the clandestine operators of the CIA. Richard Bissell told the Council on Foreign Relations: "Simply because (their) governments are much less highly organized there is less se­curity consciousness; and there is apt to be more actual or po­tential diffusion of power among parties, localities, organiza­tions, and individuals outside the central government". And in the frequent power struggles within such governments, all fac­tions are grateful for outside assistance. Relatively small sums of money, whether delivered directly to local forces or deposited (for their leaders) in Swiss bank accounts, can have an almost magical effect in changing volatile political loyalties. In such an atmosphere, the CIA's Clandestine Services have over the years enjoyed considerable success.

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Let us give you a lunch break, Dharma. We will resume with the "Swashbucklers and Secret Wars". Salu, Hatonn to stand aside. Thank you.