PJ#003, SPACE—GATE THE VEIL REMOVED

[wave]

CHAPTER 7

REC #2 HATONN

SUN., AUG. 20, 1989 10:30 A.M. YEAR 3, DAY 004

WHO GETS SAVED

"Besides the President and the other officials designated as successors, the Pentagon has developed COG plans for evacuating forty-six key officials at any time of the day or night. These forty-six, named in the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan, or JEEP, would be moved by helicopter to bunkers and command posts. Each has been issued a JEEP-1 identification card. Most of the JEEP-1 cardholders are military officers who work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An additional 248 JEEP-2 cardholders-- disaster relief specialists, senior Pentagon officials and others--would be airlifted to bunkers and command posts but only between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. An attack after business hours would mean JEEP-2 cardholders would have to get in their cars and drive to their designated locations. In all, more than 1,000 political and military officials have been deemed important enough to the continued operations of government to warrant evacuations.

"So odd is the business of planning for doomsday that nothing may be taken for granted. Thus, COG planners have assumed that the coordinates for Mount Weather and Raven Rock have already been entered into the targeting devices of the Soviet Union's long-range missiles. Because of this, there are other secret civilian and military bunkers. Specialists from FEMA and the Pentagon have divided the country into 10 different regions, among which there may be as many as 50 different 'fallout resistant' command-post bunkers, each linked with the others by satellite, ground-wave and high-frequency transmissions. Any one of these facilities is equipped to function as an emergency White House, coordinating the functions of a new, reconstituted government. Theoretically, any secret command bunkers could be used by the President or his successor during or after a nuclear strike, allowing COG planners to play the ultimate high-stakes shell game. The attacker could never be certain which bunker was the "right" one.

"Like 'command and control,' secrecy and deception would also become watch-words of the COG planners. In its essence, during the heavy expenditures of the Reagan years, COG, or Project 908, which is one of its official titles, was a crash program designed to manufacture mobile and secure communications systems, establish the regional centers to which a government under attack could safely be relocated and replicate the most important government services, including allocation of food and medicine and coordination of disaster relief. Because it was so sensitive, the Reagan administration decided to remove much of the program from congressional oversight.

EVEN MANY SENIOR PENTAGON OFFICIALS WERE UNAWARE OF ITS EXISTENCE.

"For all the planning and money that went into the COG program, there have been some embarrassments. One plan called for placing new communications gear capable of withstanding the electronic pulses created by nuclear explosions into specially configured 18-wheel tractor-trailers. The first two prototype trucks were complete in 1984, but when they were dispatched on a test run in rural Virginia that fall, disaster struck. IN ONE INSTANCE, A ROAD BUCKLED UNDER THE TRUCK, WHICH WAS FAR HEAVIER THAN ORDINARY ROADBEDS CAN ACCOMMODATE. THE TRUCK SANK INTO THE PAVEMENT, IMMOBILIZED. THE OTHER TRUCK GOT WEDGED BENEATH A HIGHWAY OVERPASS. EVIDENTLY, SOMEONE HAD NEGLECTED TO CHECK CLEARANCE HEIGHTS FOR BRIDGES." (Hatonn is too embarrassed to even comment that you might miss all this.)

"Some of the communications gear itself caused problems. Officials say THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER PROPERLY. COLLECTIVELY, THE SYSTEMS COST BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DESIGN, BUILD AND INSTALL. Three years ago, intelligence officials say, it was discovered that five such systems could not communicate with one another at all. To rectify the problem, new 'interface modems' were designed, but intelligence officials say the modems have interfered with the systems' ability to send and receive information, in some cases by as much as 75 percent. In one instance, a missile-launch protocol (a detailed series of data needed to arm, fuse and launch a missile) took several seconds to transmit; the transmission is supposed to be almost instantaneous. In selected reports to Congress, military officials say, COG planners misrepresented the results of tests on the system. 'Congress was treated to a successful demonstration,' says one source, 'except the 'results were rigged'. At one briefing, in December, 1985, congressmen were told that the communications systems were 'operational', even though they were not capable of functioning properly at the time.

"Problems with COG, which might have come to light eventually, surfaced when someone blew a whistle. In 1983, then Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the Army the job of devising and maintaining the COG communications system under Project 908. The Army, in turn, assigned the job to its Information Systems Command, based at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. "

WHO GETS PAID

"For help on Project 908, the Information Systems Command turned to a company based in Arlington, Va., the Betac Corporation. A consulting firm composed of former intelligence and communications specialists from the Pentagon, Betac was awarded a 'sole source' contract to devise and maintain security systems for parts of the COG communications system. The 'main basis for selecting the Betac Corporation for this contract effort,' according to an Army contracting document, 'was because no other company has its unique experience, business status and role in C31 architecture.' Internal Army documents indicate the value of Betac's Army contract in 1983 at $3 16,672. By 1985, it had risen to nearly $3 million. By 1988, Betac had multiple COG contracts worth $22 million.

"A civilian intelligence officer responsible for security at the Information Systems Command was curious about Betac, according to Army and congressional sources. Thomas Golden wanted to know whether regular Army personnel could supply the services Betac was being paid to provide. Golden would not talk with a U.S. News reporter. But military and congressional sources say he became curious after learning that a number of Army officials who had worked with Betac at Fort Huachuca and elsewhere were retiring from the Army and being hired back, under the auspices of Betac. As paid consultants to the Army, some were earning up to $400 a day. Seldom had the Pentagon's revolving door spun more quickly. Golden also discovered that Eugene Renzi, a colonel who was deputy chief of staff for operations at the Information Systems Command, had been a key player in the award of the Betac contract. Golden learned that Renzi's son was now working for Betac.

"Pointing fingers at COG was a risky business. Gicola Thorndike, a senior Army contracting officer at Fort Huachuca, says she was forced out of the Army after demanding repeatedly to review the Betac contract. But Golden had authority to review parts of the contract." (Now, friends, does this look just a bit strange?) "In July of 1987, when investigators from the Army inspector general's staff came to Fort Huachuca asking questions about Betac, Golden talked. Under an offer of confidentiality. Golden told of his concerns about the Betac contract. Within weeks, Golden's comments had leaked back to Fort Huachuca." (But of course, why else stage the scenario?)

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

"It was a bad sign. The Army's inspector general has enjoyed a strong reputation for integrity, but the Golden affair shot a huge hole through it. The Army IG began another investigation to determine who had leaked Golden's comments. But word of the new investigation quickly leaked, and before the investigators even left for Fort Huachuca, officials at the Information Systems Command had begun destroying documents. When the Army investigators arrived at Fort Huachuca, they were told the documents had been destroyed in compliance with 'routine classified documents disposal' procedures. According to a copy of their report, the Army investigators concluded that Renzi had retaliated against Golden. But they found no other improprieties and recommended that the investigation be closed. Renzi received a reprimand. The affair was over. Or so it seemed.

"But others besides Golden had begun raising questions about the COG program. Fred Westerman had worked for more than 20 years as an Army counter-intelligence officer before retiring to open his own consulting firm, Systems Evaluation, Inc. Documents show that his company was awarded a contract to provide security for COG facilities around the country. According to Westerman's attorney, Francis Mroz, Westerman discovered that his part of the COG program was riddled with security problems, such as inadequate alarms, faulty locks and flimsy doors. Mroz also says his client became concerned about 'waste and abuse,' such as payments for work not properly done. After Westerman proposed tighter controls, he says, the Army declined to renew his contract. He has sued the Army and FEMA for what he says are unreimbursed costs. In court papers, he has alleged that unidentified government agents have conducted a campaign of secret surveillance, break-ins at his office and wiretaps. His lawyer was a witness to one episode in which an alleged government agent kept watch on Westerman's movements. When the agent's license plate was traced, it was found to belong to a couple in Delaware, who knew nothing about the vehicle. A Justice Department attorney has since launched an investigation" (Now we know about the justice system, don't we?) "of Westerman to determine whether he committed any fraud in the COG program. In an extraordinary move, the government has also sought to classify Westerman's civil suit.

"Congressional investigators eventually became aware of some of the concerns about COG, having heard complaints informally through contact in the Pentagon. Representative Les Aspin (DWis.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was especially perturbed by the Army's initial investigation into the COG program. In a report, Aspin's investigators concluded that the Army's inspector-general system was compromised. And in a stinging letter to Army Secretary John Marsh dated
Oct. 24, 1988, Aspin said he was 'concerned about the objectivity and competence of the investigation.' Aspin wrote that the 'confidentiality of the investigation was breached almost immediately by the head of the inspector-general inspection team.' Aspin's investigators concluded that the Army had failed to exercise adequate oversight over the COG program. They also found that the sole-source contract to Betac should not have been allowed. Betac officials say they know of no investigation of any of their contracts. They declined to discuss the COG program because of its classified nature."

COVERUPS AND FAT CONTRACTS

"For the Congress, the first long look into the COG program was not a heartening one. In response to Aspin's letter, the Army has reopened its investigation of the Army's inspector general and the COG program. Those familiar with this latest inquiry, and with the ongoing congressional inquiry, say intelligence officials are disturbed by what they describe as attempted cover-ups of wrongdoing, possible fraud and woefully inadequate oversight of multimillion-dollar contracts. Investigators have been told of double billing by some COG contractors to separate agencies of the Government for the same work. It was also learned that other contracts, valued at millions of dollars, were increased, some by as much as 50 percent, without input by any contract-oversight office or without any demonstration of , need. Pentagon sources say the COG program has awarded contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to former military officials who worked on COG while they were in the Pentagon. 'The program,' says a key official, referring to a troubled multibillion-dollar antitank weapons system that was scrapped by Congress, 'is another DIVAD.' Says another: 'It is a real mess. '

"Things could get messier still. Subpoenas have been issued, and a grand jury continues to hear evidence. Congress is set to hold hearings this fall on the lack of oversight of classified, or 'BLACK'" (You see, dear ones, you have it again in their own words: BLACK PROGRAMS) "Pentagon programs like COG. For one of the nation's most secret national-security programs, the glare of publicity is bound to be embarrassing. That one of the nation's most important national-security programs were jeopardized by the very people in charge of it would be the most wounding development of all."

I wish to acknowledge the reporter of this well done article: Steven Emerson.

Now I want to quote a shorter insert article by Merrill McLoughlin in the same journal.

FROM 'DUCK AND COVER' TO 'RUN LIKE HELL'

"Perhaps the seeds of optimism were sown way back after the great flood, when Noah and his passengers trooped off the ark onto Mount Ararat, two by two, eager to get on with being fruitful and multiplying. It was then that God promised never again to 'destroy every living creature.' And ever since human beings have maintained a stubborn hope that it is possible to survive the worst.

"Nothing has changed in the Nuclear Age. The first great fad, after the Soviets detonated their first A-bomb, was blast shelters-- windowless, thick-walled buildings that might protect inhabitants if they didn't happen to be located precisely at ground zero. But such buildings were far too expensive to build, so federal officials launched a multimedia educational campaign. KNOW THE BOMB'S TRUE DANGERS blared the films and pamphlets. To avoid them, simply 'duck and cover.' Millions of schoolchildren spent untold hours ducking under desks and covering their head to the tune of air-raid sirens.

"The trouble was that even the experts didn't know the bomb's true dangers. And as it became clear that the most acrobatic ducker wouldn't survive a thermonuclear blast, officials changed their advice from 'duck and cover" to 'run like hell' and tried to design evacuation plans. In the mid-1950's, scientists realized that even if you ran, you couldn't hide. The real danger of the bomb was a silent, invisible and highly mobile by-product called "fallout". By 1962, and the Cuban missile crisis, fallout shelters were the order of the day. Families stocked backyard bunkers with food, water and weapons.

"The early 1980's brought the last great burst of civil-defense enthusiasm. Although his advisers never figured out just where he got his information, Ronald Reagan was convinced that the Soviet Union had invested in 'a great civil-defense program' and called for a matching American effort. Building shelters for all Americans would cost a budget-shattering $70 billion" (well, still cheaper than the S & L bailout) "or more. So federal officials concentrated instead on 'crisis relocations planning.' Once again, the planners designed evacuation measures. The private sector, too, pitched in. AT&T set up shelter for key executives. And in Laverkin, Utah, a developer built 240 underground condos complete with outdoor scenes painted on the 'windows.'

"For those without access to such facilities, Reagan's deputy Under Secretary of Defense, T.K. Jones, had some advice. 'Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw 3 feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it. If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it."

Now, let us turn briefly to the military scenario for coping with doomsday:

FIGHTING BACK AFTER AN ATI'ACK

"The U.S. military has its own scenario to cope with doomsday. In a nuclear attack, the Pentagon would certainly be targeted, so plans have been laid for the nation's military elite to wage war from other places. There are secret bomb shelters and airborne command posts. The most likely underground bunker is located five miles north of Camp David in the Maryland hills. Its official name is the Alternate National Military Command Center, but it is known more commonly as Raven Rock or, simply Site R." (Now, surely no one in the enemy camp could pin point that location for missile attack--it is so thoroughly SECRET in location.) "Raven Rock is said to be able to withstand everything but a direct hit." (Well, no need to worry about that as obviously no one would be able to pin point five miles north of Camp David in the Maryland hills.) "The nation's war planners could stay there a long time, too. According to military documents,
Raven Rock has a medical clinic, a barber shop and a dining hall. There is also a chapel, a laundry (self-service only), a racquetball court and a place to cash checks.

"The President and top military leaders could take to the air, if need be, boarding one of four specially equipped Boeing 747's called National Emergency Airborne Command Posts (NEACP's) kept at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington. The NEACP's can stay airborne for 12 hours and travel up to 6,000 miles without refueling. They carry tons of communications equipment linked to a satellite network, as well as commercial telephone systems.

"If the Strategic Air Command is unable to carry out its mission from its underground headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base outside Omaha, it, too, can take to the air. SAC maintains several four-engine jet aircraft code-named 'Looking Glass, ' each of which can carry a 28 person airborne command staff—including intelligence, weather, logistics and battle specialists. These craft can remain aloft for more than 8 hours. One of the jets is kept airborne at all times." Reporter: Douglas Pasternak

Well, there you have it--since it will only take Earth about 250 million years to recover from radiation contamination—who knows if those 747's can stay airborne long enough--well, perhaps if the hydraulics don't fail and they don't need refueling. Rest well tonight, brothers, knowing that you are in capable hands!

Another respite, Dharma, as I don't know how your brothers feel but you are turning green, chela. Someone is apt to guess you are one of those little green men from Mars with antennae and bug eyes.

So be it, Hatonn to stand-by. SALU