PJ 44
CHAPTER 9
REC #2 HATONN
SUN., FEBRUARY 9, 1992 10:51 A.M. YEAR 5, DAY 176
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1992
Since one of the most important men in your nation was also once head of the CIA, I think I shall probably increase the length of this particular subject to include integration of the biographical outlay of George Bush. Even if this requires several JOURNALS to adequately cover the material. Life, after all, is a series of totally integrated bits and pieces and must be considered in that light--for all impacts all other. We shall just move along and interrupt where appropriate.
I suggest you break up John's work on Russia into segments suitable to run in series in the Liberator. It is imperative that you have background on Russia and circumstances unfolding there so that you can better discern what, exactly, is taking place and how and why it impacts you so greatly. Then, at some point we are going to have to take an in-depth look into the United Nations Charter and structure to see how and why you have been "had" unknowingly.
Now, however, let us continue with the CIA subject in point. We shall begin today with:
THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The CIA is big, very big. Officially, it has authorized manpower of 16,500 [1974] and an authorized budget of $750 million [H: This, of course, is completely outdated but serves the purpose of explanation of how the system works.]--and even those figures are jealously guarded, generally made available only to Congress. Yet, regardless of its official size and cost, the agency is far larger and more affluent than these figures indicate.
The CIA itself does not even know how many people work for it. The 16,500 figure does not reflect the tens of thousands who serve under contract (mercenaries, agents, consultants, etc.) or who work for the agency's proprietary companies. Nor does the figure include the guard force which protects the CIA's buildings and installations, the maintenance and char force, or the people who run the agency's cafeterias. The General Services Administration employs most of these personnel. Past efforts to total up the number of foreign agents have never resulted in precise figures because of the inordinate secrecy and compartmentalization practiced by the Clandestine Services. Sloppy record-keeping--often deliberate on the part of the operators "for security purposes"--is also a factor. There are onetime agents hired for specific missions, contract agents who serve for extended periods of time, and career agents who spend their entire working lives secretly employed by the CIA. In some instances, contract agents are retained long after their usefulness has passed, but usually are known only to the case officers with whom they deal. One of the Watergate burglars, Eugenio Martinez, was in this category. When he was caught inside the Watergate on that day in June 1972, he still was receiving a $100-a-month stipend from the agency for work apparently unrelated to his covert assignment for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The CIA claims to have since dropped him from the payroll.
WASTEFUL PAY POLICIES
A good chunk of the agency's annual operational funds, called "project money", is wasted in this fashion. Payments to no-longer-productive agents are justified on several grounds: the need to maintain secrecy about their operations even though these occurred years ago; the vague hope that such agents will again prove to be useful (operators are always reluctant to give up an asset, even a useless one), and the claim that the agency has a commitment to its old allies--a phenomenon known in the CIA as "emotional attachment". It is the last justification that carries the most weight within the agency. Thus, hundreds--perhaps thousands--of former Cuban, East European, and other minor clandestine agents are still on the CIA payroll, at an annual cost to the taxpayers of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars a year.
All mercenaries and many field-operations officers used in CIA paramilitary activities are also contractees and, therefore, are not reflected in the agency's authorized manpower level. The records kept on these soldiers of fortune are at best only gross approximations. In Laos and Vietnam, for example, the Clandestine Services had a fairly clear idea of how many local tribesmen were in its pay, but the operators were never quite certain of the total number of mercenaries they were financing through the agency's numerous support programs, some of which were fronted for by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and, of course, the CIA proprietary, Air America.
COMPUTERIZED RECORDS VIEWED AS THREAT
Private individuals under contract to--or in confidential contact with--the agency for a wide variety of tasks other than soldiering or spying are also left out of the personnel totals, and complete records of their employment are not kept in any single place. Attempts to computerize the complete CIA employment list were frustrated and eventually scuttled by Director Helms, who viewed the effort as a potential breach of operational security. In 1967, however, when the CIA's role on American campuses was under close scrutiny because of the embarrassing National Student Association revelations, Helms asked his staff to find out just how many university personnel were under secret contract to the CIA. After a few days of investigation, senior CIA officers reported back that they could not find the answer. Helms immediately ordered a full study of the situation, and after more than a month of searching records all over the agency, a report was handed in to Helms listing hundreds of professors and administrators on over a hundred campuses. But the staff officers who compiled the report knew that their work was incomplete. Within weeks, another campus connection was exposed in the press. The contact was not on the list that had been compiled for the director.
UNCOUNTABLE: PLANES and PEOPLE
Just as difficult as adding up the number of agency contractees is the task of figuring out how many people work for its proprietaries. CIA headquarters, for instance, has never been able to compute exactly the number of planes flown by the airlines it owns, and personnel figures for the proprietaries are similarly imprecise. An agency holding company, the Pacific Corporation, including Air America and Air Asia, alone accounts for almost 20,000 people, more than the entire workforce of the parent CIA. For years this vast activity was dominated and controlled by one contract agent, George Doole, who later was elevated to the rank of a career officer. Even then his operation was supervised, part time, by only a single senior officer who lamented that he did not know "what the hell was going on".
Well aware that the agency is two or three (or more) times as large as it appears to be, the CIA's leadership has consistently sought to downplay its size. During the directorship of Richard Helms, when the agency had a career-personnel ceiling of 18,000, CIA administrative officers were careful to hold the employee totals to 200 to 300 people below the authorized complement. Even at the height of the Vietnamwwar, while most national-security agencies were increasing their number of employees, the CIA handled its increased needs through secret contracts, thus giving a deceptive impression of personnel leanness. Other bureaucratic gambits were in a similar way to keep the agency below the 18,000 ceiling. Senior officers were often rehired on contract immediately after they retired and started to draw government pensions. Overseas, agency wives were often put on contract to perform secretarial duties.
PROPRIETARY COMPANIES OUTGROW CONTROL
Just as the personnel figure is deceptive, so does the budget figure not account for a great part of the CIA's campaign chest. The agency's proprietaries are often money-making enterprises and thus provide "free" services to the parent organization. The prime examples of this phenomenon are the airlines (Air America, Air Asia, and others) organized under the CIA holding company, the Pacific Corporation, which has grown bigger than the CIA itself by conducting as much private business as possible and continually reinvesting the profits. These companies generate revenues in the tens of millions of dollars each year, but the figures are imprecise because detailed accounting of their activities is not normally required by agency bookkeepers. For all practical purposes, the proprietaries conduct their own financial affairs with a minimum of oversight from CIA headquarters. Only when a proprietary is in need of funds for, say, expansion of its fleet of planes does it request agency money. Otherwise, it is free to use its profits in any way it sees fit. In this atmosphere, the proprietaries tend to take on lives of their own, and several have grown too big and too independent to be either controlled from or dissolved by headquarters.
A MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR CONGLOMERATE WITH
BUDGETARY BLACK HOLES
Similarly, the CIA's annual budget does not show the Pentagon's annual contribution to the agency, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, to fund certain major technical espionage programs and some particularly expensive clandestine activities. For example, the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate has an annual budget of only a little more than $100 million, but it actually spends well over $500 million a year. The difference is funded largely by the Air Force, which underwrites the national overhead-reconnaissance effort for the entire U.S. intelligence community. [H: Note also that under "Black Budget" fundings there is no accounting for money in or out. It simply becomes a black hole and any project which needs more funding in secret--is simply labeled "Black this or that" and funds are shifted or acquired through any resource desirable--as in drugs, hostages, arms dealing, etc.] Moreover, the Clandestine Services waged a "secret" war in Laos for more than a decade at an annual cost to the government of approximately $500 million. Yet, the CIA itself financed less than 10 percent of this amount each year. The bulk of the expense was paid for by other federal agencies, mostly the Defense Department but also the Agency for International Development.
Fully aware of these additional sources of revenue, the CIA's chief of planning and programming reverently observed a few years ago that the director does not operate a mere multimillion-dollar agency but actually runs a multibillion-dollar conglomerate--with virtually no outside oversight.
HIDDEN SURPLUSES
In terms of financial assets, the CIA is not only more affluent than its official annual budget reflects, it is one of the few federal agencies that have no shortage of funds. In fact, the CIA has more money to spend than it needs. Since its creation in 1947, the agency has ended almost every fiscal year with a surplus--which it takes great pains to hide from possible discovery by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or by the congressional oversight subcommittees. The risk of discovery is not high, however, since both the OMB and the subcommittees are usually friendly and indulgent when dealing with the CIA. Yet, each year the agency's bookkeepers, at the direction of the organization's top leadership, transfer the excess funds to the accounts of the CIA's major components with the understanding that the money will be kept available if requested by the director's office. This practice of squirreling away these extra dollars would seem particularly unnecessary because the agency always has some $50 to $100 million on call for unanticipated costs in a special account called the Director's Contingency Fund.
"WITHOUT REGARD TO PROVISIONS OF LAW"
The Director's Contingency Fund was authorized by a piece of legislation which is unique in the American system. Under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted the privilege of expending funds "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director..." In the past, the Fund
4 LINES DELETED
But there have been times when the fund has been used for the highly questionable purpose of paying expenses incurred by other agencies of the government. [H: Are all of you feeling wonderfully calm and secure knowing that Gates is running around in the Middle East making deals and threats in your behalf--right NOW? WITH UNLIIVIITED FUNDS-YOURS!!!]
CIA DID WHAT DEFENSE SECRETARY
COULDN'T DO
In 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara promised Norwegian officials that the U.S. government would provide them with some new air-defense equipment costing several million dollars. McNamara subsequently learned the equipment was not available to the Pentagon's inventories and would have to be specially purchased for delivery to Norway. He was also informed that, because of the high cost of the Vietnam war (for which the Defense Department was then seeking a supplemental appropriation from Congress), funds to procure the air-defense equipment were not immediately at hand. Further complications arose from the fact that the Secretary was then engaged in a disagreement with some members of Congress over the issue of foreign military aid. It was therefore decided not to openly request the funds for the small but potentially sticky commitment to the Norwegians. Instead the Pentagon asked the CIA (with White House approval) to supply the money needed for the purchase of air-defense equipment. The funds were secretly transferred to the Defense
5 ½ LINES DELETED
PICKING UP LBJ'S TAB ON THE SLY
That same year President Johnson traveled to Punta del Este, a posh resort in Uruguay, for a meeting of the Organization of American States. He entertained the attending foreign leaders in a lavish manner which he apparently thought befitted the President of the United States, and he freely dispensed expensive gifts and souvenirs. In the process, LBJ greatly exceeded the representational allowance that the State Department had set aside for the conference. When the department found itself in the embarrassing position of being unable to cover the President's bills because of its tight budget (due in part to the economies LBJ had been demanding of the federal bureaucracy to help pay for the war in Vietnam), it was reluctant to seek additional funds from Congress. Representative John Rooney of Brooklyn, who almost singlehandedly controlled State's appropriations, had for years been a strong critic of representational funds (called the "booze allowance") for America's diplomats. Rather than face Rooney's wrath, State turned to the CIA, and the Director's Contingency Fund was used to pay for the President's fling at Punta del Este. [H: Still think that Johnson, Bush and cohorts didn't have anything to do with the death of JFK? People, you are going to wake up or you are going down fast in the plans they have set for you now that they got away with everything so far.]
For some reason--perhaps because of the general view in the CIA that its operations are above the law--the agency has tended to play fiscal games that other government departments would not dare engage in. One example concerns the agency's use of its employee retirement fund, certain agent and contract-personnel escrow accounts, and the CIA credit union's capital, to play the stock market. With the approval of the top CIA leadership, a small group of senior agency officers has for years secretly supervised the management of these funds and invested them in stocks, hoping to turn a greater profit than normally would be earned through the Treasury Department's traditionally low-interest but safe bank deposits and bond issues. Originally, the investment group, consisting of CIA economists and lawyers, dealt with an established Boston brokerage house which made the final investment decisions. But several years ago the Boston brokers proved too conservative to suit the agency investors, some of whom were making fatter profits with their personal portfolios. The CIA group decided it could do much better by picking its own stocks, so the brokerage house was reduced to doing only the actual stock trading (still with a handsome commission, of course). Within a matter of months the agency investors were earning bigger profits than ever before. Presumably, the gains were plowed back into the retirement, escrow, and credit-union funds. [H: This makes Keating look like small potatoes! Just think, most of the ones in the plans in the first place are assumed names, unlisted and what recourse would there ever be for any kind of recovery of retirement funds if the ones in charge either changed their minds about paying or, in fact, lost every last cent. There, further, was no way to check on the amount of private pocketing of any funds.] The investment practices of the CIA group in companies with overseas holdings open up some interesting questions about "insider" information. Would the CIA group have sold Anaconda Copper short in 1970 when the agency realized that its covert efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the Presidency of Chile had failed? Or in 1973, when Director James Schlesinger decided to allow William Broe, the former chief of the Clandestine Services' Western Hemisphere Division, to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and describe ITT's role in trying to provoke CIA action against Allende, might the investment group not have been tempted to dump its ITT stock (if it had any)?
It is time for a rest break for lunch. Thank you. We will continue with the subject at this point when we again pen.
PJ 44
CHAPTER 10
REC #3 HATONN
SUN., FEBRUARY 9, 1992 3:49 P.M. YEAR 5, DAY 176
SUNDAY FEBRUARY 9 1992
Please continue to keep in mind that the original document from which the text herein is utilized, was brought to the public in 1974. The names will be familiar to most of you as recent disclosures come forth, i.e., "JFK" and other of our own writings of disclosure. However, at this time I do not wish to take time to bring each player or counterpart into your attention. I have done so already in many of the prior JOURNALS and LIBERATORS so please be patient and we will get it all updated after we have laid the foundation in sequence, more easily making sense of the whole. Thank you.
CONT' D: CIA AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
INVESTIGATION OF CIA FINANCES (ALMOST),
In 1968, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, then the Chairman of the Senate Joint Subcommittee for overseeing the CIA's activities, privately informed Director Helms that because of increasing skepticism among certain Senators about the agency operations, it probably would be a good idea for the CIA to arrange to have its financial procedures reviewed by an independent authority. Thus, in Russell's view, potential Senate critics who might be considering making an issue of the agency's special fiscal privileges would be undercut in advance. Senator Russell suggested the names of a few private individuals who might be willing to undertake such a task on behalf of the CIA. After conferring with his senior officers, Helms chose to ask Wilfred McNeil, at that time the president of Grace Shipping Lines.
3 LINES DELETED
to serve as the confidential reviewer of the agency's budgetary practices. McNeil, a former admiral and once comptroller for the Defense Department, was thought by Helms to be ideally suited, politically and otherwise, for the assignment.
McNeil accepted the task and soon came to CIA headquarters for a full briefing on the agency's most sensitive financial procedures--including an account of the methods used for purchasing and laundering currency on the international black market. He was told of the CIA's new planning, programming, and budgeting system, modeled after the innovations Robert McNamara had introduced at the Defense Department. Agency experts explained to McNeil how funds for new operations were authorized within the agency. He learned that the agency maintained a sliding-scale system for the approval of new projects or the periodic renewal of ongoing ones; that espionage operations costing up to $10,000 could be okayed by operators in the field, and that progressively more expensive operations necessitated branch, division, and Clandestine Services chief approval until, finally, operations costing over $100,000 were authorized personally by the Director. McNeil also was briefed on the agency's internal auditing system to prevent field operatives from misusing secret funds.
McNeil's reaction to his long and detailed briefing was to express surprise at the scope of the CIA's financial system and to praise the accounting practices used. When asked where and when he would like to begin his work in depth, he politely demurred and departed--never to return. A month or so later a CIA officer working in the Director's office learned that McNeil had had certain misgivings about the project and had sought the advice of former agency Director William Raborn, who had his own doubts about the reliability of the CIA's top career officers. Raborn had apparently discouraged McNeil from becoming involved in such a review. But as far as the CIA was concerned, Senator Russell's request for an independent audit had been carried out, since the agency's fiscal practices had been looked over by a qualified outsider and found to be in no need of improvement. The whole matter was then dropped.
THE FOUR FINANCIAL DIRECTORATES OF CIA
The CIA is neatly organized into five district parts, a relatively small office of the Director and four functional directorates, the largest of which is the Directorate of Operations (known inside the agency as the Clandestine Services). The executive suite houses the CIA's only two political appointees, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director (DDCI), and their immediate staffs. Included organizationally, but not physically, in the Office of the Director are two components that assist the DCI in his role as head of the U.S. intelligence community. One is a small group of senior analysts, drawn from the CIA and the other agencies of the community, which prepares the "blue books", or National Intelligence Estimates, on such subjects as Soviet strategic defense capabilities, Chinese long-range missile developments, and political outlook for Chile. These senior analysts are called National Intelligence Officers (and sometimes "the Wise Men" by their colleagues within the community). The group has replaced the Board of National Estimates, which was a larger and more formalized body of senior officers who oversaw the preparation of national estimates. The other is the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, a group created in 1971, which provides staff assistance to the Director in his efforts to manage and streamline the $6-billion intelligence community. [H: I believe it can now become more apparent to you that it will be all but impossible to dismantle the CIA in the manner suggested in recent political circles--the myriads of finger operations precludes even locating them all. It also must become apparent how easy it would have been to find ones to commit an assassination against one who was going to "scatter the CIA to the winds" as promised by Kennedy. When the jackal's tail wags the beast it is difficult to regain control.]
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, long a dream of those officers who believe the U.S. intelligence community to be too big and inefficient, has thus far proven to be something of a nightmare. Instead of eliminating wasteful and redundant activities within U.S. intelligence, it has been turned into a vehicle for the military intelligence agencies to justify and expand their already overly ambitious collection programs. Likewise, the recent revamping of the Board of National Estimates, under present Director William Colby, has been characterized by some experienced hands as "a sellout" to Pentagon power, caused in part by the political pressures of HENRY KISSINGER's National Security Council staff. Under Colby, the board has been greatly reduced in both prestige and independence, and has been brought under the stifling influence of military men whose first allegiance is to their parent services rather than to the production of objective, balanced intelligence assessments for the policy-makers.
INTERNAL SECRECY
The other components of the Office of the Director include those traditionally found in governmental bureaucracies: press officers, congressional liaison, legal counsel, and so on. Only two merit special note: the Cable Secretariat and the Historical Staff. The former was established in 1950 at the insistence of the Director, General Walter Bedell Smith. When Smith, an experienced military staff officer, learned that agency communications, especially those between headquarters and the covert field stations and bases, were controlled by the Clandestine Services, he immediately demanded a change in the system. "The operators are not going to decide what secret information I will see or not see," he is reported to have said. Thus, the Cable Secretariat, or message center, was put under the Director's immediate authority. Since then, however, the operators have found other ways, when it is thought necessary, of keeping their most sensitive communications from going outside the Clandestine Services.
"SUBTLE" CENSORSHIP OF RETIREES
The Historical Staff represents one of the CIA's more clever attempts to maintain the secrecy on which the organization thrives. Several years ago the agency began to invite retiring officers to spend an additional year or two with the agency--on contract, at regular pay--writing their official memoirs. The product of their effort is, of course, highly classified and tightly restricted. In the agency's eyes, this is far better than having former officers openly publish what really happened during their careers with the CIA.
* * *
THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES
The largest of the agency's four directorates in the Directorate of Operations, or the Clandestine Services, which has about 6,000 professionals and clericals. The ratio between professionals, mostly operations officers, and clericals, largely secretaries, is roughly two to one. Approximately 45 percent of the Clandestine Services personnel is stationed overseas, the vast majority using official cover--i.e., posing as representatives of the State or Defense Department. About two out of three of the people in the Clandestine Services are engaged in general intelligence activities--liaison, espionage, and counterespionage--the remainder concentrating on various forms of covert action. Yet despite the smaller number of personnel working on covert action, these interventions in the internal affairs of other countries cost about half again as much as spying and counterspying ($260 million v. $180 million annually). [H: This of course, has rocketed upward since this writing. I'm sure you ones had no idea of that which you pay for. Actually you don't pay for it directly--money is borrowed from the Elite banks and you pay for the privilege of being in debt for all generations to come. The military becomes only a backup "gun fodder" group to do the bidding of these scoundrels working their horror in secret places--again, at your expense in every way imagined. For every action which makes it to the attention of the public in any measure at all--there are hundreds of others of equal degradation and danger--under way. The point is to make sure you never find out about them. It becomes easy as patriotism and yellow ribbons replace any ability to think for selves. For instance--what in all the world could one, Saddam Hussein, possibly do in a whole lifetime that had any impact on you in America in any way what-so-ever? As with all things, you fight another's battles, forfeit your children and pay for the whole ball of wax. When are you going to get enraged enough to clean up this mess of vipers?] The greater expense for covert action is explained by the high costs of paying for paramilitary operations and subsidizing political parties, labor unions, and other international groups.
The Clandestine Services is broken down into fifteen separate components, but its actual operating patterns do not follow the neat lines of an organizational chart. Exceptions are the rule. Certain clandestine activities which would seem to an outsider to be logically the responsibility of one component are often carried out by another--because of political sensitivity, because of an assumed need for even greater secrecy than usual, because of bureaucratic compartmentalization, or simply because things have always been done that way.
The bulk of the Clandestine Services' personnel, about 4,800 people, work in the so-called area divisions, both at headquarters and overseas. These divisions correspond roughly to the State Department's geographic bureaus--a logical breakdown, since most CIA operators in foreign countries work under State cover. The largest area division is the Far East (with about 1,500 people), followed in order of descending size by Europe (Western Europe only), Western Hemisphere (Latin America plus Canada), Near East, Soviet bloc (Eastern Europe), and Africa (with only 300 staff). The chain of command goes from the head of the Clandestine Services to the chiefs of the area divisions, then overseas to the chiefs of stations (COS) and their chiefs of bases (COB).
The CIA's stations and bases around the world serve as the principal headquarters of covert activity in the country in which each is located. The station is usually housed in the U.S. Embassy in the capital city, while bases are in other major cities or sometimes on American or foreign military bases. For example, in West Germany, the CIA's largest site for operations, the station is located in Bonn; the chief of stations is on the staff of the American ambassador. There are subordinate bases in (**DELETED**) and a few other cities, along with several bases under American military cover scattered throughout the German countryside.
DOMESTIC U.S. OPERATIONS "MYSTERIOUS"
The Domestic Operations Division of Clandestine Services is, in essence, an area division, but it conducts its mysterious clandestine activities in the United States, not overseas. It's chief--like the other area-division chiefs, the civilian equivalent of a two or three-star general--works out of an office in downtown Washington, within two blocks of the White House. Under the Washington station are bases located in other major American cities.
Also in the Clandestine Services are three staffs, Foreign Intelligence (espionage), Counterintelligence (counterespionage), and Covert Action, which oversee operational policy in their respective specialties and provide assistance to the area divisions and the field elements. For instance, in an operation to plant a slanted news story in a Chilean newspaper, propaganda experts on the Covert Action Staff might devise an article in cooperation with the Chilean desk of the Western Hemisphere Division. A CIA proprietary, like (**DELETED**) might be used to write and transmit the story to Chile so it would not be directly attributable to the agency, and then a clandestine operator working out of the American Embassy in Santiago might work through one of his penetration agents in the local press to ensure that the article is reprinted. While most CIA operations abroad are carried out through the area division, the operational staffs, particularly the Covert Action Staff, also conduct independent activities.
The Special Operations Division is something of a hybrid between the area divisions and the operational staffs. Its main function is to provide the assets for paramilitary operations, largely the contracted manpower (mercenaries or military men on loan), the materiel, and the expertise to get the job done. Its operations, however, are organizationally under the station chief in the country where they are located.
TECH SERVICES: JUST LIKE 007
The remaining three components of the Clandestine Services provide technical assistance to the operational components. These three are: the Missions and Programs Staff, which does much of the bureaucratic planning and budgeting for the Clandestine Services and which writes up the justification for covert operations submitted for approval to the 40 committee; the Operational Services Division, which among other things sets up cover arrangements for clandestine officers; and the Technical Services Division, which produces in its own laboratories the gimmicks of the spy trade--the disguises, miniature cameras, tape recorders, secret writing kits, and the like. [H: How many operations ever get finished do you suppose? Can there possibly be any goal important enough to end an individual job or adventure? Come now, chelas, would YOU work yourself out of an exciting and wondrously paid job without supervision? This is James Bond superliving! Can you imagine that any "PEACE" would be worthy of giving up a single operative officer or operation?]
* * *
RENAMING BRANCHES-SOUND FAMILIAR?
The Directorate of Management and Services (formerly the Directorate of Support) [H: Note the frequent and regular renaming of branches and operations. They are being changed even more rapidly today than even a decade ago so many of the branches of which we speak herein will have since been relabeled some four or five times depending on level of importance and power.] is the CIA's administrative and housekeeping part. However, most of its budget and personnel is devoted to assisting the Clandestine Services in carrying out covert operations. (This directorate is sometimes referred to within the agency as the Clandestine Services' "slave" directorate.) Various forms of support are also provided to the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology, but the needs of these two components for anything beyond routine administrative tasks are generally minimal. Covert operations, however, require a large support effort, and the M&S Directorate, in addition to providing normal administrative assistance, contributes in such areas as communications, logistics, and training.
BLACK MARKET MONEY DEALS
The M&S Directorate's Office of Finance, for example, maintains field units in Hong Kong, Beirut, Buenos Aires, and Geneva with easy access to the international money markets. The Office of Finance tries to keep a ready inventory of the world's currencies on hand for future clandestine operations. Many of the purchases are made in illegal black markets where certain currencies are available at bargain rates. In some instances, most notably in the case of the South Vietnamese piaster, black-market purchases of a single currency amount to millions of dollars a year.
SHADES OF KOL NIDRE
The Office of Security provides physical protection for clandestine installations at home and abroad and conducts polygraph (lie detector) tests for all CIA employees and contract personnel and most foreign agents. [H: I want it herein noted before we go further--that CIA personnel and especially agents in Covert Operations such as Oliver North, are required to be able to pass any type of lie detector testing device. In other words, the major training of CIA personnel is to LIE. They become most proficient at it as you can see from ones such as Gordon Liddy who is able to become totally "blank" in all situations and North who looks like an Angel on a mission of mercy, touched only by love and compassion. This is lying at its epitome of perfection and use. The more proficient "players" actually have convinced themselves that they represent that which they tout.] The Office of Medical Services heals the sicknesses and illnesses (both mental and physical) of CIA personnel by providing "cleared" psychiatrists and physicians to treat agency officers; analyzes prospective and already recruited agents; and prepares "psychological profiles" of foreign leaders (and once, in 1971, at the request of the Watergate "plumbers", did a profile of Daniel Ellsberg). The Office of Logistics operates the agency's weapons and other warehouses in the United States and overseas, supplies normal office equipment and household furniture, as well as the more esoteric clandestine materiel to foreign stations and bases, and performs other housekeeping chores. The Office of Communications, employing over 40 percent of the Directorate of Management and Service's more than 5,000 career employees, maintains facilities for secret communications between CIA headquarters and the hundreds of stations and bases overseas. It also provides the same services, on a reimbursable basis, for the State Department and most of its embassies and consulates. The Office of Training operates the agency's training facilities at many locations around the United States, and a few overseas. (The Office of Communications, however, runs
2 LINES DELETED
The Office of Personnel handles the recruitment and record-keeping for the CIA's career personnel.
Support functions are often vital for successful conduct of covert operations, and a good support officer, like a good supply sergeant in an army, is indispensable to a CIA station or base. Once a station chief has found the right support officer, one who can provide everything from housekeeping to operational support, the two will often form a professional alliance and stay together as they move from post to post during their careers. In some instances the senior support officer may even serve as the de facto second-in-command because of this close relationship with the chief.
KEY PERSONNEL NOT AS PRESENTED PUBLICLY
Together, the Clandestine Services and the Directorate for Management and Services constitute an agency within an agency. These two components, like the largest and most dangerous part of an iceberg, float along virtually unseen. Their missions, methods, and personnel are quite different from those of the CIA's other two directorates which account for only less than a third of the agency's budget and manpower. Yet the CIA--and particularly former Director Richard Helms--has tried to convince the American public that the analysts and technicians of the Directorates for Intelligence and Science and Technology, the clean white tip of the CIA iceberg, are the agency's key personnel.
* * *
Dharma, thank you for the extra hours of writing today. It is necessary for we have so little time to get this forth into the public hands. With this type of police force at the beck and call of the President--and the Congress in the total control of the Zionists--you ones of the citizenry are at great disadvantage.
I suggest as reading material to accompany this outlay of information, are Stockwell's IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES and Ostrovsky's BY WAY OF DECEPTION. You must understand that you are no longer (and haven't for a very long time) dealing with a nice bunch of American kids off playing James Bond. You are now within a functioning international intelligence terrorist organization which will function in service to the United Nations World Order Government which in turn is, and will be, run by the Committee of 300 World Elite.
I suggest we close now, Dharma, so that you are not late for your appointment. I bid you good evening and blessings rest upon you all, of our beloved brotherhood in Lighted Service. I realize it is as difficult for you of our workers to face this information as for any reader at random choosing. It is necessary for all of you to see and know.
Salu, Hatonn to clear.
